Paul Peak v. Travelers Indemnity
M2001-03047-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
The named insureds in an automobile liability insurance policy providing $300,000 per accident liability insurance appeal a trial court grant of summary judgment that they had effectively reduced their uninsured motorist limits per accident to $60,000. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Basil Marceaux v. Governor Don Sundquist
M2002-01356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Appellant filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court naming Governor Don Sundquist, all members of the United States Congress representing Tennessee, all members of the state legislature, all Tennessee District Attorneys General, all Tennessee Sheriff's Departments, and others as defendants. The complaint alleged the numerous defendants were guilty of "kidnapping, extortion, and racketeering" through the application of laws calling for mandatory car insurance, and the practice of routine traffic stops. The trial court dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.

Christina Cliburn v. Paul David Bergeron
M2002-01386-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: J. Steve Daniel

Steven Griffin v. William Roberts
M2002-01898-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a legal malpractice suit against the court-appointed attorney who represented him in his post-conviction appeal. Despite many attempts, the inmate failed to obtain service on the attorney. More than three years after suit was filed, the court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution. We affirm the trial court.

Betty Brown v. Melvin Brown
M2002-00728-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
The trial court granted the wife a divorce after a marriage of twenty-five years, and ordered the husband to pay her $300 per month as alimony in futuro. Eight years later, the husband filed a Petition to Modify the Final Decree and eliminate the alimony obligation, citing a significant increase in the wife's earnings. The trial court denied the petition. We affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Chester Floyd Cole
W2001-02871-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for rape of a child alleging insufficient evidence and excessive punishment. The trial court failed to apply pre-July 1995 sentencing guidelines for this April 1995 crime, and the trial court erred in applying one enhancement factor. After careful review, we affirm the conviction and remand for a new sentence.

Eric D. Wallace v. Warden, James M. Dukes
W2002-00882-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

In 1995, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and sentenced to consecutive sentences of life and fifteen years, respectively. Petitioner now files for habeas corpus relief, alleging he was convicted based on defective indictments. The trial court summarily dismissed petitioner's claim. We affirm the trial court's dismissal.

Dept. of Children Serv. vs. Sarah Owens
W2002-00905-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Clayburn L. Peeples
Petitioners filed a petition to intervene and for temporary custody in a dependent and neglect proceeding filed against the adoptive parents of the subject child. Pursuant to a later filed petition to terminate the parental rights of the adoptive parents, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the parental rights. The court then ruled that the petition to intervene and temporary custody was moot on the basis that juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute because of the previous order terminating the parental rights of the child's adoptive parents and granting guardianship of the child to the state. The petitioners appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo, and the circuit court subsequently dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners appeal. We affirm the circuit court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal but amend the order of the trial court to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals rather than dismissal.

Charjoray P. Weir v. State of Tennessee
M2002-00079-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. O. Bond

The Petitioner was indicted for first degree murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to second degree murder, and received a sentence of fifteen years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel resulting in an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The trial court dismissed the petition based on its untimely filing. However, our Court reversed that finding. The Petitioner filed an amended petition, and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the request for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ervin Lee Hayes v. State of Tennessee
M2001-02913-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Petitioner was indicted for two counts of attempted first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the Petitioner was convicted of both counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for each count and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The Defendant appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner then filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief. The trial court found that the Petitioner failed to state any grounds for which relief could be granted and ordered that the Petitioner respond within fifteen days. Receiving no response, the trial court dismissed the petition. Eventually, with permission from the trial court based on extenuating circumstances, the Petitioner filed an amended pro se petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Ricky E. Pullen
M2001-02140-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge James K. Clayton, Jr.

The defendant, Ricky E. Pullen, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury on one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and acquitted of child rape. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. Only one issue is raised on appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated sexual battery. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and affirm the conviction.

Terry David Stephens v. State of Tennessee
M2001-01036-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The petitioner was convicted in 1996 of aggravated rape and sentenced to confinement for twenty years as a Range I, standard offender. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and, subsequently, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and the petitioner timely appealed, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey settlement offers and to request jury instructions as to lesser-included offenses. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition following a hearing, and we affirm that dismissal.

Steven D. King v. State of Tennessee
W2001-01382-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

The petitioner, Steven D. King, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Terrance Burnett v. State of Tennessee
W2000-01954-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Terrance Burnett, appellant, pleaded guilty to two counts of felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated burglary. He received sentences of life without the possibility of parole, twenty years, and eight years, respectively. One year later, Burnett filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several constitutional violations that he claimed entitled him to relief from the above judgments. After having appointed counsel, the trial court dismissed the petition without having conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. On appeal to this Court, Burnett contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we are of the opinion that the trial court acted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Alan Adler
W2001-00178-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The appellant, Alan L. Adler, was indicted for aggravated child neglect of a child under six years of age, a Class A felony. Following trial, a Fayette County jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Subsequently, the appellant, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101 (section 40-32-101), petitioned the trial court to expunge all public records pertaining to his indictment, prosecution, and trial for the aggravated child neglect charge. After the appellant's petition was granted by the trial court, the State of Tennessee appealed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) (Rule 3(c)) and argued that Adler was not entitled to expungement under section 40-32-101 because he was convicted of a lesser-included offense. We granted this appeal to determine if the State is authorized under Rule 3(c) to appeal a trial court's expungement order. After examining the facts and the law pertinent to this issue, we hold that the State is not permitted to appeal a trial court's expungement order as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c). Nevertheless, treating the State's appeal as a writ of certiorari, we also hold that the appellant was entitled in this case to expungement of all public records pertaining to the felony charge of which he was acquitted.

Steve Vinson v. United Parcel Service, et al
W2001-02180-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Kenny W. Armstrong

The dispositive issue in this workers’ compensation action is whether the Special Chancellor erred in finding the appellant, Steve Vinson, to be 100% permanently partially disabled, as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in the scope of his employment. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that no such impairment classification exists in the workers’ compensation statutes and cases of this state. After conducting our own de novo review of the record, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence supports the appellant’s claim that he is 100% permanently and
totally disabled and entitled to full workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(4)(A)(i). Additionally, pursuant to relevant workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that the trial court erred in allowing appellees a credit for temporary total disability benefits that have heretofore been paid to appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed, as modified herein, and the case remanded for enforcement of the judgment of this Court.

State of Tennessee v. Ernest Wilson
M2000-01997-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

This appeal arises from Ernest Edward Wilson's conviction for second degree murder in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter; it did not instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. The jury convicted Wilson of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Wilson challenged the trial court's failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We granted review and now conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. Further, we hold that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

James Jones v. Pierce Garrett a/k/a Perry Garrett
E2000-00196-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kindall T. Lawson

This case arises from a proceeding to terminate parental rights. In that proceeding, the prospective adoptive parents sought a determination that the father of the child in their custody had abandoned him. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights on the basis of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-13-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (failure to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days after notice of alleged paternity by the child's mother) when the father had been adjudicated the legal parent of the child at the time of the hearing. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) applies only to cases in which no legal relationship between the parent and child has been established.

State of Tennessee v. Philip R. Workman
W2002-00300-CCA-R3-PD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

Petitioner, who received the death penalty at his original trial in 1982, now appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, he contends the trial court should have granted relief based upon the recantation testimony of an alleged eyewitness and a newly discovered post-mortem x-ray of the victim. He further contends the trial court erred in prohibiting the testimony of an original trial juror who would testify that the recantation testimony and the newly discovered evidence would have affected the juror's verdict in the original trial. We conclude that the trial court's order reflects varying and sometimes inappropriate standards of review for coram nobis proceedings; nevertheless, the actual findings by the trial court are sufficient for this court to conclude that the trial court found no reasonable probability that the new evidence would have affected the jury's verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Alan Hawkins
E2002-01095-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen M. Bevil

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Alan Hawkins, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse to be served at 75%. In this appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the state's witnesses violated the rule of sequestration, and (2) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sharon Keisling v. Daniel Keisling
M2002-01833-SC-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

This case is before the Court on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in transferring child custody from one parent to the other when no petition requesting a change of custody had been filed at the time of the ruling. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in changing custody when the aggrieved party was not provided with notice that custody would be addressed at the hearing. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's award of custody and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Nkobi I. Dunn - Concurring
E2001-02120-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt

I write a separate concurring opinion to point out and review certain important facets of the appellate record in this case. The record reflects that the defendant’s guilty pleas were “open”; they did not contain any specified sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C). See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (providing for an agreement between defendant and state “that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case”). Had the plea agreement contained specific, properly articulated sentencing provisions pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), they may have survived the revocation of judicial diversion probation, depending upon the terms as accepted by the court. See State v. Hollie D. Campbell, No. E2000-00373-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 2, 2001) (Witt, J., concurring), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2001); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-203(b) (1997) (dispensing with requirement of sentencing hearing when sentence is agreed upon and accepted by trial court); accord id. § 40-35-205(d). However, the trial court, having apparently received and accepted open pleas made in conjunction with the diversion provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313(a), was positioned and obliged, after revocation of the judicial diversion probation, to resume the case at the pre-diversion point of departure. This means that, following the revocation, the court’s next task was to conduct a sentencing hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-203(a) (1997), -209(a) (Supp. 2002).

State of Tennessee v. Nkobi I. Dunn
E2001-02120-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

Pursuant to the judicial diversion statute, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession for resale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. The plea was entered pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-313, otherwise referred to as judicial diversion, and the trial court placed the Defendant on probation for three years. Approximately six months later, a probation violation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had tested positive for marijuana use. An amended probation violation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that the Defendant had failed to make payments on court costs and had failed to pay child support, the latter being a special condition of probation. The Defendant pled guilty to violating his probation and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. Without conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgments sentencing the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days to serve in the county jail for the paraphernalia conviction and three years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony drug conviction. After reviewing the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing.

Consumers Insurance vs. Virgie Smith
E2002-00724-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
Consumer Insurance USA ("the insurance company") brought a declaratory judgment action against one of its policyholders, Virgie Smith ("the policyholder"), age 80 at the time of trial, and others, seeking a declaration regarding its liability under an automobile insurance policy ("the policy") issued by it to Ms. Smith. The suit was prompted by a two-vehicle accident involving an automobile being driven by the policyholder's great-grandson, Thomas G. Tuten ("the great-grandson"), in which Tuten and another were killed and two other individuals in his vehicle were injured. The trial court held that the vehicle being driven by the great-grandson, a 1989 Chevrolet Camaro ("the Camaro"), was a "newly acquired auto" under the terms of the policy, was reported to the insurance company within 14 days of its purchase, and was, consequently, a covered vehicle under the policy as of the date of its purchase, i.e., June 29, 1999, some 12 days before the accident on July 10, 1999. Because we hold that the evidence preponderates that the policyholder made material misrepresentations to the insurance company that void the policy, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Barbara Cox vs. Jim Stafford
E2002-01490-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
Barbara Gail Cox ("Plaintiff") purchased a camper from Jim Stafford ("Defendant") in 1997. The title to the camper never was transferred to Plaintiff's name, and, apparently, still remains in Defendant's name. Plaintiff sued Defendant in General Sessions Court and obtained a judgment against Defendant for $10,800. Defendant appealed to Circuit Court. The case proceeded to trial in June of 2001. After a jury was selected and some testimony given, Defendant moved for a continuance because a witness had not been served with a subpoena. The Trial Court granted the continuance conditioned upon Defendant's paying court costs on or before August 31, 2001. Defendant never paid these costs. In October of 2001, the Trial Court dismissed the lawsuit and reinstated the General Sessions Court verdict. Defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, which the Trial Court denied. Defendant appeals. We affirm.