William Seale v. Church of God d/b/a Pathway Press
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Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Betty Jo Sissom v. State of Tennessee Department of Labor
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Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lamar Tucker
The petitioner, Kenneth Lamar Tucker, plead guilty to one count of rape of a child in exchange for a fifteen-year sentence at 100%. In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea of guilt; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (3) he was denied the right to a trial by jury; (4) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (5) the newly discovered exculpatory evidence entitles him to relief; and (6) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit trial counsel’s case file into evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Kirk McWhorter
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Matthew Kirk McWhorter, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for each conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the offenses it wished to submit to the jury; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a law enforcement officer's testimony about the Defendant's uncharged conduct; (4) the trial court erred by permitting a law enforcement agent to testify about a recorded recollection; (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to prohibit testimony of the victim; (6) reversible error occurred when the State failed to disclose, preserve and turn over a law enforcement official's notes made during the Defendant's initial interrogation; (7) the trial court erred by allowing the State to submit an insufficient Bill of Particulars and to deviate from its Bill of Particulars; (8) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his written and oral statements made to law enforcement officials in Florida; (9) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on child abuse as a lesser-included offense; (10) the State's closing arguments were so improper that they infected the trial with unfairness and denied the Defendant due process; (11) the trial court erred by interrupting the natural flow of jury deliberations to give supplemental instructions; and (12) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect which incident of sexual touching the State intended for the jury to consider for Count 1, aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and the sentence in Count 1. We affirm the remaining convictions and sentences. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks
The Appellant, Jeffery Brian Parks, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. In 2003, Parks pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, two counts of incest, and two counts of statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Parks, as a Range I standard offender, to six years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure and incest, both class C felonies, and to two years for each count of statutory rape, a class E felony. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Parks argues that the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences with respect to each sentence and by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. The State, on appeal, asserts that consecutive sentencing should be imposed by this court following de novo review. Because the trial court failed to impose a sentence in accordance with our statutory sentencing scheme, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing to determine the length of the Appellant’s sentences, the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing, and the Appellant’s suitability for an alternative sentence. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Parks - Dissenting in Part
I believe the sentencing in the instant case is controlled by State v. Marshall, 888 S.W.2d 786 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), and Rule 4(H)(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court require it be followed. To the extent that the majority opinion holds this trial judge fashioned an improper sentence, I disagree. The two holdings in Marshall which apply to the instant cases are as follows: |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard A. Jones and Richard A. Jones, Jr. v. Jody W. Henderson
This case arises from the discovery of an extramarital affair. The Appellants brought suit against |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony C. Long v. Tony Parker, Warden
The petitioner, Anthony C. Long, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We reverse the dismissal and order habeas corpus relief. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: Estate of Angula Wilson Whitehorn Turner
Beneficiary of will appeals the order of the chancery court awarding attorney fees, executor fees, and other expenses. Both factual and legal objections are made to the awards made by the court. The legal objections are without merit, and the factual objections are not well-taken, because there is no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney McKinney v. Tony Parker, Warden
The petitioner, Rodney McKinney, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his claim for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Community Bank of East Tennessee v. Tennessee Department of Safety
The Claim Commissioner held Commission was without jurisdiction to entertain claim on appeal. We vacate Judgment and remand. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guadalupe Arroyo, Alias
The defendant entered guilty pleas to two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication and was sentenced to consecutive twelve-year terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed the imposition of maximum sentences and the order to serve the terms consecutively. After this, our second review, we again remand for a new sentencing hearing in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and the trial court's failure to find specific findings justifying the necessity for consecutive sentencing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Kathleen Meade, Deceased, L. Grady Lee, v. Helen Jo Gilliam
A typewritten document and a handwritten document prepared later in time were offered for probate. The Trial Court rejected the handwritten document and admitted the typewritten document to probate as the Last Will and Testament of Deceased. On appeal, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janice Michele Walker
Defendant, Janice Michele Walker, was charged in a four-count presentment with theft over $10,000, forgery over $10,000, computer fraud, and money laundering. Defendant pled guilty as a Range I standard offender to theft and forgery, both Class C felonies, and the other charges were dismissed. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively, and she was ordered to pay restitution. The trial court determined the manner of service of Defendant's sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve her effective eight-year sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of full probation. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ron Colquette v. Peter Zaloum
Ron Colquette (“Plaintiff”) sued Peter Zaloum (“Defendant”) claiming, in part, that Defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the sale of his business and the lease of his land to Plaintiff, and that Defendant violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $70,054.35, plus pre-judgment interest; that Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000; and that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act was not applicable to this case. Defendant appeals, and Plaintiff raises additional issues concerning the applicability of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act to the facts of this case, and the amount of punitive damages awarded to him. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Webb v. Printpack, Inc.
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Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Christopher A. Eadie v. Complete Co., Inc.et al.
We granted review in this case to consider whether an employee is barred from seeking workers’ compensation benefits in Tennessee because the employee made a binding election of remedies by pursuing benefits for the same injury in another state. We hold that the employee’s filing of a claim in South Carolina, his request for a hearing there, and the taking of depositions in that matter constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim. Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. Edward Slavin, Jr.
We have this case on direct appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from an order of the Chancery Court suspending Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Esq., from the practice of law for three years. Slavin appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether Chancellor Richard E. Ladd erred in refusing to recuse himself; (2) whether Slavin's in-court speech is protected by the First Amendment; and (3) whether the sanctions imposed by the Chancellor are excessive. Upon careful review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that Chancellor Ladd did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself and that the speech at issue does not fall within the protective ambit of the First Amendment. After a thorough examination of the sanctions, we impose a two-year suspension. Slavin may, however, apply for reinstatement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 19.3, at the expiration of one year from date of this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee v. H. Owen Maddux
A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that H. Owen Maddux had wilfully and deliberately converted funds from his law firm. In addition to other sanctions, the hearing panel suspended Maddux from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County affirmed the judgment of the hearing panel but imposed additional sanctions. Disciplinary Counsel appealed to this Court, contesting only the sufficiency of the thirty-day suspension. We hold that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Helen Gleason v. Daniel P. Gleason, III
The trial court awarded Petitioner alimony arrearages of $7,250 plus interest. Respondent appeals, asserting the statute of limitations and the defense of laches. We modify the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy E. Ballard
The defendant, Timothy E. Ballard, was convicted of DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended except for sixty days, with the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in denying full probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Franks, Jr.
The defendant, Bruce Franks, Jr., pleaded guilty to arson, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301(a)(1) (2003), and agreed to a three-year, Range I sentence. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing to determine themanner of service of the sentence and ordered split confinement. The defendant appeals the confinement component of his sentence. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Franks, Jr. - Concurring
I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I disagree with its conclusion that a sentence of split confinement fulfills the requirement of an alternative sentencing presumption. I believe an alternative sentence means one that is an alternative to confinement, as explained in my dissent in State v. Christina B. Jones, M2002-02428-CCA-R3-CD, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2003), app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003). |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert "Bobby" Powell
The defendant, Robert “Bobby” Powell, pled guilty to statutory rape and sexual battery, Class E felonies, in exchange for an effective two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Finding that a sentence less serious than confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation or other alternative sentencing and ordered that he serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider, and the defendant appealed to this court. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos Haynes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carlos Haynes, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to one count of possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a total effective sentence of two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and the trial court erred in failing to pursue the issue of the identity of the confidential informant whose tip led to the search of the petitioner’s home. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |