01S01-9510-CV-00188
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
02S01-9511-CV-00114
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
03S01-9507-CR-00075
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee ex. rel, John Jay Hooker, v. Brook Thompson, et. al., et al., State of Tennessee ex. rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
These cases are before the Court upon a Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District, and Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear. The Court having considered these matters, it is ORDERED: 1. The Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief is DENIED. 2. Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear is DENIED. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brooke Thompson. State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
The matters currently pending before this Court are a Petition to Rehear filed by Appellant Hooker, Appellees' Motion for Clarification and Appellees' Motion to Supplement the Record filed by the Attorney General, Petition on behalf of Holly K. Lillard and Jerry L. Smith to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Responding to Appellees' Motion for Clarification, Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by appellant Laska, Appellees' Petition to Rehear filed by the Attorney General and Motion of Penny J. White to Intervene. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al. State of Tennessee , ex rel. Lewis Laska
At the oral argument in this matter on July 5, 1996, an amicus curiae brief was filed by John King, who purports to be the Tennessee Republican party's nominee for the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in these cases. Verbal permission was granted by the Court at the July 5 hearing for the filing of additional briefs no later than Monday, July 8, 1996. Yesterday, in accordance with the Court's deadline, Mr. King filed a supplemental amicus curiae brief in this matter, asserting that this Court had erred in denying him the equitable relief granted to Justice Penny White and Appellant Lewis Laska. Mr. King does not assert that it was inappropriate for this Court to fashion the equitable relief granted; he “. . . simply asserts that, under the circumstances he is also entitled to an equitable remedy in the form of an extension of the qualifying deadline for nominees of a party to the same extent extended for Justice White and Mr. Laska.” (Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. King, page 5.) Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the Court made its ruling and entered an Order on July 5, 1996 within a few hours after oral argument, to be followed by an opinion. Although none of the parties had called T.C.A. § 17-1-301 to the Court's attention, in the course of researching the law and preparing to write its opinion over the weekend, the Court reviewed the provisions of T.C.A. § 17-1-301, which make it clear that the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in this case must be filled from the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee. This effectively mooted the issue of Appellant Laska's residence in the Western Grand Division. On Monday, July 8, 1996, this Court issued its Order vacating its remand to the Chancellor for a ruling as to Mr. Laska's residence vel non in the Western District and denying Mr. Laska’s request for mandamus on grounds that he lacked standing to become a candidate. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Keene
On May 23, 1994, this Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder and remanded the cause for resentencing. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a timely petition pursuant to Rule 30, Tenn. R. App. P. for a rehearing. We grant the petition to rehear and remand the cause to the trial court for the conduct of a sentencing hearing consonant with our holidng in State v. Richard Odom.
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al., State of Tennessee Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, et al.
These cases were heard before the Special Supreme Court on an expedited basis on The Court finds as follows: |
Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9412-FD-00155
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9510-CC-00173
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9601-CC-00022
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9601-CC-00022
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Supreme Court | ||
Gene v. Aaby,
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9410-CC-00069
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9410-CC-00069
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9503-CC-00034
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Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9503-CC-00034
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9501-CH-00005
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Supreme Court | ||
02S01-9502-CC-00013
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Supreme Court | ||
Ira H. Murphy v. Board of Professional Responsibility
The issue raised by this appeal is whether the petitioner, a disbarred attorney, has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement of his license to practice law contained in Rule 9, § 19.3, Rules of the Supreme Court, by clear and convincing proof. A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that the petitioner had failed to carry the burden of proof for reinstatement. The Chancery Court, however, reviewed the Hearing Panel decision and held the petitioner was entitled to "conditional reinstatement" of his license to practice law. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Keith Kimbro
We review this cause in order to address an issue of first impression: whether attempt to commit felony-murder exists as an offense in Tennessee. We conclude that it does not and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the appellee's conviction.
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Charles M. Cary, Jr. v. Cathy Ann Cary
We granted this appeal to determine whether a provision in an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective spouse waives alimony is void because it violates public policy. The trial court held that such a provision in an antenuptial agreement, which waived alimony, was valid and enforceable and, therefore, denied the spouse’s application for alimony. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the waiver of alimony provision was void as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court to consider whether to award alimony. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom AKA Otis Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom - Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s decision affirming the conviction in this case. I also agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence as mitigation the testimony of Dr. John Hutson was error which requires a reversal and a remand for re-sentencing. However, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the constitutionality and sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), as amended in 1989. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennesee v. Mario Lamont Wilson
A jury convicted defendant, Mario Lamont Wilson, of three counts of aggravated assault and of felony reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit a felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Wilson’s felony reckless endangerment conviction and sentence, but reversed and dismissed the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a deadly weapon. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it dismissed Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault.1 Although we conclude that Wilson’s convictions for aggravated assault may not stand, we do not adopt entirely the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Rather, we affirm the dismissal of the aggravated assault charges because the evidence is insufficient to prove that Wilson intentionally and knowingly caused another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. |
Madison | Supreme Court |