Jacques B. Bennett v. Virginia Lewis, Warden and State of Tennessee
E2006-01592-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, pled guilty to first degree murder in 1992 and was sentenced to life in prison. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the judgment against him was void because he was not present and not represented by counsel at his sentencing hearing and because the trial court did not follow statutory mandates in sentencing him. The trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bledsoe Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Andrew Soimis
M2005-02524-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr.

Andrew Soimis, the defendant, appeals his conviction for second degree murder (Class A felony) on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the judgment of conviction.

Putnam Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Mark A. Schiefelbein
M2005-00166-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Heldman

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Mark A. Schiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a 12-year sentence for each conviction and ordered consecutive service, thereby yielding an effective sentence of 96 years. Aggrieved of the convictions and sentences, the defendant appeals and raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to furnish discovery materials to the defendant; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by configuring courtroom seating to shield the public from viewing certain exhibits; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, sua sponte, to disregard certain truthful testimony of the defendant; (4) the trial court’s repeated questioning of State’s witnesses created an appearance of judicial bias and improperly bolstered the State’s case; (5) the trial court committed reversible error in excluding defense-proffered medical testimony that a physical examination of the victim rebutted the occurrence of sexual penetration, contact, or injury; (6) the trial court permitted the introduction of inadmissible and highly prejudicial hearsay and opinion testimony; (7) the trial court erroneously permitted the State to examine the defendant about his knowledge that a “voice stress analysis” could detect stress in an individual’s voice; (8) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant could be guilty of aggravated sexual battery if he acted intentionally, knowingly, or “recklessly”; (9) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the State could prove the mental state for aggravated sexual battery in the disjunctive by showing that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, “or” recklessly; (10) the trial judge should be disqualified from further involvement in the case; and (11) the defendant’s effective sentence is excessive, illegal, and unconstitutional. As an adjunct to the issues raised on direct appeal, the defendant also pursues Appellate Procedure Rule 10 interlocutory review to bar future prosecution of three related child rape charges that were severed, over his objection, from trial of the aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor offenses. After thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties briefs, their oral arguments, and the applicable law, we hold that none of the errors require reversal of the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery or for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. However, we hold that the incarcerative 96-years’ sentence is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing and does not provide a fair sense of predictability of the criminal law and its sanctions; therefore, we modify the defendant’s effective sentence from 96 years to 36 years. We order that the trial judge who presided at trial is disqualified from conducting any further proceedings in this cause. Finally, we dismiss the child rape offenses, as improperly severed, and hold that further prosecution on such charges is barred by
principles of double jeopardy.1

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth D. Hoover
M2006-00139-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The defendant, Kenneth D. Hoover a.k.a. Kenneth Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentence. The defendant was found guilty of second degree murder (Class A felony), reckless endangerment (Class A misdemeanor), and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of a felony (Class E felony). The defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting certain autopsy photographs and erred in imposing an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentencing.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Ayatolah W. Wallace
E2007-00150-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The defendant, Ayatolah W. Wallace, was convicted of three counts of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to sixteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, violent offender. He argues that his convictions must be overturned in light of State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tenn. 1991), which precludes dual convictions for kidnapping and another accompanying felony when the movement or confinement supporting the kidnapping charge is merely incidental to that required to commit the accompanying felony. Because the defendant was convicted only of aggravated kidnapping, however, Anthony is inapposite. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Bradley Court of Criminal Appeals

Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Pamela Greer Chandler
M2005-00034-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The plaintiff medical group loaned money to the defendant nurse for tuition at a school that trained its students to become nurse anesthetists. As part of the arrangement, the student promised to work for the group for three years after graduation. Seven months prior to graduation, the student notified the group that she would not be able to work for it upon completion of her training. She paid the loan back with interest, but the medical group filed suit to enforce a $15,000 liquidated damages clause in the loan contract. The student then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court held that the sum demanded constituted an impermissible penalty rather than a valid provision for liquidated damages and, thus, that it was unenforceable as a matter of law. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the student and affirm the denial of summary judgment to the medical group because we find that the undisputed facts do not show that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Moss Service & Supply, Inc. v. Tommy F. Gragg, Jr., et al.
M2005-02587-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas E. Gray

The defendants, homeowners, appeal an adverse jury verdict wherein the plaintiff, a heating, ventilation and air conditioning contractor, was awarded breach of contract damages plus discretionary costs.  Finding no error, we affirm.

Sumner Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Emanuel Lawrence Harris
M2006-00480-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge George C. Sexton

The defendant, Emanuel Lawrence Harris,1 pled guilty to nine felony drug offenses and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in ordering that some of his sentences be served consecutively. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Dickson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Frank Ray Ruth
E2006-01008-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

The Defendant, Frank Ray Ruth, was indicted for thirty-seven counts of filing false sales tax returns and one count of Class C felony theft of property. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion. The trial court reversed, concluding that the district attorney abused his discretion. The State obtained an interlocutory appeal from this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court ordering the district attorney general to grant the Defendant diversion is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

Melody Weston, Personal Representative, et al. v. Community Baptist Church of Wilson County
M2004-02688-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

This case arises from a dispute between a church and the estate of one of its former members over money given by the former member and her spouse to enable the newly-formed church to pay off a loan on its property. The estate contended that the money was a gift subject to a condition subsequent, with return of the gift required in the event the church ceased existence. The church admitted that it had accepted the gift, but argued that it never accepted any conditions. The court took note of a church resolution that ratified the alleged condition and ruled in favor of the estate. We affirm.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Earnest F. Brown v. State of Tennessee
M2005-02439-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

