Hazel Ann Edde v. Gladys Dalton Edde
M2002-01204-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

After a thirty-six year marriage, Wife filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, inappropriate marital conduct, and adultery. The trial court granted the divorce to Wife, divided the marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $425 per month. Husband appeals. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's decision, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In the Matter of: R.L.H., A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services, v. Darlene Medley Hall - Dissenting
M2002-01179-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Floyd Don Davis

While I concur in the majority’s opinion finding that grounds for termination of Hall’s parental rights as to R.L.H. have been established by clear and convincing evidence, I dissent as to the majority’s conclusion that termination of Hall’s parental rights is in the best interests of the minor child. I recognize that the evidence is certainly not favorable to Hall in some particulars, including the fact that her sole support is derived from social security, that she has no prospects of employment in the near future, her past failure to provide a safe and suitable home for the minor child in the face of abuse, her impaired mental condition, and the fact that Hall had no suitable residence for the child at the time of trial. However, this court must balance this evidence with the situation as it pertains to R.L.H. R.L.H. is a special needs child who has specific learning, speech, and behavioral problems. All reports indicate that R.L.H. is in need of continued counseling and therapy. Under the current arrangement, R.L.H. resides in a therapeutic foster home under the care of trained foster parents. This foster home has served as a stable and supportive environment for the minor child since approximately July 2000.

Melissa Combs Cranston v. Edward Scott Combs
M2000-02101-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano

We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the appellant (father) in this post-divorce case failed to present evidence of a material change of circumstances justifying a change of custody of the parties’ two minor children. The Chancellor granted a change in custody from the appellee (mother) after finding that there was a material change in circumstances that presented a substantial risk of harm to the children. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no material change of circumstances that presented a threat of substantial harm to the children. After reviewing the record and applying our recent decision in Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002), we conclude that a material change of circumstances occurred after the initial custody determination and that the modification of custody was in the best interest of the children. Although the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Kendrick in this case, and therefore applied an incorrect legal standard, we affirm the result reached by the Chancery Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the Chancery Court is reinstated.d.

Jeffrey Whitaker v. State of Tennessee
E2001-02399-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

Aggrieved that the lower court denied post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner, Jeffrey Whitaker, appeals and claims that his convictions resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary guilty pleas. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Alan White
E2002-00716-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Christopher Alan White, appeals as of right his conviction by a Blount County Circuit Court jury for aggravated assault and the resulting ten-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument required a mistrial, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

Town of Rogersville, ex rel. Water Commission v. Mid Hawkins County Utility District
E2002-01727-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge John K. Wilson

Petition to alter Respondent Utility's boundary was sustained by County Executive and Trial Court. On appeal, we vacate and remand with instructions.

Charles T. Kimery, v. Unicoi County Insurance Agency, et al.
E2002-00849-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

In a dispute over corporate ownership and management, the Trial Court awarded Judgment for compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, we affirm the compensatory damages and attorney fees award, but reverse punitive damage award.

State of Tennessee v. Debiasi Sirnard King
E2002-00634-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant brings this appeal and contends the following: (1) The participation of a special prosecutor, hired by the victim's family, is a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights; (2) The trial court erroneously denied defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the driver of the vehicle containing the victim, Fernando Hawkins; (3) The trial court failed to give a curative instruction after Detective Hawkins stated that he obtained a warrant for first degree murder of the defendant; (4) The trial court failed to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of facilitation of second degree murder; and (5) The trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Romey Stone
E2002-02570-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

The Appellant, Romey Stone, appeals the decision of the Grainger County Circuit Court revoking his placement in the community corrections program and ordering service of his original sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Stone argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on unreliable evidence in revoking his community corrections sentences, and (2) he was denied due process based upon the lack of a "neutral and detached" fact-finder. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Steve E. Todd v. State of Tennessee
M2001-03080-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The petitioner, Steve E. Todd, pled guilty in 1994 to two counts of rape of a child, receiving concurrent twenty-three-year sentences as a Range I offender. He filed a post-conviction petition in 1995 alleging, inter alia, that at the time of his pleas of guilty he had not understood that his sentences would be served without the possibility of parole. Counsel, appointed to represent him, filed an amended petition, which the post-conviction court dismissed following an evidentiary hearing. This court reversed the dismissal and remanded the matter for additional findings to be made. Following the remand, the post-conviction court granted the petition, concluding that the guilty pleas had not been knowing. The State appealed and, following our review, we reverse the order of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for another evidentiary hearing.

State of Tennessee v. Stephen Massey, a/k/a Stephania
M2001-02686-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

The appellant, Stephen Massey, was convicted by a jury in the Giles County Circuit Court of two counts of selling less than .5 grams of crack cocaine, Class C felonies, and three counts of selling .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, (2) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to exclude two African-Americans from the jury based on their race, and (4) the sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Brandon Ronald Crabtree
M2002-01470-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. O. Bond

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brandon Ronald Crabtree, was found guilty of (1) selling marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance in an amount of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds, a Class E felony, and (2) selling a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to two years for each conviction, and the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. The trial court also determined at the sentencing hearing that Defendant was then (or at that time) on probation for a prior conviction and that Defendant was in violation of that probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered the original sentence of eighteen months to run consecutively to the sentences imposed for the two felony convictions for an effective sentence of five and one-half years. In his appeal, Defendant does not contest his conviction for selling a Schedule VI controlled substance. However, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance. Defendant also challenges the length of his sentences arguing that the trial court failed to follow the principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and failed to properly weigh mitigating and enhancing factors. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance and affirm the trial court's judgments as to Defendant's sentences.

William Andrew Dixon v. State of Tennessee
M2002-01606-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

The petitioner, William Andrew Dixon, was convicted in 1981 of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and our supreme court determined that his sentence was void, remanding for resentencing and concluding that he should have been sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On remand, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to life with parole, and he appealed the resentencing, arguing that only a jury could impose the sentence. We conclude that the directive of our supreme court was that the punishment should be life with the possibility of parole and that the court could set this punishment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Bobby Blackmon
M2002-00612-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Bobby Blackmon, appeals from the lower court's denial of his motion to modify and correct an illegal sentence or in the alternative petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Finding no error in the summary dismissal of the appellant's motion or petition, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Clorie L. Jackson
W2002-02148-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

The Defendant, Clorie L. Jackson, was convicted by a jury of forgery and money laundering. The trial court subsequently merged the forgery conviction into the money laundering conviction,¹ and sentenced the Defendant to nineteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the money laundering conviction, as well as the trial court’s jury instructions on that offense. Because we find the evidence insufficient to support the money laundering conviction, we reverse that conviction and dismiss the charge. The conviction for forgery is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the forgery conviction.

Charles Roy Cole v. State of Tennessee
W2002-01907-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

Petitioner, Charles Roy Cole, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Madison County. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jamie Lou Haneline
W2002-01773-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The Defendant, Jamie Lou Haneline, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a police officer regarding a statement made by the Defendant; and (3) whether the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant’s sentence based upon the offense having been committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Doug Long v. T. Allen Pannell, Jr.,
2002-01792-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell

Susan Louise-Wright vs. Walter Wright
E2002-01786-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
This is a divorce case. Susan Louise Cronin-Wright ("Wife") filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the trial court to hold that Walter Curtis Wright, Jr. ("Husband"), "has no equitable interest in the marital residence and never contributed to [its] acquisition, preservation, or enhancement." The trial court granted the motion. Husband appeals, contending that the residence is a marital asset of which he is entitled to an equitable share. We affirm.

Kimberly Sue Jenkins v. Jody Dale Jenkins,
E2002-01979-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Jacqueline E. Schulten

State ex rel. Jennifer Barnes vs. Anthony Brandenburg
E2002-00994-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
The State of Tennessee, on relation of Jennifer Kamille Bond Barnes ("Mother"), filed a petition to increase the child support obligation of Anthony Wayne Brandenburg ("Father"). The trial court increased Father's child support obligation from $430 per month to $473 per month, a 10% increase. Father appeals, contending that the trial court failed to properly apply the provisions of the Child Support Guidelines ("the guidelines"). We affirm.

Dept of Children's Svrcs. vs. R. G. T.
E2002-02804-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Wright
The trial court terminated the parental rights of R.G.T. ("Father") to his minor child, L.B.T. (DOB: September 20, 2000). Father appeals, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's dual findings, i.e., (1) that grounds exist for terminating his parental rights and (2) that termination is in the best interest of L.B.T. We affirm.

Darlene Sue Singleton v. Shelby Williams, Inc.
E2002-01697-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Duane O. Slone, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant appeals the trial court's decision awarding the plaintiff compensation of $85,228.8 for a sixty percent permanent partial disability to each arm. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court erred: in allowing the introduction of the standard medical report or deposition of Dr. William Gutch into evidence; in accepting the testimony and opinion of Dr. Gutch over that of the treating physician; and by awarding a sixty percent permanent partial disability to each arm. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Grainger County Circuit Court is Affirmed BYERS, SR. J., in which ANDERSON, J., and THAYER, SP. J., joined. Joseph J. Doherty, of Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shelby Williams, Inc. James M. Davis, of Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Darlene Sue Singleton. MEMORANDUM OPINION Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452 (Tenn. 1988). Facts The plaintiff is forty-six years of age and worked as an upholster for the defendant company for twenty-four years. She has a 7th grade education and has problems reading and writing. Her duties for the defendant require the use of staple gun, welt gun, scissors, and wire cutter. In January of 2, the plaintiff alleged repetitive use injuries to both arms. She testified that she provided notice of her injuries to her employer on June 8, 2. She was then referred to Dr. Philip Bickers, who referred her to Dr. Robert Ivy for treatment. In November of 2, Dr. Ivy performed surgery on the employee's left wrist; in January 21, he performed surgery on the employee's right wrist. The employee later saw Dr. William Gutch at the direction of her attorney. The plaintiff returned to work without restrictions six weeks later. She testified that she has not seen Dr. Ivy or any other doctor since her return to work. Medical Evidence The medical evidence for the purpose of the issues raised in this trial was provided by the deposition testimony of Dr. Robert Ivy and Dr. William Gutch. Dr. Ivy, an orthopedic surgeon in Knoxville, testified that he first saw the plaintiff on October 3, 2, when she was referred to him by her workers' compensation carrier. At that visit he evaluated her for complaints of pain and numbness in both of her hands. He took her history and performed a physical examination. Dr. Ivy testified that he diagnosed the plaintiff with severe bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended release surgery, which he performed on November 17, 2 (left arm), and January 5, 21 (right arm). He testified that the plaintiff responded well to the surgeries and he placed her at maximum medical improvement on March 2, 21. He rated her at five percent permanent partial impairment to each upper extremity and returned her to work with no restrictions. Dr. Gutch, a retired orthopedic surgeon who currently uses his medical license chiefly for independent medical examinations for the purpose of litigation, testified that he examined the plaintiff on October 1, 21. He testified that he took a history from the plaintiff, reviewed her medical records (including those of Dr. Ivy,) and performed a physical examination, including tests of range of motion and grip strength. He estimated that this process took approximately one hour. Dr. Gutch testified that based upon her history and the results of his examination, he agreed with Dr. Ivy's diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff, but he disagreed with Dr. Ivy's impairment rating. Dr. Gutch assigned the plaintiff a total impairment of eight percent to her left upper extremity and eight percent to her right upper extremity. He also restricted the plaintiff to avoid excessive and repetitive finger and wrist motion, pulling and tugging, and the use of vibratory tools. Discussion Although we are required to weigh the evidence in a case in depth to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies, we are required to make such evaluation within the confines of -2-

Michael David Palmer v. Minco, Inc. and Hartford
E2002-01634-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, Ii, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant appeals the trial court's decision to award a partial vocational disability of sixty-one percent to each hand. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding the plaintiff had suffered a permanent anatomical injury and thus erred in awarding permanent disability benefits or alternatively that the evidence presented in the case does not support the award of permanent partial disability. We affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Greene County Chancery Court is Affirmed BYERS, SR. J., in which ANDERSON, J., and THAYER, SP. J., joined. Robert R. Davies, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Minco, Inc. John T. Milburn Rogers, of Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michael David Palmer. MEMORANDUM OPINION Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). Facts The plaintiff (employee) is a right-handed male thirty-six years of age. He completed the eleventh grade and obtained his GED in 1984. He also attended Walter State for approximately eighteen months where he took some college courses. The plaintiff then attended "Vo Tech" in Greeneville in auto body collision and repair. Prior to working for the defendant, the plaintiff worked at Master Guard, his father's company, where he was employed in sales and service. The plaintiff testified that he knows how to install home fire and security alarms. He further testified that in regard to installing home security and fire alarms there are really no physical requirements involved in doing the job. The plaintiff also worked at W&R Paint and Supply as a paint technician, a job he testified that he could return to in his current condition. While working for the defendant the Plaintiff was an Operator B which means he assisted Operator A in keeping furnaces loaded with sand which was then turned into glass. On April 12, 1999, while climbing a ladder, the Plaintiff's foot missed the ladder and Plaintiff caught himself by grabbing a rung on the ladder with both hands to prevent him from falling. He testified that his hands began hurting immediately and felt like they were "numb and jammed". He testified that he also did not have any feeling in his fingers. He reported the injury to his supervisor who instructed him to see a doctor, which he did the next day. The plaintiff testified that he was treated by Dr. John Holbrook, who prescribed Vioxx for numbness and tingling in the plaintiff's hands. The plaintiff was later seen by Dr. William Kennedy for the purpose of an independent medical evaluation. The plaintiff was later examined by Dr. Norman Hankins and Dr. Rodney Caldwell, vocational disability experts, for the purpose of determining his vocational disability. The plaintiff subsequently quit his job with the defendant and began working for an automobile body repair shop, but he testified that he had to quit that job too because he could no longer work with his hands. Medical Evidence The medical evidence for the purpose of the issues raised in this trial was provided by the deposition testimony of Dr. John Holbrook and Dr. William Kennedy. Dr. Holbrook, an orthopedic surgeon in Johnson City, testified that he examined the plaintiff for the purpose of treatment on May 5, 1999. At that time, the plaintiff gave Dr. Holbrook a history that included the slip and fall incident on the ladder of April 12, 1999. Dr. Holbrook testified that his examination of the plaintiff on May 5 led him to believe that the plaintiff had stretched the volar -2-

State of Tennessee v. Katherine White Byrd
E2002-00417-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The Defendant, Kathryn L. Byrd, was convicted by a jury of one count of theft over $1,000. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence; claiming reversible error because the State was not required to elect the offense for which it was seeking a conviction; and contesting the trial judge's order of consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant's conviction. We reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences and order the Defendant's sentences to run concurrently.