State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Nelson
W2004-01685-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

Originally indicted for second degree murder, Defendant, Jermaine Nelson, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve ten (10) years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a Range II offender. We agree, and affirm the conviction, but reverse the sentence and remand for an amended judgment imposing a Range I sentence of six (6) years.

State of Tennessee v. James Rowe Hudson
W2003-02433-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, James Rowe Hudson, was declared a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender in Carroll County by default judgment. Several weeks later, he was charged in Henry County with driving while a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616(a).  The defendant then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in Carroll County to set aside the original order. The motion was denied. Ultimately, the defendant was convicted in Henry County and received a Range I, two-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the following issues have been presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court of Carroll County properly denied the motion to set aside the order declaring the defendant to be a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction in Henry County for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act; and (3) whether the trial court of Henry County imposed an excessive sentence. The judgment of the Carroll County Circuit Court denying the defendant's motion to set aside the order declaring him to be a Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender is reversed and the order is set aside. Because the conviction in Henry County is based upon the Carroll County order, the conviction must be reversed and the charge dismissed.

Montea Wilson aka Marcus Floyd v. State of Tennessee
W2004-01881-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The petitioner, Montea Wilson, aka Marcus Floyd, was convicted by a jury of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery in 2000. The jury sentenced the petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court merged the
attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Montea Wilson, No. W2000-00748-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 925255 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 4, 2002). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. The petition was amended by counsel. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court refused to let the petitioner’s attorney question trial counsel about his requests for jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, determining that the issue was waived or previously determined. At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the post-conviction court improperly concluded that several of the petitioner’s issues were waived or previously determined, denying the petitioner a full and fair hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we remand the matter for a full and fair hearing on the issues presented in the post-conviction petition.

State of Tennessee v. Gloria A. Porter
W2004-02464-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

Aggrieved of her convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver and of simple possession of marijuana, the defendant, Gloria A. Porter, appeals. Because we have determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal of the charges.

Will Henderson and Express Refunds, Inc. d/b/a Henderson Tax Service v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. Janice Fullilove, and Bruce Demps
W2004-02903-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donna M. Fields

This is a defamation case. After listening to a local talk radio show, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants, asserting that the defendants had broadcast defamatory material on the radio show concerning the plaintiffs’ business practices. There was no recording of the talk radio show. In a bench trial, many witnesses testified about statements made on the show. After the trial, the trial court found that there were so many different versions, there was no way to determine what was actually said on the radio program. The trial court concluded that, assuming unflattering statements were made, they did not damage the plaintiffs’ reputations. The trial court also concluded that, even if the statements made were defamatory, the plaintiffs did not prove any injury. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

Ford Motor Credit Company v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
M2004-00050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

Ford vehicles leased by its dealers are simultaneously purchased by Ford Credit, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. Ford Credit is subject to a franchise tax which is determined by the book value of its tangible personal property owned or used in Tennessee. If the leased vehicles are finished goods inventory, their value is excluded from the calculation of franchise taxes. The trial court ruled that the leased vehicles were not held by Ford Credit for sale, and thus did not qualify as finished goods inventory. Ford Credit appeals. The judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Brandon Raymond Bartee
M2004-02637-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and consecutive nature of his sentences on three counts of sexual battery. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the enhanced sentences were justified based upon the defendant's prior criminal behavior; (2) the mitigating factors, even if applied, would not have lessened the enhanced sentence; and (3) the defendant's consecutive sentence was proper based upon the predatory nature of his conduct and the residual psychological effects incurred by the minor victim. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Edward M. Patterson
M2004-02666-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

The defendant, Edward M. Patterson, pled nolo contendere to possession of drug paraphernalia and criminal trespass and received respective sentences of sixty and thirty days, both suspended. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law as to whether there was adequate reasonable suspicion to support a seizure of his person. Because we find the certified question is not dispositive of the charges, we dismiss the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Denny Finney
M2004-02798-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

The Defendant, Denny Finney, pled guilty to misdemeanor simple possession of a schedule VI substance, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended, except for six months to serve in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence.

Melvin Perry v. Bruce Westbrooks, Warden, and The West Tennessee State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board
W2005-00904-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The petitioner prisoner was found guilty on the charge of “failure to participate” in work as instructed by a prison official. He lost his prison job and was sentenced to a brief period of segregation and a $5.00 fine. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court, naming as respondents the warden and the disciplinary board. The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse and remand to the trial court for issuance of the writ.

The Travelers Indemnity Company of America, et al. v. Moore & Associates, Inc.
M2004-01233-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

The insurer of a general construction contractor brought an action for a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the contractor against the claims raised against the contractor in a demand for arbitration. The Chancery Court for Sumner County, Tennessee, Judge Tom E. Gray, granted summary judgment to the contractor, holding that the insurer, as a matter of law, had a duty to defend the contractor in the arbitration. The court reserved ruling on whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify the contractor for damages paid as a result of the arbitration settlement until after the arbitration proceeding. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Terry Brown v. Ace Property and Casualty Insurance Company and William Bonnell Company, Inc.
M2004-01859-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge J. S. (Steve) Daniel
Trial Court Judge: Circuit Judge J. O. Bond

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Terry Brown sustained a work-related left knee injury on November 4, 2000, when he slipped on a plastic bag and fell on a concrete floor, landing primarily on his left knee. This incident occurred within the scope and course of his employment and was observed by his supervisor. Mr. Brown reported his injury and sought medical care from Dr. Bowdoin Smith with the approval of his employer. Dr. Smith administered nonsurgical treatment for pain and recommended that Mr. Brown receive an MRI scan and returned him to work. The treating physician’s recommendation of an MRI was not carried out and he made no impairment rating. Thereafter, a doctor preforming an independent medical evaluation assigned a 5% impairment to Mr. Brown’s left lower extremity. A second independent medical evaluation assigned a 1% impairment to the left lower extremity for this same injury. Unfortunately for Mr. Brown, on June 7, 2001, he sustained work-related injuries to both of his arms. Mr. Brown filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits on June 18, 2001 for all these injuries which was ultimately amended and later settled his claims related to both arm injuries. This settlement order retained as the only issue for ultimate decision, Mr. Brown’s claim for left lower extremity injury.  The trial court, after considering the medical and lay evidence, awarded Mr. Brown 45% permanent partial disability to his left lower extremity and the benefits associated therewith. The employer has appealed this decision asserting that this award is excessive and takes into account subsequent injuries to the arms. Therefore, this appeal is limited to whether the trial court’s award was excessive. After carefully considering the record, we find that although the award of the trial court is generous, we affirm the trial court’s determination.

Donald E. Smith v. Fleeman's Transport, Inc. and Tennessee Second Injury Fund
M2004-01709-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge J. S. (Steve) Daniel
Trial Court Judge: Circuit Judge Jim T. Hamilton

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Donald E. Smith had suffered a number of injuries prior to and after his employment with Fleeman’s Transport, Inc., but none of these incidents resulted in a disability impairment rating or job restrictions. On November 9, 2000, Mr. Smith suffered a work-related accident which caused him to be permanently and totally disabled.  The trial court determined that Mr. Smith reached maximum medical improvement from his injuries on October 23, 2003, and based on the court’s assessments of prior work injuries, apportioned the award of workers’ compensation for the November 9, 2000 injury to both the employer and the State Second Injury Fund. Fleeman’s appeal contends that the trial court erred in assigning the date of maximum medical improvement past the date of the employee’s actual maximum recovery. The Second Injury Fund appeal contends that the trial court erred in assigning it any liability because the employer failed to establish actual knowledge of a prior disability. We find that the proof fails to preponderate against the judgment of the trial court on the date of maximum medical improvement and affirm this portion of the trial court’s decision. We also find that Fleeman’s Transport, Inc. did not establish actual knowledge of disability required for assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund.  Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s apportionment of liability for this work-related injury and modify that determination and assign all responsibility and liability for this work-related injury to Fleeman’s Transport, Inc.

Dianna Gail Thompson v. Travelers Indemnity Co., Charter Oakfire Insurance Co., and Toshiba American Consumer Products, Inc.
M2004-01913-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge J. S. (Steve) Daniel
Trial Court Judge: Circuit Judge J. O. Bond

This case is before the court upon the entire record including the Order of Referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dianna Gail Thompson suffered a work-related injury to her back and neck as a result of her attempt to move a wooden pallet during the course and scope of her employment as a relief operator. Ms. Thompson promptly reported her injury to her supervisor and sought medical care. The treating physician concluded that Ms. Thompson had a strained back and found no permanent impairment. Ms. Thompson thereafter sought other physicians who treated her condition. Thereafter a doctor performing an independent medical evaluation, assigned a 5% impairment to the body as a whole for her back injury. The trial court, in determining whether the employee’s injury was permanent, considered this conflicting medical testimony and after evaluating that medical testimony, awarded Ms. Thompson a 12.5% permanent impairment to the body as a whole and the benefits associated therewith. The employer in this appeal contends that the trial court erred in accrediting the independent medical evaluation over that of the treating physician’s evaluation of Ms. Thompson’s injury. The employer also contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the employer to pay 6.4 weeks of temporary total disability based on records submitted after the proof had closed. Therefore, this appeal is limited to whether the trial court’s award of permanent partial disability benefits was excessive and whether the award of 6.4 weeks of temporary total disability benefits was based on sufficient proof. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the trial court’s determination of 12.5% permanent partial disability and reverse the trial court’s award of 6.4 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, finding that the trial court impermissibly reopened proof and accepted inadequate evidence for a finding of temporary total disability award. We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s determination.

Brenda and Stanley Morrison v. Citizen State Bank
M2004-00263-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

This is the third action between Stanley Morrison and Citizen State Bank concerning a series of promissory notes and security agreements. In the first action, Citizen State Bank filed a civil warrant in General Sessions Court against Stanley Morrison to recover a deficiency judgment and repossess a truck that was collateral on a series of loans. The bank obtained a default judgment against Morrison and repossessed the truck when Morrison failed to appear in court. Morrison failed to timely appeal the default judgment. Thereafter, Morrison and his wife filed this action challenging the validity of the default judgment and seeking damages for fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion of property, contending four of six promissory notes and security agreements that the judgment was based upon were forgeries. The trial court held this action was barred by res judicata and dismissed it on summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of this action on the basis of collateral estoppel.

State of Tennessee v. Donnie Glenn Thompson
W2005-00658-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

The Defendant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted for one count of stalking his former wife, Kimberly McClinsey. The Defendant subsequently submitted an application for pretrial diversion on this charge, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant sought review by the trial court, and the trial court found no abuse of discretion by the district attorney general. The Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s ruling. Finding that the district attorney general abused his discretion in analyzing the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration.

Dickey L. Cotton v. David Mills, Warden - Dissenting
W2004-02523-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge David H. Welles

I agree that if the allegations and assertions contained in the petition are correct, the Defendant’s sentences appear to be in direct contravention to Tennessee’s sentencing act and are therefore illegal and void. However, because the Defendant’s habeas corpus petition was summarily dismissed without a hearing, I would remand the case to the habeas court for a determination of whether the sentences are indeed void.

Dickey L. Cotton v. David Mills, Warden
W2004-02523-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The petitioner, Dickey L. Cotton, appeals the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his Pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Juan Alfonzo Hill v. State of Tennessee
E2004-02915-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court and the district attorney general erred in failing to comply with the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which caused him prejudice. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

Xavier S. Todd v. State of Tennessee, County of Shelby and District Atty. General Paul Summers
W2005-00681-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

The Petitioner, Xavier S. Todd, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner is statutorily prohibited from seeking state habeas corpus relief as he is in federal custody and is being restrained under an order of a federal court. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

John R. Benson v. State of Tennessee
M2005-01417-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel and that the trial court erred by charging the jury with reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Stanley Arthur Lawson v. Vonda Lea (Lawson) Mattox
M2005-02159-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The mother has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application for an extraordinary appeal from an ex parte Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order entered by the Chancery Court for Lawrence County on September 6, 2005. The mother asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it had transferred the case to the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2001. The father now agrees that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the application for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order.

State of Tennessee v.Jeffery Scott Sherrill
E2004-02914-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

The defendant, Jeffery Scott Sherrill, pleaded guilty to second degree murder. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve a 25-year sentence as a Range I violent offender. Aggrieved of his sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence as excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

State of Tennessee v. Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr.
W2004-01935-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The defendant, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to seventeen years in confinement. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the sequential jury instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter are unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by failing to consider all mitigating factors; and (4) the State committed Brady violations with regard to a witness.  Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

Raymond T. Schmidt, Jr. v. Barbara J. Schmidt
M2004-01350-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano

This is a petition to modify alimony. The divorce decree required that the husband pay the wife alimony of $1,500 per month for ten years or until she remarries. The husband filed this petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that there had been a material change in circumstances. The wife maintained that the alimony award was alimony in solido and, therefore, not subject to modification. The husband filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the alimony award was modifiable. The trial court held that the alimony award was alimony in solido, not subject to modification. From that order, husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the award was alimony in futuro and, therefore, subject to modification.