SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of Tenncare et al.
M2020-01358-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

Article II of Tennessee’s Constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly. We have held, however, that the General Assembly may “grant an administrative agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations which have the effect of law in the agency’s area of operation.” Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1997). The General Assembly frequently has done so. But it also established important guardrails for administrative agencies by enacting the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. One of those guardrails is the requirement that agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking: a process that gives the public and other affected parties an opportunity to weigh in. Here, we consider whether a reimbursement cap imposed by TennCare is a “rule” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process. We hold that it is and reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision.

Davidson Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight the flawed and impractical analysis in the concurring in judgment opinion, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice Kirby.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I would not adopt a new evidentiary privilege for expert witnesses because that privilege is not grounded in the Constitution, Tennessee’s statutes, the common law, or this Court’s Rules—the only permissible sources of a privilege under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 501. Although the trial court erred by excluding the expert opinions at issue in this case, that error was harmless and did not warrant reversal of the judgment below or a new trial. For that reason, I join in the Court’s judgment.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I am pleased to concur in Justice Campbell’s separate concurring opinion, concurring in the result of the majority opinion but not the reasoning. I write separately on particular problems with the majority’s reasoning, as well as far-reaching unintended consequences of this ill-defined new common-law privilege.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al.
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Hamilton Supreme Court

In Re Markus E.
M2019-01079-SC-R11-PT
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes “knowing” failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define “knowing.” We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered “knowing,” and a person is deemed to “knowingly” act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was “knowing.”

Davidson Supreme Court

In Re Markus E. - Concurring
M2019-01079-SC-R11-PT
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the termination of parental rights as to both Mother and Father, and I join nearly all of Justice Kirby’s opinion for the majority. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case presents circumstances that call strongly for application of the prior-construction canon. I would hesitate to apply the canon if only one or two intermediate appellate courts had interpreted the language at issue. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had issued at least eight opinions interpreting “knowing” in a uniform manner before the General Assembly’s reenactment of that language. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding “the uniformity of . . . judicial precedent construing the [statutory] definition significant”); Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the force of the prior-construction canon is “stronger when the lower courts uniformly adopt a particular interpretation of an oft-invoked statute”); cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (declining to apply canon where “widespread disagreement exist[ed] among the lower courts”).

Davidson Supreme Court

George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher Et Al.
E2020-01222-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth

The issue before us is whether the voluntary dismissal of a defendant in a multi-defendant case that is governed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) may be set aside and the claim against the dismissed defendant reinstated on the motion of a plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The plaintiff in this case initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants. Before any responsive pleading was filed by any defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming only the physician as a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal that dismissed all of the defendants except the physician, and the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal the following day. In his answer to the amended complaint, the physician argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed under the GTLA because the hospital, which was his employer and a governmental entity, was not a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend in which he sought to set aside the trial court’s order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The trial court later dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice and granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the physician. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the order of voluntary dismissal. Upon our review of this case, we do not reach the question of whether the voluntary dismissal order could be altered or amended pursuant to Rule 54.02. Because the plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint, the plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect. Accordingly, there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend. As a result, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues it deemed pretermitted as moot.

Hamilton Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser
M2019-01946-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Uniform Commercial Code provides a mechanism for secured creditors to give notice to the world of their security interest in debtors’ property as collateral for debt by filling out a form for a financing statement and posting it on the website for Tennessee’s Secretary of State. In this case, that system was weaponized. Collectively, the defendants filed over a hundred bogus financing statements on the Secretary of State’s website regarding over forty Tennessee residents, including judges, mayors, public officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and ex-spouses. The online financing statements falsely claimed liens for the defendants’ alleged security interest in the victims’ property as collateral for millions of dollars in fictitious debt. All were done for the apparent purpose of vexing and harassing the victims. All of the defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis, a Class E felony, and forgery of at least $250,000, a Class A felony. We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the forgery convictions. We hold that the defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the apparent value associated with the fraudulent financing statements was over $250,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser - Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
M2019-01946-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendants’ convictions for forgery. I agree with the majority that the Defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-114(b)(1)(B). I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support sentencing the Defendants for forgery as a Class A felony. Based on the text of the applicable statutes, I would hold that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the UCC-1s had a fair market value of at least $250,000. 1 I would reverse the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals as to the value associated with the Defendants’ forgery convictions.

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Kemontea Dovon McKinney
M2020-00950-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Goodman, III

A Robertson County jury convicted Kemontea Dovon McKinney (“Defendant”), a juvenile at the time of the offenses, of aggravated robbery, premeditated first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and theft of property valued at over $10,000. The trial court merged the murder convictions and merged the theft conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder conviction and eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction. This appeal concerns whether Defendant’s pretrial statement to detectives was voluntary, whether Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress and admitted Defendant’s pretrial statement into evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the intermediate court erred when it stated that an involuntary confession claim is “inextricably linked” to a Miranda-waiver claim, such that the two inquiries can be considered together. We also granted the State’s application to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in determining that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. After review, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred with respect to the issues raised by the State. We reiterate that the voluntariness test is distinct from the test for Miranda waiver, despite similarities between the analyses. After separately considering both questions, we conclude that Defendant’s overall statement was voluntary and his Miranda waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder. We reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgments.

Robertson Supreme Court

Kenneth J. Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39 Et Al.
M2020-01285-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Darrell Scarlett

Kenneth J. Mynatt (“Plaintiff”) served as the vice president of the local chapter of his union. He filed an action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against the union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union. He alleged that after he publicly criticized the union’s financial waste, its leadership accused him of misusing union funds. Those accusations led to his indictment on two felony charges. In the resulting criminal case, the State filed a motion to retire the charges for one year, and those charges were ultimately dismissed after the year passed. In Plaintiff’s complaint for malicious prosecution, he stated that he continued to maintain his innocence, that he refused any plea deals, and that the criminal case terminated in his favor because it was ultimately dismissed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. Thus, they argued his complaint was missing an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. The defendants sought review from this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard for determining what constitutes a favorable termination for the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim. We conclude that the prohibition in Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012), precluding a factintensive and subjective inquiry into the reasons and circumstances leading to dispositions in civil cases also applies to dispositions in criminal cases. We hold that plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. Under this standard, Mr. Mynatt did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss.

Rutherford Supreme Court

Paul Zachary Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board
W2017-01813-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

The issue presented is whether a civil service merit board acts arbitrarily or capriciously
by not allowing an employee to ask questions in a termination hearing about more lenient
discipline imposed on other civil service employees. A Shelby County Fire Department
employee was fired based on his participation in an altercation involving a firearm at a
political rally and his dishonesty during the subsequent investigation. He appealed his
termination to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. During the hearing, the Board
did not allow the employee’s counsel to ask questions about discipline imposed on other
Fire Department employees. The Board affirmed the employee’s termination for just cause.
The employee appealed, and the trial court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Board’s decision to exclude the questions about other discipline was
arbitrary and unreasonable, and remanded the case for consideration of such evidence.
Under the narrow standard of review provided in the Uniform Administrative Procedures
Act, we hold that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by declining to consider
evidence of discipline imposed on other employees. We reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Supreme Court

Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee et al.
E2020-01529-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

Governmental entities generally are immune from suit. But the Governmental Tort Liability Act removes immunity for certain injuries caused by the negligent acts of an employee. In this case, we consider whether the term “negligent” in the Act’s removal provision is limited to ordinary negligence or instead also encompasses gross negligence or recklessness. We hold that the Act removes immunity only for ordinary negligence. Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.

Hawkins Supreme Court

Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee et al. (Concur)
E2020-01529-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

I concur in the majority’s analysis and holding that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 29-20-205 removes immunity for Hawkins County only for ordinary negligence,
not gross negligence or recklessness. I write separately to highlight an issue not addressed
in the majority opinion—whether we should continue to apply the common law public duty
doctrine and the related special duty exception in cases where the legislature has addressed
the issue of immunity by statute.

Hawkins Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Quinton Devon Perry
W2019-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

In this appeal, we address principles governing the imposition of consecutive sentencing for “an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2) (2019). Quinton Devon Perry pleaded guilty to twenty-four counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor that took place during the years 2016 and 2017, stemming from the discovery that he had uploaded 174 images or videos comprising child pornography or child erotica to his electronic file sharing account. Although Mr. Perry had no prior criminal convictions, the trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing after finding that he qualified as an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. A divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Perry, No. W2019-01553-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2563039, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2021), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Nov. 18, 2021). The dissenting judge, citing a lack of proof that Mr. Perry engaged in a continuous course of downloading and uploading materials over the alleged time period, concluded that the record did not establish him as an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. Id. at *6–7 (McMullen, J., dissenting).1 Mr. Perry sought permission to appeal, arguing that the lower courts improperly found him to be an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive based solely on the number of offenses to which he pleaded guilty. We accepted Mr. Perry’s appeal. In this opinion, we clarify certain principles for imposing consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(2) and set forth a non-exclusive list of considerations to aid determining whether a defendant qualifies as an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Based on our review, we have determined that the trial court adequately articulated the reasons for ordering consecutive sentencing on the record. Affording the trial court’s decision a presumption of reasonableness, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Madison Supreme Court

In Re: Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr., BPR #011451
M2022-00339-SC-BAR-BP
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Board of Professional Responsibility Hearing Panel

This is an attorney discipline proceeding concerning Tennessee attorney Joseph H.
Crabtree, Jr. and his representation of several clients with varying legal issues. The Board
of Professional Responsibility ("the Boare) filed formal petitions for discipline against
Mr. Crabtree in February 2019. A Hearing Panel of the Board ("Hearing Panel")
adjudicated the petitions and rendered a judgment suspending Mr. Crabtree for two years
and ordering him to serve six months as active suspension and the remainder on probation.
It also directed Mr. Crabtree to pay restitution to two clients, to reimburse one client for
any costs assessed against her upon the dismissal of her case, and to reimburse the
Tennessee Lawyers Fund for Client Protection ("TLFCP") for any money it pays to the
complainants in this matter. Mr. Crabtree failed to perfect an appeal from the Hearing
Panel's decision, and the Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Hearing
Panel's judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, sections 15.4(d) and (e),
we determined that the punishment imposed by the Hearing Panel appeared inadequate.
Thus, we proposed to increase it. Based on our careful consideration of the entire record,
"with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and
appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case," we modify
the judgment of the Hearing Panel to impose a three-year suspension, with one year served
as active suspension and the remainder on probation. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), (d).
During the first year of the probationary period, Mr. Crabtree shall engage a practice
monitor at his own expense to supervise his compliance with trust account rules and office
management procedures in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section
12.9. Finally, as a condition of reinstatement, Mr. Crabtree shall complete twelve hours of
continuing legal education ("CLE"), with six hours focused on ethics and six hours on law
office management, in addition to the annual fifteen-hour CLE requirement. In all other
respects, including payment of restitution to his clients and reimbursement to TLFCP, the
decision of the Hearing Panel is affirmed.

McMinn Supreme Court

City of Knoxville, Tennessee v. Netflix, Inc. et al.
M2021-01107-SC-R23-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clifton L. Corker

This is a case about fitting new technology into a not-so-new statutory scheme. Exercising our power to answer questions certified to us by federal courts, we consider whether two video streaming services—Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC—provide “video service” within the meaning of a Tennessee law that requires such providers to obtain a franchise and pay franchise fees to localities. Netflix and Hulu say they do not provide “video service” and therefore do not owe franchise fees; the City of Knoxville says they do. We agree with Netflix and Hulu.

Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker
E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

Tyshon Booker challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee’s mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. In fulfilling our duty to
decide constitutional issues, we hold that an automatic life sentence when imposed on a
juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile’s age or other
circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Booker stands convicted of
felony murder and especially aggravated robbery—crimes he committed when he was
sixteen years old. For the homicide conviction, the trial court automatically sentenced Mr.
Booker under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2) to life in prison, a
sixty-year sentence requiring at least fifty-one years of incarceration. But this sentence
does not square with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. When sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, a court must have discretion
to impose a lesser sentence after considering the juvenile’s age and other circumstances.
Here, the court had no sentencing discretion. In remedying this constitutional violation, we
exercise judicial restraint. We need not create a new sentencing scheme or resentence Mr.
Booker—his life sentence stands. Rather, we follow the policy embodied in the federal
Constitution as explained in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and grant Mr.
Booker an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be
properly considered. The timing of his parole hearing is based on release eligibility in the
unrepealed version of section 40-35-501(h)(1), previously in effect, that provides for a term
of sixty years with release eligibility of sixty percent, but not less than twenty-five years
of service. Thus, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to sixty years in prison, and after he has
served between twenty-five and thirty-six years, he will receive an individualized parole
hearing where his age and other circumstances will be considered. Our limited ruling,
applying only to juvenile homicide offenders, promotes the State’s interest in finality and
efficient use of resources, protects Mr. Booker’s Eighth Amendment rights, and is based
on sentencing policy enacted by the General Assembly.

Knox Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker (Concur)
E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

Not so long ago, it was commonplace for states to require juveniles convicted of
homicide to serve sentences of over fifty years. Now, that practice has vanished. A review
of sentencing statutes enacted by state legislatures and court decisions shows that there is
now only one state where juvenile offenders face a mandatory non-aggregated sentence of
more than 50 years for first-degree murder with no aggravating factors—Tennessee. In the
entirety of the nation, Tennessee stands alone.

Knox Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker (Dissent)
E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins (C.J. Page, joins)
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by a majority of the Court today. Quite
frankly, I find the policy adopted as a result of the plurality opinion of Justice Lee and the
concurring opinion of Justice Kirby to be sound. However, it is just that. It is a policy
decision by which the majority today has pushed aside appropriate confines of judicial
restraint and applied an evolving standards of decency/independent judgment analysis that
impermissibly moves the Court into an area reserved to the legislative branch under the
United States and Tennessee Constitutions.

Knox Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Lynn Frank Bristol
M2019-00531-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Vanessa Jackson
In this appeal, we clarify the scope of an appellate court’s limited discretionary authority to consider unpreserved and unpresented issues. Appellee Lynn Frank Bristol was convicted on two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Bristol appealed his convictions to the Court of Criminal Appeals. That court determined Bristol was not entitled to relief on the issues presented, but it reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial based on a supposed problem with the written jury instructions that Bristol had not raised, that no party had an opportunity to address, and that turned out to be nothing more than a clerical error by the trial court clerk’s office. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals abused its discretion by granting relief on an unpreserved and unpresented issue without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision on the jury-instruction issue and reinstate Bristol’s convictions.

Coffee Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Tyler Ward Enix
E2020-00231-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

In this appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object but later raises the claim in a motion for a new trial.  Tyler Ward Enix was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery for the 2015 killing of Kimberly Enix.  Mr. Enix filed a motion for a new trial challenging his convictions.  As relevant to this appeal, he alleged that four instances of improper prosecutorial closing argument, which were not contemporaneously objected to at trial, constitute reversible error.  The trial court denied his motion for new trial.  The Court of Criminal Appeals, reviewing the claims under the plain error doctrine, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Mr. Enix sought permission to appeal, arguing that this Court should employ plenary review to address his claims because they were included in his motion for a new trial.  We granted permission to appeal and now hold that plain error review is the appropriate standard, and, furthermore, that Mr. Enix is not entitled to relief.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals for the separate reasons stated herein.

Knox Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Marvin Maurice Deberry
W2019-01666-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

Timing is everything. In this case, at least, that adage holds true. Marvin Maurice Deberry committed a criminal offense and was convicted. But the legislature repealed the statute creating that criminal offense before he was sentenced. Years ago, the legislature enacted a default rule to govern this situation and similar ones. That rule, known as the criminal savings statute, provides generally that an offense must be prosecuted under the law in effect at the time the offense is committed, even if the law is later repealed or amended. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-112 (2018). If the later-enacted law “provides for a lesser penalty,” however, the savings statute dictates that “any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act.” Id. At first, the trial court sentenced Deberry under the law in effect at the time of his offense. But Deberry eventually convinced the trial court that the “lesser penalty” exception applied, and the trial court entered an amended judgment retaining Deberry’s conviction but imposing no punishment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We now reverse and reinstate Deberry’s original sentence. We hold that a statute that repeals a criminal offense does not “provide for a lesser penalty” within the meaning of the criminal savings statute. Rather, a person who commits an offense that is later repealed should be convicted and sentenced under the law in effect when the offense was committed unless the legislature provides otherwise.

Madison Supreme Court

Elijah "Lij" Shaw et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
M2019-01926-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

This appeal addresses mootness when a law challenged in the trial court is altered or amended after the trial court issued its final judgment and while the appeal is pending.  The plaintiff homeowners operated businesses out of their homes.  They filed a lawsuit against the defendant municipality challenging an ordinance that prohibited them from having clients visit their home-based businesses.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant municipality, and the homeowners appealed.  While the appeal was pending, the municipality repealed the ordinance that was the subject of the complaint and enacted a new ordinance that allowed limited client visits to home-based businesses.  The Court of Appeals held that the repeal of the original ordinance rendered the homeowners’ case moot, and the homeowners were granted permission to appeal to this Court.  While the appeal to this Court was pending, the ordinance was amended again. On appeal, based on the current record, we cannot determine whether the homeowners suffer ongoing harm from the new ordinance, how the change will affect their claims, and whether they retain some residual claim under the new ordinance.  Consequently, we vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in which the parties may amend their pleadings to address any claims the homeowners may assert under the new ordinance.  

Davidson Supreme Court