W2003-01816-COA-R3-CV
W2003-01816-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton

State of Tennessee v. Marcus Antwone Gillard
W2002-01189-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, facilitating aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. He now appeals these convictions contending that the (1) evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions, (2) trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of aggravated kidnapping or in refusing to merge the charge of aggravated kidnapping with his aggravated robbery charge, (3) trial court erred by denying him his right to effective cross-examination by stating that questions regarding the prior inconsistent statements of the victim would allow the admission of more damaging testimony against the defendant, and (4) trial court erred in sentencing. We hold that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor four; however, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

Mitchell Tarver v. State of Tennessee
W2002-01662-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Tarver, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing the habeas petition under the peculiar circumstances presented in the instant case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

W2003-00303-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00303-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Roger A. Page

State of Tennessee v. Thaddaeus Medford
W2002-00226-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III
Before us are the consolidated appeals of Thaddaeus Medford who, in his first trial, was convicted of Class E felony evading arrest. The jury in that trial deadlocked on the companion charges of cocaine possession with intent to deliver and drug paraphernalia possession. Upon retrial, the defendant was convicted of the two possession offenses. He appeals the legal sufficiency of his evading arrest and cocaine possession convictions, complains that testimony about the street value of cocaine and money found in his automobile was erroneously admitted, and argues that his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. Based on our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s evading arrest conviction. As to the cocaine possession conviction, we affirm the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and rejection of the defendant’s motion to suppress, but we, nevertheless, reverse the conviction because the evidence is legally insufficient.

State of Tennessee v. Vernon Lamar Bryant
E2002-01234-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

Ed Netherland, et al v. Bill Hunter, et al
M2002-03094-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
In this matter we are asked to determine which statute controls the issue of venue for a claim filed under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the venue provision of that act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-109, or Tennessee's general venue provision, section 20-4-101 of the Code. The trial court determined that section 47-18-109 controls venue in this action and denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

LLoyd Williams vs. State
E2003-01409-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Lloyd E. Williams ("Plaintiff"), who absconded while on bond, was tried, convicted, and sentenced on drug charges in absentia. Years later, Plaintiff was apprehended and placed in prison. Plaintiff sued the State of Tennessee ("the State") claiming that the trial and sentencing violated various statutory rights of his. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission ("the Commission") granted the State's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Dept. of Children's Services vs. K.G., et al In re: K.L.H.
E2003-00437-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey
The State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of K.G. ("Mother"), and F.L.H., Jr. ("Father"), the biological parents of the minor child, K.L.H. ("the Child"). The trial court granted DCS' petition to terminate first Father's, and later Mother's, parental rights. Mother appeals. We vacate the order terminating Mother's parental rights and remand for a new termination decision.

Department of Children's services vs. R.A.W.
E2003-00847-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Wright
R.A.W. ("Father") challenges the termination of his parental rights, claiming there was insufficient proof to establish grounds for termination or that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. Father also claims the Juvenile Court erred when it refused to grant him visitation after the petition to terminate his parental rights had been filed. We affirm the decision of the Juvenile Court.

State v. Jerry Davidson
M1998-00105-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

State v. Jerry Davidson
M1998-00105-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

State v. Jerry Davidson
M1998-00105-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

In the Matter of D.L.B., A Minor
W2001-02245-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Kenny W. Armstrong

This appeal involves an action to terminate parental rights filed by the prospective adoptive parents of a child. The child’s father asserts that the chancery court erred in terminating his parental rights on the basis that he abandoned his child for the four-month period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To compute the four-month period, the chancery court used the date on which the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights. CASA’s petition was later dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court’s termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and found an additional ground for abandonment as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) specifies that parental rights may be terminated if the father “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child.” We granted permission to appeal. We hold that the commencement of the four-month period of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is properly computed from the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed in chancery court, not from the filing date of the earlier juvenile court petition. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in terminating the father’s parental rights based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Mona Ray Cloud alias Mona R. Headrick, alias Mona R. Cloud, alias Mona Headrick
E2002-03002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Mona Ray Cloud, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act, a Class E felony; and criminal impersonation, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received four-year, one-year, and six-month sentences, respectively, with the one-year and six-month sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the four-year sentence for an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that she should have received alternative sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Paul Pettibone
M2002-03021-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The appellant, Paul Edward Pettibone, Jr., pled guilty to the offense of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C Felony. He was sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial judge ordered the appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration, but asserted that if the appellant successfully completed an addiction treatment program known as Lifeline Therapeutic Community, he could apply to the court to suspend the rest of his sentence.¹ In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant either an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement. After a review of this case, we conclude that the evidence did not support the grant of an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bobby Joe Carter v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02802-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The appellant, serving an effective twenty-year sentence on three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Barry Inman
M2002-02463-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The appellant, Barry Inman, was convicted by a jury in the Williamson County Circuit Court of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of Alprazolam with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and speeding. Additionally, the appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgments of acquittal and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Myra Pate vs. State
E2003-00297-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Myra Pate ("Plaintiff") filed a claim with the Tennessee Division of Claims Administration after she slipped and fell on her way to class at Pellissippi State Technical Community College ("PSTCC"). When her claim was denied, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Tennessee Claims Commission ("Commission") against the State of Tennessee ("the State"). The State filed a motion for summary judgment claiming Plaintiff had filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and failed to disclose the existence of her claim against the State. The State argued Plaintiff was judicially estopped from pursuing this lawsuit and also that she lacked standing. When Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the motion for summary judgment, the Commission granted the motion solely because no response had been filed. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Willie Ira Poteat, Jr.
E2003-00314-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The Defendant, Willie Ira Poteat, Jr., was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine for resale and criminal conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence taken during the execution of a search warrant, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges against him, reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law regarding the trial court's ruling on the suppression issue. We now address the Defendant's appeal based upon this certified question of law.

Louis Laurent vs. Suntrust Bank
E2003-01408-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Louis A. Laurent and Barbara Laurent ("Plaintiffs") sued SunTrust Bank ("Defendant") for alleged defamatory statements made by Defendant's attorney in a separate lawsuit. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Arthur Creech vs. Robert R. Addington
E2003-00842-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
The plaintiffs leased land in Mississippi from D.C. Parker and Richard B. Flowers ("Defendants") for the purpose of building motels on the land. Plaintiffs claim they were told by Defendants' agent that financing was in place to build immediately and that this representation induced them to enter into the leases. Financing never materialized and the motels never were built. Plaintiffs sued Defendants, the parties expected to provide financing, and others. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate and remand.

In Re: Estate of Gloria Eleanor Franklin vs. W. Jess Waltman
E2003-00926-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
The Trial Court following an evidentiary hearing, held decedent's holographic will to be conditional and inoperative. On appeal, we reverse.

Hitchock Metal Sources vs. John D. Mulford
E2003-00738-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Diane Hitchcock ("Mrs. Hitchcock") and Hitchcock Metal Sources, Inc. ("HMS") sued John D. Mulford, Jr. ("Mulford") and Mulford Enterprises, Inc. ("the defendant corporation") for breach of an oral contract between Mulford and Mrs. Hitchcock's deceased husband, James H. Hitchcock ("Mr. Hitchcock"). Mulford and the defendant corporation responded by filing a counterclaim against Mrs. Hitchcock and HMS, asserting, inter alia, breach of contract. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court found in favor of Mrs. Hitchcock, awarding her damages of $87,896.74 jointly and severally against Mulford and the defendant corporation, and an additional amount of $8,855.93 against the defendant corporation. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim of Mulford and the defendant corporation, as well as the original claim of HMS. Mulford and the defendant corporation appeal the trial court's dual determinations that the parties' oral agreement did not prohibit either party from pursuing other business opportunities and that the defendant corporation converted Mrs. Hitchcock's steel by selling it without her knowledge or consent. In addition, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to reform the parties' contract and in its calculation of damages. By way of a separate issue, Mrs. Hitchcock asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court's judgment in toto.

Mary Ann Gurganus Eure v. Barry Lynn Eure
E2003-00745-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
This is a post-divorce modification case involving the custody of, and support for, the parties' minor child, Matthew Chandler Eure (DOB: July 22, 1996) ("the child"). Mary Ann Gurganus Eure ("Mother") filed a complaint seeking custody of the child. Barry Lynn Eure ("Father"), the child's custodian, answered and filed a counterclaim seeking an increase in Mother's weekly child support obligation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mother's complaint. The court subsequently increased Mother's support obligation to $113 per week. Mother appeals, arguing, in so many words, that the evidence preponderates against both of the trial court's rulings. We affirm.