John Jay Hooker v. Senator Lamar Alexander, et al.
Appellant was an independent candidate for election to the United States Senate in the November 5, 2002, election in which he was defeated by the present incumbent Lamar Alexander. He seeks to have the election declared void on the basis that Alexander used his own money and accepted campaign contribution in support of his candidacy. He alleges that such self financing arrangements and campaign contributions financing violate the qualifications clauses and the equal protection and due process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions. Named as defendants were Lamar Alexander, Attorney General Paul Summers and the Lamar Alexander for Senate Committee. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss, which motions were granted by the trial judge. We affirm the actions of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Maxwell
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Johnny Maxwell, of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twenty-four years for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, to be served at one hundred percent, and to eleven years for the aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the other sentences for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions cannot stand under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), because the victims’ detention was incidental to the aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence during the jury instructions; and (3) his sentences are improper in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Bailey
The Appellant, Raymond Bailey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping and carjacking. Following a sentencing hearing, Bailey was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-eight years for especially aggravated kidnapping and twelve years for carjacking. On appeal, Bailey raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of undisclosed evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of his drug possession at the time of his arrest; (4) whether Bailey’s sentences violate Blakely v. Washington; and (5) whether the cumulative errors require a new trial. After review of the record, we conclude that issues (1), (2), (4), and (5) are without merit. With regard to issue (3), we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence but conclude that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Korie Bates
The defendant appeals his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Specifically, he avers that, (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts; (2) the State’s failure to disclose the statement of an unindicted co-conspirator constitutes a Brady violation and entitles him to a new trial; (3) the sentence was issued in error, in light of Blakely v. Washington; and (4) the cumulative effect of all errors merits a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James C. Breer v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, James C. Breer, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Breer argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and prepare for trial, and (2) failing to advise him of his right to testify at trial in violation of Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). After review, we conclude that issue (1) is without merit. However, with regard to issue (2), we conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that Breer personally waived his right to testify as required by Momon. Moreover, because the procedural guidelines adopted in Momon for determining whether the error was harmless were not followed, we find it necessary to remand for resolution of this issue. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry L. Sandridge
The defendant, Jerry L. Sandridge, was convicted by a jury of two counts 1 of aggravated robbery. On direct appeal, this Court modified one of the convictions to aggravated assault and remanded for re-sentencing. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant presents the single issue of whether the trial court properly classified him as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ervin Davis v. Warden Glenn Turner and State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Otis Miller, III
The appellant, Otis Miller, III, pled guilty to four (4) counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result of the guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the appellant to ten (10) years on each conviction and ordered the first two counts to be served concurrently and the last two counts to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered that the first two counts be served consecutively to the remaining two counts, for an effective sentence of twenty (20) years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's application of certain enhancement factors in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences. Because our supreme court recently determined that Blakely has no application in Tennessee, we have reviewed the appellant's sentence de novo. Despite the trial court's improper application of several enhancement factors, we affirm the appellant's sentence because we determine that the existence of enhancement factor (16) justifies enhancement of the sentence from eight (8) to ten (10) years. We also affirm the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Eugene Stubblefield
Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance (Lortab), a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent four-year sentences. He appeals to this Court contending that: (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the defendant acted knowingly; (2) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the transaction constituted a sale; (3) the trial court erred in finding that the dispensing of prescription drugs creates a high risk of harm to human life; and (4) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
J & M, Inc. v. Clarence D. Cupples and Crete Carrier Corp.
Plaintiff sued for damages incurred to correct condition of roadway caused by defendants' motor vehicle which destroyed a section of guardrail. Defendants appeal from Judgment awarding damages to plaintiff on grounds damages were not proved. On appeal, we affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
City Of Johnson City vs. Dorian Jones
Dorian Jones ("the defendant") was cited to the Municipal Court of Johnson City for a violation of the Animal Control Ordinance ("the Ordinance") of the City of Johnson City ("the City"). The City contends that the defendant failed to have his dog "under control." Following a finding of guilt and the imposition of a $50 fine and costs, the defendant appealed to the trial court. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered its judgment, in which it held that the defendant violated the Ordinance. The trial court dismissed the defendant's appeal and decreed that "the fine of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) . . . be reinstated and is hereby upheld and affirmed." The defendant appeals to us, contending that he was entitled to a jury trial. He also argues, in legal effect, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's judgment. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Collier v. Harris v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare his case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Syrus Maurice Coleman
A Dyer County jury convicted the defendant, Syrus Maurice Coleman, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy K. Pomeroy v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Plaintiff, a switchman/brakeman for Illinois Central Railroad Company, filed a claim for damages arising from injuries allegedly caused by the railroad’s failure to maintain a track switch. The jury allocated 100% fault to the railroad and awarded Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The trial court denied the railroad’s motion for a directed verdict, remittitur, or new trial. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph D. Taylor
The appellant, Joseph D. Taylor, was convicted of attempted rape, attempted sexual battery, and aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen (15) years for attempted rape, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for attempted sexual battery, and twelve (12) years as a violent offender for aggravated kidnapping. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction for attempted rape and reversed the other two convictions. See State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court after a hearing. On appeal, this Court set aside the appellant's sentence for attempted rape because he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. See Joseph D. Taylor v. State, No. M2003-00138-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 350641, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 20, 2004). On remand, the trial court sentenced the appellant to fifteen (15) years as a Range III offender. A timely notice of appeal was filed. The appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that his sentence violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), because the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors that were not admitted by the appellant or determined by a jury. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Tassell, et al. v. U.S. Bank, Inc.
William and Shirley Tassell's ("Plaintiffs") purchase of a house in 1998 was financed through U.S. Bank, Inc. (the "Bank"). After Plaintiffs fell behind in their payments, the Bank filed a detainer warrant and began the foreclosure process. Plaintiffs claim they made a payment bringing their mortgage current and they made this payment one day before their house was to be sold at foreclosure. Plaintiffs claim the Bank, nevertheless, proceeded with the foreclosure sale thereby forcing them to file this lawsuit seeking to have the foreclosure set aside. The Trial Court denied Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and refused to interfere with the foreclosure proceedings, noting that no valid appeal had been taken in the detainer action. Plaintiffs appeal. We dismiss this appeal because there is no final appealable judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Duff Petty vs. Randy Neal Petty
In this divorce case, Mother was declared to be the primary residential parent and Father's overnight co-parenting time was required to be exercised at his parents' home with them present. This restriction was prompted by presentation of evidence that Father haded computer internet sites exhibiting material of a sexual nature and had placed a personal advertisement on an internet site in an apparent effort to attract sexual partners. Father appeals. Absent proof that Father's actions presented any risk of harm to his children, we modify the judgment of the trial court and the parenting plan to delete the requirement that Father's overnight visitation be supervised by his parents at their home. We further modify the parenting plan to the extent that it does not require mutual decision-making. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S. Londono - Order
Petitions for rehearing have been filed by Edwin Gomez, Jonathan Londono, the Attorney General and Reporter1, and amicus curiae, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The petitioners primarily argue that the majority opinion rests upon a misunderstanding and misapplication of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The arguments advanced in the petitions to rehear were considered and rejected by a majority of this Court in its original opinion. We remain convinced that Blakely must be read in light of Booker. To do otherwise would not serve to “preserve Sixth Amendment substance.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752. In Booker, Justice Stevens explained: If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [Sentencing Reform Act] the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges; it is that circumstance that makes the Court’s answer to the second question presented possible. For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant. Id. at 750 (citations omitted). The Court harmonized the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with the Sixth Amendment byapplying in Booker a remedywhich created a discretionarysentencing scheme. Id. at 764. We are not persuaded that the differences between the Reform Act and the post-Booker Federal Sentencing Guidelines are constitutionally significant. If the Sixth Amendment countenances a sentencing scheme that permits judges to find factsrelevant to sentencing and affords judges discretion to select a sentence anywhere within a statutory range, even in the absence of enhancing facts, we are unable to conclude that the Sixth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme in which a state legislature limits judicial discretion by designating the presumptive sentence that must be imposed when a judge finds no enhancement or mitigating factors. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Ford Williams, Jr.
The defendant, Henry Ford Williams, Jr., entered a plea of guilt to the unlawful possession of a firearm. Tried by a jury on a charge of possession of .57 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within one thousand feet of a school and simple possession of cocaine, the defendant was convicted on each count. The trial court merged the two illegal drug convictions. Concurrent sentences of three years for the firearm conviction and thirty-two years, six months, for the cocaine conviction were imposed upon the defendant. The single issue presented for review is whether the evidence was sufficient. The judgments are affirmed. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas McPherson v. Shea Ear Clinic, P.A.
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having reviewed the complaint, we disagree and reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Melton Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Matthew Melton Jackson, appeals as of right the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Robertson County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and effective sentence of twenty-five years. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not voluntary or knowing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bud Cash, Jr.
The Defendant, Bud Cash, Jr., was indicted on sixteen counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and three counts of possession of an altered serial number weapon. After the statute of limitations had expired, the State filed two subsequent superceding indictments. The trial court dismissed all three indictments, holding that the original indictment was insufficient to provide the Defendant notice of the charges and insufficient to protect the Defendant from double jeopardy, and that the subsequent indictments were untimely filed. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it dismissed the indictments. We agree with the State, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Diane Lane v. Rich Products and Continental Casualty Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In determining whether pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-241(a)(2) and 50-6-207(3)(F), the appellant was entitled to reconsideration benefits stemming from a 1997 injury when she was terminated following a subsequent injury to the body as a whole, the trial court found the claim to be prohibited by statute. The appellant contends the trial court erred in its statutory interpretation. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Citadel Investments, Inc., v. White Fox Inc., F/L/A The Jones Group, et al.
This is an action on a promissory note against two stockholders of a now insolvent closely-held corporation, who it is alleged, guaranteed payment of a note owed by the corporation. The alleged guarantee arises out of a stock purchase agreement. Liability hinges on the construction of the stock purchase agreement and whether parol evidence is admissible. The trial court found the agreement unambiguous and barred parol evidence. The defendants insist the agreement is ambiguous and that evidence of negotiations leading up to the execution of the agreement and the intent of the parties should have been admitted. We find the agreement is ambiguous and therefore parol evidence should have been considered. We also find that the defendants are entitled to a new trial on the merits because they have been deprived of the substantial right to introduce evidence of contract negotiations and the intent of the parties at the time the Agreement was executed. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
William Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals |