State of Tennessee v. James Alton Campbell a/k/a Jamie Campbell
The defendant, James Alton Campbell, was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to 15 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of a photograph depicting the victim’s injury, and the length of his sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Catherine Evonne Flowers v. Jerome Bernard Flowers
The trial court determined the Husband to be the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $250 per month for eighteen months. Wife takes issue with these decisions and presents this appeal in which we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Roger T. Johnson v. Wayne Brandon, Warden
The petitioner, Roger T. Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for first degree murder and second degree murder. Because we find that the petitioner has failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy Clardy v. TRW Commercial Steering Division
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Dew Roy Neal v. TRW Commercial Steering Division
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Paul S. Bush v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Paul S. Bush, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief andcontends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his guilty plea. Specifically,the petitioner argues that counsel met with him only three or four times, failed to sufficiently reviewthe plea agreement with him, told him he had to take the plea, made no attempt to have him mentallyevaluated, failed to file a motion to suppress, and failed to review discovery materials with him priorto entering his guilty plea. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm thejudgment from the post-conviction court. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teresa L. Herman - Dissenting
I believe that the trial court acted well within its authority in granting Appellee credit against the full forty-eight hours of incarceration ordered as a result of her conviction first offense DUI. I would not grant the State’s request to treat this appeal as a common law writ of certiorari and I would dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teresa L. Herman
The defendant, Teresa L. Herman, pled guilty to possession of marijuana and driving under the influence (DUI). For each offense, she was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served consecutively. The sentences were to be suspended after the defendant served forty-eight hours in a jail or workhouse as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) (2004). At the defendant’s request, the trial court granted the defendant jail credit for time she spent during an inpatient evaluation for competency to stand trial, which credit was to apply toward the mandatory service of forty-eight hours in a jail or workhouse. On appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s authority to grant such credit. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the defendant was entitled to sentencing credit to be applied toward the satisfaction of her sentence; however, the credit should not have applied toward the mandatory service of fortyeight hours in the jail or workhouse. Therefore, we must remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denise Wiggins
The Appellant, Denise Wiggins, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect of her five-year-old daughter. The trial court subsequently merged the two Class A felonies into a single conviction for aggravated child abuse. Following a sentencing hearing, Wiggins was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment as a violent offender. On appeal, Wiggins raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the sentence imposed is excessive. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Wiggins’ conviction for aggravated child abuse. We conclude, however, that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated child neglect. With regard to sentencing, we remand for resentencing based upon the misapplication of enhancing factors and for adherence with the holding of Blakely v. Washington. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy Nelson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Roy Nelson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Paul Watson
The appellant, Willie Paul Watson, was convicted by a jury in the Dyer County Circuit Court of two counts of assault, and he received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after service of ninety days. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court should not have required him to serve ninety days of his sentence. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Kirk Tarver, et al. v. Garrison's Custom Cabinets, Inc.
Based on a Special Master’s report, the Circuit Court of Shelby County entered judgment against the appellant for damages for breach of a contract to install cabinets in the appellee’s home. The appellant contends that the trial judge did not independently review the evidence in the record and that the damage award was not supported by the evidence. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Margaret Ann King v. Christy King Spain (Hudson) and Wanda Faye King, et al.
This case involves a dispute over the division of proceeds from the sale of a failed business venture. The trial court referred certain matters to a special master for determination. The special master made several specific findings, but left issues open to be decided by the trial court. The trial court adopted the findings of the special master and made no additional determinations. Appellants appeal. We must dismiss this appeal because there is no final order resolving all the claims between the parties and remand the matter back to the trial court for further determinations. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Lee v. Anderson County Election Commission, et al - Dissenting
I find nothing in the factual allegations of the complaint that, even if true, would warrant the voiding of this election. As with everything else in life, elections are not perfect. Voters — I suppose for various and sundry reasons, e.g., a long ballot, inexperience in voting, lack of familiarity with the voting machine — stay too long in the voting booth. Furthermore, I am sure that there have been instances in the past when voters reflected their choices on paper ballots even though functioning voting machines were available. The statutes instruct that these things should not happen; but there is nothing in any of the subject statutes to indicate the legislature intended that these violations would warrant the voiding of an election. Furthermore, there is nothing in the complaint even remotely suggesting that, had the various votes in question been cast in strict compliance with the statutes, the election result in this case would have been different. To the extent that Stuart supports the majority opinion in the instant case, I disagree with Stuart — a decision inwhich I was not involved. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Lee v. Anderson County Election Commission, et al.
The Trial Court dismissed this election contest on Motion. On appeal we hold the allegation that enough illegal votes were cast to change the outcome of the election when taken as true stated a cause of action. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Oliver
The defendant, Antonio Oliver, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder. He was sentenced as a violent offender to life in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he claims that insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction and that he is entitled to a new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demarcus Young
The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eight years in prison as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, and he also contends that the trial court committed plain error in admitting evidence of the robbery victim’s identification of the defendant as the perpetrator. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, and that the identification issue is waived on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Michael Stephens v. State of Tennessee
In 2005, Petitioner, Richard M. Stephens, was indicted on ten counts of rape, ten counts of incest and seven counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of rape, one count of incest and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without a hearing.On appeal, Petitioner alleges that the trial court improperly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. We reverse and remand the dismissal of the post-conviction petition. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara A. Meier v. James W. Meier
This is a post-divorce proceeding in which James W. Meier (“Husband”) filed a motion to amend the final decree pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60. The trial court denied the motion. Husband appeals, contending, in part, that the trial court “committed reversible error” when it signed a judgment by consent when it knew that he did not agree to the terms of the proposed judgment. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Joe McCauley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bobby Joe McCauley, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In this post-conviction appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel relative to his mental health condition and whether his plea was knowingly entered. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Szumanski Stroud
The defendant, Szumanski Stroud, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury trial convictions of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, for which he received seven-year and six-month sentences, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. In this appeal, he claims (1) that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of “intentionally” and “knowingly” mental states, and (3) that he was excessively sentenced. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Lamar Osborn
The defendant, Antonio Lamar Osborn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his probation order because more than thirty days had elapsed since the entry of the order. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alberto Camacho
Appellant, Alberto Camacho, was indicted on six counts of theft and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of four counts of theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony, two counts of theft over five hundred dollars, a Class E felony, and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each Class D felony and two years for each Class E felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of four years. The trial court further ordered Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, with the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. Appellant was also ordered to pay $750 per month toward restitution. Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the charge of impersonation of a licensed professional and that his sentence is improper. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court properly instructed the jury and the trial court properly applied enhancement factors (2) and (16), we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court erred in imposing a sentence ordering Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Kellow v. TML Risk Management Pool and the City of Lebanon
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found the Employee's bilateral shoulder injury to be compensable and awarded benefits for 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer asserts that the trial court erred by accepting the evaluating physician's opinion that Employee suffered an 11% impairment and by awarding Employee 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer also contends that the permanent partial disability award should be limited to one and one-half times Employee's medical impairment rating because there was a meaningful return to work. We find the trial court did not err in accrediting Employee's medical proof, but we conclude that the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court's finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding benefits in excess of the one and one-half statutory cap. We modify the trial court's judgment and award one and one-half of the medical impairment rating of 11% or 16.5% to the body as a whole. |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Christin Pickens v. Delta Faucet
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Delta Faucet, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the date of injury was prior to July 1, 2004, and that the award was therefore not subject to the "cap" of 1.5 times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-241(d)(1)(a) (Supp. 2004). The employee argues that the award of 25% permanent partial disability to both arms is inadequate. We conclude that the injury occurred after July 1, 2004, and modify the award to 15% permanent partial disability to both arms. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel |