State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Mallard
M2003-00953-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Steve Daniel

The defendant, Robert Lee Mallard, appeals the revocation of his probation relating to his convictions for attempting to tamper with evidence and resisting arrest. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in revoking his probation; (2) the drug tests administered by the probation officers constituted improper body cavity searches; and (3) the drug tests violated his right to privacy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kenneth Townsend v. Auto Zone, Inc.
M2002-02958-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This appeal involves the grant of summary judgment to Defendant in a slip and fall case. The trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact existed and that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because we find the summary judgment motion was improperly granted, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lamar Tucker
M2003-02847-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry B. Stanley, Jr.

The petitioner, Kenneth Lamar Tucker, plead guilty to one count of rape of a child in exchange for a fifteen-year sentence at 100%. In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea of guilt; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (3) he was denied the right to a trial by jury; (4) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (5) the newly discovered exculpatory evidence entitles him to relief; and (6) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit trial counsel’s case file into evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Freddie L. Osborne v. State of Tennessee
M2003-02088-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

The petitioner was convicted for sale of a controlled substance and sentenced to 32 _ years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed his conviction to this Court. We affirmed his conviction. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief. The post-conviction court granted his petition. The State now appeals the post-conviction court's decision, arguing two issues: (1) Whether failure of trial defense counsel to follow the mandatory provisions of Rule 609 amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and (2) whether failure of trial defense counsel to request the jury charge of facilitation amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, where that charge would now be automatically given. We reverse and remand the decision of the post-conviction court.

Ceciel Ros Halpern v. Laurence Halpern
W2003-01323-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This is an appeal by the appellant-father from an order awarding the appellee-mother child support arrearage and setting prospective child support obligations. Because the support orders appear to deviate from the child support guidelines without specific findings by the trial court, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Sharon Taylor v. Douglas Butler and City Auto Sales
E2002-01916-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Honorable D. J. Alissandratos

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a claim for fraudulent inducement to a contract must be submitted to arbitration when the contract’s arbitration clause covers “all claims, demands, disputes or controversies” and states that it is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). We hold that parties may agree to arbitrate claims of fraudulent inducement despite prohibition of arbitration of such claims under Tennessee law, and because the parties in this case specifically agreed that the FAA governs the arbitration clause, they agreed to arbitrate the claim for fraudulent inducement of the contract. However, we also find that the arbitration clause in this case is unconscionable and therefore void because it reserves the right to a judicial forum for the defendants while requiring the plaintiff to submit all claims to arbitration. For these reasons, the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint is overruled, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Sharon Taylor v. Douglas Butler and City Auto Sales - Concurring and Dissenting
W2002-01275-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Honorable D. J. Alissandratos

Mitchell Lloyd MaGill v. Mary R. MaGill
E2003-02209-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dennis W. Humphrey

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Mary R. MaGill ("Wife") a divorce based upon the inappropriate marital conduct of her spouse, Mitchell Lloyd Magill ("Husband"); awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony of $600 per month for four years, plus attorney's fees of $600; and divided the parties' marital property. Husband appeals the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony. In a separate issue, Wife contends that the trial court failed to divide marital assets in the form of two businesses, i.e., MaGill Electric and C&M Lounge. She also seeks an award of damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. David Lee Bellamy - Concurring
E2003-02936-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

In my view, we must recognize the possibility that Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), hampers a trial judge’s authority to make the fact findings necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of favorable candidacy for alternative sentencing. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102(6) (2003) (establishing presumption of favorable candidacy for alternative sentencing for certain mitigated or standard offenders convicted of felonies in Classes C through E), -103(1) (2003) (establishing factual bases which may support a sentence of confinement).

Samuel F. Sanchez v. Saturn Corp.
M2003-01894-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John A. Turnbull, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. E. Lee Davies, Judge
The employee suffered a biceps tendon rupture in the course and scope of his employment. While performing arthroscopic surgery to confirm the existence of a rotator cuff tear, the treating physician performed a resection of the employee's distal clavicle. The employee contends that the trial judge erred in failing to consider any impairment for this resection in the calculation of the employee's vocational disability and therefore rendered an inadequate award. The Panel finds that medical testimony refutes any causal connection between the work-related injury and the clavicle resection. The Panel also concludes that the employee has failed to meet his burden of showing that the resection was reasonably necessary to treat the work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Seale v. Church of God d/b/a Pathway Press
E2003-01559-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court found the claim was compensable and ordered the employer to provide medical treatment of total knee surgery. The employer contends the employee's condition was the result of pre-existing condition of arthritis and did not result from the accident. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Betty Jo Sissom v. State of Tennessee Department of Labor
M2003-01605-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John A. Turnbull, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, Judge
The employee in this reconsideration case sustained a work-related back injury and previously sustained other work-related and nonwork-related injuries. Although she initially settled for a permanent partial disability award as compensation for her recent back injury and returned to work, she was later discharged due to that back injury. She argues that the trial court erred in not raising her prior permanent partial disability award to an award of permanent total disability. A reconsideration award is limited to 6 times the medical impairment rating due to the subject injury under Tenn. Code Ann. __ 5-6-241(a)(2) and 5-6-241(b), and the trial court's decision within that maximum is supported by the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Edwin R. Oliver
W2003-00670-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of facts and conclusions of law. In this case the trial court held that ProLogis Trust and Steve Graves were employers of the employee, Edwin C. Oliver pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-113 and awarded workers' compensation benefits for an injury to his left lower extremity. The sole issue presented for review is whether the defendant ProLogis Trust, at the time of the employee's accident, was the employee's statutory employer as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-113, and therefore liable for workers' compensation benefits. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we find that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed as to the defendant, ProLogis Trust Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., in which JOE H. WALKER, III, SP.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined. John Robert Cannon, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for appellant, ProLogis Trust. Clyde W. Keenan, Memphis, Tennessee, for appellee, Edwin R. Oliver, Individually as next friend of Edwin C. Oliver, a minor. MEMORANDUM OPINION ProLogis Trust is a global company that leases, owns and manages industrial buildings. They have approximately 45 buildings in the Memphis - Shelby County area with approximately seven million square feet. At the time the employee was injured, Steve Graves owned a company called ABC Roofing and Tree Service. The name of his company was later changed to ABC Repair because he did not do much tree work anymore. Mr. Graves described his work as cleaning, repair, fix-up and paint- up. An employee of ProLogis described Graves' work as putting up sheetrock, building some type of office, installing carpet, cleaning up the space, cleaning the windows, and pressure washing the inside of a building to get cobwebs down. On July 19, 1999, Plaintiff, Edwin C. Oliver, called Defendant, Steve Graves, and inquired about summer work with Mr. Graves. Mr. Oliver and Mr. Graves had not met before, but they attended the same church. At this time, Mr. Oliver was 17 years of age. Mr. Graves instructed Mr. Oliver to come to a warehouse owned and operated by ProLogis Trust. When Mr. Oliver arrived at the warehouse, Mr. Graves was not there. Mr. Oliver began to sweep floors in the warehouse. When Mr. Graves arrived, Mr. Graves and Mr. Oliver began to straighten concrete poles. The poles were approximately 4 feet tall and 12 inches in diameter. As a pole was being straightened, the pole broke and struck Oliver's left foot, causing injury to his foot. This injury necessitated the amputation of three toes and the tip of the fourth toe. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court found that ProLogis Trust and Steve Graves were employers of Mr. Oliver pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-113.1 The trial court found that Graves had an obligation to provide workers' compensation coverage, which he didn't. Further, the trial court found that ProLogis knew that Graves did not have coverage as required under the contract between ProLogis and Graves, and allowed Graves to work nevertheless. The trial court found that Mr. Oliver suffered a disability of 5 percent to the left lower extremity. ANALYSIS Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the 1Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-113 provides in pertinent part: (a) A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontracter shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer. ........... (d) This section applies only in cases where the injury occurred on, in, or about the premises on which the principal contractor has undertaken to execute work or which are otherwise under the principal's control or management. -2-

Jimmy Darryl Ingle v. Nissan North America Inc., and Royal and
M2003-01912-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John A. Turnbull, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew Iii
Plaintiff contends the Chancellor erred in denying his benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act when the only medical evidence presented after his final work at Nissan demonstrated permanency of injury. The chancellor properly found that the plaintiff has not suffered a permanent anatomical injury and therefore no permanent partial impairment under the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any further benefits for vocational disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David B. Cloninger v. City of Dyersburg, Tennessee,
W2003-01716-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: E. Riley Anderson, Justice
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Chancellor
. The Chancellor determined that the employer rebutted the statutory presumption that the employee's stroke arose out of his employment as a police officer, see Tenn. Code Ann. _ 7-51-21(a)(1) (1998), and that the employee failed to establish that the stroke arose out of his employment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the Chancellor's findings. We therefore affirm the judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Matthew Kirk McWhorter
M2003-01132-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Matthew Kirk McWhorter, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for each conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the offenses it wished to submit to the jury; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a law enforcement officer's testimony about the Defendant's uncharged conduct; (4) the trial court erred by permitting a law enforcement agent to testify about a recorded recollection; (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to prohibit testimony of the victim; (6) reversible error occurred when the State failed to disclose, preserve and turn over a law enforcement official's notes made during the Defendant's initial interrogation; (7) the trial court erred by allowing the State to submit an insufficient Bill of Particulars and to deviate from its Bill of Particulars; (8) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his written and oral statements made to law enforcement officials in Florida; (9) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on child abuse as a lesser-included offense; (10) the State's closing arguments were so improper that they infected the trial with unfairness and denied the Defendant due process; (11) the trial court erred by interrupting the natural flow of jury deliberations to give supplemental instructions; and (12) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect which incident of sexual touching the State intended for the jury to consider for Count 1, aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and the sentence in Count 1. We affirm the remaining convictions and sentences.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks
M2003-02002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The Appellant, Jeffery Brian Parks, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. In 2003, Parks pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of incest, and two counts of statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Parks, as a Range I standard offender, to six years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure and incest, both class C felonies, and to two years for each count of statutory rape, a class E felony. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Parks argues that the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences with respect to each sentence and by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. The State, on appeal, asserts that consecutive sentencing should be imposed by this court following de novo review. Because the trial court failed to impose a sentence in accordance with our statutory sentencing scheme, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing to determine the length of the Appellant’s sentences, the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing, and the Appellant’s suitability for an alternative sentence.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks - Dissenting in Part
M2003-02002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

I believe the sentencing in the instant case is controlled by State v. Marshall, 888 S.W.2d 786 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), and Rule 4(H)(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court require it be followed. To the extent that the majority opinion holds this trial judge fashioned an improper sentence, I disagree. The two holdings in Marshall which apply to the instant cases are as follows:

Rodney McKinney v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2004-00133-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The petitioner, Rodney McKinney, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his claim for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In re: Estate of Angula Wilson Whitehorn Turner
W2003-02652-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dewey C. Whitenton

Beneficiary of will appeals the order of the chancery court awarding attorney fees, executor fees, and other expenses. Both factual and legal objections are made to the awards made by the court. The legal objections are without merit, and the factual objections are not well-taken, because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm.

Richard A. Jones and Richard A. Jones, Jr. v. Jody W. Henderson
W2003-02564-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert A. Lanier

This case arises from the discovery of an extramarital affair. The Appellants brought suit against
Appellee, seeking damages on theories of outrageous conduct and interference with a contract.
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss and this appeal followed. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Anthony C. Long v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2003-02609-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The petitioner, Anthony C. Long, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We reverse the dismissal and order habeas corpus relief.

State of Tennessee v. Guadalupe Arroyo, Alias
E2003-02355-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

The defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication and was sentenced to consecutive twelve-year terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed the imposition of maximum sentences and the order to serve the terms consecutively. After this, our second review, we again remand for a new sentencing hearing in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and the trial court's failure to find specific findings justifying the necessity for consecutive sentencing.

In Re: The Estate of Kathleen Meade, Deceased, L. Grady Lee, v. Helen Jo Gilliam
E2003-02629-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard E. Ladd

A typewritten document and a handwritten document prepared later in time were offered for probate. The Trial Court rejected the handwritten document and admitted the typewritten document to probate as the Last Will and Testament of Deceased. On appeal, we reverse.

State of Tennessee v. Janice Michele Walker
E2003-02753-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

Defendant, Janice Michele Walker, was charged in a four-count presentment with theft over $10,000, forgery over $10,000, computer fraud, and money laundering. Defendant pled guilty as a Range I standard offender to theft and forgery, both Class C felonies, and the other charges were dismissed. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively, and she was ordered to pay restitution. The trial court determined the manner of service of Defendant's sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her effective eight-year sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of full probation. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.