State of Tennessee v. Leonard Franklin
W2002-03008-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Leonard Franklin, of simple assault. The trial court sentenced him to seven months in the Shelby County Correctional Center with sixty days incarceration followed by eleven months and twenty-nine days probation. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance; (2) limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim concerning her civil lawsuit against him; (3) admitting evidence of the defendant’s suspension from his place of employment; (4) improperly commenting on the evidence; and (5) imposing a period of confinement. We reduce the probationary term to ten months but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. James Mellon
E1999-01505-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

Although the defendant, James A. Mellon, raises numerous issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the subsequently imposed death sentence in violation of due process, when he was not adequately informed of the consequences should he breach the plea agreement. Prior to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and especially aggravated robbery as part of a plea agreement with the prosecution. The agreement provided that, in exchange for his pleas of guilty, the State would recommend a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the trial court to decide the actual length of the sentence. Pursuant to the agreement, sentencing would be reserved until after testimony by the defendant in any related proceeding or at the conclusion of such proceedings. The defendant reneged on the agreement and instead moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and empaneled a jury. A sentencing hearing was conducted, resulting in a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence for the felony murder. On automatic appeal to this Court, we conclude that the defendant was not adequately informed of the consequences if he should breach the plea agreement. We are constrained to hold that the defendant's pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and thus the subsequent sentence denied him due process of law. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Paul Charles Carnahan
E2003-00400-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

The Defendant, Paul Charles Carnahan, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Morgan County for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally failing to provide support for a minor child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-101. After the Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial judge found him guilty of the Class E felony "Flagrant Nonsupport" and sentenced the Defendant to one year imprisonment and six years of probation. Further, the court ordered that the Defendant pay $64,041.19 in restitution. The Defendant now appeals that order contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) that the indictment contained a fatal flaw. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the trial court below, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and dismiss the indictment.

State of Tennessee v. Luis Anthony Ramon
W2002-03084-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The Henry County Grand Jury indicted the fifteen-year-old Defendant for first degree murder for the stabbing death of his aunt. The Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of the charged offense, after a jury rejected his insanity defense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The Defendant appealed, arguing that his insanity defense was established by clear and convincing evidence. In an opinion filed August 9, 2002, a majority of this Court reversed the judgment of conviction, modified the judgment to “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303. State v. Ramon, No. W2001-00389-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1841608, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2002). The State filed an application for permission to appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On December 23, 2002, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for the purpose of remanding the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002). On remand, we find that a rational jury could have found that the Defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of a severe mental illness or defect, the Defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act of stabbing his aunt to death so as to entitle him to the insanity defense. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Allen Harris
E2001-02810-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

On October 29, 1997, the Hamblen County Grand Jury returned an indictment against the appellant, Christopher Allen Harris for rape of a child in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522. On January 19, 2000, the appellant entered a guilty plea to attempted rape of a child. He received a sentence of eight years to be served as a work-release sentence for 11 months and 29 days in the county workhouse with the balance on intensive probation. The appellant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether he was properly subject to revocation of a Community Corrections sentence, and (2) whether the record preponderates against a determination that he had violated the terms of his Community Corrections sentence. After a review the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Whirlpool Corporation v. Sherry Pratt
M2002-02449-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's award of 75 percent disability for a serious disfigurement. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Randall Scott
M2001-02911-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Randall Scott, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. This Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions upon his direct appeal, see State v. Randall Scott, No. 01C01-9708-CR-00334, 1999 WL 547460, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. At Nashville, July 28, 1999), but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, see State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746 (Tenn. 2000). At the conclusion of the defendant’s second trial, a second Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court subsequently ordered the defendant to serve an aggregate thirty-five-year sentence for his convictions. The defendant now brings the instant direct appeal of his convictions and sentence alleging five grounds of error. The defendant argues that the trial court (1) erroneously admitted the evidence that the victim identified the defendant as her perpetrator in the first trial, (2) erroneously admitted certain hearsay testimony as an adoptive admission by a party opponent, (3) erroneously instructed the jury that they could draw an inference of guilt if they concluded that the defendant had concealed or destroyed or had attempted to destroy or conceal evidence of his crime, (4) failed to separate the defendant’s charges for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, as was required by law, and (5) ordered the defendant to serve an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the defendant’s claims and the record, we find that several of the defendant’s allegations were previously determined by this Court pursuant to his first direct appeal and that none of his claims merit relief.

Ruthie Curbow v. James Stucki
M2001-02908-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lonnie R. Hoover
In this case, Ruthie Ann Curbow appeals from a custody and support proceeding in Williamson County Juvenile Court. On the day of the hearing, parties and counsel appeared in camera for a pre-trial conference. Upon announcement of an apparent settlement in open court, Mother expressed disagreement with the terms of the settlement and a desire to preserve her right to appeal. The trial court determined that no settlement existed and trial on the merits proceeded with proof from all parties. The court entered an order awarding joint custody with Father as primary custodian under the statutory fitness comparison. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment.

Sherry Hunter v. Jay Ura
M2002-02573-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
Administratrix of estate of deceased husband filed wrongful death action against defendants anesthesiologist and anesthesia services group. Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, finding defendants at fault and awarding damages for medical and funeral expenses, and the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased including loss of consortium of wife and children. Defendants appeal, raising several procedural and evidentiary issues for consideration. We vacate and remand.

Shemeka Buford v. State
M2003-00176-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers
This is an action for damages against the Department of Children's Services of the State and one of its employees who allegedly strip-searched one of the plaintiff's young children, and attempted to strip-search another, while ostensibly seeking evidence of abuse allegedly inflicted by the mother. Process was never served on the employee. The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission. The plaintiff appeals, complaining of the dismissal of the employee, and of the transfer to the Commission. The judgment is affirmed.

Roger Dale Lewis v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02439-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

Roger Dale Lewis, the petitioner, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Sumner County Criminal Court. Through his petition, the petitioner sought to collaterally attack his aggravated arson conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations in the nature of suppression of exculpatory evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. After consideration of the entire record, we affirm the post-conviction courts disposition.

State of Tennessee v. Stephen Denton
E2000-02615-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

In August 1998, the McMinn County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Stephen L. Denton, M.D., for one count of rape, two counts of sexual battery, and two counts of unlawful distribution of a Schedule IV controlled substance. In November 1998, the McMinn County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for three counts of rape, one count of attempted rape, and eight counts of sexual battery. In March 1999, the McMinn County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of rape and four counts of sexual battery. In sum, the Defendant was charged in three different indictments for twenty-two criminal offenses involving eleven different female patients. Despite repeated objections by the Defendant, the three indictments were consolidated for trial. Four of the counts were nollied before trial, two more counts were dismissed at the conclusion of the State's proof, and the final sixteen counts were considered by the jury. The jury convicted the Defendant for six counts of sexual battery, one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, and three counts of assault and acquitted the Defendant on the remaining six counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his Motion for Severance; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress his statement given to law enforcement officers after his arrest; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to improperly cross-examine the Defendant and his former wife; (4) that the Defendant did not exercise "supervisory power" over his patient, and, therefore, was improperly convicted for sexual battery by an authority figure; (5) that the State presented improper closing arguments that were "so inflammatory and prejudicial as to require reversal;" (6) that the Defendant's conviction for assault against an undercover law enforcement officer should be dismissed because the undercover officer consented to the actions of the Defendant; (7) that the State failed to elect the incident upon which it was relying to support one of the Defendant's sexual battery convictions; and (8) that the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. Finding reversible error in case number 98-538, we reverse and remand the Defendant's conviction for assault in that case. We affirm all of the other judgments of the trial court.

John M. Johnson v. David Mills, Warden
E2002-02175-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

The Defendant, John M. Johnson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Finding that denial of the petition was appropriate, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jerry Worley v. State of Tennessee
E2003-00098-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The Defendant, Jerry Worley, pled guilty to nine counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine. For these offenses, the Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty years. The Defendant did not perfect an appeal of his sentence, but petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that his guilty plea was not valid; was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his sentence offends constitutional due process. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dolwin Deon Cormia v. State of Tennessee
E2003-00653-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dolwin Deon Cormia, of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole plus a concurrent two year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

State of Tennessee v. Glenn C. Summers
E2002-01996-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant, Glenn C. Summers, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant presents two issues for review: (1) that he established the affirmative defense of insanity and (2) that the trial court erred by providing an irrelevant definition of "intentional" in its jury instructions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Gregory A. Hedges v. State of Tennessee
E2002-02610-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis claiming a due process violation in that the State failed to disclose a plea agreement with a material witness. We conclude the issues raised by the petitioner have been previously determined and are time barred. We further conclude the facts of this case do not justify tolling of the statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's dismissal.

Permanent General Insurance v. Howard E. Raymer
M2002-03042-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
In this appeal, the appellant questions the trial court's findings that the employee's hernias were work related and the extent of his vocational disability. The appellant further contends the trial court erred in not reducing the lump sum award to its present value. As discussed below, the panel has concluded (1) the evidence fails to preponderate against the trial court's findings of fact and (2) Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-229(a) prohibits the reduction of a lump sum award to its present value.

State of Tennessee v. Zellburge Gleaves
M2002-02613-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Appellant, Zellburge Gleaves, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court following his guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Gleaves agreed to an eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. The plea agreement further provided that the manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered total confinement. Gleaves appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to grant a sentence of split confinement. After review of the record, we affirm.

Karen Scoggins vs. Larry Scoggins
E2002-02923-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
Karen Thompson Scoggins ("Plaintiff") and Larry Browder Scoggins ("Defendant") were divorced in 2000. The divorce judgment ordered Defendant to use funds from his 401(k) plan to pay off certain marital debts and then to convey the remainder of the 401(k) to Plaintiff. Defendant did not do this. Instead, Defendant filed for bankruptcy, listed Plaintiff as a creditor, and was granted a discharge in bankruptcy. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Chancery Court ("Trial Court") seeking to enforce the divorce judgment. Defendant claimed the debt to Plaintiff was discharged in bankruptcy. The Chancery Court held that the discharge in bankruptcy does not bar Plaintiff from enforcing her rights in Defendant's 401(k) plan. Defendant appeals. We reverse and remand.

Nicole M. Sullivan v. The Yasuda Fire & Marine
W2002-00857-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers, Circuit Judge
The trial found the plaintiff suffered a 5 percent disability to her body as a whole as a result of injury to her leg and abdomen, obviously applying the 2 _ times multiplier to the treating physician's impairment rating. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings and we affirm.

Arthur Lynn v. Randy Camp
M2002-02708-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This case concerns a petition for judicial review filed in chancery court. The petition sought review of the ALJ's order affirming the Petitioner's termination for sleeping on the job in violation of the Arlington Development Center's policy. The chancellor dismissed the Petition. We affirm the Chancellor.

State of Tennessee v. Abdullah Morrison
W2002-00881-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder. He now contends that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

State of Tennessee v. William Wilson
W2001-02601-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

On May 19, 2001, a jury in Memphis convicted the defendant, William Wilson, of aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I Standard Offender to life in prison for the first degree felony murder conviction and to eight (8) years for the aggravated robbery to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals these convictions. He argues four issues on appeal: (1) He was not criminally responsible for his co-defendant's actions, and therefore, not guilty of first degree murder; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery and first degree murder; (3) the trial court erred by failing to charge the affirmative defense of duress; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing him to eight (8) years consecutive to his life sentence with the possibility of parole. We affirm the trial court's actions with regard to these issues.

State of Tennessee v. Henry Mitchell Dixon
E2002-00731-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

A Sullivan County Jury convicted the appellant, Henry Mitchell Dixon, Jr., also known as "Mackie" Dixon, of one count of attempted first degree murder (Count One), one count of attempted second degree murder (Count Two), one count of attempted aggravated assault (Count Four), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts Three and Five), one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle (Count Six), and one count of aggravated burglary (Count Seven). The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-two (22) year sentence as a Range I offender for Counts One through Six and four (4) years probation on Count Seven, to run consecutively to the twenty-two (22) year sentence. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, his sentence, and the trial court's refusal to set aside the appellant's conviction for attempted first degree murder based on the jury foreman's statement after the trial that there was a mistake as to how the verdict was returned. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that none of these claims merit relief. However, we must reverse and remand the conviction for attempted second degree murder due to an erroneous jury charge on the definition of "knowingly." In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.