Clifford Leon Farra v. State of Tennessee
E2005-00963-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The petitioner, Clifford Leon Farra, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by proceeding with an evidentiary hearing even though the state had failed to file an answer to his original pro se petition. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. James Riels
W2004-02832-CCA-R3-DD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The appellant, James Riels, appeals his sentences of death imposed by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. On September 18, 2003, a Shelby County Grand Jury charged the appellant with one count of first degree felony murder for the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, one count of first degree felony murder for the death of Franchion Pollack, one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Franchion Pollack, one count of especially aggravated robbery of Franchion Pollack, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery of Mary Jane Cruchon, and one count of aggravated burglary of the habitation of Mary Jane Cruchon. On August 9, 2004, the appellant entered guilty pleas to all seven counts. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions with the premeditated murder convictions, resulting in two convictions for first degree murder. A jury was impaneled for the sentencing phase, and on August 13, 2004, the jury imposed the death penalty for the murder of each victim. In the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances. In the death of Franchion Pollack, the jury unanimously found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances. The jury further determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-five-year sentence for the remaining noncapital convictions. The appellant appeals, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress, (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine him regarding the circumstances of the offenses, (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting the introduction of a post-mortem photograph of one of the victims, (4) whether the trial court’s instruction that the appellant’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution, (5) whether the trial court’s instruction on victim impact evidence constituted a coercive jury instruction, and (6) whether Tennessee’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the appellant’s sentences of death.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston - Dissenting
E2005-01746-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion “that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and diligence, and are entitled to a refund of their earnest money.” I agree fully with everything in the majority’s opinion except this final conclusion.

Washington Court of Appeals

Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston
E2005-01746-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

Plaintiffs sued to recover earnest money tendered with a contract to purchase realty. Defendant counter-sued for breach of contract and damages. The Trial Court Ordered the return of the earnest money to plaintiffs. We affirm.

Washington Court of Appeals

Ronald Eugene Gilmore v. Kenneth Locke, Warden
M2005-01235-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The petitioner, Ronald Eugene Gilmore, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that (1) his judgment of conviction for assault with intent to commit murder is void because the indictment was defective; (2) the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) the trial court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury; and (4) the trial court erred by not appointing counsel. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Cornelius Marshall v. State of Tennessee
W2005-01170-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The petitioner, Cornelius Marshall, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of facilitation to commit aggravated arson, and resulting effective twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Fayette Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Michael W. Belcher
E2005-00532-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant, Michael W. Belcher, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of two counts of aggravated assault by reckless conduct, for which he received an effective 24-year sentence as a career offender. Aggrieved of his convictions, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and accordingly affirm the judgments of the lower court.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

Lawrence Lee Brown v. Kelly Sue Brown
W2005-00811-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rita L. Stotts

This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding child support and related issues. The trial court awarded Wife/Appellee all of her attorney’s fees and expenses, and couched one-half of that award as additional child support pursuant to T.C.A. §36-5-103(c)(2005). Husband/Appellant appeals asserting that the trial court erred in categorizing the attorney’s fees as child support and on the ground that the attorney’s fees are excessive. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

John Jay Hooker v. Bettye L. Nixon, et al.
M2005-01383-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

Plaintiff filed this action to challenge the constitutionality of the Charter provision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County, Tennessee that imposes term limits on certain elected offices. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending the plaintiff did not have standing to maintain the action because he had not sustained a private injury distinct from other voters. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al.
W2005-01508-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

In this expedited appeal, this Court is asked to decide two questions of first impression. The first question is whether a term limit provision contained in a county charter is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4). Like the lower courts, we answer this question in the affirmative. The second question before this Court is whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-1-210(4) violates Article VII, section 1, of Tennessee’s constitution to the extent that the statute authorizes a county with a charter form of government to impose term limits upon members of its legislative body. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we answer this question in the negative. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the chancery court is reinstated.

Shelby Supreme Court

Lee Franklin Grace v. Kehe Food Distributors, Inc.
E2005-0064-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff seventy-five (75) percent permanent, partial vocational disability to the left leg. On appeal, the employer contends that the employee's injury was not work related and therefore not compensable. The employer also contends that benefits should be denied because the Plaintiff failed to provide the requisite notice of injury to the employer and that the action was not timely filed within the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Roane Workers Compensation Panel

Karam Hanna v. Gaylord Entertainment Company
M2004-00413-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Donald P. Harris
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara Haynes

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a workers' compensation claim for failure to prosecute and to abide by the orders of the trial court with regard to setting the case for hearing. The employee filed a motion to alter or amend the dismissal order which was denied by the trial court. The employee appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion on part of the trial court, we affirm the dismissal.

Davidson Workers Compensation Panel

Joseph Jackson v. State of Tennessee
W2005-01181-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The petitioner, Joseph Jackson, appeals the ShelbyCounty Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and resulting twenty-year concurrent sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims that his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy provision of the federal constitution, that his indictments were constitutionally defective, and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Clarice Perkins
W2005-01643-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

This is an appeal from the order of the trial court denying the Defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty pleas and motion to dismiss all charges. The Defendant, Clarice Perkins, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault pursuant to entry of guilty pleas. She received an effective eight-year sentence to be served on probation. After sentencing, but before the judgments became final, the Defendant filed pro se motions to withdraw her guilty pleas and to dismiss all charges. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: the trial court erred in denying (1) the Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, and (2) the Defendant’s motion to dismiss all charges. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Joseph Michael Harris v. Susan Taylor
W2004-02855-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This appeal stems from a suit to partition real estate. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the chancery court erred when it granted summary judgment and a judgment on the merits based on stipulated facts, evenly splitting the proceeds of the sale of property between joint tenants with rights of survivorship where one joint tenant paid more than her equitable share of the purchase money.  Specifically, the appellant contends that she was entitled to contribution from the appellee for the excess of the purchase price paid by her and that she did not make a gift of the excess. In addition, Appellant requests that she was entitled to a credit of $2,000 pursuant to an interim consent order disposing of numerous issues between the parties. The appellee has requested attorney’s fees incurred as a result of this appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the appellee.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Javier Soto-Hurtado v. State of Tennessee
W2005-01779-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The petitioner, Javier Soto-Hurtado, has filed a pro se appeal of the post-conviction court's refusal to reopen an earlier post-conviction petition which had been dismissed. He claims that he is entitled to relief based upon the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The judgment is affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Henry Court of Criminal Appeals

Marian L. Crull v. Donald R. Crull
E2005-01430-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon J. Bell

This declaratory judgment action was filed by Donald R. Crull (“Husband”) on November 4, 2003.  It seeks primarily a declaration as to the rights of Husband’s former spouse, Marian L. Crull (“Wife”), in and to Husband’s United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) retirement benefits, a subject addressed in the parties’ judgment of divorce entered in the trial court some 14 years and 3 months earlier, i.e., on July 11, 1989. In addition, Husband’s complaint seeks to terminate his alimony obligation effective when he retires at some unspecified time in the future.  The trial court – interpreting the language of the judgment of divorce – held that the language mandates that Wife is entitled, without limitation, to one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits. The court, in its judgment, did not grant or deny Husband’s request for termination of his alimony obligation; but, in the incorporated memorandum opinion, the court did opine that Husband’s retirement, when it happens, would constitute a change in circumstances. Husband appeals, arguing that Wife’s entitlement with respect to the retirement benefits should be limited to a share of the benefits that accrued before the divorce. Wife, by way of a separate issue, contends that the trial court erred in stating that a retirement, which has not yet occurred, would constitute a change in circumstances when it takes place. We vacate this latter observation by the trial court but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Knox Court of Appeals

John L. Medearis v. Bonnie Baumgardner (Stoloff)
E2005-01785-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

The mother sued to enforce Agreement with the father to pay college expenses for adult child of the parties. The Trial Court refused to enforce the terms of the Agreement on the equitable grounds of unclean hands and the lack of cooperation and fair dealings by the mother. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

C. Noelle Chaffin v. Marcus Ellis
M2003-01620-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge R.E. Lee Davies

This is a divorce and child custody case. The husband and the wife were married in February 1998.  Throughout the marriage, they lived together with the husband’s mother. The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate soon after the wedding. The wife felt that the husband and his mother were controlling and oppressive, while the husband felt that the wife was unfit. One child was born of the marriage. In October 2000, the wife filed the instant petition for divorce. After a nine-day trial, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, and designated the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. The trial court also awarded the wife a portion of her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. From that decision, the husband now appeals. We vacate a portion of the award of costs, and affirm as to the remaining issues, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s opinion in all other respects. The cause is remanded for reconsideration of a portion of the award of costs for expert fees.

Williamson Court of Appeals

C. Noelle Chaffin v. Marcus Ellis - Order Withdrawing Opinion
M2003-01620-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge R.E. Lee Davies

The Opinion filed by this Court on August 24, 2005, is hereby withdrawn, and a revised Opinion is being filed concurrently herewith.

Williamson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. James O. McCarson, Jr.
M2005-01094-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

The Defendant, James O. McCarson, Jr., was convicted of one count of stalking, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for stalking; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied him judicial diversion. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Humphreys Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Earl Bradshaw
M2005-01232-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The Defendant, Thomas Earl Bradshaw, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to an effective sentence of thirty-six years imprisonment. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his pleas. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Ricky Northern v. State of Tennessee, Stephen Dotson, Warden
W2005-02165-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Petitioner, Ricky Northern, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Hardeman Court of Criminal Appeals

Darwin Theus v. David Mills, Warden
W2005-02204-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Petitioner, Darwin Theus, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

John C. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
M2004-02675-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The petitioner, John C. Johnson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. The petition for writ of error coram nobis was dismissed without a full evidentiary hearing. In this consolidated appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s rulings on both petitions.1 Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. However, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief and remand for a new trial.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals