Douglas McPherson v. Shea Ear Clinic, P.A.
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having reviewed the complaint, we disagree and reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Melton Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Matthew Melton Jackson, appeals as of right the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Robertson County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and effective sentence of twenty-five years. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not voluntary or knowing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bud Cash, Jr.
The Defendant, Bud Cash, Jr., was indicted on sixteen counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and three counts of possession of an altered serial number weapon. After the statute of limitations had expired, the State filed two subsequent superceding indictments. The trial court dismissed all three indictments, holding that the original indictment was insufficient to provide the Defendant notice of the charges and insufficient to protect the Defendant from double jeopardy, and that the subsequent indictments were untimely filed. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it dismissed the indictments. We agree with the State, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Diane Lane v. Rich Products and Continental Casualty Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In determining whether pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-241(a)(2) and 50-6-207(3)(F), the appellant was entitled to reconsideration benefits stemming from a 1997 injury when she was terminated following a subsequent injury to the body as a whole, the trial court found the claim to be prohibited by statute. The appellant contends the trial court erred in its statutory interpretation. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Citadel Investments, Inc., v. White Fox Inc., F/L/A The Jones Group, et al.
This is an action on a promissory note against two stockholders of a now insolvent closely-held corporation, who it is alleged, guaranteed payment of a note owed by the corporation. The alleged guarantee arises out of a stock purchase agreement. Liability hinges on the construction of the stock purchase agreement and whether parol evidence is admissible. The trial court found the agreement unambiguous and barred parol evidence. The defendants insist the agreement is ambiguous and that evidence of negotiations leading up to the execution of the agreement and the intent of the parties should have been admitted. We find the agreement is ambiguous and therefore parol evidence should have been considered. We also find that the defendants are entitled to a new trial on the merits because they have been deprived of the substantial right to introduce evidence of contract negotiations and the intent of the parties at the time the Agreement was executed. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
William Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Earl A. Crow, III v. Daniel R. LeDoux, et al.
Earl A. Crow, III, brought this action against his landlords, Daniel R. LeDoux and wife, Katherine Marie LeDoux (collectively "the defendants"), for injuries sustained by him in a fall caused by an allegedly defective heating grill in his apartment. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff's knowledge of the condition of the grill was at least co-extensive with that of the defendants, and that, as a consequence of this fact, no liability attached. The trial court agreed and granted the defendants' motion. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Debra L. Ogelsby v. Mark D. Bridges
Debra L. Ogelsby ("Mother") and Mark D. Bridges ("Father") are the natural parents of Holly Bridges ("the child"). By an order entered in 1986, Mother was awarded custody of the child and Father was charged with a duty of support but with no amount being set. In 1998, the child started living with Father. At that time, Father, motivated by the fact the child was now living with him, filed a petition to terminate his support obligation. His petition was granted. In 1999, the child left Father and again took up residence with Mother. The child was emancipated by marriage in 2000. In 2002, the State of Tennessee ("the State"), on behalf of Mother, brought this action seeking retroactive child support for the period from 1999 through 2000. Father argues that the trial court was prohibited from awarding retroactive child support prior to June 11, 2002, the date upon which the State filed its petition. The trial court held that Mother was entitled to retroactive child support since there was no active order for child support in place at the time the petition was filed. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas F. Jordan, Jr.
The defendant, Douglas F. Jordan, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder and ordered to serve twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court committed certain evidentiary errors, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for continuance, and that the sentence was excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Yates Carter v. Happy Trucking Company, Inc. and State of Tennessee Department of Labor Workers' Compensation Division Second Injury Fund, Jim Farmer, Director
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the appellee was entitled to proceed with his lawsuit for reconsideration benefits stemming from a 1998 injury when he was terminated following a subsequent injury to the body as a whole, and awarded benefits. The trial court further found no liability on the part of the Tennessee Second Injury Fund. The appellant contends that the employee’s claim for enlargement is prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-241(a)(2) and 50-6-207(3)(F), and that the trial court erred in its statutory interpretation. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the holding of the trial court. |
Jackson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Roger M. Ralph, et al. v. Robert Pipkin, et al.
Plaintiffs in this action, Roger Ralph and Kem Ralph, were sued in federal court for patent infringement and breach of contract. Their farmer’s liability insurance carrier, Grange Mutual, denied coverage and refused to defend. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Lauderdale County Chancery Court against Grange Mutual seeking a declaratory judgment, a judgment for breach of contract, and specific performance. They also filed a complaint for professional negligence and breach of contract against their insurance agent, Pipkin Insurance Agency/Mr. Robert Pipkin. The trial court granted Grange Mutual’s motion to dismiss and awarded the Pipkin Insurance Agency/Mr. Pipkin summary judgment. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve Brian Hannah
The appellant, Steve Brian Hannah, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of theft of property over $10,000, three counts of theft of property over $1,000, and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to resell. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received an effective five-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of his sentence on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant claims the trial court erred by refusing to grant his request for full probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments as to the thefts. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mack T. Transou
Following a jury trial, Defendant Mack Transou was convicted of aggravated burglary and rape. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fifteen years for aggravated burglary and sixteen years for rape. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court erred in admitting DNA evidence, and that his sentence was improper in light of Blakely v. Washington. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's convictions, the DNA evidence was properly admitted, and that the trial court did not err in its application of one enhancement factor when sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas L. Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Douglas L. Brown, has appealed from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition attacked the petitioner's two 1998, Davidson County, guilty-pleaded convictions of rape of a child. The state has moved the court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules to summarily affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. We sustain the motion and affirm the judgment. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David James Wiley
The appellant, David James Wiley, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to arson and received a probationary sentence of six years. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation. The appellant now appeals, contesting the trial court's evidentiary rulings during the revocation hearing and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new hearing. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Milta D. Blanchard v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Milta D. Blanchard, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief and claims that his 1992 conviction of reckless endangerment is void because the charging instrument did not charge the offense of reckless endangerment. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gatha Blankenship v. American Ordinance Systems, LLS, d/b/a Milan Army Ammunition Plant
The employee in this workers’ compensation case injured her back while taking an upper body strength test on the employer’s premises. The employee, who was laid off at the time of the injury, voluntarily took the strength test as part of the application process for new jobs being created in the employer’s factory. The trial court found that the employee’s injury was not compensable because it did not arise out of her employment. The employee’s appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel hearing oral argument. The dispositive question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury did not arise out of her employment. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury did not arise out of her employment. We also conclude that the employee’s injury did not occur in the course of her employment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Carroll | Supreme Court | |
Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee
This appeal presents two determinative issues: (1) whether post-conviction review of a death sentence should be mandatory and should proceed over the objection of a competent death-sentenced inmate; and if not, (2) whether, and under what circumstances, a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke her waiver of post-conviction review. We conclude that post-conviction review is not mandatory and may be waived by a competent death-sentenced inmate. We also conclude that a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke a waiver of post-conviction review so long as the revocation occurs within thirty days of the trial court's order permitting the inmate to waive post-conviction review. Our holding is limited to death-sentenced inmates who seek to revoke an initial waiver of post-conviction relief. Our holding does not apply to death-sentenced inmates who attempt to manipulate and to delay the judicial process by repeatedly seeking to waive and thereafter to reinstate post-conviction review. Applying this rule, we conclude that Christa Gail Pike may revoke her waiver and reinstate her post-conviction petition. Pike filed a motion seeking to revoke her waiver on the twenty-ninth day after the trial court filed its order permitting her to waive post-conviction review. Pike had not previously waived post-conviction review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the petition for post-conviction relief and to schedule an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Harlen Roy L. Zirker, aka Anthony Lamont Zirker
The defendant, Harlen Roy L. Zirker, aka Anthony Lamont Zirker, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective sentence of seventy-two years. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike two jurors for cause, in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior criminal convictions, and in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and sentences. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Prentiss Phillips v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Prentiss Phillips, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Luis Perez
The defendant appeals his dual convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and with intent to deliver. We affirm the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. We remand for merger of the offenses as the dual convictions are violative of double jeopardy. Further, we modify the sentence to two years in our de novo review, due to error in failure to make findings of fact in sentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard Dale Kincer
A Van Buren County Jury found the Defendant, Leonard Dale Kincer, guilty of facilitation of the manufacture of one hundred grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on facilitation; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing prejudicial information during its closing argument; and (4) the statute under which the Defendant was convicted is unconstitutional. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence, and remand for entry of an amended judgment in Count one. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas E. Copeland
The defendant, Douglas E. Copeland, was convicted by a Putnam County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with probation after ten days in jail, to be served concurrently with his sentence of six months on probation for the driving with a suspended license conviction. The trial court also ordered that the defendant pay fines totaling $860.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that his inoperable vehicle was a defense to the DUI offense. We affirm the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel Champion
A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Nathaniel Champion, of the sale of a controlled substance, cocaine, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the sale of cocaine; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion for dismissal of appointed counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathy McPeak v. Virginia Thomas
Defendant appealed from the Trial Court's Judgment in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, appellant argues the Trial Court erred in ruling for appellee and appellee should be estopped from gaining possession of the property in dispute. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals |