James Yates v. State of Tennessee
W2005-01047-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Defendant, James Yates, filed a pro se pleading seeking to have a conviction and sentence set aside as unconstitutional. The trial court treated the pleading as seeking a writ of habeas corpus and summarily denied the Defendant’s claim for relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

Rick A. Hughes and Lisa J. Hughes v. Richard C. Poulton and Annette L. Poulton
M2004-01712-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

This is a property dispute between next-door neighbors over a gate across a driveway easement. The two neighbors shared a common driveway from the public road in front of both properties. After a clash between the two neighbors' dogs, one neighbor erected a fence on the boundary line with a gate across the other neighbor's portion of the driveway. This lawsuit followed. The trial court enjoined the defendant neighbor from placing the fence and gate over a portion of an easement that was the only existing driveway to the plaintiff's residence on the adjoining property. The trial court found that the gate was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of their property, and held that the defendants' erection of the gate constituted an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement. The defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that, although the gate may not have been an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that it was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of the property.

Wilson Court of Appeals

John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al. - Concurring
M2004-02185-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen H. Lyle

I fully concur with all aspects of the Court’s well reasoned majority opinion. Nevertheless, I wish to address the scurrilous, unfounded and unprofessional personal attacks made by Appellee against the person holding the position of and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee.  Unfounded and unwarranted accusations such as those cast by Appellee accomplish little but to reflect adversely on the one casting. This jurist enjoys a heated exchange of differing opinions and an aggressive analysis of legal theories and principles. Moreover, I find such exchanges often productive, enabling the tribunal to get to the intellectually honest assessment of the case; however, scurrilous and unfounded personal attacks serve no legitimate purpose and have no place in the dispute resolution arena.

Davidson Court of Appeals

John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al.
M2004-02185-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Defendants appeal the refusal of the Chancellor to impose Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al. - Dissenting
M2004-02185-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The trial court specifically found that the complaint herein was “duplicative of matters already settled and litigated by rulings of superior courts.” Nonetheless, the court decided sanctions were not appropriate due to the ambiguity created by the Special Master’s determination the case could proceed under the order limiting the cases filed by the plaintiff. The majority opinion agrees that the lawsuit’s clearance under the screening order and the Attorney General’s failure to challenge the result of that screening justify the refusal to impose sanctions. Thus, the test applied by the trial court and the majority of this court is whether the complaint complied with the screening order.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Jesse Teasley v. Jack Morgan, Warden
E2005-00102-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle

The petitioner, Jesse Teasley, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Morgan Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Terry Boyd Collins
E2004-01677-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant, Terry Boyd Collins, stands convicted by a Sullivan County jury of arson and presenting a fraudulent insurance claim, for which he received an effective nine-year sentence. Aggrieved of his sentence and convictions, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and claims that prosecutorial comments during closing arguments constitute reversible error, that the trial court's sentencing determination conflicted with the mandates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that the trial court erred when denying all forms of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Donald Luke Seiber, alias - Concurring
E2004-01794-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

Respectfully, I find I cannot fully concur in the opinion because, based upon the absence of a contemporaneous objection, it treats as waived the issue of the trial court’s “reading the aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense out of order during the charge to the jury.”   The instructional problem alleged is one of instructional error, not instructional omission. In the case of the former, no contemporaneous objection is required, unlike when an instruction is omitted. See, e.g., State v. Johnny Wade Meeks, No. 03C01-9811-CR-00411, slip op. at 8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Dec. 3, 1999).

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Donald Luke Seiber
E2004-01794-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

The appellant, Donald Luke Seiber, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and two counts of sexual battery, and he received a total effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Sherry Kay Hepler v. Donald Merle Hepler
M2004-00530-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This is a petition to modify custody. When the parties divorced in 2000, the mother received primary custody of the parties' three children. After the mother sought an increase in the father's child support obligation, the father filed this petition to obtain primary custody of the children, alleging a material change in circumstances. The father later amended his petition to include allegations of physical abuse by the mother. The trial court declined to modify custody, finding the evidence insufficient to justify modification. We vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand for written findings on the abuse allegations, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a)(8).

Davidson Court of Appeals

Charles Goode v. State of Tennessee
W2004-01577-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

Petitioner, Charles Goode, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his counsel’s representation at trial was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s case and failed to effectively cross-examine the victim.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

George R. Caldwell, Jr., et ux v. PBM Properties
E2004-02512-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

George R. Caldwell, Jr. and Angie R. Caldwell ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Caldwell" as appropriate) sued PBM Properties ("Defendant") for nuisance claiming that during Defendant's development of Blue Grass Heights Subdivision ("Blue Grass"), Defendant denuded the land altering water runoff and causing Plaintiffs' property to flood. The case was tried before a jury and the jury found that Defendant was 100% liable to Plaintiffs for a temporary flooding nuisance. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $3,820.50 in damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming that the evidence supported a finding of permanent nuisance, the nuisance had to be abated on Defendant's property to be considered abated, and, the jury did not award the proper amount of damages. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

In Re Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr.
M2002-02234-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This appeal involves a dispute stemming from an effort to probate a will and two codicils in solemn form. The testator’s widow filed a petition to probate these instruments in solemn form in the Chancery Court for Marshall County. Prior to the entry of an order admitting the will and two codicils to probate, the widow discovered that a third codicil she believed to have been destroyed had, in fact, not been destroyed by her late husband or in his presence and that her late husband’s lawyer had made a copy of this codicil before destroying it himself. Accordingly, she filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to admit the third codicil to the probate in solemn form along with the will and the other two codicils. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form without mentioning the declaratory judgment petition. The testator’s daughters moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition, and the testator’s widow filed a motion for postjudgment relief from the order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form.  Following a series of hearings, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment petition and denied the motion for post-judgment relief. The testator’s widow appealed. We have determined that the order admitting the will and the first two codicils must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings regarding the third codicil.

Marshall Court of Appeals

Martha M. Boote v. Helen Boote Shivers, et al.
M2003-00560-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This appeal involves a challenge to an antenuptial agreement. Following the death of her husband, the decedent's wife filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County to have her husband's will and two codicils admitted to probate in solemn form. She later discovered that a third codicil that would have dramatically increased her share of the estate had not been properly revoked. When the trial court rebuffed her efforts to have the third codicil admitted to probate, she filed a petition to dissent from the will and to seek an elective share of the estate and one year's support. The decedent's daughters opposed the petitions based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the court set aside the antenuptial agreement after finding that the decedent's wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably and without duress. The decedent's daughters appealed. We have determined that the antenuptial agreement is enforceable.

Marshall Court of Appeals

AT&T Corporation, Network Systems Division v. Loren Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
M2004-01514-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

AT&T sued the Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee to recover sales tax paid on central office equipment for the years 1995 and 1996 asserting that the equipment qualifies for exemption as industrial machinery. Determining that the outcome of the case was controlled by AT&T v. Johnson, 2002 WL 3124708 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the Chancellor held that the industrial machinery exemption was not applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Peter Keenan and wife, Jan Keenan v. The City of Kingston, Tennessee and Jim Pinkerton (in his capacity as City Manager of City of Kingston)
E2004-02728-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

Petitioners' Writ of Certiorari was dismissed as being moot because petitioners had moved outside defendants' jurisdiction. On appeal, we affirm and remand with instructions.

Roane Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Sarah Martin
E2004-01972-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The defendant was convicted following a jury trial in Knox County for arson and aggravated burglary, as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant six (6) months confinement and five (5) years and (6) months on probation to be followed by a second six (6) year sentence to be served entirely on probation. The defendant argues three (3) issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony at trial contrary to the defendant's motion in limine which was granted by the trial court; and (3) the defendant's sentence was imposed contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions and remand for resentencing.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Ben D. Braden v. Boeing-Oak Ridge Company
E2004-02194-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Roger E. Thayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl Fansler

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a bifurcated hearing on the issue of causation, the trial court found plaintiff’s cirrhosis of liver condition was not caused by his exposure to methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) and methyl ethyl toluene (MET) and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff’s appeal challenges the ruling upon the ground the trial court failed to properly weigh the expert testimony and also upon the ground the trial court applied an incorrect standard of law to the case. We find the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion of the trial court and affirm the judgment in all respects.

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Arrow Electronics v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc.
W2004-02595-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

Plaintiff/Appellant, a computer distribution company, sued Defendant/Appellee, a temporary employment service, for damages resulting from a temporary employee’s allegedly negligent act.  The trial court found in favor of the Defendant/Appellee on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellant had not met its burden of proof to show negligence. We affirm on the grounds that the temporary employee was the loaned servant of the Plaintiff/Appellant and, as such, Defendant/Appellee is not liable for the negligent act of the temporary employee.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State ex rel. Walter J. Davis v. ABC Brentwood Locksmith Service, et al.
M2004-00638-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R.E. Lee Davies

Appellant is a defendant in a delinquent tax suit by Williamson County for business personal property taxes for the year 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff because the defendant had not utilized his available administrative remedies, and Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Sherrye Hampton-Cross, et al. v. State of Tennessee, et al.
M2004-01672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner Stephanie R. Reevers

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Student of the University of Memphis was struck by two vehicles while crossing the street from the University-owned parking lot to the University campus. Student and husband filed suit in the Claims Commission against the University and the State, claiming that Defendants negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Claims Commission granted the motion. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission in all respects.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Phyllis A. Young v. Taylor-White, LLC
E2004-00788-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to an employee injured while attending an employer-sponsored company picnic. After reviewing the evidence and applicable authority, we conclude that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of her employment and therefore is not compensable under the workers' compensation law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

Cocke Supreme Court

Tabatha R. White v. State of Tennessee
M2004-02679-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The petitioner, Tabatha R. White, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence and (2) that she received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because her attorney failed to object to hearsay testimony, failed to request a circumstantial evidence instruction, failed to file pretrial motions requesting that the State reveal any plea bargain agreements it had made with the State's witnesses, and denied her the right to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

James Ray Bartlett v. State of Tennessee
M2004-03057-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

The petitioner, James Ray Bartlett, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner asserts that the judgments of conviction for aggravated assault and four counts of theft are void because the sentences are illegal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Wayne Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Gay Nathan Yarbro
W2005-00374-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The Defendant, Gay N. Yarbro, was convicted by a jury of introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction for this offense, to be served consecutively to a sentence for
a prior conviction. Additionally, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence for the prior conviction and ordered him to serve the original sentence in confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution and further challenges the length of his sentence for that offense. The Defendant also challenges the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence on the prior conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the instant conviction, and further affirm the trial court’s order of revocation.

Hardin Court of Criminal Appeals