SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Nelson
E1997-00021-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the
defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Kenneth L. Storey v. Randall E. Nichols, et al.
E1998-00851-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor David H. Cate

The dispositive issue in this case is whether an appeal as of right from a trial court’s judgment in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding initiated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-201–2041 lies in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Because we hold that jurisdiction over an appeal as of right in a statutory disciplinary proceeding lies in the Court of Appeals, we reverse the intermediate appellate court’s order transferring the case to the Supreme Court, and we transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for its review on the merits. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Transfer Order of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Transferred to Court of Appeals
 

Donald E. Griffin v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
M1997-00042-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The appellant, Donald E. Griffin, brought suit seeking damages for injuries he sustained when his vehicle was struck from the rear in Maury County by a car driven by Richard Vaughn. After obtaining a judgment against Vaughn in the amount of $225,000, Griffin learned that Vaughn had only $50,000 of liability insurance coverage. Griffin then requested that his uninsured motorist carrier, the appellee Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), pay the remainder of the judgment up to its policy limit of $100,000. When Shelter refused the claim, Griffin brought this action against Shelter in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancellor granted summary judgment to Shelter, finding that Griffin had failed to comply with the notice provisions of the insurance policy and with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a). The Court of Appeals agreed that Griffin had failed to comply with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) and thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Shelter. This Court thereafter granted Griffin’s application for permission to appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed DROWOTA, J.,

Brown vs. Bd. of Professional Responsibility
E1999-02636-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

Lavin vs. Jordon
M1997-00259-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

Lavin vs. Jordon
M1997-00259-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

Crabtree vs. Crabtree
M1997-00262-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

State et al vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. et al vs. Gregory Bennett Perry and Steve Lloyd Champion, et al
M1999-00455-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

State vs. Carter
W1997-00248-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

State vs. Keen
W1997-00147-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

State vs. Keen
W1997-00147-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

Maestas vs. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.
W1998-01907-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' products, surgically implanted in their backs, were defective. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that: 1) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the "discovery rule"; and 2) under the doctrine of "cross-jurisdictional tolling," the statute of limitations was tolled during the period in which the plaintiffs sought class certification in a class action filed in federal court. We decline to adopt the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling. As the plaintiffs have conceded a "universal date of discovery" that is outside the applicable statute of limitations, our rejection of cross-jurisdictional tolling renders the plaintiffs' claims time-barred. Accordingly, we need not address the "discovery rule" issue raised by plaintiffs. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, is hereby affirmed.

State vs. Culbreath, et al
W1999-01553-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Beauregard
W1997-00060-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
In this appeal, we consider whether the constitutional principle of either double jeopardy or due process is violated and therefore bars separate convictions for both rape and incest when the offenses arise from a single act committed against the same victim. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions for rape and incest. After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the separate convictions for rape and incest did not violate double jeopardy principles under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions because the offenses require different elements, different evidence, and have different purposes. We also conclude that the convictions for rape and incest did not violate due process under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions because neither offense was "essentially incidental" to the other. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Lipscomb vs. Doe
W1997-00132-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

Lipscomb vs. Doe
W1997-00132-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

State vs. Chalmers
W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Chalmers
W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett

State vs. Fitz
W1997-00186-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

State vs. Keough
W1997-00201-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Blackstock
E1994-00004-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

Federated Insurance Company v. Francis I. Lethcoe, et al.
E1997-00048-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Earl H. Henley

This is an appeal from the Chancery Court for McMinn County which, pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 60.02(5), modified a judgment that was previously entered in accord with a
settlement agreement between the parties. The appellants appealed and contended that the trial court improperly modified the judgment and reduced the benefits they were to receive according to the agreement. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the appellants filed a motion for full review by this Court to determine whether a party can seek modification of a workers’ compensation judgment for a fixed sum to be paid periodically almost two years after entry of judgment. We hold that where a party agrees to settle a workers’ compensation claim, and the trial court approves the settlement, the settling party is generally not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals panel and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Eric Flemming
M1997-0073-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

We granted the appeal in this case to decide (1) whether fists and feet are deadly weapons
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B); and (2) whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on criminal responsibility for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery was reversible error. We conclude that fists and feet are not deadly weapons under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B). In addition, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed
 

Momon vs. State
E1996-00007-SC-R11-PC