State vs. Wanda Bledsoe
W1999-00072-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison

Also State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2D 661, 668-71 (Tenn. 1999). As a Result, The Trial Court
W1999-00241-CCA-R3-CD

State vs. Billy Moore
W1998-00029-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley

W1999-1977-CCA-R3-CD
W1999-1977-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

State vs. Frank Massengill
W1999-02434-CCA-R3-CD

State vs. John M. Johnson
W1999-00679-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

03C01-9906-CR-00227
03C01-9906-CR-00227
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

03C01-9905-CR-00200
03C01-9905-CR-00200

State vs. Wayne Leroy Evans
E1999-00384-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

Judy Lynn Patterson Conner, v. Billy Ray Conner
E1999–03A01-9903-CV-00095
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jacqueline E. Schulten

In this divorce action the wife has appealed and raises issues as to the amount of the alimony award and the division of marital property. The husband objects to an aw ard o f alimony in futuro and the Order requiring him to pay $2,047.20for the w ife’s atto rney’s fees.

Wayna Shadwick v. Shirley Young and Betty Thompson and F.H. Showmaker Distributors, Inc.
02607-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

The essence of this appeal is whether a judgment creditor of an estate should be permitted to intervene in a marital/familial matter.

Leslie A. Lewis, v. John S. Muchmore and Virginia L. Muchmore
W1998-00794-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. McCarroll, Jr.

Leslie A. Lewis filed a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County against John S. Muchmore and Virginia Muchmore alleging forcible entry and detainer (FED)1 or unlawful detainer. The court entered judgment for possession only and the Muchmores appealed to circuit court where the Muchmores brought a counter-complaint for specific performance of a real estate contract. Following a bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, Leslie A. Lewis, restoring her to possession of the subject premises and dismissing the countercomplaint. This appeal resulted.

Robert Eugene Lamb, James Morris Lofton, et al. v. MegaFlight Inc., a Florida Corp., Ronald Rosenburg, et al., - Concurring
W1998-00797-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Dewey C. Whitenton

Lamb, Lee, Lofton, and Bailey (“Plaintiffs” or “Phoenix”) brought suit alleging breach of contract and fraudulent inducement in the Chancery Court of McNairy County, Tennessee. MegaFlight, Rosenberg, and Noel (“MegaFlight”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because a forum selection clause in the contract specified that any action must be brought in the courts of Orange County, Florida. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. Based upon the following, we reverse the lower court’s grant of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

David Chenault, v. Jeff L. Walker, Jo Bursey, Jack L. Moore, Ocean Inn, Inc., and Dimension III Financial Inc.
W1998-00769-COA-RM-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

This case deals with in personam jurisdiction under the Tennessee Long Arm 1 This Court originally denied the application for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appellant’s T.R.A.P. 11 application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this Court for a review on the merits. 2 Also named as a defendant is Jeff L. Walker, but he is not involved in this interlocutory appeal. 2 Statute and comes to this Court as a T.R.A.P. interlocutory appeal.1 Defendants, Jo Bursey (Bursey), Jack L. Moore (Moore), Ocean Inn, Inc. (Ocean Inn), and Dimension III Financial, Inc. (Dimension III)2, appeal the order of the trial court denying their motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

David . LeFemine, and David Sanders, v. Phillips & Jordan, Incorporated
03A01-9904-CH-00136
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

This is a suit by Plaintiffs David LeFemine and David Sanders seeking damages for breach of contract against Defendant Phillips & Jordan, Incorporated, which alleges that Defendant  Phillips & Jordan failed to provide the Plaintiffs an access road as it had by written contract agreed to do. The Trial Court dismissed the Plaintiff's proof resulting in this appeal which insists the evidence preponderates against the action of the Trial Court. We vacate the Trial Court'sjudgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Gerald W. Smith, v. Roane County Circuit Court Harriman Utility Board, Richard A. Hall and the City Harriman, Tennessee
E1999-02456-COA-
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

'This is an appeal by Gerald W. Smith (“Plaintiff”) under T.R.A.P. Rule 3 alleging error in the Trial Court’s granting Summary Judgment to Defendants/Appellees, Harriman Utility Board (“HUB”), HUB General Manager Richard A. Hall (“Hall”), and the City of Harriman, Tennessee (“Harriman”). Plaintiff was an employee of HUB, and after his employment was terminated filed suit for breach of contract, procurement of breach of contract in violation of T.C.A. 2 § 47-50-109, retaliatory discharge, and promissory estoppel. The Circuit Court for Roane County entered summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In the Matter of The Liquidation for United American Bank of Knoxville, TN Security Pacific Equipment Leasing, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
E1999-00270-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl E. Fansler

Appellant leased equipment to United American Bank (“UAB”) for a seven year term. Three years into the lease, UAB was closed by the Tennessee Commissioner of Banking and FDIC FILED February 9, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk 2 was appointed as receiver. Appellant filed a claim with FDIC seeking recovery of the full amount due on the lease. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to FDIC, thus upholding the constitutionality and applicability of T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b), which provides that lessors can recover a maximum of two months’ lease payments after a Tennessee bank fails and is closed. In this appeal, lessor contends that T.C.A. § 45-2-1504(b) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions by treating lessors differently from other contract claimants and that the application of the statute results in an unconstitutional taking of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Shyun S. Hamlett v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture Co. and Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company
W1998-00117-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is an appeal by the employee, Shyun S. Hamlett, from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Madison County in favor of the defendants. The chancellor found that the appellant "was outside the course and scope of her employment" at the time of the accidental injury. In her only issue, the plaintiff states that the trial court was in error in its conclusion. We find that the preponderance of the evidence supports the finding of the chancellor and affirm his judgment. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (1991 and Supp. 1998); Henson v. Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Damien Darden
M1996-00044-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert B. Wedemeyer

We granted this appeal to decide (1) whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over criminal charges that were not addressed in juvenile court during the transfer hearing; and (2) whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1- 159(d) (Supp. 1999), generally eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing, is unconstitutional. After examining the record and considering the arguments of the parties and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over the criminal charges transferred from juvenile court as well as over the additional charges found in the grand jury’s indictment. In addition, we conclude that the General Assembly did not act unconstitutionally in eliminating the requirement for an acceptance hearing. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Donald P. Spicer v. State of Tennessee
W1996-00042-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

In this appeal, we address several issues related to the consolidation and severance of multiple sexual abuse offenses pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 8, 13, and 14. More specifically, these issues are: (1) whether the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses under Rule 14(b)(1) by objecting to a pre-trial motion for consolidation; if so, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by improperly consolidating two indictments alleging child rape and aggravated sexual battery in a single trial; and if so, (3) whether that abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the appellant properly preserved his right to a severance of offenses and that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating both indictments in a single trial. Because we also hold that the trial court’s abuse of discretion affirmatively appears to have affected the outcome of the trial, we vacate the appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand this case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new trial. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part as modified and reversed in part.

Harry Clark March and Trudi Janette Marsh, Susan R. Limor, Trustee v. Fleet Mortgage Group and Bank United
398-04816-KL3-7)
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolph A. Birch, Jr.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee: Whether the omission of the official notary seal in the acknowledgment on
a Tennessee deed of trust as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-22-110, renders the instrument “null and void as to . . . subsequent creditors . . . or bona fide purchasers . . . without notice” as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-26-103. After careful consideration, we conclude that the official seal of the acknowledging notary public must be affixed to a deed of trust if that instrument is to constitute notice to subsequent creditors or bona fide purchasers. Because the deed of trust before us did not bear the official notary seal, it does not constitute notice to subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers without notice.

State of Tennessee vs. Ronald Lockhart
03C01-9902-CC-00071
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

Defendant Ronald Lockhart appeals as of right from his conviction by a Hamblen County jury of driving under the influence, third offense, and driving with a revoked license. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of driving under the influence. After a careful review of the record, we find no error, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Pallmer Jahn, Jr., v. Sheryl June Jahn
E1999-01098-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

This is a third appeal in this divorce action which was filed more than six years ago between plaintiff (“husband”) and defendant (“wife”).

Joe Parker, et al., v. Board of Commissioners of Roane Co., and TN Board of Commissioners of Roane Co., TN, v. Joe Parker, et al.
E1999-02277-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank W. Williams, III

This an appeal of a Roane Chancery Court order which enjoined Appellants, Joe Parker, Mary Lynn Parker and Tiger Haven, Inc., from maintaining any Class I, wild or exotic animals, on certain parcels of land in Roane Count, and from expanding theoperation of Tiger Haven, Inc., except upon proper applicatin and approval by the County. While not as exactly stated by the parties, the issues raised on appeal aare whether (1) Appellant's refusal to rezone Appellant' property was arbitrary and capricious, (2) Appellants' use of parcel 22.06 is a pre-existing nonconforming use which may be expanded by Appellants, (3) Appellee's affirmative respresentations to Appellants and its failure to enforce its zoning ordinance for over six years estops it from now enforcing the zoning ordinances, (4) the A-2 zoning regulations are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad (5) the A-1 zoning regulations and Appellee's actions in not rezoning Parcel 29.01 work an unreasonable discrimination against Appellant's property, and (6) the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's motion asking that the judgment be altered or amended or a new trial had based on evidence discovered after the trial. For the reasons herein stated, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Harley White and William Mack White v. Guy N. Jones and wife, Violet E. Jones
E1999-01605-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Telford E. Forgety, Jr.

This is a dispute between adjoining property owners over a tract of land which the Chancellor determined was owned by plaintiffs.