John Ruff v. James G. Neeley, Tennessee Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, and EPerformax, Inc.
This case involves a claim for unemployment benefits after an employee was terminated for failing to follow company policy and refusing to follow his supervisor’s instructions. A female co-worker had previously complained about the claimant’s repeated attempts to ask her out on dates and several occasions when he had followed her to her car, all of which had made her uncomfortable. The claimant was suspended for two days at that time. A few months later, another female co-worker complained to her supervisor about the claimant’s behavior after he continued asking her out on dates for over a month, waited for her at her car, and eventually hugged her at work after she rejected another invitation to go out with him. A meeting was held about the claimant’s conduct, and his female co-worker and his supervisors asked that he agree not to communicate with the co-worker in the future. The claimant would not agree to stop contacting his co-worker, and he was terminated from his employment the next day. He filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially approved by the Department of Labor. On appeal, the Appeals Tribunal found that the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had been terminated for work related misconduct. The finding was affirmed by the Board of Review, and later by the chancery court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Opal Jean Woodruff, by and through the Guardian of Her Estate, National Bank of Commerce v. W.C. Sutton, Jr., et al.
In 1997, an Arkansas state court adjudged the plaintiff/ward to be incapacitated and appointed a bank to be the conservator of her estate. The conservator bank, acting on the behalf of the incapacitated plaintiff/ward, filed a complaint in 2002 against the defendants. The plaintiff sought to set aside a quit claim deed for property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff/ward had executed the deed in 1996 and transferred title for the property to the defendants. The co-defendant bank, which had obtained an interest in the property through the defendants in 2002 but was not named as a defendant in the complaint, answered the complaint in 2003 and moved for a dismissal. The plaintiff sought to amend the complaint and name the bank as a co-defendant. The co-defendant bank moved to strike the amended complaint. The originally named defendants filed an answer later in 2003, and in 2004 they moved for dismissal based upon the statute of limitations. In 2005, the defendants moved for a dismissal based upon their original defenses and for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the complaint. The plaintiff set a trial date in the chancery court, and the defendants moved to strike the trial date. The trial court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Marie Gillespie v. Andrew Mark Gillespie
The issue presented in this case is whether the Wife’s alimony award is modifiable due to her remarriage when the divorce decree does not classify the alimony award, stating only that “the [Husband] shall pay alimony to the [Wife] in the amount of five hundred dollars per month for a |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Melissa A. Rhymer, Legal Custodian of Robert A. Trivett and wife, Maria Trivett, v. 21st Mortgage Corporation and Southern Showcase Housing, INC., d/b/a Homes America
In this case defendants moved to arbitrate the dispute since plaintiff signed a contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff pled incompetence to contract, but the Trial Court held that issue was subject to arbitration. We vacate and remand and instruct the Trial Court to decide the issue of incompetency. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
R.D.M. v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, In the Matter of: D.J.M.M., Jr., D.O.B. 8/28/2000
Appellant, who was married to the mother at the birth of the child, claims the Trial Court erred in failing to engage in a comparative fitness test in awarding the child to a person who by DNA testing was shown to be the biological father. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
C.S.C., et. al. v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
In this class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, were guilty of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional violations in the design and implementation of theBoard’s evening alternative education program for students who are expelled or suspended from their regular schools. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: S. L. A.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, contending the evidence was not clear and convincing that she abandoned her child and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child. The trial court found the mother had abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, which conduct included ingesting drugs while pregnant and while breast feeding, and the manufacture of methamphetamine in the family home. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al. - Concurring
I concur in the opinion of the Court and write separately in order to re-emphasize and reaffirm the sound rules of law stated in Holt v. Citizen Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn.1984). Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Holt, an innocent purchaser at a foreclosure sale had constantly to look back over his shoulder for fear that someone would challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale in equity under the “shock the conscience of the court” standard. Holt makes it clear that, in the absence of misconduct or fraud, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale where the property brings less than true value is free from a constant cloud upon his title. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al.
This case involves a creditor’s entitlement to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale in which the creditor was the only bidder, and in which he paid considerably less for the large tract of mountaintop property than the debtor alleged it was worth. The trial court awarded the creditor’s successor-in-interest a deficiency judgment of over $4 million, holding that in accordance with the rule of Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1984), the debtor should not be permitted to challenge the legal presumption that the value of the property at the time of foreclosure was equal to the sale price because there was no evidence of “irregularity, misconduct, fraud or unfairness on the part of the mortgagee.” Since the Holt case did not involve a deficiency judgment, we believe it is inapplicable. After examining both the law of Tennessee and that of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to challenge the presumption by attempting to prove that the sale price was grossly inadequate. We accordingly reverse. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Edwin R. Oliver, Individually as Next Friend of Edwin C. Oliver, a Minor v. Prologis Trust
In this premises liability case, the minor plaintiff received a severe foot injury while assisting an independent contractor straighten concrete poles with a forklift on defendant premises owner’s property. The plaintiff’s father sued the independent contractor and the premises owner on his minor |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Brown v. Nissan North America, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-226(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In determining the appropriate vocational disability rating, the trial court considered conflicting medical testimony, the employee's work duties, and other factors such as the employee's education, age, and skill level. The employer contends the trial court erred when it awarded a 10% vocational disability rating to the plaintiff's right leg. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Adam Charles Partin v. Delores Lourraine Wallis
Adam Charles Partin (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his child support obligation claiming that a significant variance existed between his income at the time his child support obligation was originally calculated and his current income. The case was tried and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that a significant variance did exist making the child support order eligible for modification. The Trial Court then reduced Father’s child support. Delores Lourraine Wallis (“Mother”) appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in calculating Father’s income and that a significant variance does not exist. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tulinague Thandiwe
The Appellant, Tulinague Thandiwe, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court which resulted in the imposition of an eight-year sentence of incarceration. On appeal, Thandiwe challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen D. Lamb
The Appellant, Stephen D. Lamb, was convicted by a Madison County jury of burglary, a Class D felony, and the misdemeanor offenses of possession of burglary tools and evading arrest. Lamb received an eight-year sentence for burglary and an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for each misdemeanor conviction. The misdemeanor sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the felony conviction. On appeal, Lamb raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress certain items found in Lamb’s possession at the time of his arrest; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a police videotape; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether Lamb’s sentence |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Oscar Sevilla v. Douglas Cox
The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert R. Neese - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with the opinion’s conclusion that the trial court properly instructed the jury that the culpable mental state of recklessness would satisfy the unlawful sexual penetration element in the offense of child rape. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert R. Neese
The defendant, Albert R. Neese, appeals from jury convictions of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The defendant also appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences which totaled twenty-eight years. The issues on appeal include challenges to the admissibility of a videotaped interview of the seven-year-old victim, the defendant’s pastor’s report to the police, and the victim’s statement to a social worker for medical diagnosis and treatment. The remaining issues are the propriety of the jury instructions as to the mens rea elements of child rape and the propriety of consecutive sentences. Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentence as imposed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eugene L. Lampley, et al. v. Melvin D. Romine, et al.
In a boundary dispute, the trial court refused to find estoppel by deed since the party raising the estoppel had not relied on the erroneous deeds. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dale Rimmer
Capital Appellant Michael Dale Rimmer appeals as of right his sentence of death resulting from the 1997 murder of Ricci Ellsworth. In November 1998, Appellant Rimmer was convicted of theft of property, aggravated robbery and premeditated first degree murder. He was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. On direct appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed Appellant Rimmer’s convictions but, concluding that the sentencing verdict was “enigmatic and uncertain,” vacated the sentence of death and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See State v. Michael D. Rimmer, No. W1999-00637-CCA-R3-DD, 2001 WL 567960, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 25, 2001). Accordingly, the case was remanded to the Criminal Court for Shelby County for re-sentencing. At the conclusion of the re-sentencing hearing in January 2004, the jury found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, i.e., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997). The jury further determined that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. Appellant Rimmer timely appeals presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for recusal; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for a continuance; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding mitigation evidence; (4) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; (5) whether the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was error; (6) whether the Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify; (7) whether it was error for the jury to be informed that the Appellant had been on “death row;” (8) whether the jury verdict was complete; (9) whether cumulative error requires reversal; and (10) whether the Tennessee death penalty statutes are constitutional. After review, we find no error of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s imposition of the sentence of death in this case. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Willie Johnson, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of burglary and theft over $500, for which he is serving eight years. He was sentenced to eight years on the burglary conviction and four years for theft, to be served concurrently. The petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel and argues that his attorney: (1) failed to provide him a list of the grand jurors who indicted him, including their racial make-up; (2) failed to consult him on every peremptory challenge; (3) failed to advise him to testify on his own behalf; (4) failed to persuade him to wear something other than his prison uniform at trial; and (5) failed to fully investigate and interview the witnesses in his case. After careful review, we conclude that no basis to grant relief exists, and we affirm the postconviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nathaniel Benton, a/k/a, Nathan Gray v. Tony Parker, Warden
The Petitioner, Nathaniel Benton, a/k/a, Nathan Gray filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his conviction and subsequent sentence for being a habitual criminal is void because the underlying convictions upon which the habitual criminal conviction is based are void. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Myrna Jill Johnson Halle
The Defendant, Myrna Jill Johnson Halle, was convicted of reckless aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of twelve years in prison to be served at sixty percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and established that the Defendant acted in self-defense; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced her. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., f/k/a Holiday Inns Franchising v. States Resources, Inc., et al.
The issue presented in this priority dispute between a first deed of trust holder and a judgment lien creditor involves the legal effect of the inadvertent and erroneous release of the deed of trust. States Resources Corporation (SRC), Defendant/Appellant, holds two liens on the same real property: one as successor-in-interest to a judgment creditor and the other as assignee of a promissory note for a construction loan, secured by a deed of trust originally held by Trust One Bank. Plaintiff/Appellee Holiday Hospitality Franchising (Holiday) also holds a judgment lien that, in relation to SRC’s filings, was filed last in time. SRC appeals summary judgment entered in favor of Holiday and contends that as assignee of Trust One’s note and first-filed deed of trust, it occupies the most senior lien position, notwithstanding the mistaken release of the deed prior to the assignment. Because Trust One’s release was inadvertent and unintended, and because restoring the deed of trust to its original priority position would not prejudice the rights of Holiday, an intervening judgment lien creditor, we hold that, as a matter of law, the mistaken release should be cancelled in part and the deed as to Lot 30 should be restored to its position as first deed of trust. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ cause of action as time-barred under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 6-51-102(a)(1) & 103. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael A. Sullivan, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated Under T.C.A. 29-21-104 v. Karen Watson, et al.
The petitioner, Michael A. Sullivan, filed an application for habeas corpus relief in the Williamson County Circuit Court to challenge his conviction in the Williamson County General Sessions Court for sixth offense driving on a revoked license. He was sentenced to 11 months, 29 days, with all but 65 days suspended on supervised probation. He contends that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 5(c) and Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-1-109 and 40-3-101 are unconstitutional and should not allow a defendant to waive an indictment. After careful review of the record, we conclude no grounds exist for granting habeas corpus relief and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals |