Charles E . Carey v. Carolina Freight Carriers 02S01-9506-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of seventy percent (7%) to the lower extremity and that the trial court erred in computing the employee's average weekly wage at $273. instead of $22.21 per week. The panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's assessment of permanent disability and modifies th e award to thirty-five percen t (35%) to the lower e xtremity. Prope rly computed, the employee's average weekly wage is $22.21 per week. Charles E. Carey ("Carey") was injured on December 27, 1991, when a bank vault weighing five hundred pounds fell off a fork lift and struck the front part of his left thigh. He was initially treated by Dr. R. Michael Cobb, an orthopedic surgeon, who suspected a torn ligament in Carey's knee. Dr. Cobb later concluded, however, that the ligament was not torn and that surgery was not needed. In February, 1992, Carey began to complain of numbness in his toes, although Dr. Cobb was unable to find any indication of injury to the sciatic nerve, which provides feeling to the toes. Carey was given a note to return to work on March 1, 1992. Upon examination on March 16, 1992, Carey's range of motion was excellent and his strength appeared to be normal. He advised Dr. Cobb that he was hav ing no pro blem at w ork. A ne rve cond uction study, pe rformed as a result of the c ompla ints of to e num bness, s howe d no sig n of inju ry to the sc iatic nerv e. Carey was given no permanent physical anatomical impairment and was discharged from Dr. Cobb's care on March 16, 1992. When he returned to work in March, Carey performed the same duties that 2
Madison
Workers Compensation Panel
Charles E . Carey v. Carolina Freight Carriers 02S01-9506-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its appeal, the employer contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of seventy percent (7%) to the lower extremity and that the trial court erred in computing the employee's average weekly wage at $273. instead of $22.21 per week. The panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's assessment of permanent disability and modifies th e award to thirty-five percen t (35%) to the lower e xtremity. Prope rly computed, the employee's average weekly wage is $22.21 per week. Charles E. Carey ("Carey") was injured on December 27, 1991, when a bank vault weighing five hundred pounds fell off a fork lift and struck the front part of his left thigh. He was initially treated by Dr. R. Michael Cobb, an orthopedic surgeon, who suspected a torn ligament in Carey's knee. Dr. Cobb later concluded, however, that the ligament was not torn and that surgery was not needed. In February, 1992, Carey began to complain of numbness in his toes, although Dr. Cobb was unable to find any indication of injury to the sciatic nerve, which provides feeling to the toes. Carey was given a note to return to work on March 1, 1992. Upon examination on March 16, 1992, Carey's range of motion was excellent and his strength appeared to be normal. He advised Dr. Cobb that he was hav ing no pro blem at w ork. A ne rve cond uction study, pe rformed as a result of the c ompla ints of to e num bness, s howe d no sig n of inju ry to the sc iatic nerv e. Carey was given no permanent physical anatomical impairment and was discharged from Dr. Cobb's care on March 16, 1992. When he returned to work in March, Carey performed the same duties that 2
This is a suit brought by William Bland (Bland) against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for breach of contract for failure to pay a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy. At trial, the jury found for Bland and awarded him damages under the insurance contract for the loss of his home and its contents due to a fire. Allstate argued at trial that material misrepresentations on the application, as a matter of law, warranted Allstate’s decision to void Bland’s policy ab initio. Allstate appeals the denial of its motion for directed verdict and alleges error in a number of the jury instructions. We affirm the trial court.
This is a breach of contract action brought by Henry County Medical Center (HCMC) against Henry Gronski, M.D. (Gronski). In response, Gronski admitted the amounts owed to HCMC under the contract but claimed that he was owed a larger amount as set-off. The trial court awarded HCMC a judgment of $44,900.40 on the contract and awarded Gronski $56,204 as set-off. The court also ordered HCMC to pay Gronski's attorney's fees and accountant fees. HCMC appeals the court’s award of set-off to Gronski as well as the award of attorney’s and accountant fees. We affirm the trial court on all issues.
Plaintiff, Eldred Reid, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Northwest 2 Correctional Center in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various officials at the correctional center violated his constitutional rights.
This is an action for damages for breach of a construction contract and of an implied warranty of good workmanship and materials and for negligent construction.
This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.
This malpractice action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. It arose from a routine prostate resection which went awry, resulting in adverse consequences to the plaintiff. A device referred to as a resectoscope manufactured by the Circon ACMI Ohio Manufacturing Company,1 malfunctioned while being used by and under the control of the defendant, Dr. Paul Hatcher [hereafter, the “defendant”]. It is not disputed that a portion of the penis of the plaintiff, Herman Davis [hereafter, “plaintiff”], was either chemically, thermally or electrically burned away, with disastrous results unnecessary here to be recounted.
The State has requested a rehearing in this case. The Court has considered the petition and finds it to be without merit. The petition to rehear is denied. The Members of the Court adhere to the positions stated in the original Opinions in this cause. It is so ORDERED.
Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to amend the judgment to delete the award of attorney fees, the Court concludes that the motion is without merit and should be denied. It is so ORDERED.
The State has appealed from a ruling of the Criminal Court of Anderson County in which the trial court ruled that the Juvenile Court of Anderson County did not have jurisdiction to require a juvenile traffic offender to attend psychological counseling.
This appeal involves a post-divorce contempt proceeding. The appellant, Mrs. Brenda Cherry, filed an unverified complaint in the Probate Court for Davidson County seeking to recover unpaid child support from her former husband, Mr. Songoleke Kurante Kotunu (formerly Joseph Tyree Glanton). Mr. Kotunu filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the Complaint was defective since Mrs. Cherry had not verified it. The probate court agreed with Mr. Kotunu, and dismissed Mrs. Cherry’s suit. The court also awarded Mr. Kotunu his attorneys fees. Mrs. Cherry asserts on appeal that the probate court erred by requiring her to have verified her complaint, and in granting Mr. Kotunu’s attorneys fees. We partially disagree with Mrs. Cherry, and therefore affirm the probate court in part.
In this wrongful death case we have determined that when the plaintiffappellant accepted a jury verdict finding the decedent was forty-nine percent at fault, that finding became binding in the appeal of the trial judge’s action in dismissing another defendant on the day of the trial. We, therefore, pretermit the issues raised by the appellant and affirm the judgment below.
This appeal involves one of the central principles of our comparative fault system - that all persons involved in an occurrence giving rise to injury or damages should have their rights and liabilities determined in one action. Douglas Samuelson perfected this appeal solely to obtain appellate review of the summary dismissal of his malpractice claim against one of several defendants on the day of trial. Rather than deciding this question, the majority has decided that the jury’s verdict with regard to the remaining parties somehow forecloses Mr. Samuelson from ever obtaining relief from the defendant who was removed from the case even before the trial started. I cannot agree with this decision.
This is an appeal by petitioner, Allen B. Cole, from the judgment of the Chancery Court of Davidson County granting the motion to dismiss of respondent, the Tennessee Board of Paroles ("the Board").
Even though I concur completely with Judge Lewis’s opinion, I have prepared this separate opinion to elaborate further on the procedure whereby a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) requires this conversion whenever “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the [trial] court.”
In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant, Dr. Afsoon Vafaie Elmore, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Dr. Walter R. Owens, III, with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Owens for assault, malicious harassment and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Cheryl Roberts Owens as to Plaintiff’s claims against Mrs. Owens for assault, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff further appeals certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court during the course of Plaintiff’s jury trial against Dr. Owens in which the Plaintiff sought to recover damages for severe emotional distress, arising from the alleged outrageous conduct of Dr. JuOwens.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Gary Harris 03C01-9510-CC-00319
Authoring Judge: Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II
A jury found Gary Harris guilty of manufacturing marijuana in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 39-17-417. Harris appeals and presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction; and II. Whether the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence.
We affirm.
Grainger
Court of Criminal Appeals
Mart E. Kobeck v. Murray, Inc. 01S01-9511-CV-00207
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James L. Weatherford
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff injured his neck at work in October of 1991 and subsequently underwent anterior cervical disc removal, dissection and fusion after which he did not recover. The trial judge found the plaintiff to be 8 percent vocationally impaired as a result of his work injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff had worked for Murray, Inc. for 35 years when, on October 21, 1991, he injured his neck on the job while working overhead repairing lawn mowers. The company sent him to see Dr. Norman Henderson, who then referred him to Dr. Rex Arendall, neurosurgeon, on April 1, 1992. Dr. Arendall diagnosed cervico-thoracic radiculopathy and prescribed physical therapy and pain medications, but plaintiff did not improve. On April 23, 1992, Dr. Arendall performed anterior cervical discectomy, anterior cervical fusion and microscopic dissection at C4-5 and C5-6. Post-operatively, plaintiff continued to have increasing pain and weakness in his right arm and shoulder. He also developed loss of balance. Dr. Arendall re-admitted plaintiff for investigation of the continuing symptoms, and MRI of the brain then revealed small areas of infarction. Dr. Arendall referred plaintiff to his medical practice partner and neurologist, Dr. Mary Clinton, for a second opinion, and then to another neurologist, a Dr. Rubinowicz. Neither examiner could find a neurological basis for plaintiff's problems except for the brain infarctions. Dr. Arendall stated that after the second hospitalization, plaintiff "seemed to go progressively downhill." His right arm and hand atrophied. Dr. Arendall thought that plaintiff might be exhibiting early onset symptoms of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or multiple sclerosis, but there were no objective findings to indicate either disease. On October 21, 1992, Dr. Arendall saw the patient and opined that he was totally and permanently disabled as a result of his medical problems. He opined that 15 percent of the disability was "purely for his work-related findings." Plaintiff testified that for many years prior to his accident, he had worked without missing a day and that he had no prior medical problems that required him to 2
Lawrence
Workers Compensation Panel
Mart E. Kobeck v. Murray, Inc. 01S01-9511-CV-00207
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James L. Weatherford
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff injured his neck at work in October of 1991 and subsequently underwent anterior cervical disc removal, dissection and fusion after which he did not recover. The trial judge found the plaintiff to be 8 percent vocationally impaired as a result of his work injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff had worked for Murray, Inc. for 35 years when, on October 21, 1991, he injured his neck on the job while working overhead repairing lawn mowers. The company sent him to see Dr. Norman Henderson, who then referred him to Dr. Rex Arendall, neurosurgeon, on April 1, 1992. Dr. Arendall diagnosed cervico-thoracic radiculopathy and prescribed physical therapy and pain medications, but plaintiff did not improve. On April 23, 1992, Dr. Arendall performed anterior cervical discectomy, anterior cervical fusion and microscopic dissection at C4-5 and C5-6. Post-operatively, plaintiff continued to have increasing pain and weakness in his right arm and shoulder. He also developed loss of balance. Dr. Arendall re-admitted plaintiff for investigation of the continuing symptoms, and MRI of the brain then revealed small areas of infarction. Dr. Arendall referred plaintiff to his medical practice partner and neurologist, Dr. Mary Clinton, for a second opinion, and then to another neurologist, a Dr. Rubinowicz. Neither examiner could find a neurological basis for plaintiff's problems except for the brain infarctions. Dr. Arendall stated that after the second hospitalization, plaintiff "seemed to go progressively downhill." His right arm and hand atrophied. Dr. Arendall thought that plaintiff might be exhibiting early onset symptoms of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or multiple sclerosis, but there were no objective findings to indicate either disease. On October 21, 1992, Dr. Arendall saw the patient and opined that he was totally and permanently disabled as a result of his medical problems. He opined that 15 percent of the disability was "purely for his work-related findings." Plaintiff testified that for many years prior to his accident, he had worked without missing a day and that he had no prior medical problems that required him to 2
Lawrence
Workers Compensation Panel
Frances Reynolds Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc. 01S01-9512-CH-00226
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends (1) the chancellor erred in not accepting the opinion testimony ofthe claimant's treating physician, (2) the claimant's back injury is not compensable because the evidence failed to establish that "the accident either otherwise injured her or advanced the severity of her preexisting condition, (3) that the chancellor erred in considering expert medical testimony not based on reasonable medical certainty, and (4) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. The panel concludes that the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court. The judgment is modified as provided herein. On November 29, 1993, the claimant, Kellerman, slipped and fell in a puddle of water at work, twisting her right knee and injuring her back. She was eventually referred to Dr. Richard Bagby, who saw her on January 13, 1994 and January 2, 1994. Dr. Bagby ordered a CT scan and studied the results. He opined that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on January 24, 1994, when she was released to return to work with some minor restrictions. The doctor further opined that she would not retain any permanent impairment. We do not find in the record the degree of certainty upon which the doctor's opinion was based. The claimant returned to Dr. Bagby on March 1, 1994, when he noted her continuing pain but did not change her restrictions from lifting more than twenty pounds or any repetitive bending, or assess any permanent impairment. The claimant was referred to Dr. Keith Brown for examination and evaluation. Dr. Brown performed additional testing which put stress on her knee and back. From his examination, particularly a positive McMurray's test, this doctor diagnosed a torn medial meniscus in the right knee joint, which, if not treated, will worsen, he said. He assigned a permanent impairment rating of five percent to the right leg, using AMA Guidelines, and added restriction from any kneeling or stooping activities. Dr. Brown further opined that the claimant's disabling back pain was permanent and causally related to the injury at work. He diagnosed circumferential disc disorder which, he said, may or may not have preexisted that injury but was aggravated by the injury, and assigned an additional permanent impairment of ten percent to the whole person, from AMA Guidelines. His testimony included the following question and answer: Q. In the opinions you have expressed, have they been based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty? 2
Franklin
Workers Compensation Panel
Frances Reynolds Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc. 01S01-9512-CH-00226
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends (1) the chancellor erred in not accepting the opinion testimony ofthe claimant's treating physician, (2) the claimant's back injury is not compensable because the evidence failed to establish that "the accident either otherwise injured her or advanced the severity of her preexisting condition, (3) that the chancellor erred in considering expert medical testimony not based on reasonable medical certainty, and (4) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. The panel concludes that the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court. The judgment is modified as provided herein. On November 29, 1993, the claimant, Kellerman, slipped and fell in a puddle of water at work, twisting her right knee and injuring her back. She was eventually referred to Dr. Richard Bagby, who saw her on January 13, 1994 and January 2, 1994. Dr. Bagby ordered a CT scan and studied the results. He opined that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on January 24, 1994, when she was released to return to work with some minor restrictions. The doctor further opined that she would not retain any permanent impairment. We do not find in the record the degree of certainty upon which the doctor's opinion was based. The claimant returned to Dr. Bagby on March 1, 1994, when he noted her continuing pain but did not change her restrictions from lifting more than twenty pounds or any repetitive bending, or assess any permanent impairment. The claimant was referred to Dr. Keith Brown for examination and evaluation. Dr. Brown performed additional testing which put stress on her knee and back. From his examination, particularly a positive McMurray's test, this doctor diagnosed a torn medial meniscus in the right knee joint, which, if not treated, will worsen, he said. He assigned a permanent impairment rating of five percent to the right leg, using AMA Guidelines, and added restriction from any kneeling or stooping activities. Dr. Brown further opined that the claimant's disabling back pain was permanent and causally related to the injury at work. He diagnosed circumferential disc disorder which, he said, may or may not have preexisted that injury but was aggravated by the injury, and assigned an additional permanent impairment of ten percent to the whole person, from AMA Guidelines. His testimony included the following question and answer: Q. In the opinions you have expressed, have they been based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty? 2
Franklin
Workers Compensation Panel
Woodrow Cecil Foster v. Coffee County Highway Department and Coffee County, Tennessee 01S01-9512-CH-00232
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John W. Rollins,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's conclusion that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5- 6- 23, a one year statute of limitation. The employer also contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on forty-five percent to the body as a whole is excessive. This panel finds that the judgment should be affirmed. The action was commencedby the employee or claimant, Woodrow C. Foster, by the filing of a complaint on March 6, 1991, against the employer, Coffee County Highway Department and Coffee County, Tennessee, seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries occurring in 1986 and 1987. The defendants served an answer raising the affirmative defense that the claim was barred by the above statute of limitation. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2) (1992). We accept the chancellor's relevant findings of fact as follows: "The plaintiff was a 59 year old male with a tenth grade education who, for the most part, had spent his adult life either driving a truck or loading and unloading a truck with short periods of employment as a carpenter's helper and working at a service station. Mr. Foster testified that in March, 1986, while changing a flat tire, he thought he 'broke his back,' that he went to a doctor who put a corset on him for two weeks and told him he had a 'pulled muscle.' Plaintiff went back to work and testified that he thought (the 'pulled muscle') was the only condition for which he suffered any discomfort. Plaintiff testified that in 199 he saw a doctor because his back continued to hurt. He saw Dr. Robison and Dr. Jekot, who asked him to return for another appointment but he did not let him return to work without seeing a neurosurgeon. He went to see Dr. Verne Allen...(who) performed an MRI that showed a bulging disc...(for which) he ultimately had surgery.... Plaintiff testified that he went back to work after surgery. He was off work approximately two months, but despite being given no restrictions as a result of the surgery he has constant pain out of the left side of his back and down his leg, that he presently takes steroids and walks to try to stay limber although he continues to hurt. Plaintiff testified that he continues to try to perform his job as a truck driver with the defendant Highway Department." An action by an employee to recover workers' compensation benefits for an accidental injury must be commenced within one year after the occurrence of the injury. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-224(1). However, if within such one year period the employer or its insurer makes voluntary payment of benefits, the action may be commenced within one year after the cessation of benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23. 2
Coffee
Workers Compensation Panel
Gary Allen Ferrell v. Batesville Casket Company 01S01-9512-CV-00218
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff reported problems with swelling, pain and numbness in his right arm to his supervisor in June or July 1991. These problems occurred after using a pneumatic sander at work which plaintiff alleged was defective. He went to the company doctor about a week after he reported these problems to his employer. The company doctor advised him that his problems with his right arm were the result of his use of the pneumatic sander and further advised him to forever avoid using vibrating tools with his right hand. Plaintiff continued to have the same problems with his right arm and experienced exacerbations of his pain whenever he used a vibrating tool. He continued to see physicians, by referral from defendants and on his own. No proof was offered as to whether the defendants had paid any medical expenses for the plaintiff in relation to his alleged injury within a year of his filing this complaint in March 21, 1994. The trial judge held that there was no question in the court's mind that the plaintiff had known since June/July 1991 that he had a work-related injury and that the action was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-23 provides: The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law shall be forever barred, unless within one (1) year after the accident resulting in injury . . . occurred the notice required by _ 5-6-22 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; provided, that if 2
Coffee
Workers Compensation Panel
Gary Allen Ferrell v. Batesville Casket Company 01S01-9512-CV-00218
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appeals this ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff reported problems with swelling, pain and numbness in his right arm to his supervisor in June or July 1991. These problems occurred after using a pneumatic sander at work which plaintiff alleged was defective. He went to the company doctor about a week after he reported these problems to his employer. The company doctor advised him that his problems with his right arm were the result of his use of the pneumatic sander and further advised him to forever avoid using vibrating tools with his right hand. Plaintiff continued to have the same problems with his right arm and experienced exacerbations of his pain whenever he used a vibrating tool. He continued to see physicians, by referral from defendants and on his own. No proof was offered as to whether the defendants had paid any medical expenses for the plaintiff in relation to his alleged injury within a year of his filing this complaint in March 21, 1994. The trial judge held that there was no question in the court's mind that the plaintiff had known since June/July 1991 that he had a work-related injury and that the action was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial court are correct. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-23 provides: The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law shall be forever barred, unless within one (1) year after the accident resulting in injury . . . occurred the notice required by _ 5-6-22 is given the employer and a claim for compensation under the provisions of this chapter is filed with the tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter; provided, that if 2
