Mark Cowan v. Kim Hatmaker - Concurring
I agree with the results reached by the trial court – including the award of attorney’s fees – as affirmed by the majority opinion. I write separately to express my disagreement with the appellant’s belief and the majority’s belief that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the custodial arrangement. I recognize that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the identity of the primary residential parent. However, I believe the trial court did find that the circumstances regarding the child’s custodial arrangement had changed so as to “affect[] the child’s well-being in a meaningful way,” Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002); and that it then proceeded to (1) modify the existing parenting plan by transferring decision-making authority regarding the educational/extracurricular activities of the child from the father to the mother and (2) grant the mother the right to obtain a second opinion as to medical matters. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Cowan v. Kim Hatmaker, In Re: BC, D.O.B 4/15/93, Minor Child Under Eighteen (18) years of age
The father filed a Petition to Change Custody of child from the mother to the father, alleging change of circumstances. Following trial, the Trial Court refused to order a change of custody, but modified the Parenting Plan. On appeal, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Vanover
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, James Vanover, of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years for the rape and eight years for each aggravated sexual battery to be served consecutively at 100% for an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, but we conclude that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. We remand the case to the trial court for resentencing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bernardino Lira, also known as Jose Fernandez
The defendant, Bernardino Lira, pled guilty to DUI, third offense, and driving on a revoked license, receiving concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and ten days, with all but four months suspended. He reserved as a certified question whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of the stop of his vehicle. We conclude that the question is properly certified and that the trial court ruled correctly in denying the motion to suppress. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Davis
The appellant, Larry Davis, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Allen Construction, LLC v. Jerome Hancock, Sandra Hancock, and Carroll Bank and Trust
This is a construction case. The defendant homeowners entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff contractor to construct a house for the defendants. After the contractor had substantially completed construction of the house, the homeowners discharged the contractor. The contractor then filed suit for unpaid costs and fees. The defendant homeowners counter-sued, alleging breach of the original contract. After a trial, the trial court entered a final order granting a monetary award to the contractor for his unpaid fees, minus several credits awarded to the defendant homeowners. The record does not include any factual findings or legal conclusions detailing the basis for the award. The defendant homeowners appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of an expert witness and in its calculation of the award to the contractor. We affirm the trial court’s admission of the expert testimony, but vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for factual findings and legal conclusions in order to resolve the remaining issues on appeal. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur Lee Harrison
The Appellant, Arthur Lee Harrison, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the attempted voluntary manslaughter of his estranged wife. On appeal, Harrison argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scottie D. Pennington
The Appellant, Scottie D. Pennington, was convicted by a Jackson County jury of driving under the influence (DUI) and felony reckless endangerment. As a result of these convictions, Pennington received consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty nine days for DUI and two years for reckless endangerment. On appeal, Pennington argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, he asserts that the State failed to prove his identity as the driver of the vehicle or that the vehicle was operated in a reckless manner. After review of the record, we affirm. |
Jackson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert L. Moore v. Glenn Turner, Warden
The petitioner, Robert L. Moore, filed in the Hardeman County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his 1994 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, his three 1991 convictions for sale of cocaine, and his three 1991 convictions for concealing stolen property are void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry L. Cowan v. David Mills, Warden
The petitioner, Jerry L. Cowan, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to second degree murder, and he received a sentence of thirty-five years as a Range II offender. Subsequently, he filed in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cumecus R. Cates v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cumecus R. Cates, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition based on its determination that the underlying conviction was on appeal to this Court. It is from the order of dismissal that the Petitioner appeals. The State concedes that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Ivy - Concurring and Dissenting
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Ivy
The defendant, David Ivy, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to death. In imposing a death sentence, the jury found that two aggravating circumstances, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person and the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another, had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (6) (Supp. 1999). In addition, the jury determined that the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at (c). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. After the appeal was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying eight issues for oral argument.1 Having reviewed the record and applicable authority, we now hold that: 1) the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction; 2) the trial court did not err in impaneling an anonymous jury; 3) the trial court properly ruled that the victim’s statements were admissible under the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exception; 4) the evidence supported the jury’s findings that the two aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; 5) the trial court erred during the sentencing phase in instructing the jury that two of the five prior felony convictions relied on by the prosecution involved violence to a person, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 6) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce the defendant’s prior indictment for first degree murder in the sentencing phase of the trial where the defendant had been convicted of second degree murder, but the error did not affect the outcome; 7) the trial court erred in ruling that defense counsel could not argue residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance during the sentencing phase, but the error did not affect the outcome; and 8) the evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death sentence was not arbitrary or disproportionate. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Neil Laurent - Dissenting
The majority affirms consecutive sentences based upon a finding that the appellant’s criminal history is extensive. T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2). The pre-sentence report reflects no documentation of a prior conviction of any type. The appellant’s statements to the pre-sentence officer indicate excessive alcohol and drug abuse and that he completed a drug and alcohol treatment program in 1983. Based upon the appellant’s self-reporting of drug use, the majority concludes that consecutive sentences are warranted. I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that a defendant’s self-reporting of uncharged alcohol or drug abuse will warrant consecutive sentences. This information is sought in the pre-sentence report for the purpose of fashioning an individualized sentence under sentencing guidelines, not for purposes of gathering incriminating evidence. To utilize the offender’s statements within the report for increased penal sanctions is counterproductive in that it discourages truthfulness and is inconsistent with the purposes of the pre-sentence report. If the State wishes to introduce evidence of uncharged criminal activity, then it may do so; however, the defendant should not be penalized for candor. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Neil Laurent
The appellant, Paul Neil Laurent, was indicted in 2003 for twelve counts of various crimes allegedly committed against his step-daughter and daughter. After a bench trial, the appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count of attempted child neglect. The appellant received a total effective sentence of seventeen years. The appellant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and motion to dismiss regarding the charge of aggravated kidnapping; (2) the trial court erred in determining that the appellant was guilty of attempted aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sexual battery because the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roderick Harris v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Roderick Harris, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2004, he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and received a sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a pretrial mental evaluation. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Camilla Jean Palmer Revocable Trust
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Larry Law et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Harold B. Knight et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Ruth W. Briley
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Martha Jo Law Fenimore
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Calvin Kirkham et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Patricia G. Green
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. David Smith et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. William Sherron et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |