Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc.
In this workers' compensation case, the employee sought benefits due to mental injuries that allegedly arose out of his contact with hazardous material in the course of his employment. We conclude that the record and the applicable law support the trial court's determination that the employee's mental injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment and that the employee is 100% permanently disabled with respect to his mental faculties. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Danny Russell v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Manufacturing, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding: 1) that the employee’s pre-existing leg condition was aggravated by his work for the employer; 2) that the employee gave proper notice of his injuries; and 3) that the employee had sustained a 90% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sharon Marcel Keisling v. Daniel Kerry Keisling v. Francisco (Frank) Huberto Guzman & wife, Billie Ann Guzman
This is a post-divorce petition to modify custody. During the marriage, the mother and father lived with the mother's parents. The parties were divorced in September 1998, and custody of the parties' three children was granted to the mother. After the divorce, the mother and the parties' children continued to live with the maternal grandparents. In March 2000, the mother filed a petition to restrict the father's visitation, alleging that the father sexually abused the parties' two daughters. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the children. After a hearing, the allegations of sexual abuse were determined to be unfounded. Approximately a year later, the mother filed a second petition to restrict the father's visitation, once again alleging sexual abuse. The father filed a counter-petition for custody based on a material change in circumstances. The father alleged that the mother and her parents were causing harm to the children by subjecting them to persistent questioning and repeated physical examinations in an attempt to prove sexual abuse. The mother's parents were joined as third-party defendants. The mother's parents then filed a cross-petition for grandparent visitation. After a bench trial, the trial court granted the father's petition for a change in custody and allowed the mother unsupervised visitation in the grandparents' home. The grandparents' petition for grandparent visitation was dismissed. At the conclusion of trial, the guardian ad litem for the children submitted a request for $15,000 in fees. The trial court denied the request, awarding the guardian ad litem only the $1,500 she had already been paid. The mother, the grandparents, and the guardian ad litem now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court, except that we remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the guardian ad litem's fee request in light of the applicable law. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Yvonne Bilyeu v. Glenn E. Bilyeu
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the Chancery Court's denial of alimony, denial of Rule 60 post-judgment relief, and the court's classification of his workers' compensation benefits as marital property. Finding Husband's appeal without merit, we affirm the Chancery Court's decision. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In re A.J.H.
The child who is the subject of this Petition to Terminate Parental Rights, A.J.H., is the latest of five children born to the mother, M.H. A.J.H. is the fourth child of D.H., the father. At the conclusion of an initial investigation by DCS personnel, A.J.H. was removed from the parents’ custody immediately after birth and has remained with his foster parents since that removal. The father appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights as well as its refusal to consider the paternal grandparents’ petition for custody. We reverse and vacate the order of termination and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Todd Jackson v. Ken Goble, et al.
Pro se prisoner Plaintiff filed a claim against circuit court clerk, circuit court judge, district attorney general, assistant public defender, and two attorneys, alleging civil conspiracy and forfeiture. The trial court dismissed the claims sua sponte without a hearing pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Steven A. Edwards, et al. v. Nancy Allen, et al.
Plaintiffs appeal the action of the trial court in granting Defendants' Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) Motions to Dismiss their challenge to a November 9, 1992, amendment to the Rutherford County Zoning Resolution. The trial court determined that the 10-year statute of limitations provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110 barred the action and that the discovery rule did not apply. We hold that on the record before the Court, the November 9, 1992, purported amendment is void ab initio. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence County Education Association, et al. v. The Lawrence County Board of Education, et al.
Basketball coach and employee association appeal trial court's refusal to order coach reinstated as a method to enforce arbitration decision under Master Contract between school board and association. We affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Dolwin Deon Cormia v. State of Tennessee
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dolwin Deon Cormia, of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole plus a concurrent two year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Miller S. Price, Deceased, Greene County Bank v. Mark F. Price
Deceased had executed loan guaranties to claimant. Claimant filed claim in Estate based on the guaranties. The Estate excepted on the grounds that the underlying loans were not due and payable because claimant had not accelerated the indebtednesses. The Trial Court upheld the claims. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Lucy R. Chapman v. H & R Block Mortgage Corporation, et al.
This appeal presents the issue of the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The plaintiff entered into a loan transaction with the defendant mortgage corporation to obtain funds on behalf of her daughter. The loan was secured by a mortgage on plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's daughter subsequently discontinued making payments on the loan, and plaintiff filed a petition to rescind the loan, asserting that plaintiff was caused to sign the loan by defendant lender's fraud. Several months after the case had been pending, lender demanded that the case be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an agreement signed by plaintiff when the loan was closed. The trial court granted lender's motion compelling arbitration. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the arbitration agreement she entered into is unenforceable because it is an adhesion contract and is unconscionable and unreasonable. Plaintiff further argues that lender waived its right to compel arbitration under the circumstances in this case. We hold that the arbitration agreement is enforceable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Building Materials Corporation d/b/a GAF Materials Corporation v. Leonard Coleman
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained injuries to his left shoulder while working for the employer. The trial court: (1) held that the injury was compensable; (2) awarded a 45 percent vocational disability; (3) awarded the employee 45 weeks of temporary total disability benefits; (4) held that the employer denied the claim in bad faith; and (5) awarded a bad faith penalty of 25 percent of the temporary total disability award plus 25 percent of the permanent partial disability award. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable. We affirm the award of 45 percent to the arm. We modify the award of 45 weeks of temporary total disability to 16 weeks. We vacate the penalty for partial permanent benefits, but affirm the penalty for temporary total benefits, as modified. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lawrence Milliken
The Defendant, Christopher Lawrence Milliken, pled guilty to one count of resisting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search; one count of simple possession of marijuana; and one count of violating the implied consent law. In conjunction with his guilty pleas, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law for this Court's consideration. Because the certified question of law is not dispositive of the Defendant's case, we dismiss this appeal. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Martinez
On December 17, 1999, Defendant, Henry Martinez, pled guilty to the Class A felony offense of conspiracy to sell more than 300 pounds of marijuana. Under the negotiated plea agreement, he received a sentence of fifteen (15) years as a Range I, standard offender. Also, pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the State dismissed a charge of possession with intent to deliver seventy (70) pounds of marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, as long as he testified truthfully against his co-defendants in the case. On July 19, 2004, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was denied by the trial court and defendant has appealed to this Court. The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the motion has merit, grant same, and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of A.M.H., a minor Jerry L. Baker and Louise Baker v. Shao-Quiang (Jack) He and wife, Qin (Casey) Luo - Concurring and Dissent
While I concur in the majority opinion on some issues, I must dissent from the affirmance of the termination of the Hes’ parental rights on the ground of willful failure to visit.1 I would instead reverse the trial court’s termination of the Hes’ parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of AMH, a minor Jerry L. Baker and wife, Louise K. Baker v. Shao-Qiang (Jack) He and wife, Qin (Casey) Luo
In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents to a minor child. The biological parents are Chinese immigrants who are presently in this country illegally and are subject to deportation proceedings. Shortly after coming to the United States, the biological parents had a daughter. Facing financial difficulties at the time of their daughter’s birth, the parents decided to place their daughter in the care of an adoption agency until their financial situation improved. The agency placed the child with foster parents who agreed to care for the child over an initial three month period. At the conclusion of the three month foster care period, the biological parents agreed to the entry of a consent order by the juvenile court transferring custody of the child to the foster parents. The biological parents continued to visit with their daughter at the home of the custodial non-parents approximately once each week for one hour each visit. However, they paid no child support to the custodial non-parents. The biological parents subsequently filed a petition to modify the juvenile court’s custody order seeking to regain custody of their daughter, which the court denied. Thereafter, the biological parents continued to visit their daughter with the same frequency as before. On one day in particular, the biological parents asked to take their daughter fora family portrait, and the custodial non-parents refused their request. When the biological parents refused to leave the custodial non-parents’ home, the police were called. After speaking with the police, the biological parents left the home and never returned to visit their daughter citing their fear of arrest. A short time after this incident, the biological parents filed a second petition to modify the juvenile court’s custody order. In response, the custodial non-parents filed a petition to adopt the child and to terminate the biological parents’ parental rights in the chancery court, primarily relying on the ground of abandonment. As a result, the biological parents’ petition to modify the custody order was transferred to the chancery court. Following a lengthy and tortured procedural history, the chancery court held a bench trial in the matter and subsequently entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights. The biological parents filed a timely appeal to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decisions of the chancery court in this case. However, in light of our decisions on certain issues presented in this case, we need not remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie D. Sims
The Defendant, Ronnie D. Sims, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of vandalism, and one count of possession of burglary tools. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to seventeen years in the Department of Correction for the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of six years for the vandalism conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the burglary tools offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence; claims that his right to a fair trial was compromised by the State's loss of evidence; and complains that his seventeen year sentence for the aggravated robbery is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward H. Tenison v. The Penn Warranty Corporation
This appeal involves interpretation of a warranty contract for used cars. Since the contract provided no exclusion for an inaccurate odometer, we affirm the trial court's enforcement of the warranty. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wade P. Tucker
This is an appeal as of right from a denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Wade P. Tucker, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder pursuant to a guilty plea, and especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary following a bench trial. The Defendant was sentenced to twenty-four years in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). This Court upheld the Defendant's attempted murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions on direct appeal, but reversed the conviction for aggravated burglary. See State v. Wade P. Tucker, No. M2001-02298-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1574998 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 17, 2002). The Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. The Defendant now appeals denial of post-conviction relief, arguing: (1) his conviction for attempted first degree murder is void due to a faulty guilty plea; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester James Farris, Jr.
This is a direct appeal as of right from jury verdict convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and theft of property. The Defendant, Lester James Farris, Jr., was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective twenty year sentence. The Defendant argues three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he made to law enforcement officers; (2) there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the three offenses for which he was convicted; and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bernardo C. Lane v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Bernardo C. Lane, petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This direct appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion. The issue presented for review, as stated by the Appellants is: Whether the Chancery Court correctly held that County Charter, Article II, § 2.03(g)(the “Charter”and the “Amendment”), which provides that no County Mayor or County Commissioner is eligible to be elected to or to hold office for more than two consecutive four year terms, is valid in accordance with the third paragraph of Tennessee Constitution, Article VII, Section 1 and Tenn. Code Ann. § § 5-1-201, et seq. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al.
This appeal from a declaratory judgment action requires us to determine whether term limits imposed on Shelby County Commissioners by the 1994 amendments to the Shelby County Charter, Article II, section 2.03(G), are permissible under Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-210 and, if so, whether § 5-1-210 is unconstitutional under the Tennessee Constitution, Article VII, Section 1. We hold that term limits are permitted as “qualifications” under Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-210(4). We further hold that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-210(4), insofar as it permits county charters to prescribe the qualifications of members of the county legislative body, is void as unconstitutional under Article VII, Section 1, of the Tennessee Constitution. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the trial court, award summary judgment to Plaintiffs/Appellants, and enjoin enforcement of section 2.03(G) of the Shelby County Charter. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
M.D. v. R.L.H.
M.D. ("Mother") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of R.L.H. ("Father") to the parties' seven year old son. Following a hearing, the Juvenile Court held that grounds for terminating Father's parental rights had been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Juvenile Court made no factual findings or conclusions of law as to whether terminating Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly C. Smith v. Ronnie R. Smith, et al.
This case involves an intrafamily transaction in real property. A now-deceased owner of a piece of commercial property held by tenancy by the entireties agreed to sell it to his nephew in a handshake transaction. The nephew made a $10,000 down payment, began paying off the balance in monthly installments, and made improvements to the property. After the seller died, his widow filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the court to declare the rights of the parties with regard to the real property. Although the trial court found there was indeed an agreement between the uncle and the nephew to sell the land to the nephew, the court declined to require the widow to effectuate the contract, not because she had not agreed to the sale, but because she offered to reimburse the nephew for all his out-of-pocket costs. Because we conclude the widow should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds to avoid the sale, and because her offer cannot limit the buyer’s remedies, we reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |