Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee
The prisoner in this case filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis long after expiration of the one-year limitations period and sought tolling of the statute of limitations. The petition was filed under the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations adopted by this Court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). The coram nobis court held a hearing on whether to toll the statute of limitations. It accepted the factual allegations in the coram nobis petition as true, but determined that the new evidence did not show that the petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted, so he was not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the coram nobis court on the tolling exception, reversed the dismissal for untimeliness, and remanded for a hearing on the allegations in the petition. On appeal, we hold that if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is not timely filed and seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, it must be based on new evidence, discovered after expiration of the limitations period, that clearly and convincingly shows that the petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime, i.e., that the petitioner did not commit the crime. To obtain tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations, the prisoner must file the petition no more than one year after he discovers the new evidence of actual innocence. From our review of the record, we agree with the analysis and conclusion of the coram nobis court and find no error. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the decision of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Clardy’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis without conducting a hearing on the merits because the petition was untimely and was not entitled to tolling. I also agree with the majority that the trial court handled and decided this case exactly as it should have. Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert Allen Doll, III v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this case, an attorney appeals the recommended sanction of disbarment after three criminal convictions. The attorney was convicted by a jury of two counts of subornation of aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, all Class E felony offenses and serious crimes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22. All three criminal convictions arose out of the attorney’s conduct in representing a client. In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended disbarment. The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the chancery court, which affirmed. The attorney appealed to this Court. On appeal, the attorney argues the hearing panel should have reviewed similar cases of attorney misconduct where a suspension was imposed, and that he should be suspended based on the sanction imposed in those cases. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panels and trial courts considering attorney discipline promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by anchoring their decisions on punishment to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Rule 9 does not give either hearing panels or trial courts authority in attorney disciplinary cases to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. The Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective from seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—whether appealed or not—puts it in the best position to consider comparative cases for the sake of uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee. In this case, considering the nature of the attorney’s misconduct, no comparable case convinces us that suspension, rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Loring E. Justice v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This is a direct appeal of a disciplinary proceeding involving a Knoxville attorney who filed four motions containing pejorative statements about the trial judge in a child custody case involving the attorney’s minor child. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the attorney violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct and imposed a three-year suspension as punishment. The attorney appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s judgment in all respects with the exception of the attorney’s punishment. The trial court held that the hearing panel erred in imposing a suspension, and it increased the punishment to disbarment. The attorney appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues with the exception of the issue regarding the attorney’s punishment. We hold that the trial court erred in increasing the punishment to disbarment, and we reinstate the three-year suspension imposed by the hearing panel but modify it to take effect upon the filing of this Opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Loring E. Justice v. Board of Professional Responsibility (concurring)
I agree with virtually all of the majority’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, with one exception: its determination that ABA Standards 6.21 and 7.1, which identify disbarment as the presumptive sanction, do not apply to this case. As explained below, I would hold that ABA Standards 6.21 and 7.1 apply, and consequently disbarment is the presumptive sanction, because Mr. Justice engaged in the misconduct with intent to obtain personal benefit. I nonetheless concur in the majority’s decision to impose a three-year suspension, based on the comparative cases cited in the majority opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is the second interlocutory recusal appeal in this conservatorship action, filed by two attorneys in the case. In the first recusal appeal, the Court of Appeals entered an order staying all trial court proceedings. The Court of Appeals then issued an opinion affirming denial of the recusal motion, stating that the stay was lifted, and remanding the case to the trial court. Before the appellate mandate issued, the attorneys filed a second motion for the trial court judge to recuse; this was denied as well. The attorneys then filed this second petition for recusal appeal. They later filed a motion in the Court of Appeals arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals agreed and held the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators have filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court, and we ordered the attorneys to file a response. Having reviewed the application for permission to appeal, the answer, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the application, and dispense with additional briefing and oral argument. We hold that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We further hold that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Melissa Binns v. Trader Joe's East, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal involves an alleged slip and fall incident that occurred at the defendant’s grocery store. The plaintiff’s amended complaint included allegations of vicarious liability, premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision against the defendant. In an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claims, the defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and asserted two alternative arguments, both of which the trial court rejected. First, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts must dismiss “negligent activity” claims, such as claims for negligent training and supervision, when asserted concurrently with a premises liability theory of recovery. Second, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims were no longer legally viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, commonly referred to as the “preemption rule.” After denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and we granted review. We hold that the preemption rule is incompatible with Tennessee’s system of comparative fault and decline to adopt it. In addition, we decline to adopt the rule proposed by the defendant pertaining to “negligent activity” claims asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner
A jury convicted two defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, of three counts of |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner (Concur in Part and Dissent in Part)
I agree that Tony Thomas’s murder convictions should be affirmed. The Brady v. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Thomas and LaRonda Turner (Concur in Part, Dissent in Part)
I join in full the majority opinion’s analysis of the Brady issue and its judgment |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al. (Dissenting)
To enforce and compel arbitration in this case, the majority rewrites a health care facility admission contract, disregards the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, ignores precedent, and creates confusion in an important area of the law. I respectfully dissent. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al. (Dissenting)
I agree with many of the points made in Justice Lee’s dissenting opinion. I write separately out of concern about the practical implications of the majority’s decision to leave the law so unsettled in an area that touches so many. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Brian Philip Manookian v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
In this lawyer disciplinary case, the lawyer’s conduct compels disbarment. The lawyer sent a series of intimidating, demeaning, embarrassing, and harassing communications to opposing counsel and others. Some targeted family members of opposing counsel, including one family member who was also a former client, and caused well-founded concern for their well-being and safety. In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that the purpose of the communications was to intimidate opposing counsel in order to gain unfair advantage in pending litigation. It concluded inter alia that the lawyer’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, that he failed to respect the rights of third persons, and that he violated his duty to a former client, in violation of Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing panel said the presumptive sanction was disbarment, found four aggravating factors, and found no mitigating circumstances. Without explanation, the hearing panel recommended a two-year suspension instead of disbarment. The attorney appealed to the trial court. The trial court indicated that, had the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a separate petition for review, the trial court would have recommended disbarment, but because the Board did not, the trial court affirmed the sanction of suspension. Both parties appeal. Here, the lawyer’s conduct was egregious. Victimizing the families of opposing counsel and causing concern for their well-being and safety is an especially grave offense and a profound dishonor as a lawyer. The hearing panel’s decision to deviate downward from the presumptive sanction of disbarment was arbitrary and capricious, and the lawyer must be disbarred. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
James Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC et al.
Granville Williams, Jr., died while residing at an assisted-living facility. The central question in this appeal is whether his son’s ensuing wrongful-death action against the facility must be arbitrated. To answer that question, we must resolve two subsidiary issues—first, whether the attorney-in-fact who signed the arbitration agreement as Williams’s representative had authority to do so and, second, whether Williams’s son and other wrongful-death beneficiaries who were not parties to the arbitration agreement nevertheless are bound by it. We hold that signing an optional arbitration agreement—that is, one that is not a condition of admission to a health care facility—is not a “health care decision” within the meaning of the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. The durable power of attorney that gave Williams’s attorney-in-fact authority to act for him in “all claims and litigation matters” thus provided authority to enter the optional arbitration agreement even though it did not specifically grant authority to make health care decisions. We further hold that Williams’s son is bound by the arbitration agreement because his wrongful-death claims are derivative of his father’s claims. Because we conclude that the claims in this action are subject to arbitration, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand to the trial court. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Brian Philip Manookian v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (Dissenting)
While this Court has inherent jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters, attorneys must be afforded fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. For the first time, this Court has increased an attorney’s discipline through the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction outside of the process outlined in Rule 9 by disbarring Brian Philip Manookian without giving fair notice of its intent. I dissent from the Court’s decision to disbar Mr. Manookian and would affirm the hearing panel’s finding of a twenty-four-month suspension. Neither the hearing panel nor the trial court erred. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Eady
This appeal presents two issues. First, we consider whether the District Attorney General’s |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Fleming Mabry v. The Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court
This is an appeal in a lawyer-disciplinary proceeding involving Tennessee attorney Thomas |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
John Earheart v. Central Transport et al.
John Earheart, Jr. ("Employee") filed a workers' compensation claim against Central Transport ("Employer") for temporary disability benefits. After initially denying the claim, Employer ultimately agreed to pay the requested benefits on the day before the scheduled expedited hearing. Following a compensation hearing, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims ("trial court") ordered Employer to pay Employee's attorney's fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(d)(l)(B). The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Appeals Board") affirmed. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Appeals Board and adopt its opinion as set forth in the attached Appendix. |
Supreme Court | ||
Pratik Pandharipande, M.D. v. FSD Corporation
This case arises from a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association. The property owner, Pratik Pandharipande, purchased a home in a vacation community on a Tennessee lake, intending to use it as a short-term rental. At the time of the purchase, the property was subject to covenants requiring that the home be used for “residential and no other purposes.” The covenants were amended several years later to allow leases with minimum lease terms of thirty days. Pandharipande contends that neither the original covenants nor the amendments prohibit him from leasing his property for short terms of two to twenty-eight days. His homeowners’ association disagrees on both scores. We agree with Pandharipande that the original covenants requiring residential use of the property do not bar his short-term rentals, but we agree with the homeowners’ association that the amendments do. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association based on both the original covenants and the amendments. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
DeKalb | Supreme Court | |
Robert Crotty, et al. v. Mark Flora, M.D. (Concur in Part and Dissent in Part)
This interlocutory appeal involves two pretrial orders. I concur with the holding |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Robert Crotty, et al. v. Mark Flora, M.D.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant physician in a health care liability action asks us |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ebony Robinson
In 2020, Ebony Robinson (“Defendant”) pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Roger Baskin v. Pierce & Allred Construction, Inc.
In this appeal, we address whether a Tennessee resident may sue an Alabama corporation in a Tennessee court for alleged breach of contract and breach of warranty pertaining to its construction of a custom lake house in Alabama. Tennessee resident Roger Baskin hired Pierce & Allred Construction, an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama, to build a house on a parcel of land in Alabama. Mr. Baskin supplied the architectural plans and some of the materials, all sourced from Tennessee, and the parties communicated throughout the project from their respective states. However, all of Pierce & Allred Construction’s activities on the project occurred in Alabama. Mr. Baskin ultimately became dissatisfied with the quality and expense of the construction work, and he filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court. Pierce & Allred Construction moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the corporation lacked the “minimum contacts” with Tennessee that due process protections require. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The trial court granted the motion, finding that the events relevant to the claims occurred in Alabama and that the corporation’s contacts with Tennessee were minor and attenuated. The Court of Appeals reversed, looking to recent decisions from this Court, see Crouch Ry. Consulting, LLC v. LS Energy Fabrication, LLC, 610 S.W.3d 460 (Tenn. 2020), and the United States Supreme Court, see Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (explaining that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff’s claim arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum contacts). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review, we have determined that Pierce & Allred Construction’s contacts with Tennessee were not such that the corporation reasonably should have anticipated being haled into a Tennessee court to answer this suit. In making this determination, we conclude that certain contacts with Tennessee did not reflect that the corporation purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business activities in Tennessee, while certain other contacts were not sufficiently related to Mr. Baskin’s claims to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Thus, we hold that Mr. Baskin failed to establish a prima facie case of the minimum contacts necessary for a Tennessee court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Alabama corporation. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing Mr. Baskin’s complaint. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Commercial Painting Company, Inc. v. The Weitz Company, LLC, et al. (Dissent)
economic-loss doctrine bars recovery in tort for purely economic losses in certain |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Commercial Painting Company, Inc. v. The Weitz Company, LLC, et al.
The economic loss doctrine generally precludes a contracting party who suffers only |
Shelby | Supreme Court |