SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Ashe vs. Radiation Oncology Assoc., et al
M1997-00036-SC-R11-CV

Supreme Court

Lamar Fletcher v. State of Tennessee
W1998-00120-SC-R11-RL
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker

In this appeal we address two primary issues: (1) whether an indigent party is liable for payment of outstanding litigation taxes levied under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-4-602 (1998), and (2) whether the Tennessee Department of Correction had authority to withdraw money from an inmate’s trust account to pay a distress warrant. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that indigent parties become liable for litigation taxes when taxed by the court and that the Tennessee Department of Correction has the authority to deduct money from an inmate trust fund to satisfy a distress warrant. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Jackson Supreme Court

Edmonds vs. Wilson Co., et al
M1998-00451-SC-WCM-CV

Wilson Supreme Court

Wells vs. TN Board of Regents, et al
M1998-00459-SC-R3-CV

Supreme Court

State vs. Legg
M1998-00479-SC-R11-CD

Supreme Court

State vs. Cook
M1995-00011-SC-R11-CD
Trial Court Judge: Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.

Coffee Supreme Court

King vs. Jowers
W1999-00984-SC-S10-CV

Supreme Court

W1995-00004-SC-R11-PC
W1995-00004-SC-R11-PC
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley

Hardin Supreme Court

E1997-00044-SC-R11-CV
E1997-00044-SC-R11-CV

Supreme Court

E1997-00044-SC-R11-CV
E1997-00044-SC-R11-CV

Supreme Court

M1997-00040-SC-WCM-CV
M1997-00040-SC-WCM-CV

Supreme Court

King vs. Jowers
W1999-00984-SC-S10-CV

Supreme Court

Heck Van Tran vs. State of TN
W1998-00175-SC-R11-PD

Supreme Court

02-S-9909-CR-0087
02-S-9909-CR-0087

Supreme Court

W1997-00034-SC-R11-CV
W1997-00034-SC-R11-CV

Lake Supreme Court

E1998-00248-SC-WCM-CV
E1998-00248-SC-WCM-CV

Supreme Court

03S01-9812-CV-00137
03S01-9812-CV-00137

Sevier Supreme Court

W1997-00023-SC-DDT-DD
W1997-00023-SC-DDT-DD
Trial Court Judge: Whit A. Lafon

Madison Supreme Court

Momon vs. State
E1996-00007-SC-R11-PC

Supreme Court

Momon vs. State
E1996-00007-SC-R11-PC

Supreme Court

E1998-00176-SC-R11-CV
E1998-00176-SC-R11-CV

Supreme Court

In State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2D 299 (Tenn. 1991) Bars The Defendant'S Separate
M1997-00019-SC-R11-CD

Supreme Court

M1997-00020-SC-R11-CD
M1997-00020-SC-R11-CD
Trial Court Judge: Ann Lacy Johns

Davidson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee Henry Circuit v. Brenda Anne Burns
W1996-00004-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

Defendant/appellee Brenda Burns was tried and convicted of criminal responsibility for the commission of first-degree murder in the death of her ex-husband, Paul Burns.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview two potential defense witnesses and present the testimony of those witnesses before the jury. The State filed an Application for Permission to Appeal contesting the intermediate court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction on that basis. The defendant filed a Cross-Application for Permission to Appeal raising, among other issues, whether the trial court had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-403 (1991), and solicitation to commit a criminal offense (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102 (1991). We granted both Applications in order to address these important issues.

Jackson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Terry Allen Dominy
M1995-00001-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The dispositive issues in this appeal are as follows: (1) whether the indictment in this case charging the defendant with aggravated rape is sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape, a “lesser grade” offense under this Court’s 1The defendant rais ed tw o oth er iss ues in this a ppeal: (1) whe ther th e trial c ourt e rred in refus ing to gran t the d efendant’s mo tion fo r recusal; and (2) w heth er the trial co urt er red in admitting into evidence a tape-recorded interview between the victim and the field supervisor of the Department of Human Services. Because we have reversed and remanded on other grounds, we need not address these issues in detail. However, we note that the proof in this record indicates that the trial judge was residing in a home owned by the assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case and was paying only the utilities and cable bills and not monthly rental. Under such circum stance s, recus al is appro priate. See Sup. C t. R. 10, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2(A) 4(D)(5 ), and 3(E ). We also agree w ith the defen dant that th e trial court er red in allow ing the Sta te to offer into evidence the entire tape-recorded interview of the victim by the Department of Human Services field supervisor. While the State has the right to “convey the true picture of the prior statement alleged to be inconsistent,” State v. Boyd, 797 S.W .2d 5 89, 5 93-9 4 (Te nn. 1990), this rule does not form a basis for reference to portions of the statement which were not made an issue on cross-exam ination and which are not necessa ry to convey an acc urate picture of the matters discussed on cross-examination. The trial judge could have either allowed the State to question the witness concerning her prior statement to place her testimony on cross examination into context or permitted the State to use the transcript of the DHS tape to refresh the victim’s recollection. Neither the tape nor the transcript, how ever, should have been introduced as substantive evidence in this case. decision in State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1996); and (2) if so, should this Court reconsider it decision in Trusty. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, under Trusty, the indictment in this case would be sufficient to support a conviction for the “lesser grade” offense of spousal rape. However, upon careful reconsideration, we overrule Trusty to the extent that it recognizes “lesser grade” offenses as distinct from lesser-included offenses and permits convictions of “lesser grade” offenses that are not lesser-included offenses embraced by the indictment. In light of our overruling of Trusty, the indictment in this case is not sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s convictions, dismiss the indictments, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Lawrence Supreme Court