State of Tennessee v. Gary Lee Silcox
E2004-02420-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

The Defendant, Gary Lee Silcox, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued over $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for criminally negligent homicide; and (2) the trial court improperly ordered that the Defendant's sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Campbell Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Mandell Benton
W2002-02257-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

The defendant, Mandel Benton, who was originally charged with statutory rape, was convicted of attempted statutory rape. The trial court imposed a sentence of one hundred and eighty days to be served in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The judgment is affirmed.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Jeannine Cox
M2002-01849-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

We accepted review of this cause under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, in order to address a question properly preserved and certified pursuant to the provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37(b)(2)(i). The question, as certified, is: Whether the consent given to search the defendant's motel room is consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Tennessee? Because we hold that during the course of a lawful traffic stop the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of her motel room, we find the trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of that search. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Montgomery Supreme Court

Huan Ouyang v. Xiaohui Chen
W2004-00335-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This is a divorce case. The parties were declared divorced in February 2003. The divorce decree reserved issues regarding their minor child, property valuation and distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. After a hearing on the reserved issues, the trial court granted the wife alimony and designated her the primary residential parent of their child, set child support, and distributed the marital property. The husband appealed the trial court’s decision on all of the reserved issues. We affirm the trial court’s decision, with modification on the issue of the husband’s residential parenting time.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Cortez D. Hubbard
W2004-01937-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

The Appellant, Cortez D. Hubbard, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court which resulted in the imposition of an effective eight-year sentence of incarceration. On appeal, Hubbard challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Donald Greg Hopper v. Betty J. Moling
W2004-02410-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James F. Butler

The plaintiff, an unlicensed home improvement contractor, entered into an agreement with the defendant/homeowner to make certain improvements to her existing home. Shortly after the plaintiff left the job site, the defendant/homeowner began to experience several problems associated with the plaintiff’s work. The defendant/homeowner paid to have the defects repaired and/or completed. The plaintiff filed a petition against the defendant/homeowner to enforce a materialman’s lien. The defendant/homeowner filed a counter-complaint seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, fraud, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the chancellor held that the plaintiff’s conduct amounted to constructive fraud, thereby voiding the contract; the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the cost of his labor and materials under quantum meruit; and the defendant/homeowner was entitled to damages, attorney’s fees, and discretionary costs. The plaintiff appealed to this Court to contest the chancellor’s inclusion of certain costs in the damage award, the limitation of his quantum meruit recovery, the finding of constructive fraud, and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendant/homeowner. The defendant/homeowner appealed the chancellor’s exclusion of certain costs from the damage award and the method used by the chancellor in calculating the damages. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

Madison Court of Appeals

James Rimmer v. State of Tennessee
W2004-02427-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

The petitioner, James Rimmer, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Patricia Hazlerig v. Millington Telephone Company, Inc.
W2004-01657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This case involves the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff telephone customer paid a fee to the defendant telephone company to block calls to 900 numbers from being made from her phone.  Despite this, charges for 900 calls continued to appear on the customer’s bill. The customer disputed this, and the telephone company cut off her telephone service. The customer filed a claim against the telephone company in general sessions court for breach of contract and the telephone company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid charges for the 900 number calls. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the telephone company, and the customer appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court ruled in favor of the customer. The customer then filed a separate lawsuit against the telephone company in chancery court, seeking injunctive relief to require the telephone company to reinstate her telephone service. The telephone company answered, and later sought to amend its answer to plead the defense of res judicata. The chancery court refused to allow amendment of the answer to assert the defense. The chancery court then ruled in favor of the telephone customer. The telephone company appeals, asserting that the chancery court erred in not allowing amendment of its answer to assert the defense of res judicata. We affirm, finding that the principle of res judicata did not apply and the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit amendment of the answer.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Michael E Ingle, et al. v. Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC
E2004-02756-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

Michael E. Ingle and his wife, Melissa R. Ingle ("the plaintiffs"), purchased a house from Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC ("the defendant"). The defendant had constructed the residence and the plaintiffs were the initial purchasers. The plaintiffs began to experience problems with their home and filed suit against the defendant on several theories, including a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). The trial court, following a bench trial, found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, but not under the TCPA. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. They also claim that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found by the trial court. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, challenge the trial court's ruling with respect to their claim under the TCPA. We affirm.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

Carol Bracken Orten v. Thaddeus Charles Orten
E2004-02987-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

Carol Bracken Orten (“Wife”) sued Thaddeus Charles Orten (“Husband”) for a divorce. During the course of discovery, Husband refused to provide certain financial information as he felt the information to be irrelevant. After Husband failed to appear without explanation at the second Trial Management Conference, the Trial Court entered a default judgment against Husband as a sanction for his actions. Husband’s attorney immediately withdrew from the case and the Trial Court then proceeded to distribute the marital property and award Wife alimony and child support based solely on Wife’s uncontested testimony. Husband secured new counsel and filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. The Trial Court denied Husband’s motion and this appeal followed. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Carol Bracken Orten v. Thaddeus Charles Orten - Dissenting
E2004-02987-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold that the trial court erred in not setting aside the entry of the default judgment against Mr. Orten. In my judgment the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Orten did not intentionally fail to appear at the second Trial Management Conference, but simply forgot to appear. Entry of a default judgment against Mr. Orten is too drastic a measure in this case.

Knox Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Allen Franks, II
E2005-00292-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The defendant, Thomas Allen Franks, II, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years for aggravated burglary and six years for aggravated assault. There were concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days each for misdemeanor evading arrest and resisting arrest. The effective sentence is, therefore, sixteen years. In this appeal as of right, the single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by declining to grant a continuance or other relief when the state filed notice of its intent to use impeaching convictions just before the beginning of the trial. The judgments are affirmed.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Rabia Kafozi, et al.. v. Windward Cove, LLC
E2004-01791-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

Rabia Kafozi and Audry C. Kafozi ("Plaintiffs") signed an installment sales contract to purchase real property from Windward Cove, LLC ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs made some, but not all of the payments as scheduled. Defendant declared a default and then sold the real property to another party. Plaintiffs sued Defendant seeking, among other things, either specific performance or the return of payments made by them. The case was tried and the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the installment sales contract did not set a due date and, therefore, Plaintiffs never were in default. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in interpreting the installment sales contract. We reverse, and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Mold-Tech USA, LLC v. Holley Performance Products, Inc.
E2004-01938-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Marie Williams

Mold-Tech USA, LLC ("the Supplier") brought this action against Holley Performance Products, Inc. ("the Manufacturer") for breach of contract, seeking to recover the cost of component parts purchased by the Supplier in connection with its contract with the Manufacturer. Following a bench trial, the court found that the Manufacturer had breached the contract, and the court awarded the Supplier $79,436.87 in damages. In addition, the court awarded the Supplier prejudgment interest at the rate of 4% per annum. The Manufacturer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding for the Supplier because the Supplier failed to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Tennessee version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Manufacturer also contends that the Supplier is not entitled to prejudgment interest. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

John Dolle, et al. v. Marvin Fisher, et al.
E2003-02356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

John and Christina Dolle ("Plaintiffs") entered into a contract with Fisher Builders, Inc., for the construction of a single family residence. Plaintiffs eventually obtained a judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., for breach of contract and breach of warranty. Plaintiffs' judgment against Fishers Builders, Inc. was for $61,102, plus interest and costs. After the judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., became final, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Marvin Fisher, the president, secretary, sole director, and sole stockholder of Fisher Builders, Inc. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that Fisher Builders, Inc., was a sham corporation, the corporate veil should be pierced, and Fisher should be held personally liable for the judgment against his corporation. The Trial Court agreed and entered a judgment against Fisher personally. We affirm.

Sevier Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Larry Dale Driver
M2004-02569-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

The Robertson County Circuit Court convicted the defendant, Larry Dale Driver, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, following a bench trial. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with probation following 180 days in jail. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the trial court.

Robertson Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L. - Concurring
M2004-02758-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

I adhere to my longstanding view that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a “clear and convincing evidence” standard are incompatible with each other and cannot be reconciled either in the trial court or in appellate courts. The effort to make these standards compatible, as asserted in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001), and its progeny are in my view incorrect for reasons stated at length in Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) and In re Z.J.S. and M.J.P., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, filed June 3, 2003 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003-Cain, concurring).

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L.
M2004-02758-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological mother who is serving a lengthy prison sentence. Following years of drug abuse, criminal conduct, periodic incarceration, and inconsistent attention to the needs of her two children, the mother pled guilty to charges of especially aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of fifteen and twelve years in prison. Following her incarceration, the fathers of both children filed petitions to terminate her parental rights. The juvenile court consolidated these petitions with the mother’s petition for visitation and appointed guardians ad litem for the children. The guardians ad litem later filed a joint petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, and the fathers voluntarily dismissed their termination petitions. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court entered orders terminating the mother’s parental rights to both children on three grounds. The mother has appealed.  We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating the mother’s parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the court and to support the court’s conclusion that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Bernice Walton Woodland and John L. Woodland v. Gloria J. Thornton
W2004-02829-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon K. Blackwood

This is a personal injury case arising out of an automobile accident. The defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle, and the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant for the damages resulting from the accident. A jury trial was held. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, including an amount for future pain and suffering and permanent injury.  The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. The defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that some elements of the jury’s verdict were not supported by the evidence at trial. The motion was denied. The defendant now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to amend the judgment to conform with the evidence at trial.

Fayette Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Samuel T. Cravens
M2004-01710-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

The defendant, Samuel T. Cravens, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of two counts of vehicular assault and one count of assault. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence fails to support the convictions because the witness testimony upon which the convictions are based is inherently impossible and irreconcilable with the physical evidence and because the state failed to prove that the defendant's intoxication was the proximate cause of the victims' injuries. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the convictions and, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgments.

Fentress Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Lawrence Ralph, Sr.
M2004-02293-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry B. Stanley, Jr.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Lawrence Ralph, Sr., was convicted of failure to display a driver's license, a Class C misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and simple possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of thirty days for his failure to display a driver's license conviction, six months for his resisting arrest conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his simple possession conviction, for an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court suspended all but 120 days of Defendant's effective sentence, and placed Defendant on probation. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for simple possession. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for resisting arrest and failure to display a driver's license; and (3) the trial court erred in determining the percentage of Defendant's effective sentence which must be served in confinement. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Warren Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re C.L.M., M.M.M., and S.D.M.
M2005-00696-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Andrew Jackson

Mother appeals the Dickson County Juvenile Court’s Order terminating her parental rights to three children, C.L.M., M.M.M., and S.D.M. Father does not challenge the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dickson Court of Appeals

Freeman Industries v. Eastman Chemical Co., et al.
E2003-00527-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard E. Ladd

We granted permission to appeal to determine: 1) whether an indirect purchaser may bring an action under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act against defendants involved in an price-fixing scheme; 2) whether the conduct complained of falls within the scope of the act; and 3) whether the trial court erred in declining to grant summary judgment to the defendants as to the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. We conclude that although an indirect purchaser may bring an action under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the conduct complained of in this case did not substantially affect Tennessee commerce and thus falls outside the scope of the act. We further conclude that to sustain an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff is not required to: 1) establish that the defendants received a direct benefit or 2) exhaust all remedies against the party with whom the plaintiff is in privity if the pursuit of the remedies would be futile. Because the plaintiff failed to provide a factual basis to support its bare allegation that any attempt to exhaust its remedies would have been futile, the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Sullivan Supreme Court

Clyde Edwards v. Sarah Ann Edwards
E2004-02490-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

This is a post-divorce case. Clyde Edwards (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his alimony obligation to his former wife, Sarah Ann Edwards (“Wife”).  Husband’s original motion was premised on the fact that Wife was living with her adult daughter and son-in-law. We affirm.

Unicoi Court of Appeals

Clyde Edwards v. Sarah Ann Edwards - Dissenting
E2004-02490-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

I concur completely with the majority’s resolution of Appellant’s first issue. I, respectfully, dissent from the majority’s decision as to Appellant’s second issue.

Unicoi Court of Appeals