Edward Ray Armstrong v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Edward Ray Armstrong, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Dyer County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. In 2006, the Petitioner pled guilty as a Range I, standard offender to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to subpoena his medical records and to adequately prepare for trial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Peggy J. Coleman v. Daystar Energy, Inc.
In this breach of construction contract suit, the trial court gave judgment in favor of plaintiff homeowner, and contractor defendant has appealed. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John William Matkin, III
The defendant, John William Matkin, III, was convicted by a Sevier County Circuit Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to serve six years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, that the trial court committed reversible error with respect to the jury instructions, and that he was improperly sentenced. Upon review, we hold that the defendant is not entitled to relief and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Union Realty Company, Ltd. D/B/A Northgate Shopping Center v. Family Dollar Stores of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
This dispute arises from a premises liability action filed against Plaintiff property owner Union Realty Company. The trial court determined that Defendant Travelers Property Casualty Company had an obligation to insure Union Realty as a named insured under a public liability contract of insurance issued to Defendant Family Dollar store. Family Dollar and Travelers appeal; we affirm in part, vacate in part, and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andreco Boone
The defendant, Andreco Boone, appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court improperly admitted a photo spread during the trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darnell Lavelle Welch v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darnell Lavelle Welch, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sean Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Sean Williams, was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, which was denied by the post-conviction court following a hearing. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition and specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a jury instruction for facilitation. After review, we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective, and we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Baldwin v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
A prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for writ of certiorari after he was denied parole. The trial court dismissed the petition on the basis that it was not sworn to and did not state that it was the first application for a writ. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Carter - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that sufficient evidence supports the defendant’s conviction of the aggravated assault of Michael Langston. My departure centers around the assault element of “caus[ing] another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.” See T.C.A. § 39-13-101 (a)(2) (2006). |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Carter
A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Christopher Carter, on five counts of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The state dismissed the remaining counts, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions, and we therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vicky Berry v. Houchen's Market of TN, Inc. and J. D. Easterly Properties - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the Defendant Houchens. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Plaintiff was, as a matter of law, 50% or more at fault when she slipped and fell in oil in the parking lot owned by the Defendant Eatherly. After a review of the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Berry, the nonmoving party, as is required when considering a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997), I conclude that there are facts and inferences reasonably drawn from the facts which would permit reasonable minds to differ as to whether Ms. Berry was less than 50 % at fault. Accordingly, I do not agree that the Defendant Eatherly is entitled to summary judgment. The undisputed facts are that Ms. Berry drove into the parking lot, parked her car, got out of her car, walked three or four feet, and then slipped and fell in a puddle of oil in the parking lot. Ms. Berry was looking straight ahead as she walked and did not see the oil. She did not see the oil when she drove into the parking spot or before she fell. She could not see the oil after she had gone into the store and was looking out onto the parking lot. She testified that the oil was invisible to her. I cannot conclude that because she had oil in her hair and down her backside after she fell that the oil puddle was so large that she should have seen it. I cannot agree that her recovery should be barred because she was looking straight ahead and not down at her feet as she was walking. We know there was oil in the parking lot. But how large was the puddle of oil? How visible was it? Should Ms. Berry have seen it? These are material questions of fact to be answered by a jury - not the trial court or the appellate court. Issues of comparison and allocation of fault are properly left to the jury. Prince v. St. Thomas Hosp., 945 S.W.2d 731,735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable minds can differ as to the reasonableness of Ms. Berry’s conduct as she left her vehicle and attempted to enter the store. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vicky Berry v. Houchen's Market of TN, Inc. and J. D. Easterly Properties
Plaintiff fell in a puddle of oil in the parking lot near the Save-a-Lot Market. The Trial Court granted the market and the owner of the parking lot summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Donnell Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marshall Donnell Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel and entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Earl Robinson
The defendant, William Earl Robinson, pled guilty to one count of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years in confinement. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation with credit for time served. The defendant was subsequently arrested for violation of probation. Following a hearing, his probation was revoked and he was remanded into custody for the remainder of his original sentence. The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation and argues that the trial court erred by placing his entire sentence into effect. We affirm the decision of |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of L.A.J., III State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Larry Jones, Jr.
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was born in 1992. In 2000, the child was taken into protective custody based on allegations that the father had sexually abused him. A no-contact order was entered against the father. The mother regained custody of the child in 2002. In April 2003, the mother voluntarily relinquished custody of the child and he was placed with his aunt and uncle. After the child kicked his pregnant aunt in the stomach, custody was returned to the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). In June 2003, the child was found to be dependent and neglected. After the father failed to comply with the child’s permanency plan, DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both the mother and the father. Default judgment was granted as to mother. The court appointed an attorney to represent the father. A trial was held, after which the court ordered termination of the father’s parental rights on several grounds. The father appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the failure to appoint an attorney for him during the dependency and neglect proceedings violated his due process rights. Finding that the dependency and neglect proceedings are separate and distinct from the termination proceedings, we hold that the father received full procedural protection in the termination proceedings that are the subject of this appeal, and affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Taylor, Jr.
The defendant, James Taylor, Jr., was found guilty by a Lauderdale County jury of aggravated assault (Class C felony) and assault (Class A misdemeanor). He was sentenced to six years for his aggravated assault conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for his assault conviction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support either of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the aggravated assault indictment because it did not allege the type of deadly weapon used by the defendant; (3) the trial court should have excluded testimony that the defendant was the subject of a restraining order; and (4) his sentence was improper. After review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Lane v. American General Life and Accident Insurance Company - Concurring
I concur completely in the result reached by the majority. In my opinion, the failure of Mr. Lane to correctly respond to the question pertaining to doctors seen and hospitals visited in the past five years and the question regarding medical tests administered in the same time frame, and the resulting increase in the risk under evaluation by American General, operate as a complete bar to the suit by Wife. Given the very recent nature of these doctor visits, the trip to the hospital, and the tests taken, the information pertaining to these matters had to have been within the consciousness of Mr. Lane when he responded to the subject questions. A trier of fact could not have reasonably found otherwise. Hence, in my judgment, there is no genuine issue of material fact on this critical point. Because of this, I do not think it is necessary to address the interplay between (1) the “knowledge and belief” language on the application and (2) the “unless the matter represented increases the risk of loss” language in Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. I disassociate myself from this analysis. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Lane v. American General Life and Accident Insurance Company
In 2002, Ronnie Lane applied for and was issued a life insurance policy through American General Life and Accident Insurance Company (“American General”). Less than two years later, Mr. Lane died from a massive heart attack. Mr. Lane’s wife, Pamela Lane, made a claim for the life insurance benefits. American General denied the claim, asserting that Mr. Lane had made material misrepresentations on the application for life insurance which increased the insurance company’s risk of loss. The Trial Court agreed and granted American General’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Jo Bertuca v. Theodore Joseph Bertuca
This is an appeal from a divorce action filed by Christina Jo Bertuca against her husband, Theodore Joseph Bertuca. The divorce was granted on June 23, 2005, but the trial court reserved the issue of a division of marital assets. That matter was tried in February, 2006. While the hearing related to a variety of assets, most of the evidence presented related to the value of the husband’s ninety percent ownership in Capital Food Services, a Tennessee general partnership that was engaged in the ownership and operation of seven McDonald’s franchises located in Wilson County, Tennessee. The trial court determined the value of Capital Food Services had increased by $1,000,000 above the amount paid for the restaurants. The value of Mr. Bertuca’s interest had, therefore, increased by $900,000 and half that amount was awarded to Ms. Bertuca. Mr. Bertuca has appealed challenging the conclusions reached by the trial court. Ms. Bertuca has appealed from the judgment of the trial court allowing Mr. Bertuca to pay the sum awarded in eighty-four equal monthly installments without interest and asserting she is entitled to her attorneys’ fees on appeal. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial but modify the increase in value of Capital Food Services to $780,768 and Ms. Bertuca’s award to $350,345.50, payable as ordered by the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Meeks v. Ricky J. Bell, Warden
In 1990, Appellant, Billy Merle Meeks, was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and extortion. He received an effective sentence of thirty-nine (39) years. On October 29, 2004, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Davidson County. A "Motion to Dismiss" was filed by Respondent on November 29, 2004, and the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition on March 10, 2005. Appellant has appealed from the trial court's dismissal of the petition. The State has filed a motion for this Court to affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timmy Charles McDaniel v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Timmy Charles McDaniel, entered pleas of guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary in exchange for concurrent sentences of life without the possibility of parole and 12 years, respectively. Following his incarceration, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In this appeal, he challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and reasserts his claim that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tammy Noonan v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Timothy Roberson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy Roberson, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this issue because the Petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing review of a denial of a motion to reopen. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117. Also, in this appeal, the Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery in 1995, challenges the denial of his motion for a sample of his own blood. The Petitioner sought to determine his blood type in order to compare it with the blood type found on a towel in the victim’s residence. The court determined that the motion for the Petitioner’s blood sample should be denied as there was substantial evidence of the Petitioner’s guilt presented at trial. Finally, the Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis that alleged newly discovered evidence in the context of a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation. The coram nobis court1 concluded that any relief was time-barred and that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim. We affirm the judgment of the Gibson County Circuit Court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Ray O'Dell
Defendant appeals his sentences as a result of guilty pleas to two counts of robbery, a class C felony. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I Standard Offender to one six-year term for case number 0015 to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction and one six-year term, suspended, for case number 0016 to be served on probation. Defendant was also ordered to pay $6,999.00 in restitution for case number 0015 and $621.00 in restitution for case number 0016. The sentences are to be served consecutively. On appeal Defendant argues that he should have received a sentencing alternative other than incarceration and that the sentences should have been ordered to be served concurrently with each other. He does not challenge the length of the individual sentences or the amounts of restitution. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lillian A. Carpenter, et al. v. Michael E. Sims, et al.
Beneficiaries under a will sought to rescind the sale of a condominium in which they asserted an inheritance interest upon allegations that 1) the consideration paid by the purchasers was so inadequate as to shock the conscience; 2) the purchasers exerted undue influence over the seller; and 3) the seller was mentally incompetent at the time of the sale. Upon findings that the seller was mentally competent at the time of sale, that the purchasers did not exert undue influence over her, and that she had reason to sell the condominium for the amount she did, the trial court ruled that the sale of the condominium should not be set aside. Upon our determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusions, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals |