Charles W. Ayrhart v. Dewel B. Scruggs, et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's refusal to grant a summary judgment to the defendants in a negligence case. We find that the defendants have not affirmatively negated an element of this negligence claim and that reasonable minds could differ on the allocation of fault between the parties. Consequently, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore agree with the trial court and affirm the denial of summary judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Shockley v. Joseph F. Crosby, et al.
This appeal arises from a claim filed in Van Buren County Circuit Court alleging breach of contract, outrageous conduct, and assault. At the close of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the outrageous conduct claim. At the close of all the proof, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, and the parties then stipulated that the assault had occurred. The case went to the jury for consideration of the damages resulting from the breach and the assault. The jury returned a verdict of $57,500 for the breach of contract and specifically found that the assault did not cause injury to Carl Shockley for which compensatory damages should be awarded. Nonetheless the jury did find that Joseph Crosby acted in such a way that punitive damages should be awarded. The trial court refused to submit the punitive damages issue to the jury and granted a remittitur of $7,500 on the contract claim. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Paul G. Summers and Milton H. Hamilton, Jr. v. B&H Investments, Inc., Charles R. Smith and Alvin G. Pierce
The Trial Court held purchaser of land responsible for prior owner’s violations of the Tennessee |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dorian Soriano Bautista v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dorian Soriano Bautista, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to explain to him the adverse consequences that his guilty plea and conviction could have on his resident alien status, which led to his deportation. We affirm the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michaela Babb v. Hamilton County Board of Education
This is a suit brought by a school teacher against the Hamilton County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act wherein the teacher alleges negligence on the part of the Board of Education as a result of an assault on her by a student who was re-enrolled in school and re-placed in her classroom despite the fact the student had assaulted her the previous month and been suspended from school. The trial court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We hold that the decision to place the student back in the teacher's classroom, despite the previous assault, was a discretionary action for which the Board of Education was immune from liability. Accordingly, we affirm and remand to the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Frank Soard
This case involves a dispute between a widow and the personal representative of her husband’s estate. The parties differ as to the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-4-101 (2001), the statute setting forth the criteria pursuant to which a surviving spouse’s elective share is computed. The trial court adopted the estate’s construction of the statute and subtracted the widow’s exempt property, homestead allowance, and year’s support allowance from the value of her percentage share of the net estate in arriving at the elective-share amount to which she is entitled. We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of that court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony O. Johnson
The appellant, Tony O. Johnson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Following the appellant’s conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court’s application of certain enhancement factors. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Harp
The Appellant, Tony Harp, was convicted in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court of one count of theft of property valued between $ 1,000 and $ 10,000, a class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a thirty-month community corrections sentence, with service of ninety days in the county jail. On appeal, Harp asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction and (2) the trial court erred in denying him full probation. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Mark Burns
While initially indicted on three counts of attempted first degree murder, the defendant, John Mark Burns, was convicted on three counts of attempted second degree murder. The trial court imposed sentences of eleven years for each offense, all of which are to be served concurrently. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues that the trial court erred in several of its instructions to the jury, and he contends that the sentence is excessive. Because the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors, the defendant’s sentences are modified to three concurrent nine-year terms. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Anthony
The Defendant, Sean Anthony, was tried and convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal he contends that: (1) the trial court improperly refused to accept his guilty plea; (2) the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sylvester Young v. Bank One, N.A.
The Trial Court awarded possession to purchaser of property at foreclosure sale and dismissed possessor's action to rescind foreclosure. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lynn (Katz) Smith v. Steven White Smith
Wife appeals the trial court's distribution of marital property as inequitable in of her contribution to the acquisition of the only significant asset, the marital home. The trial court clearly recognized that without Wife's contribution from her separate property, the parties would have been unable to buy the house. We modify the trial court's award of the equity in the house and affirm as modified. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: T.A.R. and D.F.R.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father, and both appealed. Because statutory grounds were proved by clear and convincing evidence and it was also shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Holli Thacker Haney, et al. v. Bradley County Board of Education, et al.
Holli Thacker Haney ("Plaintiff") had two children who attended Michigan Avenue Elementary School (the "School") in Bradley County. Plaintiff's husband, Tracy Thacker ("Thacker"), was not the biological father of the oldest child, but he was the biological father of the youngest child. Thacker filed for divorce, and he and Plaintiff were in sharp disagreement over custody matters. Apparently believing he was going to lose on the custody issues, on the morning of December 12, 2000, Thacker went to the School and signed out both children. The School required Thacker to provide a written explanation as to why the children were being signed out. Thacker wrote "Keeping Promise by Mother" and "Pay Back" as his reasons for signing out the children. School employees did not read what Thacker had written prior to allowing him to leave the premises with the children. Tragically, Thacker then murdered both young children. Plaintiff sued the Bradley County Board of Education asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se based on the School's allowing Thacker to sign out the children and leave the School with them on December 12. The Trial Court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn (Hurst) Fugate v. William Kendred Fugate, III
In this divorce case, Teresa Lynn (Hurst) Fugate ("Wife") appeals the trial court's decision to set aside the parties' marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a quitclaim deed to the marital residence executed by the Husband shortly after the parties separated. The trial court found the residence to be marital property and equally divided the equity in the property between the parties. Wife argues that the trial court should have found the residence to be a gift from husband, and thus separate property, and that the trial court erred by not enforcing the quitclaim deed. Wife also appeals the trial court's award of $187.00 in attorney fees to Husband. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Kathyrn Morris Brown and Swann Brown Jaffurs v. Juan F. Gutierrez, William E. Kessler, Donald J. Vernine individually and D/B/A GKV Leasing
In this Declaratory Judgment action, the Trial Court established the purchase price of property pursuant to a right of first refusal, awarded interest and denied a request for attorney's fees. On appeal by Seller, we Affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Dillard Phillips, Deceased, Leroy Phillips v. Cora Chitwood
In this action to contest a Will, the Trial Court granted proponent summary judgment. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kathy E. Cooper
The defendant appeals her resentencing following the revocation of her eight-year community corrections sentence for vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction, following her arrest for DUI. Based on the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration in light of its holding. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rosetta Willis v. Mike Settle, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Rosetta Willis v. Mike Settle, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: J.J.D., O.J.S., A.L.S. and C.M.S.
Because of questions regarding the trial court's denial of appointed counsel in this proceeding that resulted in the termination of parental rights, the Department of Children's Services has acknowledged that the trial court's judgment must be vacated. We agree. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Frazier, et al., v. Lewis County Beer Board
This appeal involves a dispute between the owners of a convenience store and the Lewis County Beer Board over a permit to sell beer. After the Beer Board denied their application because their store was within two thousand feet of a church, the owners filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Lewis County asserting that the Beer Board was selectively enforcing its distance rule. The owners appealed after the trial court granted the Beer Board's motion to dismiss. We have determined that this appeal is now moot because the persons applying for the permit sold the store while this appeal was pending. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Raymond Mitchell, was convicted in 1996 of two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. He pled nolo contendere to a third rape charge, which was reduced to sexual battery. He received a total effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging he was entitled to earn sentence reduction credits and challenging his classification as a "multiple rapist." The trial court dismissed the petition and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Correction ("DOC") did not err by classifying the petitioner as a multiple rapist and determining he was not eligible for sentence reduction credits. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instructions, double jeopardy violations, and again challenging the sentence enforcement by the DOC. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this appeal followed. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court denying the petition but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3 to reflect that the petitioner is a "multiple rapist," and his sentences are to be served as such. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond K. McCrary
The defendant, Raymond K. McCrary, pled guilty to one count of manufacture of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of possession for resale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, also a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Department of Correction on each count to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the length of the sentence but modify it to reflect a period of incarceration of sixty days, with the remainder to be served on probation with appropriate conditions to be established by the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher T. Cochran
The defendant pled guilty in 2000 to vehicular homicide and the judgment ordered, in addition to setting the sentence at five years and the restitution amount, that he forfeit his driver's license for five years. Following his release from incarceration, he petitioned the trial court to reduce the period of suspension of his license to three years. The trial court granted this petition, and the State appealed, arguing that the court was without authority to alter the license revocation period. Upon our review, we find that the judgment, which was the basis for the defendant's request that the trial court reduce the suspension period to three years and the State's appeal of the court order doing so, had been superseded by an amended judgment entered several days after the first which corrected the listing of the statute for the defendant's conviction offense but omitted setting a period of suspension of his driver's license. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court reducing the suspension period to three years and remand for entry of a second corrected judgment, this one to set a period for the license revocation. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals |