Opinions
Jennifer L. Biscan, et al. v. Franklin H. Brown, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Issac Law
The defendant pled guilty in the Lincoln County Circuit Court to eleven counts of forgery, eleven counts of transferring a forged instrument, sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine, and aggravated perjury. The trial court merged the forgery convictions with the transferring a forged instrument convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to one year on each count, to be served concurrently. He was sentenced to ten years for the sale of cocaine conviction, which the trial court merged with the delivery conviction, to be served concurrently with the forgery sentence, and four years for the aggravated perjury conviction, to be served consecutively to the sale of cocaine sentence, for a total effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, he alleges the trial court erred in applying several enhancement factors in violation of the recent United States Supreme Court case, Blakely v. Washington, and in not sentencing him to the community corrections program. Following our review, we affirm the sentences but remand for entry of corrected judgments in all three cases to reflect the conviction offenses, which were omitted, and to reflect the correct offense date in Case No. S0300119. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Porter
The Defendant, Larry Porter, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years, as a multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl McIntosh
The Defendant, Carl McIntosh, was convicted by a jury for: the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine on October 5, 2001, the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine on October 5, 2001; and two counts of simple possession on October 9, 2001. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl McIntosh - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except to that portion which holds that the felony sentence imposed in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie T. Inman, Jr.
The defendant was convicted of theft of property greater than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State a continuance over the defendant’s motion to dismiss, in not granting the defense a continuance because of a missing witness, in limiting cross-examination of a witness, in denying a continuance due to a witness who was not subpoenaed, in not allowing the testimony of two witnesses at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and in sentencing the defendant as a career offender. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Alvin A. Moore
Separate petitions for the appointment of conservator were filed, one by the two nieces of the disabled person and the other by a daughter. Notwithstanding the statutory preference given to the daughter, the probate court determined that it was in the best interest of the disabled person to grant the petition filed by the nieces. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Taketa Puryear and Johnnie B. McNeal
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services began providing services to the biological parents of three minor children in December of 2000. Eventually, all three children were removed from the home after the juvenile court determined they were dependent and neglected due to the parents’ failure to provide for their medical and nutritional needs. The department created a permanency plan for each child calling for the parents to provide adequate housing, provide for the children’s medical and nutritional needs, undergo a psychological evaluation and follow through with treatment recommendations, and participate in counseling/parenting classes designed to teach the parents how to adequately provide for their children. The department subsequently filed a petition to terminate the biological parents’ parental rights, alleging the grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the responsibilities in the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and the mother’s alleged mental incompetency. Following a trial, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights to their minor children. The juvenile court found that the department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parents abandoned the children, substantially failed to comply with the responsibilities in the permanency plans, and allowed conditions to persist which made it unsafe to return the children to the parents. In addition, the juvenile court found that terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Only the mother filed an appeal to contest the juvenile court’s judgment. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Beasley
On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts, and (2) the trial court’s denial of his request for a mistrial. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Belchia
The defendant, William Belchia, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property over $1000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, for failing to return a rental car. He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to deprive the rental car company of its property and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the temporary taking of a vehicle, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-5-104, as a lesser-included offense of theft of property. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason White
The appellant, Jason White, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court improperly limited the scope of cross-examination of a State’s witness; (2) the trial court erred by admitting gruesome photographs of the deceased victim; (3) the trial court’s improper remarks in the presence of the jury prejudiced the appellant; (4) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence as an excited utterance; and (5) “[t]he form of the jury verdict [was] so lacking in meaning as to render it ineffective to convict the [appellant].” Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Sommerville
The Defendant, Carlos Sommerville, was convicted of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted certain autopsy x-rays and photographs into evidence at trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Barnett Bills aka Micheal/Michael Burnett Bills
On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that he could not use his peremptory challenges to “strike back” jurors after the first two rounds of challenges; and (2) the State failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, by failing to disclose a letter written by the defendant to his girlfriend, thus disadvantaging his trial preparation. Upon our review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Thomas
The defendant, Howard Walter Thomas, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; especially aggravated robbery, a ClassAfelony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and attempted first degree murder, also a Class A felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twenty-two years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, with the twenty-two-year sentences to be served concurrently and the twenty-five-year sentence to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following claims: (1) the circumstances surrounding his identification by one of the victims amounted to prejudicial error; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge based on the juror’s learning disability, by utilizing the pattern jury instructions on the element of deliberation, by proceeding with a death-qualified jury after the State withdrew its intent to seek the death penalty post-trial, and by failing to provide any weight to the mitigating factor of childhood/family background in sentencing for the attempted first degree murder conviction; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilt with respect to the element of deliberation; (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions; and (5) that cumulative error denied the defendant a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the convictions but, in light of the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), reduce the sentences for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping to twenty-one years, eighteen years, and eighteen years, respectively. We affirm the consecutive sentencing of the defendant. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Walter Thomas - Dissenting
The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Allen Butler and State of Tennessee v. Re'Licka DaJuan Allen
The issues presented by these consolidated Rule 9 interlocutory appeals are whether Tennessee's sexual exploitation of a minor statute is constitutional in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002), and whether the trial court may require the State to provide the defense with a copy of the alleged child pornography that forms the basis for the prosecution's case. As to these questions, the trial courts ruled that the State had to provide the defense with copies of the alleged pornographic materials and that while a portion of the statute is unconstitutional, the remainder is not. Following our review, we affirm the rulings of the trial courts. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Allen Millsaps v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Allen Millsaps, challenged his 1998 Monroe County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder via filing the October 1, 2001 post-conviction relief proceeding now under review. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the post-conviction petition. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the conviction was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition. We disagree and affirm the dismissal. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gwynne Barton, et al., v. Roy Gilleland, et al.
The limited partners ("the plaintiffs") of Henry Manor, Ltd., a Tennessee limited partnership ("the Partnership"), brought this declaratory judgment action against (1) Roy J. Gilleland and J. Cleve Smith, the Partnership's former administrative general partners, and (2) the trust created by the Partnership's former, and now-deceased, managing general partner, Glen R. Claiborne. The plaintiffs seek relief related to the Partnership's property, as well as an accounting and an order for distribution of proceeds. In 1992, Claiborne and his wife formed the G & P Claiborne Trust ("the Trust"), to which they transferred, among other assets, Claiborne's beneficial interest in the Partnership. Claiborne died in 1997. The apartment complex owned by the Partnership, which was its primary asset, was sold in 2000. Subsequently, Gilleland and Smith sought a percentage of the proceeds from the sale pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement. The plaintiffs aver, among other things, (1) that Gilleland and Smith are not entitled to any of the proceeds from the 2000 sale, as they resigned from the partnership in 1982, and (2) that the Partnership was dissolved in 1992 when Claiborne transferred his interest to the Trust. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that Gilleland and Smith are entitled to share in the proceeds of the 2000 sale; that the Partnership did not dissolve until the death of Claiborne in 1997; and that the plaintiffs are not required to pay capital contributions that came due in 1983 and 1984. We agree with the trial court that Gilleland and Smith are entitled to share in the sale proceeds under the terms of the original partnership agreement. We further agree with the trial court that the Trust's claim against the plaintiffs for unpaid capital contributions is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Although we disagree with the trial court's judgment that Claiborne did not violate the partnership agreement by transferring a part of his interest in the Partnership to the Trust in 1992, we hold that the transfer, while a violation of the agreement, does not constitute an event of dissolution. We affirm the trial court's judgment that the Partnership did not dissolve until 1997. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
C. W. McMahan v. Barbara Jean Greene
This is a boundary line dispute. C. W. McMahan (“the plaintiff”) and Barbara Jean Greene (“the defendant”) owned adjacent tracts of land. Both parties received their respective tracts through a complicated chain of title. When a dispute arose as to the location of the boundary line, the plaintiff brought this action seeking to clear title. Following a bench trial, the trial court found for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Hunter v. Jay Michael Ura, M.D., et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error in granting the plaintiff eight peremptory challenges during jury selection, whether the trial court properly denied a motion for a mistrial after the plaintiff cross-examined a defense expert witness with a prior statement, whether the trial court properly allowed the plaintiff to cross-examine a defense expert with an alleged learned treatise, and whether the trial court properly excluded the deposition of a defense expert witness. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error on these four issues, reversed the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and remanded for a new trial. The intermediate court chose not to review numerous remaining issues raised by the parties. After carefully reviewing the record and authority, we conclude: 1) that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff eight peremptory challenges but the error did not affect the outcome or prejudice the administration of justice, 2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial after the plaintiff had cross-examined an expert witness with a prior statement, 3) that the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to cross-examine a defense expert witness with an alleged learned treatise, and 4) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the deposition testimony of a defense expert witness. In addition, after reviewing the remaining issues, including those that were pretermitted by the Court of Appeals, we hold: 1) that the trial court erred in remitting the jury’s verdict by $1,500,000, 2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying prejudgment interest to the plaintiff, 3) that awarding damages for the loss of consortium did not violate the defendants’ rights under the United States or Tennessee constitutions, 4) that the trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff’s expert witness established the professional standard of care in the community in which the defendants practiced and in denying the defendants’ motion for directed verdict on this basis, 5) that the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to introduce hearsay statements from medical literature or make arguments as to the presence or absence of medical literature, 6) that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for a mistrial or a continuance based on the unavailability of a defense expert witness, and 7) that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendants a credit against the jury’s verdict based on a payment received by the plaintiff under the decedent’s executive insurance plan. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sherry Hunter v. Jay Michael Ura, M.D., et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Malinda L. Mason
Defendant, Malinda L. Mason, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fifth offense, and sentenced to twenty-one months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant's sole issue on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her request for a mistrial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Apollo Hair Systems of Nashville v. First Lady International Corporation, d/b/a New Image
This case involves a contract dispute between a retail seller and manufacturer of hair replacement products. The parties entered into an exclusive dealing contract, whereby the manufacturer agreed to sell four models of hair replacement units exclusively to the retailer within a geographically defined area of Tennessee. In return, the retailer agreed to purchase all hair replacement units from themanufacturer and paya $10.00 premium for the units purchased. The manufacturer subsequently sold hair replacement units to a competitor of the retailer in Tennessee. The retailer filed a complaint against the manufacturer for inducement of breach of contract, pursuant to section 47-50-109 of the Tennessee Code, and breach of contract. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion as to both causes of action alleged in the complaint. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alley-Cassetty Coal Co., Inc. v. Ruth Johnson, Commission of the Tennessee Department of Revenue
This appeal involves a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Revenue. The taxpayer operates a brick and block business on a ten-acre tract of land in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on which is located a block manufacturing facility and retail sales office. Upon undertaking an audit of the taxpayer, the department inspected the property in Murfreesboro. The department subsequently assessed a sales and use tax liability against the taxpayer for the Murfreesboro property. The department determined that the Murfreesboro property constituted one location, and sales of concrete blocks manufactured at the facility constituted less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the gross sales at this location. The taxpayer filed an action in the trial court alleging it was entitled to a sales tax exemption under section 67-6-206 of the Tennessee Code because it operated two "locations" at the Murfreesboro property under the fifty-one percent (51%) test used by the department. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the department's motion and denied the taxpayer's motion. The taxpayer filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
La Southaphanh v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, La Southaphanh, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's dismissal of his two petitions for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated burglary and theft over one thousand dollars because his attorney failed to move to suppress his confession, failed to move for a mistrial when his co-defendant stated that the petitioner was in a gang, failed to attack the credibility of one of the investigating officers, and failed to meet with him and prepare for trial adequately. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for aggravated assault because his attorney failed to meet with him and prepare for trial adequately. We affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |