Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Frank A. Bass et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Denver L. Pryor
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Lorrie Marcum
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Rufus Reese et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Linda Scott Webster
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Nikki Wallace et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Berton Gregory et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Fred P. Walter et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Fred Thomas McKee et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Ronald R. Dunn, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Charles Carter, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. James R. Stephenson, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Robert G. Ingrum et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Michael Rippy et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. James Lassiter, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Rebecca Warren
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Charles A. Deshler and Martha A. Deshler Joint Caring Trust et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Carlito D. Adams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carlito D. Adams, was convicted in 1995 of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted felony murder, with the latter being reversed and dismissed. See State v. Carlito D. Adams, No. 02C01-9608-CR-00267, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1247 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 1997), perm. to appeal denied concurring in results only (Tenn. Nov. 9, 1998). In November 1999, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which, according to the petitioner, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Additionally, he alleges that this court denied, on January 25, 2002, his motion to reconsider the dismissal. On January 19, 2005, he filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, claiming that a new right, which he sought to assert, had been recognized in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that there was new scientific evidence establishing his actual innocence. The post-conviction court denied the motion to reopen, and the petitioner appealed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos L. Rice v. David Mills, Warden
The Petitioner, Carlos L. Rice, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Grover L. Dunigan v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Grover L. Dunigan, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his conviction for second degree murder. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing on the grounds that the petition was time-barred. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations because his trial attorney never told him that the supreme court had denied his Rule 11 application. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the lower court properly dismissed the petition. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edna Phelps
The defendant, Edna Phelps, was found guilty by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years, all suspended except for eleven months and twenty-nine days with the balance to be served on intensive probation. On appeal, she argues the trial court erred in overruling her objections to certain questions asked by the State. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Murphy
The defendant, Steven Murphy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, for which the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, merged the two theft convictions, and sentenced the defendant to two years for the theft conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence without parole. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to allow hearsay statements of the victim into evidence, in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police, and in not instructing the jury on the adverse inference that could be drawn from the State’s failure to preserve the tape recording of the defendant’s statements. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Case No. 01-02751 to reflect the defendant’s conviction offense which was omitted. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shields Mountain Property Owners Assocation, Inc., et al. v. Marion A. Teffeteller, et al.
Shields Mountain Property Owners Association, Inc., James R. Hall, and Terri L. Hall ("Plaintiffs") sued Marion A. Teffeteller and Charlene A. Teffeteller ("Defendants") seeking, among other things, to enforce restrictive covenants and enjoin Defendants from renting their property in Shields Mountain Estates for overnight vacation purposes. The Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the covenants and restrictions at issue are applicable to the lots within Shields Mountain Estates including Defendants' lots; that Defendants' use of their lots for vacation rentals is a violation of the covenants and restrictions; and that Defendants are permanently enjoined from using property they own in Shields Mountain Estates for vacation rentals. Defendants appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Grigsby v. University of Tennessee Medical Center, et al.
In this pro se medical malpractice case, the issues on appeal are whether the Appellant, Larry Grigsby, timely filed a notice of appeal as regards Defendants Dr. Paul A. Hatcher and Dr. E. Jay Mounger, and whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the University of Tennessee Medical Center ("UTMC"). We dismiss the appeal as to the Defendant doctors because we find that Mr. Grigsby did not comply with the jurisdictional requirement of Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), mandating the timely filing of a notice of appeal. We affirm summary judgment in UTMC's favor because Mr. Grigsby proceeded solely on the vicarious liability theory of respondeat superior, pursuant to his allegations that Drs. Hatcher and Mounger were agents and/or employees of UTMC. Because the alleged agents have been exonerated by an adjudication of non-liability, and therefore the alleged principal, UTMC, may not be held vicariously liable, we affirm summary judgment in favor of UTMC. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Jamison v. Harrell Ulrich, et al.
The issue presented in this case is whether the policemen and firemen's rule applies to an animal control officer who was bitten by a Doberman pinscher while performing the duties of his employment. The plaintiff, an animal control officer for the Chattanooga Police Department, was bitten when, in the course and scope of his employment, he attempted to take possession of the defendants' dog at their home. The plaintiff sued the defendants for compensatory damages, claiming that they were negligent in failing to warn him about the dangerous nature of the dog. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment upon its determination that the dog's owners owed no duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances pursuant to the policemen and firemen's rule which precludes police officers and firefighters from recovering for injuries arising out of risks peculiar to their employment. Upon review, we find that the dog's owners owed no duty of ordinary care to the animal control officer and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |