SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Mitchell Brian Ramsey v. James G. Beavers
03S01-9509-CV-00104
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge Samuel H. Payne

In this case we are faced with the issue of the continued viability of the zone of danger test as a limitation on liability when plaintiff is neither physically injured nor in an area where physical injury is possible. We conclude that in cases such as this, in which plaintiff sensorily observes the injury and resulting death of his mother, recovery should be allowed under circumstances in which the incident which produces the emotional injuries and the emotional injuries are reasonably foreseeable.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Walter P. Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Svcs. & Dina Tobin, Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund, State of Tennessee and Charles Burson, Atty General, State of Tennessee
03S01-9601-CV-00005
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge John A. Turnbull

In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers’ compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse.

Knox Supreme Court

State of Tennessee, Ex. Rel., v. Brook Thompson, Riley Darnell, Charles Burson, Don Sundquist, and Penny White
01S01-9605-CH-00106
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

These consolidated cases arise from the efforts of appellants, Lewis Laska and John Jay Hooker, to have their names placed on the ballot for the August 1, 1996, statewide election to the office of Supreme Court  Justice. The deadline for filing nominating petitions for this election was 12:00 noon on May 16, 1996, in accordance with T.C.A. § 2-5-101.

Davidson Supreme Court

01S01-9506-CH-00098
01S01-9506-CH-00098
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

Sumner Supreme Court

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Supreme Court

01S01-9510-CV-00185
01S01-9510-CV-00185

Supreme Court

01S01-9507-CR-00110
01S01-9507-CR-00110

Supreme Court

01S01-9507-CR-00110
01S01-9507-CR-00110

Supreme Court

01S01-9509-CV-00150
01S01-9509-CV-00150

Supreme Court

01S01-9511-CC-00219
01S01-9511-CC-00219

Supreme Court

03S01-9601-CH-00002
03S01-9601-CH-00002
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples

Supreme Court

02S01-9512-CH-00131
02S01-9512-CH-00131
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Supreme Court

02S01-9509-CV-00083
02S01-9509-CV-00083

Supreme Court

02S01-9511-CC-00121
02S01-9511-CC-00121

Supreme Court

03S01-9509--CV-00112
03S01-9509--CV-00112

Supreme Court

03S01-9511-CH-00122
03S01-9511-CH-00122
Trial Court Judge: John K. Byers

Supreme Court

Charles M. Cary, Jr., v. Cathy Ann Cary
02S01-9505-CV-00035
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
 

Jackson Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, A/K/A Otis Smith
02S01-9502-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original Opinions in this cause.  It is so ORDERED.

Supreme Court

Eli Mike and James A. Schrampfer and Jane N. Forbes, as Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of David L. Osborn v. PO Group, Inc. a Tennessee Corp., James W. (Bill) Anderson III, and the Estate of Harold L. Jenkins - Concurring
01S01-9508-CH-00137
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming an award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' suit charging the breach by a  majority shareh older of a fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders is barred by the o ne year statute of limitations. This Cou rt concludes that the applicable period of limitations is three years and remands the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs' action was time-barred.

Davidson Supreme Court

Blanche Bilbrey and Cecil Asberry v. Vestel Smithers - Concurring
01S01-9509-CH-00168
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Vernon Neal

This case presents for review the right of a child born out of wedlock to  inherit from his natural father who died prior to the amendment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1995) in 1978. The record supports the finding of paternity, but the claimant failed to establish the right to inherit as required by the statute; however, the appellant is estopped to deny the claimant's asserted interest in the decedent father's real property.

Pickett Supreme Court

Geneva Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Products Corporation
01S01-9601-CV-00003
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Maddux, Jr.

In this retaliatory discharge action, the plaintiff, Geneva Coffey, appeals fromtwo aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment: (1) its suggested remittance of the punitive damage award from $500,000 to $150,000; and (2) its disallowance of the $20,000 in “front pay” awarded by the trial court. After a careful consideration of the law and the record in this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects. Therefore, we reverse that court’s judgment, and reinstate, in its entirety, the judgment rendered by the trial court.
 

Overton Supreme Court

Frank L. White v. Hubert A. McBride, Executor - Cocurring
02S01-9510-PB-00104
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard Pierotti

This case presents the question of whether the plaintiff, attorney Frank White,may recover attorney’s fees from the estate of Kasper McGrory. This broad question may, in turn, be divided into two specific subissues: (1) whether the contingency fee contract between White and McGrory is “clearly excessive” under Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professiona Responsibility, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, and is, thus, unenforceable; and (2) if the contingency fee contract is unenforceable, whether White may, nevertheless, recover attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the contract is unenforceable and that White is not entitled to recover under the theory of quantum meruit. Because the probate court and the Court of Appeals held that White could not recover under the contract, but could recover on a quantum meruit basis, we reverse the latter part of the judgment.

Shelby Supreme Court

02A01-9503-CV-00036
02A01-9503-CV-00036
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn

Carroll Supreme Court

01A01-9502-CH-00037
01A01-9502-CH-00037

Supreme Court

01S01-9507-CV-103
01S01-9507-CV-103

Supreme Court