Marc Eskin, et al. v. Alice B. Bartee, et al.
Parents, individually and on behalf of their two minor children, sued various defendants for damages resulting from an automobile accident caused allegedly by the negligence of defendants. The complaint, in addition to seeking damages for the personal injuries sustained by one of the minor children, seeks damages on behalf of the mother and one minor child for negligent infliction of emotional distress. An uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed an answer in the cause and subsequentlymoved for summary judgment, which ostensibly involved only the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion but failed to denote that the grant was only a partial summary judgment for that particular claim. We modify the trial court's order by granting only a partial summary judgment and further reverse and remand that grant. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Lee Noe
The Appellant, Stephen Lee Noe, proceeding pro se, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. Noe pled guilty to one count of statutory rape and, following a sentencing hearing, was placed on a two-year period of probation. On appeal, Noe argues that the trial court erred by not granting judicial diversion. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby L. Holland and Wife, Rita Holland v. Amelia Jo Dinwiddie, DDS d/b/a Jo Dinwiddie, DDS
The plaintiff patient visited the defendant dentist periodically between 1998 and 2003. Between 2001 and 2003, the defendant performed dental work on the plaintiff including root canals, fillings, and crown work. Over this period, the plaintiff’s dental condition became significantly worse. The plaintiff developed abscesses and infection in his mouth and suffered from substantial dental pain. The plaintiff’s last visit to the defendant was in October of 2003. Over the 2003 holidays, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to contact the defendant for relief from his increasingly painful condition. The plaintiff ultimately received treatment from another dentist throughout 2004. After receiving the plaintiff’s dental records from the defendant in October of 2004, the treating dentist informed the plaintiff that the defendant’s treatment had been negligent. The plaintiff filed a dental |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tavarski Childress
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tavarski Childress, was convicted of first degree felony murder, reckless homicide, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged Defendant’s conviction of reckless homicide with his felony murder conviction, and Defendant was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for his felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, and ordered that this sentence be served consecutively to his life sentence. After filing a petition for post-conviction relief, Defendant was granted a delayed appeal. In his appeal, Defendant argues as plain error that the admission of his co-defendant’s statements to the police during the State’s re-direct examination of Sergeant Shemwell violated his constitutional right of confrontation. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the length of Defendant’s sentences, but remand for a new sentencing hearing to reconsider whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Elizabeth Stillwell, Decedent by and through Husband, H. Chester Stillwell v. Kenneth Wayne Hackney, Sr., et al.
Invitee fell in gravel driveway of rental property, allegedly due to a partially hidden concrete divider. Invitee ultimately died as result of the fall and invitee, by and through her husband, filed an action against rental property owners. Property owners filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish an exception to the general rule of landlord non-liability. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hal Gerber v. Robert R. Holcomb
Attorney filed an action against client to collect unpaid installments due under a promissory note. The trial court entered a consent final decree awarding attorney the sum currently due under the note. Attorney filed a second action against client to collect the then unpaid installments due under the same promissory note. Client answered alleging affirmative defenses which attacked the validity of the note and which were not raised in the first proceeding. Attorney filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that client was precluded from asserting the defenses under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion and attorney filed an extraordinary appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent herewith. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ellen Reagan v. Tennplasco, Federated Mutual Insurance Company, and CNA Insurance
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in (a) holding the employee’s right shoulder injury could not be considered in determining vocational disability resulting from carpal tunnel syndrome, (b) accrediting the testimony of one physician over that of another, (c) finding the employee sustained a 75 percent vocational disability to the arm, and (d) permitting codefendant CNA Insurance to participate in the trial. We affirm. |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mary Ellen Reagan v. Transcontinental Insurance Co., Manar, Inc., Tennplasco Division, and Sue Ann Head, Administrator of the Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Second Injury Fund contends the trial court erred in (a) finding the employee gave notice of injury to her left arm and shoulder, (b) awarding separate scheduled member and body as a whole awards for one gradually occurring injury, (c) failing to find the employee permanently and totally disabled from the last injury if notice was properly given, and (d) finding that an award on appeal constituted a “prior award” for the purposes of assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). We modify and remand |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Kimberly Walls v. National Healthcare Corp.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusionsof law. The employer asserts that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the employee’s injury is work-related, that the award is excessive, and that the employee failed to give appropriate or reasonable notice of the claimed injury. We affirm. |
Marshall | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jerry Peterson, et al. v. Henry County General Hospital District, et al.
This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff/Appellant allegedly suffered injuries after slipping in a pool of water that was allowed to stand on the Hospital/Appellee’s floor. The trial court ruled that Hospital/Appellee had no actual or constructive notice of the water and entered judgment in favor of Hospital/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcellus Hurt
The Appellant, Marcellus Hurt, was convicted by a Madison County jury of three counts of misdemeanor theft, two counts of burglary of a vehicle, one count of felony vandalism over $500, one count of possession of burglary tools, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. As a result of these convictions, Hurt received an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty nine days in confinement. On appeal, Hurt raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the vidence is sufficient to support his convictions for burglary of a vehicle and possession of burglary tools; and (2) whether his sentence is excessive. Following review of the record, we affirm the convictions and sentences as imposed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert W. Fink, et al. v. Fred M. Crean, et al.
The defendant, Mitchell Lee Blankenship, was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with one year to serve in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing by improperly weighing enhancement factors, not applying mitigating factors, and not granting him full probation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient. Although the trial court erred in applying the multiple victims enhancement factor, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was justified. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Russell House
The defendant, Russell House, was convicted by a Sumner County Criminal Court jury of aggravated perjury, a Class D felony, for lying about his criminal history during his testimony at his probation revocation hearing. The trial court subsequently sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years, with six months to be served in the county jail and the balance of the time on supervised probation. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the probation revocation hearing judge and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny McGowan v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I join in the result, but write separately for the following reasons. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny McGowan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Johnny McGowan, appeals the habeas corpus court’s orders dismissing his petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis. Following our review, we affirm the orders of dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corey Adams Kennerly v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayne Shelton
The Appellant, Wayne Shelton, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the Bedford County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shelton pled guilty to aggravated assault and attempted arson and received an effective six-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, Shelton argues that the court erred in denying him an alternative sentence, specifically community corrections. After review, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Lee Blankenship
The defendant, Mitchell Lee Blankenship, was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with one year to serve in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing by improperly weighing enhancement factors, not applying mitigating factors, and not granting him full probation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient. Although the trial court erred in applying the multiple victims enhancement factor, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was justified. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven A. Davis, Jr. v. April Dawn (Blackmon) Davis
Appellant appeals the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from a Final Decree of Divorce as it relates to child custody. Appellant asserts that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to the entry of a previous order of protection in the Alabama family court. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Opal Jean Woodruff, by and through the Guardian of Her Estate, National Bank of Commerce v. W.C. Sutton, Jr., et al.
In 1997, an Arkansas state court adjudged the plaintiff/ward to be incapacitated and appointed a bank to be the conservator of her estate. The conservator bank, acting on the behalf of the incapacitated plaintiff/ward, filed a complaint in 2002 against the defendants. The plaintiff sought to set aside a quit claim deed for property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff/ward had executed the deed in 1996 and transferred title for the property to the defendants. The co-defendant bank, which had obtained an interest in the property through the defendants in 2002 but was not named as a defendant in the complaint, answered the complaint in 2003 and moved for a dismissal. The plaintiff sought to amend the complaint and name the bank as a co-defendant. The co-defendant bank moved to strike the amended complaint. The originally named defendants filed an answer later in 2003, and in 2004 they moved for dismissal based upon the statute of limitations. In 2005, the defendants moved for a dismissal based upon their original defenses and for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the complaint. The plaintiff set a trial date in the chancery court, and the defendants moved to strike the trial date. The trial court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Ruff v. James G. Neeley, Tennessee Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, and EPerformax, Inc.
This case involves a claim for unemployment benefits after an employee was terminated for failing to follow company policy and refusing to follow his supervisor’s instructions. A female co-worker had previously complained about the claimant’s repeated attempts to ask her out on dates and several occasions when he had followed her to her car, all of which had made her uncomfortable. The claimant was suspended for two days at that time. A few months later, another female co-worker complained to her supervisor about the claimant’s behavior after he continued asking her out on dates for over a month, waited for her at her car, and eventually hugged her at work after she rejected another invitation to go out with him. A meeting was held about the claimant’s conduct, and his female co-worker and his supervisors asked that he agree not to communicate with the co-worker in the future. The claimant would not agree to stop contacting his co-worker, and he was terminated from his employment the next day. He filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially approved by the Department of Labor. On appeal, the Appeals Tribunal found that the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had been terminated for work related misconduct. The finding was affirmed by the Board of Review, and later by the chancery court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Gailand Bruff
The defendant, Howard Gailand Bruff, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The murder convictions were merged, and the defendant received concurrent sentences of life and twenty-five years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish his convictions because the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to prove his identity as the assailant, that he committed a theft against the victim, that he had the requisite intent to rob the victim to be convicted of felony murder, or that he killed the victim with premeditation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al. - Concurring
I concur in the opinion of the Court and write separately in order to re-emphasize and reaffirm the sound rules of law stated in Holt v. Citizen Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn.1984). Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Holt, an innocent purchaser at a foreclosure sale had constantly to look back over his shoulder for fear that someone would challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale in equity under the “shock the conscience of the court” standard. Holt makes it clear that, in the absence of misconduct or fraud, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale where the property brings less than true value is free from a constant cloud upon his title. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al.
This case involves a creditor’s entitlement to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale in which the creditor was the only bidder, and in which he paid considerably less for the large tract of mountaintop property than the debtor alleged it was worth. The trial court awarded the creditor’s successor-in-interest a deficiency judgment of over $4 million, holding that in accordance with the rule of Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1984), the debtor should not be permitted to challenge the legal presumption that the value of the property at the time of foreclosure was equal to the sale price because there was no evidence of “irregularity, misconduct, fraud or unfairness on the part of the mortgagee.” Since the Holt case did not involve a deficiency judgment, we believe it is inapplicable. After examining both the law of Tennessee and that of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to challenge the presumption by attempting to prove that the sale price was grossly inadequate. We accordingly reverse. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Edwin R. Oliver, Individually as Next Friend of Edwin C. Oliver, a Minor v. Prologis Trust
In this premises liability case, the minor plaintiff received a severe foot injury while assisting an independent contractor straighten concrete poles with a forklift on defendant premises owner’s property. The plaintiff’s father sued the independent contractor and the premises owner on his minor |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |