SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

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X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

03S01-9507-CH-00077
03S01-9507-CH-00077

Janice Holder v.Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission and George T. Lewis, III, Esq. in his official capacity as Chairperson of the Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission
01S01-9610-CH-00211
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The petition to rehear is denied. ENTER this the 2nd day of December, 1996.
 

William Wesley Goad v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9509-CR-00169
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Fred A. Kelly, III

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner, William Wesley Goad, was afforded his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial.
 

State of Tennessee v. John Michael Denton and William Douglas Brown v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9509-CC-00152
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry D. Bell

We granted review and consolidated these cases in order to consider the circumstances under which imposition of two convictions resulting from a "single" criminal act may violate the double jeopardy and du process clause of the state and federal constitutions in light of State v. Anthony, 817S.W. 2d299 (Tenn. 1991).

01S01-9507-CV-00102
01S01-9507-CV-00102

02S01-9509-CC-00085
02S01-9509-CC-00085

01S01-9509-CR-00151
01S01-9509-CR-00151
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

03S01-9603-CV-00033
03S01-9603-CV-00033

01S01-9509-CR-00151
01S01-9509-CR-00151
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

01S01-9509-CR-00151
01S01-9509-CR-00151
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

01S01-9509-CR-00151
01S01-9509-CR-00151
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

Leonard L. Rowe v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga and Dr. Harry Reynolds, Superintendent of Schools
03S01-9603-CV-00033
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank M. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R. Van Owens

The Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga and Dr. Harry Reynolds, Superintendent of Chattanooga schools, appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision finding that Leonard L. Rowe was deprived of liberty without due process of law by a Board policy which renders any employee previously terminated “for cause, inefficiency, or immorality” ineligible for future employment within the Chattanooga school system. The primary issue for our review is whether adoption of Board policy 4117.5 deprived Rowe of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest to which the requirements of procedural due process apply.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that due process is not implicated because the Board policy did not deprive Rowe of either a protected property or liberty interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

01A01-9606-CH-00259
01A01-9606-CH-00259

02S01-9509-CH-00084
02S01-9509-CH-00084

02S01-9512-CV-00122
02S01-9512-CV-00122
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

01S01-9508-CH-00140
01S01-9508-CH-00140

01S01-9610-CH-00211
01S01-9610-CH-00211

02S01-9507-CH-00056
02S01-9507-CH-00056

01S01-9509-CR-00170
01S01-9509-CR-00170
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Sherry Wimley v. Linda Rudolph, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Human Services - Concurring
01S01-9507-CH-00108
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff can combine an original action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with a petition for judicial review under the Uniform Administration Procedures Act when the sole relief requested under the Section 1983 claim is an award of attorney fees. We affirm the Court of  Appeals’ decision allowing plaintiff an award of attorney fees.

Ethel Faye George v. Clyde Wayne Alexanderand Phillip R. Jones, M.D.
01S01-9505-CV-00084
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Ethel Faye George, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. This case presents the following issue for our determination: whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff’s injury. We conclude that the defendant is required to affirmatively plead comparative fault in such a situation; and because that was not done in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Ethel Faye George v. Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. - Concurring
01S01-9505-CV-00084
Authoring Judge: Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

I agree with the result reached by the majoirity however, resolution of the important principles of comparative fault and rules of pleading and evidence presented in this case requires, in my view, a more precise articulation and analysis of the pleadings, the facts, and the legal issues.  As an example, the statement of the issue decided in themajority's introductory paragraph - if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff's injury - encompasses various situations controlled by different rules and cannot be decided as stated. Since the ruls of substantive law. pleading and evidence are correlated, I can best state my views in an integrated opinion rather than in a commentary on the majority's opinion.

Mitchell Brian Ramsey v. James G. Beavers
03S01-9509-CV-00104
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge Samuel H. Payne

In this case we are faced with the issue of the continued viability of the zone of danger test as a limitation on liability when plaintiff is neither physically injured nor in an area where physical injury is possible. We conclude that in cases such as this, in which plaintiff sensorily observes the injury and resulting death of his mother, recovery should be allowed under circumstances in which the incident which produces the emotional injuries and the emotional injuries are reasonably foreseeable.

Walter P. Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Svcs. & Dina Tobin, Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund, State of Tennessee and Charles Burson, Atty General, State of Tennessee
03S01-9601-CV-00005
Authoring Judge: Justice Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge John A. Turnbull

In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers’ compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse.