Janey Fluri and David Fluri v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, Dawn Taylor, Melinda Blue, M.D., and Vista Radiology, P.C.
The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the grant as to defendants Blue and Vista Radiology, arguing the Trial Court erred in granting judgment on grounds that the statute of limitation had run. We vacate and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Ray Wolford v. Ace Trucking, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, employee, argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the employee was 100% permanently partially disabled and seeks an award of permanent total disability benefits. The appellees, the employer and the Second Injury Fund, argue that the trial court was correct in finding that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled. For the reasons stated below, the panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed as modified. |
Decatur | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In the Matter of: A.S., Q.S., and J.S.
This is a mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her three children. Mother suffers from a cocaine addiction. She has had numerous opportunities for rehabilitation but failed to stay drug-free. At the time of trial, the children had been in foster care for two years during which time Mother only exercised token visitation. The juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Germaine McKenzie
The appellant, Germaine McKenzie, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offense of second degree murder. As a result of the conviction, the appellant was sentenced to twenty-four years, to be served at one hundred percent incarceration. The appellant appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Waldo Wiggins, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Waldo Wiggins, Jr., was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court of first degree murder. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied both petitions, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Whittington
The defendant, John Whittington, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be suspended to probation after the service of 120 days of confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dena M. Taylor v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a Regional Medical Center at Memphis, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the circuit court erred when it granted a defendant doctor’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff asserts, as she did at trial, that there was a genuine issue of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The plaintiff filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vivian Braxton
The Defendant, Vivian Braxton, pled guilty to one count of theft between ten and sixty thousand dollars, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to three years to be served as follows: six months in the County Workhouse with the remainder suspended, and three years of probation to follow the confinement. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in declining her request for judicial diversion; denying her request for full probation; and in ordering her to serve six months day-for-day in confinement. We modify the Defendant’s sentence insofar as removing any requirement that she serve her period of confinement day-for-day. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malinda L. Mason
Defendant, Malinda L. Mason, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fifth offense, and sentenced to twenty-one months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant's sole issue on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her request for a mistrial. When this case was originally before this court, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Subsequently, Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court. On August 22, 2005, the supreme court granted the application and remanded to this Court for reconsideration in light of Walsh v. State, 166 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2005). After reviewing this case in light of Walsh, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patricia Ann Starkey, alias
The defendant, Patricia Ann Starkey, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but seven days suspended. As a condition of her guilty plea, she sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in denying the evidence obtained as the result of her allegedly unlawful arrest. However, upon review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly preserve a question of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. v. Eastman Chemical Company
Eastman Chemical Company ("Eastman") and Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc. ("Cryotech") entered into an agreement whereby Cryotech would purchase non-food grade feedgas from Eastman which was roughly 78% carbon dioxide ("CO2"). Cryotech then would purify the feedgas and sell it as food grade CO2. Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. ("Messer") purchased the CO2 from Cryotech. Messer in turn sold the CO2 to soft drink manufacturers. The CO2 sold to Messer was contaminated with cyanide and resulted in property damage to Messer and Messer's customers. In the third appeal arising from this litigation, we must determine whether the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Eastman on Messer's claims for breach of warranty, products liability, and negligence, and whether the Trial Court properly refused to allow Messer to amend its complaint to assert a claim for negligence per se. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Samuel Bennecker, et al. v. Howard Fickeissen, et al.
This appeal involves the enforceability of the parties' oral settlement agreement. The parties, who were next-door neighbors, were involved in a lawsuit over their common boundary line. The parties appeared for depositions, but before depositions commenced, they allegedly reached a settlement and cancelled the depositions. A dispute later arose as to whether there had been a settlement of all issues in the case; the Defendants filed a motion seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs responded that there was no enforceable contract because there had been an agreement as to some, but not all, of the issues in the case. The trial court determined that there had been a settlement agreement as to all issues and ordered enforcement of the agreement. After careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the parties had an enforceable agreement to settle all claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lucille Richardson
The appellant, Lucille Richardson, with the trial court’s permission, filed an interlocutory appeal, and, pursuant to the appellant’s Rule 9 application, this Court agreed to review the appellant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of pretrial diversion. After reviewing the record as a whole, we |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dot Bush Goot et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County
This appeal involves a dispute between the surviving spouses of five disabled city employees and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County over the amount of life insurance benefits payable after the employees died. The surviving spouses filed three separate lawsuits asserting that the city had breached their spouses' employment contracts as well as its fiduciary duty and had committed fraud by concealing information and by knowingly providing false information regarding a waiver of premium benefit that would have greatly increased their death benefits. These suits were consolidated in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing all the surviving spouses' intentional tort claims because they were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The remaining breach of contract claims of three of the surviving spouses were tried to a jury, and the trial court directed a verdict for the city at the close of the plaintiffs' proof. Thereafter, the trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims of the other two surviving spouses. All the surviving spouses have appealed. We affirm the summary judgment orders dismissing the surviving spouses' intentional tort claims and the breach of contract claim of one surviving spouse. We reverse the directed verdict with regard to three of the remaining surviving spouses' breach of contract claims, as well as the summary judgment dismissing the other surviving spouse's breach of contract claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Israel Allen Jackson
The Appellant, Israel Allen Jackson, appeals the order of the Dickson County Circuit Court revoking his suspended sentences. In November 2004, Jackson received an effective eight-year sentence, which was suspended following his guilty pleas to three counts of Class C felony sale of cocaine. The eight-year sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a two-year term of probation, stemming from a prior drug conviction which Jackson was still serving at the time of his guilty pleas. In December 2004, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Jackson had violated numerous conditions of probation. Following a revocation hearing, Jackson was found in violation of probation, and his effective eight-year suspended sentence was revoked with reinstatement of his sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his effective eight-year sentence as the sentence had not yet "begun to run." Additionally, he argues that the trial court erred in finding him in violation of probation. Finding these assertions without merit, the order of revocation is affirmed. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gloria Mastilir v. The New Shelby Dodge, Inc.
Plaintiff Gloria Mastilir filed a tort action against Defendant The New Shelby Dodge arising from the Defendant’s alleged faulty repair of Plaintiff’s motor home. Plaintiff subsequently took a voluntary non-suit and later failed to refile her action within the one-year savings statute under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. As a result, the general sessions court and circuit court held that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals arguing that the lower courts erred in not finding that Defendant was equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitation defense and also asserts that Defendant revived Plaintiff’s suit by promising to repair or pay for repairs to Plaintiffs vehicle. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dempsey Ausley v. Ferrell Shaw, et al.
This case arises from alleged defamatory statements made by Defendants David Smith, Vanessa Smith, and Charles Pagett, Jr. against Plaintiff Dempsey Ausley. The alleged statements were made subsequent to Ausley's termination as Pastor of Parker's Chapel Missionary Baptist Church in Portland, Tennessee. Plaintiff sued the three Defendants asserting claims of slander. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims because they were too closely entangled with Plaintiff's termination as pastor, which is an ecclesiastical matter of the church. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kardoush, LLC, d/b/a Caesar's Wine and Liquor, et al. v. City of Memphis Alcohol Commission
The Memphis Alcohol Commission denied Plaintiffs/Appellees’ Kardoush’s application for a certificate of compliance over 80 days after the application was filed, and Kardoush appealed to the chancery court. The trial court determined that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 57-3-208(e), the Memphis Alcohol Commission would have been deemed to have granted the application where the Commission had failed to either grant or deny the application within 60 days of submission. Thus, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-208(f), Kardoush was not required to submit a certificate of compliance with its application to the Tennessee Alcohol and Beverage Commission. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall K. Bishop
The defendant, Randall K. Bishop, was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony. A jury convicted the defendant of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced to three years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. After careful review, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm the conviction. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Bartley Bell
A Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, David Bartley Bell, of driving under the influence, third offense, and violation of the implied consent law. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion. After a suppression hearing, the trial court dismissed the charges against the defendant because the arresting officer was not present to testify. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against the defendant. After our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Dwain Norton
The Appellant, Terrance Dwain Norton, appeals the imposition of certain conditions of work release following his commitment to the Lincoln County Jail. Norton's jail confinement stems from a revocation of probation. On appeal, Norton argues that work release conditions imposed by the Lincoln County Circuit Court are "onerous" and will impede his ability to maintain his current employment. We find this argument without merit. The sentencing decision of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Dwain Norton
The Appellant, Terrance Dwain Norton, appeals the imposition of certain conditions of work release following his commitment to the Lincoln County Jail. Norton's jail confinement stems from a revocation of probation. On appeal, Norton argues that work release conditions imposed by the Lincoln County Circuit Court are "onerous" and will impede his ability to maintain his current employment. We find this argument without merit. The sentencing decision of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Troy Noles v. Michigan Powersports, Inc. d/b/a Champion Motorsports & Champion Powersports
This case involves a dispute over whether Tennessee courts have personal jurisdiction over two Michigan corporations regarding an alleged violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Tennessee had personal jurisdiction over the Michigan corporations and the corporations filed an interlocutory appeal. We find that the Tennessee Long Arm Statute provides Tennessee with personal jurisdiction over the corporations and that the decision comports with the requirements of due process; therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent herewith. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell Bowers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mitchell Bowers, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1997. He appeals the denial of his post-conviction petitioner in which he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to advise him that he was not required to testify in his own behalf at trial, and (2) failing to disclose that counsel had previously represented the victim. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court; therefore, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Eric Nash - Concurring
I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the trial court erred by giving the nature of circumstances definition of "knowingly" and the result of conduct definition of "intentionally" in its instructions to the jury. As indicated by the majority, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: Knowingly means that a person acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. The requirement of knowingly is also established if shown that the defendant acted intentionally.
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Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals |