Douglas Edward Corder v. Valerie Jean Corder - Dissenting
I am in agreement with the majority’s well-written and well-reasoned opinion with one exception. I would not hold that the trial court’s requirement for the father to provide financial information to mother constitutes impermissible “support” after the children reach majority. I |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas Edward Corder v. Valerie Jean Corder
This case involves a divorced parent’s obligation to support college-age children. After the divorce, the mother was the primary residential parent for the parties’ two children, who are now adults. In 1999, when both children were still minors, the father’s child support obligation was increased, and he was ordered to provide to the mother financial documents and financial information necessary to assist the children with their private high school and college expenses. The mother later filed a petition for contempt, arguing that the father failed to comply. At a 2001 contempt hearing, the mother asked that the father be held in contempt for, among other things, his failure to provide Mother with his 2000 tax returns for a financial aid application for the older child’s Ivy League college tuition. The trial court reserved the issue until further evidence could be presented. Soon after the hearing, in June 2001, the older child graduated from high school and the father unilaterally reduced his child support payments without seeking a modification of the trial court’s support order. Four years went by without a court hearing, and both children reached majority. In 2005, the father filed a petition to resolve all outstanding matters and close the case. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the father was in contempt of court for his failure to provide the mother with the financial documents necessary to complete a financial aid application for the older child’s college education and awarded damages to Mother. The trial court further held that the father was not permitted to unilaterally reduce his child support payments when the older child graduated from high school and, consequently, assessed a child support arrearage against him. The father appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part holding, inter alia, that once the parties’ child was emancipated, the trial court was without authority to require the father to provide financial documents to assist her in obtaining college financial aid. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Maurice Pruitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Maurice Pruitt, was convicted of the sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis Coker, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. The Purdue Pharama Company, et al.
This is a class action involving federal preemption. The defendants own a series of patents for the prescription pain medication OxyContin®. In prior separate litigation between the defendants and a generic drug manufacturer, a federal district court in New York found that the defendants committed inequitable conduct before the United States Patent Office in procuring the patents. After this order was entered by the federal court in New York, the plaintiff filed the instant class action in Shelby County, Tennessee, on behalf of all consumers of OxyContin, alleging violations of the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and common law monopolization. These state law claims were based on the defendants’ conduct before the United States Patent Office. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court for the Western |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Paul H. Martin v. Billy W. Long
This case is based on the existence of an oral contract. The trial court determined that there was insufficient proof on damages to allow the plaintiff any recovery. We remand the case for findings about the existence and terms of the alleged oral contract. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. In this regard, I view the prosecutor’s improper statements to be a matter of serious concern. I disagree, however, with the opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to a reckless mental state regarding rape of a child. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams
This is a direct appeal as of right from convictions on a jury verdict of one count of child rape and two counts of rape. For these convictions, the Defendant, Charles L. Williams, received an effective twenty-two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction with 100% service required. On appeal, the Defendant raises six issues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony of the victim; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of child rape and rape; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State’s DNA expert witness to speculate about the significance of the ratio of DNA discovered under the Defendant’s fingernails; (4) prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial; (5) the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions when it stated the elements of child rape could be satisfied by a showing of a mens rea of recklessness; and (6) the trial court erred in failing to merge the lesser rape convictions into the child rape conviction. We have concluded that the trial court erred by allowing certain speculative testimony by the State’s DNA expert witness. We also have concluded that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. In addition, the two rape convictions should have been merged into the child rape conviction. We have determined that the cumulative effect of the trial errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Judge Welles also concludes that the trial court erred by giving erroneous jury instructions for the requisite mens rea. We reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zachary Rosenberg, et al. v. BlueCross BlueShield, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the provision in the Commercial Provider Administration Manual requiring them to be responsible for one-half of the fees and expenses directly related to conducting the arbitration renders arbitrating
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Zachary Rosenberg, M.D., et al. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
This appeal results from the trial court’s order granting a Motion to Compel Arbitration. Two doctors, Zachary Rosenberg, M.D. and Dewayne P. Darby, M.D., sued BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (“BCBST”) and the Tennessee Healthcare Network alleging breach of contract, seeking class action status, and requesting injunctive relief under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. From the trial court’s order compelling arbitration, the doctors appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dotson - Dissenting
The majority concludes that there was insufficient evidence that victim Crain was “put in fear.” The majority concludes that Mr. Crain disavowed being “in fear.” I simply disagree. Witness Kevin Young, Mr. Crain’s assistant who came from inside the store, testified that Mr. Crain told him he was being robbed and to call the police, which Mr. Young did. Mr. Crain described how a man jumped into his truck and ordered him to the front of the truck. Mr. Crain described that he was “angry” this was happening to him. He did not like being “backed into a corner at all.” Mr. Crain offered no resistance and somehow exited the truck. Still angry about what was happening, Mr. Crain attempted to close the door and lock the defendant inside. When the defendant saw Mr. Crain’s attempt or “caught him,” the defendant threatened to shoot Mr. Crain. Mr. Crain believed the defendant was armed and saw the defendant reach for his pocket or belt line. Mr. Crain testified “there was too much things going through my mind at the time to actually mentally get a good picture.” Mr. Crain could not identify the defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dotson
The defendant, Andre Dotson, appeals from his 2005 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of robbery. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in joining four indictments for trial, (2) in severing, on the morning of trial, the charges against a co-defendant, (3) in excluding the co-defendant’s pretrial statement as evidence offered by the defendant, (4) in failing to hold that the evidence was insufficient to support three of the convictions, (5) in denying the defendant’s motion to allow him to sit with his attorney at the counsel table, (6) in failing to instruct the jury as to the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, and (7) in sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender on two convictions and as a persistent offender on two convictions. We reverse one conviction of robberybut affirm the court’s judgments, as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alena Wharton v. Robert Wharton
This case arises from post-divorce proceedings concerning custody of the parties’ minor child. Mother/Appellant appeals from the order of the trial court granting primary residential custody to Father/Appellee. Specifically, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in disallowing testimony at the hearing. Father also raises an issue concerning whether the trial court erred in not making an award of retroactive child support. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry D. Eckler v. Dr. Lee Allen, et al.
This is a medical malpractice action in which Plaintiff alleges Defendant physician failed to obtain informed consent. The trial court awarded Defendants summary judgment upon finding that Plaintiff’s amended expert affidavit failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115(a)(1) and that Plaintiff had failed to file the amended affidavit by the deadline imposed by the court. We affirm summary judgment for Defendant under § 29-26-115(a)(1). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dewayne Alston
The appellant, Anthony Alston, was indicted with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver and felony possession of cocaine. The appellant pled guilty to the charges, but agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of nine years for possession with intent to deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine. Further, the trial court ordered the nine-year sentence to run consecutively to a sentence for which the appellant was on Community Corrections at the time of the current offense. The appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Hammonds
The Defendant, Robert Lee Hammonds, pled guilty to possession of over 26 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved four certified questions of law relating to whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the traffic stop and subsequent search were unconstitutional. He contends that the officer exceeded the scope of the stop and that the mandatory blanket consent form that he signed as part of a previous community corrections sentence did not give the arresting officer consent to search his vehicle. Further, he contends that he revoked any consent given by the mandatory blanket consent. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. R.R.'s, In the Matter of R.R. Jr., (dob 11/17/01), K.P., (dob 4/26/00), and R.C., (dob 07/16/96), Children Under 18 Years of Age
Both parents appeal the Trial Court’s termination of their parental rights. We hold the State established by clear and convincing evidence statutory grounds for terminations, and the terminations were in the children’s best interests. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur R. Brooks
The defendant, Arthur R. Brooks, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in the Knox County Criminal Court to three counts of robbery, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each conviction, to be served concurrently, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Builders Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Paul Simms
This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeal Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 29, 2003, the appellant, Paul J. Simms, fractured his ankle at a construction site in Spring Hill, Tennessee. The trial court determined Mr. Simms' injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment. Mr. Simms has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's holding. Mr. Simms also alleges the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Jack Russell, the subcontractor whom Mr. Simms claims employed him on the day of his accident, because Mr. Russell invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial. After carefully considering the evidence adduced at trial, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Bobbie Jane T. Hagewood v. American Casualty Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Yates Services, L.L.C. v. Donald E. Black, Jr.
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined the employee, Donald E. Black, Jr. (Black), had sustained a work-related injury resulting in a permanent partial disability amounting to 26% of the body as a whole, and awarded temporary total disability and future medical benefits. The employer, Yates Services, L.L.C. (Yates) has appealed and contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing Black to present his evidence first at trial, (2) by holding that Black sustained a gradual back injury caused by his employment, and (3) by finding that Black had given adequate notice of his injury to his employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Estate of Eva Friedman Weisberger Philip J. Cooper v. Estate of Eva Friedman Weisberger
This is a petition for attorney’s fees in probate. The petitioner attorney was retained to represent the estate in the underlying probate action. After his duties were essentially completed, the representatives of the estate hired new counsel for the estate. The petitioner attorney then filed a petition for attorney’s fees, asserting that there had been an oral contract for 3% of the estate’s assets. The estate’s representatives objected, contending that there had been no agreement on attorney’s fees, and that the amount of the fee requested was excessive. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the parties had entered into the agreement as asserted by the attorney, and that the fee agreement was reasonable at the time it was made. Therefore, the trial court enforced the fee agreement and entered a judgment in favor of the petitioner. The estate now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Rico Walls
The petitioner pled guilty to three counts of selling cocaine over .5 grams within 1000 feet of a school. He was also convicted in a jury trial of a fourth count for the same offense. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to fifteen years for each conviction to run concurrently. The petitioner was unsuccessful on his direct appeal and appeal of a certified question. The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that his rights of equal protection were violated. The post-conviction court denied the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca Lee Bradshaw Owings v. William Albert Owings
This is a post-divorce petition to modify child support. When the parties divorced in 1995, the mother was granted custody of the parties’ two children, and the father was ordered to pay child support. The father was self-employed. In 2003, the mother filed the instant petition to increase the father’s child support obligation, alleging that the father’s income had increased since the divorce. The mother sought to prove the amount of the father’s income by submitting into evidence his bank |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Kay Brister Davis v. John W. Davis
This is a divorce case. After ten years of marr iage, the parties separated. Subsequently, their marital home was destroyed in a fire. The husband then executed a quit claim deed on the home to the wife. Consequently, the insurance proceeds on the home were paid to the wife, with none distributed to the husband. Both parties then filed for divorce. During the trial, the husband testified that the wife persuaded him to quit claim his interest in the home to her so that she could deal with the insurance company and sell the land on which the home stood. The husband sought a share of the insurance proceeds and the proceeds from the sale of the land. The wife alleged that the husband quit claimed his interest in the home to her as a gift. At the conclusion of the divorce proceedings, the trial court held, inter alia, that the home was a marital asset, despite the existence of the quit claim deed, and granted husband a share of the proceeds from the insurance and the sale of the land. The wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that, by executing the quit claim deed the husband did not intend to make a gift of his interest in the property to the wife. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Kay Brister Davis v. John W. Davis - Dissenting
It is difficult for this member of the Court to believe that husband, who had been married twice before, did not understand the effect of a deed or that he was “duped” by wife into conveying his property. The more likely scenario is that husband was fearful that wife would gain an interest in his business and that he agreed to convey the residential property in exchange for her acquiescence not to seek such an interest. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |