03C01-9512-CC-00382
03C01-9512-CC-00382
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

03C01-9511-CR-00353
03C01-9511-CR-00353
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

03C01-9603-CC-00087
03C01-9603-CC-00087
Trial Court Judge: Frank L. Slaughter

03C01-9602-CR-00083
03C01-9602-CR-00083
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

03C01-9602-CR-00061
03C01-9602-CR-00061
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins

03C01-9512-CC-00415
03C01-9512-CC-00415
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen

03A01-9609-CV-00289
03A01-9609-CV-00289

03S01-9603-CC-00023
03S01-9603-CC-00023

03S01-9603-CV-00032
03S01-9603-CV-00032

Terry Jamar Norris v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2007-00594-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Lue Ann Smith, v. Winchester City Council, et. al.
01A01-9609-CV-00419
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Lue Ann Smith, from an order of the Franklin County Circuit Court quashing her writ of certiorari. The writ suspended the decisions of respondent/appellee, the Winchester City Council (“the Council”), allowing intervening petitioner, Karl Smith, permission and denying Appellant permission to sell fire works within the City of Winchester. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

IN RE: Estate of Foster Hume, III; The University of the South v. Meredith Klank - Concurring
01A01-9609-PB-00432
Authoring Judge: Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

The University of the South, residuary legatee under the will of Foster Hume, deceased, has appealed from the judgment of the Probate Court holding that a specific devise to Meredith Klank was not extinguished by ademption and therefore the subject of the specific devise did not become a part of the residuary estate.

State of Tennessee vs William Eugene Hall, Jr., a/k/a Billy Hall, and Derrick Desmond Quintero
01C01-9311-CC-00409
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

In this capital case, the appellants, William Eugene Hall and Derrick Desmond Quintero, were each convicted by a jury of two counts of murder during the perpetration of first-degree burglary, three counts of grand larceny, one count of petit larceny, and three counts of first-degree burglary. After a hearing, the jury sentenced each of the appellants to a life sentence for the murder of Buford Vester. As to the murder of Myrtle Vester, the jury found the following five aggravating factors: (1) the appellants were previously convicted of one or more felonies involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the appellants or another; (4) the murder was committed while the appellants were engaged in committing, or were accomplices in the commission of, or were attempting to commit, or were fleeing after committing or attempting to commit any first-degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and (5) the murder was committed by the appellants while they were in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during their escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement. See T.C.A. § 39-2-203(i)(2), (5), (6), (7), (8) (1982). The jury found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and sentenced the appellants to death by electrocution for the murder of Mrs. Vester.

William Depriest, Gates-Pate-McDaniel, Henry H Headden, Joel P. Morris, Maurice Pinson, Richard R. Standel, Jr., and W.O. Vaughan, Jr., v. 1717-19 West End Associates., et. al
01A01-9609-CH-00428
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The captioned plaintiffs have appealed from the summary dismissal of their various claims by the trial court. The various claims and defenses on appeal arose from a failed investment scheme, and are illustrated by the following issues presented by the parties:

Richard E. Finch vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. - Concurring
01A01-9607-CV-00342
Authoring Judge: Judge Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

This appeal addresses the issue of whether the “innocent co-insured doctrine,” first recognized by our supreme court in Spence v. Allstate Insurance Co., 883 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1994), should be extended so as to permit the appellant, Richard E. Finch (Finch) to recover under an insurance policy, issued by the appellee, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (TFMIC), for loss to property held jointly with his co-insured spouse whose intentional acts caused the loss. The trial court  interpreting Tennessee case law to disallow such recovery primarily “on the basis of policy considerations,” entered a summary judgment for TFMIC.1 Finch challenges the correctness of that decision. For reasons to be set forth, we reverse and remand.

Frank McNeil, MD. and Janet McNeil, M.D., et. ux. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners - Concurring
01A01-9608-CH-00383
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.

The orders handed down by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners on March 6, 1995 can stand only if the board’s conclusions are supported by substantial and material evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5) (Supp. 1996). Cases of this sort require either admissions by the accused physician, Williams v. State Dep’t of Health & Env’t, 880 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), or expert proof concerning the standard of professional conduct alleged to have been violated. Williams v. Tennessee Bd. of Medical Examiners, App. No. 01A01-9402-CH-00060, 1994 WL 420910, at *6-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1994) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

Robert A. Hewgley, Deane Pritchett, and H. Mel Weaver, v. Jose A. Vivo and wife Peggy M. Vivo
01A01-9506-CH-00266
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

This appeal involves the enforcement of a 47-year-old restrictive covenant in a residential subdivision in Tullahoma. After a physician converted one of the homes in the subdivision into a medical clinic, a group of property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Coffee County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce a restrictive covenant requiring the property in the subdivision to be used for residential purposes. The trial court, sitting without a jury, determined that the restrictive covenant remained enforceable, directed the physician to remove an illuminated exterior sign, and awarded attorney’s fees to the property owners. On this appeal,  the physician takes issue with the enforcement of the restrictive covenant and with the award of attorney’s fees. While we affirm the enforcement of the restrictive covenant, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees.

Frank McNeil, MD. and Janet McNeil, M.D. v. TN. Board of Medical Examiners - Concurring
01A01-9608-CH-00383
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The captioned petitioners sought judicial review and reversal of the administrative order of the respondent Board subjecting them to discipline for professional misconduct. From a judgment affirming the administrative order, the petitioners have appealed, presenting the issue for review in the following terms: The Petitioner-Appellants, Frank McNiel, M.D. and Janet McNiel, M.D., respectfully submit that the issue presented for review in this case is whether or not the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners’ decision to discipline their license to practice medicine in Tennessee should be reversed pursuant to T.C.A. §4-5-322(h) of the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, in that the decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence and was otherwise arbitrary and capricious.

Anthony Lee Eden, v. CherylAnn Eden
01A01-9609-CV-00427
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion, it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.
 

Ila Stephens Bertram v. Charles R. Gernt, Estate of Bruno Gernt, Inc. Champion International Corporation, Hood Coal Company, et. al .
01A01-9609-CH-00435
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

The plaintiff filed suit to establish present title to land in Fentress County that had previously belonged to her family. The Chancery Court dismissed her suit on the ground that she lost whatever interest she had in the land through foreclosure. After examining the record and the briefs of the parties, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing the suit, and we affirm.

Randall Myers v. Hurst Construction Company, Inc.
01A01-9609-CV-00397
Trial Court Judge: Don R. Ash

The Trial Court and this Court have granted permission to the Hurst Construction Co., Inc., to appeal from an interlocutory order of the Trial Court overruling the motion of Hurst Construction Co., Inc., for summary judgment on grounds of the statute of limitations.

Tennessee Consumer Advocate, v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority and United Cities Gas Company
01A01-9606-BC-00286
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd

The petitioner, Tennessee Consumer Advocate, has petitioned this Court for review of administrative decisions of the Tennessee Public Services Commission pursuant to T.R.A.P. Rule 12. By order entered by this Court on October 3, 1996, the review is limited to an order entered by the Commission on May 3, 1996. However, the circumstances stated hereafter require reference to an order previously entered by the Tennessee Public Service Commission on May 12, 1995.

Danny E. Wilson v. Calvin Burgess Lumber Company
03S01-9604-CH-00041
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Vernon Neal,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee, Wilson, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that his injury did not arise out of the employment. This panel affirms the trial court. The employee or claimant worked for the employer, Burgess, as a log skidder operator. On May 29, 1994, at approximately 12:3 p.m., the claimant lost consciousness and became incontinent. When he regained consciousness, he told his employer he was ill and needed to go home. In his complaint, he claims his condition was caused by a faulty exhaust system on the skidder he was operating. It is undisputed the exhaust system on the skidder he had been operating was faulty. The defective part has since been replaced. The skidder did not have a closed compartment for the operator. Although a toxicologist diagnosed brain damage caused by carbon monoxide poisoning, tests on the skidder produced carbon monoxide readings below the OSHA limit of no more than fifty parts per million for an eight hour exposure. A sample taken at two feet from the end of the exhaust pipe showed thirty parts per million and one taken sitting in the operator's seat, with a slit in the piece of flexible pipe that had a hole in it, showed two parts per million. Moreover, another medical expert opined those levels were insufficient to cause brain damage to an operator in an open seat. Dr. Myron L. Mills, an occupational medicine specialist, further opined the claimant's injury was the result of a non-work-related seizure. The trial judge dismissed the claim for insufficient proof of causation. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). An accidental injury arises out of one's employment when there is 2

Cynthia J. Bowers Logue v. Leaf, Inc. and Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company Brown, Jr.
02S01-9603-CH-00030
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George H.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Wilbur E. Cagle v. Mike Underwood Builders Inc. and Mike Underwood
03S01-9605-CV-00057
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dale Workman,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Underwood, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that (1) the employee's injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) the employer had actual notice of the injury, and (3) the employee retains a forty percent permanent partial disability to the right leg from a torn meniscus. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Cagle, is forty-eight years old and has a ninth grade education. He has worked primarily in construction and as a machine operator in a factory. His duties with Underwood include performing repairs on new houses during the first year after they are sold, but not home maintenance. His normal working hours are from 8:3 a.m. until 4:3 p.m., but he often works later. He is paid a salary rather than wages. On September 29, 1993, Underwood left the work site at 4: p.m., instructing the claimant to "lock up" when he left. The claimant went to one of the houses to check mortar joints and, as he was about to leave, Suzanne Chandler, who had purchased one of the employer's houses in April of the same year, asked to borrow some WD-4. Although it was after normal hours, the claimant offered to spray Ms. Chandler's squeaky door. While doing so, Cagle slipped and fell, injuring his knee. He had to call his wife to come and drive him home. Two months earlier, the claimant had slipped and slightly injured his knee while performing a repair at the Chandler home, but the injury was so slight that he did not lose time or require medical attention. He did not report that occurrence. The record is clear that the employer had actual knowledge of the accident which is the basis of this workers' compensation claim. The treating physician, an orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed a complex bucket handle tear of the lateral meniscus and probable exacerbation of pre-existing arthritic disease, caused by the occurrence of September 29th. 2