In October 2004, Petitioner, Earnest F. Brown, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property over $1,000.00, one count of burglary, two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, and one count of assault. In exchange for his plea, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve two years as a Range I offender for the first conviction of theft over $1,000.00, four years as a Range II offender for the second conviction of theft over $1,000.00, two years as a Range II offender for each burglary of a motor vehicle conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, for a total effective sentence of fourteen (14) years, eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days. In June 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After appointing counsel and conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner post-conviction relief. Petitioner now appeals that denial arguing that the trial court erred in denying his petition because (1) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and (2) he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Wiley Hawthorne
W2005-02320-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

OnNovember 2, 2004, the appellant, Wiley Hawthorne, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of felony reckless endangerment. On July 27, 2005, a jury found the appellant guilty on both counts. On August 26, 2005, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-two years for attempting to commit first degree murder and eighteen months for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, the sentences to run concurrently. On September 9, 2005, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on both counts of the indictment. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the accused guilty of both counts of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s convictions.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Frances Barnett v. Milan Seating Systems
W2006-00582-SC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

We accepted this appeal prior to its review by a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel primarily to determine whether the chancery court correctly ruled that an employee is working for her “pre-injury employer” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) when the company she was working for at the time of the injury is sold to a new entity and the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay with the new entity remain unchanged. We conclude that an employee is not working for her “pre-injury employer” when she returns to work and the company she was working for at the time of the injury then is purchased by a different company, and this is so even if the employee’s place of work, job duties, and rate of pay remain unchanged. The judgment of the chancery court on this particular issue is, therefore, reversed.

Gibson Supreme Court

Billy Joe McKinney v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging, Inc., and Ace Property and Casualty
E2005-2786-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jean A. Stanley

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court sustained the employee's complaint by concluding that the claimant had suffered a compensable, work related back injury. The court awarded benefits based upon a permanent, partial disability rating of thirtytwo (32) percent to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support a determination that the employee suffered a compensable injury. The employer also challenges the court's determination as to the extent of vocational disability. The employee contends that the trial court's award of permanent, partial disability should be upheld. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Carter Workers Compensation Panel

Anna E. Givens v. Cleve Mac, Inc., McDonald's Corp. and Wausau Insurance Co.
E2006-00364-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court sustained the employee's complaint by concluding that the claimant had suffered a compensable, work related injury. The court awarded benefits based upon a permanent, partial disability rating of ten (10) percent to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support a determination that the employee suffered a compensable injury. The employee contends that the trial court's award of permanent, partial disability should be increased to the maximum allowed under the Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Monroe Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee v. William Granville Howell
W2005-02837-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

Defendant, William Granville Howell, was indicted for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault and sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days, with the sentence suspended. On appeal, Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting testimony pertaining to a prior assault claim against Defendant; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the prior conviction and for opening the door for introduction of this evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hardeman Court of Criminal Appeals

Wanda Spires v. Watson Supermarkets, Inc. and the PMA Insurance Group, their Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier
E2005-02431-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the evidence supports a determination that she suffered a compensable aggravation of her preexisting degenerative disc disease. The employer contends that the trial court properly found that the employee did not sustain a compensable injury and that an award of costs, including discretionary costs, is appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Haskell E. Sutton v. Wackenhut Services, Inc.
E2006-00427-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald R. Elledge

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Rodney L. Marlowe v. Town of Oliver Springs
E2006-00026-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge T. E. Forgety, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald R. Elledge

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals a finding of non-compensability due to a lack of causation. We affirm.

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Tina Lynn Wyatt v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc.
E2006-00227-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge T. E. Forgety, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jean A. Stanley, Judge

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals from a judgment of non- compensability. We affirm.

Carter Workers Compensation Panel

Douglas Elliott v. Randstad Employment Services, Inc., and Ward North American Insurance Company
E2005-02450-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge T. E. Forgety, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Richard Johnson

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225 (e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee appeals, claiming he is entitled to permanent, or at least temporary, benefits. We affirm the trial court's finding that the Plaintiff failed to prove a permanent injury, but we remand the case for a determination of whether any temporary total disability benefits are payable.

Washington Workers Compensation Panel

Terry Hambrick v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc.
E2005-01793-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge T. E. Forgety, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225 (e)(3) (2005) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employer appeals an order requiring it to furnish certain medical treatment for a previous injury. We Affirm in part, and Modify in part.

Unicoi Workers Compensation Panel

Laura Johnson v. Clover Bottom Development Center, et al.
M2005-01440-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

An employee of Clover Bottom Development Center appeals the summary dismissal of her action under the Tennessee Handicap Act. The employee alleged she was the victim of discrimination due to her medical limitations. The trial court dismissed the action finding the employee failed to show she sustained an adverse employment action, an essential element of her claim. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Percy Lee Palmer v. State of Tennessee
M2006-01673-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The Appellant, Percy Lee Palmer, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant concedes on appeal that the trial court's judgment is correct. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

Lisa Ann (Gallahaire) Cartwright v. Robert Howard Cartwright, Sr.
W2005-02759-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ron E. Harmon

This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of marital property. The parties signed a prenuptial agreement. After they married, the parties operated a cattle and farming business, which was conducted in the wife’s name only. After three years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. A trial was held primarily on issues related to property distribution. The husband argued that the cattle and farming equipment was purchased with his separate funds and therefore was his separate property under the prenuptial agreement. The husband also alleged that the wife had discarded or destroyed numerous items of his separate property. The trial court found that the cattle and farming equipment was marital property and divided it equally, and declined to find the wife responsible for the items that had been discarded or destroyed. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

Benton Court of Appeals