Stephen P. Geller v. Henry County Board of Education
In this appeal, we apply the Teacher Tenure Act to the transfer of a tenured teacher, working as a school administrator, for lack of proper credentialing. The plaintiff school administrator challenges the decision of the director of schools to transfer him to a teaching position because the plaintiff did not have an administrator license. The trial court upheld the transfer. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that a regulation required the director to review the administrative duties the plaintiff had performed in the past in order to determine whether an administrator license was required, and that the director’s failure to do so rendered his transfer decision arbitrary and capricious. Under Tennessee caselaw, judicial review of a school system director’s decision to transfer a teacher must be conducted in light of the director’s broad discretion to make such decisions. The proof showed that the director and the board of the school system had established certain priorities for its administrators. Absent an administrator license, in the upcoming school year, the regulation would have precluded the plaintiff from performing duties consistent with the school system’s priorities. Consequently, the director’s failure to consider the plaintiff’s past work did not render the transfer decision either arbitrary or capricious. Under these circumstances, we hold that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that the transfer decision was not made in good faith and was arbitrary, capricious, or improperly motivated. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of the school board. |
Henry | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquail Patterson
Marquail Patterson, Defendant, was found guilty by a jury of unlawful possession of a handgun, second degree murder, and five counts of attempted reckless endangerment after a shooting at Studio X in Knoxville in the summer of 2014 during which one person was killed and five people were injured. Defendant received an effective sentence of thirty years in incarceration to be served at 100%. In this delayed appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to Defendant’s convictions for unlawful possession of a handgun and second degree murder. However, we vacate Defendant’s convictions for attempted reckless endangerment because Defendant was convicted of a crime which does not exist. Therefore, those convictions are void. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christina Eads
Defendant, Christina Eads, appeals the revocation of her supervised probation for her simple possession of a Schedule VI drug and possession of drug paraphernalia convictions. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence incarcerated. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earl Harold Crisp
After presenting with a criminal record that consists of 21 prior felony convictions and 16 prior misdemeanor convictions, Defendant, Earl Harold Crisp, appeals the trial court’s refusal to grant an alternative sentence despite his eligibility for probation. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Lipton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault by a Sevier County jury. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a direct appeal. This Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Mark Lipton, No. E2012-02197-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4365969, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 14, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief on January 12, 2016. On February 2, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition seeking relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The same day Petitioner filed the petition for DNA analysis, he filed an amended post-conviction petition. Petitioner filed two additional amended post-conviction petitions. In the final amended petition, Petitioner abandoned arguments in his prior petitions and argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to file a motion to disqualify the District Attorney; (2) failed file a change of venue motion; (3) failed to request specific Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) findings of fact; and (4) erred by calling a particular trial witness. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for DNA analysis and the Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) issue in the petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction petition denied relief on the remaining issues. After a reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles R. Goodwin v. Morristown Driver's Services, Inc. et al.
A Georgia resident, employed by a Tennessee company, filed a workers’ compensation claim in Georgia for an injury he sustained in Tennessee. Later, the employee also filed a workers’ compensation claim in Tennessee for the same injury. The Georgia State Board of Workers’ Compensation dismissed the Georgia claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims held that the employee’s claim was not barred based on the election of remedies doctrine. In a split decision, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed, holding that the employee’s claim was barred because he had first pursued a claim for benefits in Georgia. We reverse and hold that the employee’s Tennessee claim is not barred because his Georgia claim had been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus the employee had no remedy to elect. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
In Re Jessica V., et al.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his children on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to support, (3) abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility of the children. The trial court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
John E. Coolidge, Jr. v. Elizabeth M. Keene, Et Al.
This appeal concerns whether certain easements were abandoned. John E. Coolidge, Jr. (“Mr. Coolidge”) is a neighbor of Elizabeth M. Keene (“Ms. Keene”) and Christopher P. Keene, II (“Mr. Keene”) (“the Keenes,” collectively). Pursuant to recorded easements, the Keenes may use a driveway to access an old garage encroaching on Mr. Coolidge’s property. However, the garage was damaged by fire many years ago and never repaired or rebuilt by the Keenes’ predecessors. When the Keenes sought to repair or rebuild the garage, Mr. Coolidge sued them in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Mr. Coolidge argued that both the driveway and encroachment easements had been abandoned, largely because the garage was in ruins for such a long time. A bench trial was held. The Trial Court found that, notwithstanding the passage of time, the easements had not been abandoned, and the Keenes could proceed with their plans. Mr. Coolidge appeals, and the Keenes raise their own issues as well. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lataisha M. Jackson v. Charles Anthony Burrell, et al.
The question presented in this health care liability case is whether the plaintiff’s claim against a salon for negligent training, supervision, and retention of a massage therapist should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not file a certificate of good faith with her complaint under section 29-26-122 of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“the Act”). Our answer depends on whether the common knowledge exception applies— that is, whether laypersons using their common knowledge and without expert testimony could decide whether the salon was negligent. If the common knowledge exception does not come into play and expert testimony is necessary, then the plaintiff needed to file a certificate of good faith with her complaint certifying that her negligence claim was supported by a competent expert witness and that there was a good faith basis for the claim. Here, the plaintiff alleged that a massage therapist working for the salon sexually assaulted her during a massage. In support of her claim of negligent training, supervision, and retention, the plaintiff presented evidence that before her assault, the salon had received complaints from two customers that the massage therapist had acted inappropriately and made them feel uncomfortable. The trial court granted summary judgment to the salon because the plaintiff had not filed a certificate of good faith. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the plaintiff had waived the common knowledge exception and that, in any event, expert testimony was necessary. We reverse and hold that 1) the plaintiff did not waive the common knowledge exception; and 2) the plaintiff’s claim against the salon for negligent training, supervision, and retention of the massage therapist was within the common knowledge of laypersons and did not require expert testimony about the standard of care in the massage industry. Thus, the plaintiff did not have to present expert proof to establish her negligence claim against the salon. It follows then that the plaintiff had no reason to file a certificate of good faith under section 29-26- 122, and her claim is not subject to dismissal for noncompliance with this section. The trial court’s award of summary judgment is vacated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re Estate of Samuel Dattel
Decedent died in 2015 and his widow submitted his latest will for probate in March 2016. Children from a prior marriage filed a will contest in August 2016, alleging a will dating from 1984 constituted Decedent’s last will and testament and all later wills were the result of fraud and undue influence. The widow and her children challenged the will contest on various grounds, all of which the probate court rejected. The probate court entered an order directing the court clerk to certify the will submitted to probate in addition to three earlier original wills and a partial codicil to the circuit court for a trial to determine which document(s), if any, constituted Decedent’s last will and testament. We affirm the decision of the probate court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Keller v. Janice Casteel et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address when an employee handbook may create a property interest entitled to due process protection. After the petitioner municipal firefighter pled guilty to a criminal charge, his employment was terminated. The firefighter filed a complaint for judicial review of the termination, asserting a due process claim based on the municipality’s personnel manual. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both held that the personnel manual gave the firefighter a property interest entitled to due process protection. We reverse that holding. In Tennessee, employment is presumed to be at-will. Employers, including governmental employers, may adopt policies and procedures to promote efficiencies and fair, consistent treatment of employees, and may put those policies and procedures in employee manuals or handbooks. In the absence of specific language showing the employer’s intent to be contractually bound, such policies and procedures do not change employees’ at-will status and do not create a constitutionally protectable property interest. In this case, the municipality’s personnel manual included an explicit statement that the municipality did not intend the procedures to be binding or constitute any type of contract. Such disclaimers preclude any finding that the employer intended to be bound by the terms of the employee handbook. Accordingly, we decline to hold that the employee handbook converted the employee’s at-will employment into a property interest entitled to due process protection. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Jamar Scott v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jamar Scott, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that he has newly discovered evidence of innocence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court denying the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v Jorge Pena
The Defendant-Appellant, Jorge Pena, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in qualifying a local police officer as an expert in Spanish language translation and admitting his translation of pretextual phone calls between the Defendant and the victim’s mother at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamie Faucon v. Michael Mgridichian
This case involves a violation of an ex parte order of protection. The order required the respondent to refrain from contacting the petitioner in any way, including electronic communication. The trial court found the respondent in criminal contempt for violating the order by contacting Petitioner over “amateur radio” on three separate occasions. Respondent appealed, asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case and that he did not receive sufficient notice of the criminal contempt charges. We affirm the trial court and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Miller
The Appellant, Kimberly Miller, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder. The convictions were merged, and she was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her convictions. Specifically, the Appellant contends that the evidence “does not show that it was [the Appellant’s] conscious desire to kill the victim in this case, nor that she acted in concert with the shooter, or that she was an active participant in the shooting.” Therefore, she could not be found criminally responsible for the first degree premeditated murder of the victim. The Appellant also contends that “the evidence unquestionably established that [the Appellant] did not share the intent of [the victim’s] assailants nor did she actively participate in any facet of the armed robbery and subsequent shooting”; therefore, she cannot be held criminally responsible for the felony murder of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric L. Parker v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Eric L. Parker, of aggravated domestic assault by reckless conduct, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender, to four years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. State v. Eric L. Parker, No. E2013-02339-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 5483015, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 29, 2014), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Ann Shelton et al. v. Mary F. Eden
The maker of three promissory notes claims that the third promissory note was intended to consolidate and discharge the earlier notes. When the holders of the two earlier notes filed suit to collect, the maker raised discharge as a defense. The trial court granted the maker summary judgment. Because the maker failed to meet her burden to show that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Arturo Cardenas, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Pro se petitioner, Arturo Cardenas, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief.” Upon our review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Levon Johnson, Jr.
The Defendant, Tony Levon Johnson, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony, and theft of property under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of two years, with 240 days of “shock incarceration” in the Madison County Jail before release to Community Corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues, and the State agrees, that the trial court erred in ordering a sentence of continuous confinement before release to Community Corrections. Because the Defendant’s sentence of continuous confinement is prohibited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122, we reverse the sentence of incarceration, modify the sentence to Community Corrections, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgments in accordance with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Octavious Wright
The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Octavious Wright, for the rape of A.B., a person more than three years of age but less than thirteen years of age (Count 1); the aggravated sexual battery of A.B., a person less than thirteen years old (Count 2); the rape of A.G., a person more than three years of age but less than thirteen years of age (Count 3); and the aggravated sexual battery of A.G., a person less than thirteen years of age (Count 4). Prior to trial, the charges pertaining to the two victims, A.B. and A.G., were severed, and the trial proceeded as to Counts 1 and 2. After the proof was presented at trial, the trial court instructed the jury that the offense of aggravated sexual battery charged in Count 2 was a lesser included offense of rape of a child charged in Count 1, and a nolle prosequi was entered as to Count 2. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Wright as charged in Count 1, and the trial court subsequently imposed a thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Wright argues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a Tennessee Child Protective Services investigative report on the grounds that the report was inadmissible hearsay, not relevant, and speculative; and (2) the exclusion of this investigative report violated his due process right to present a defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Cole Moose
Defendant, Timothy Cole Moose, was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in an indictment returned by the Monroe County Grand Jury. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to a sixyear sentence as a career offender. In this appeal, Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Brennan
The Defendant, Joseph Brennan, appeals as of right from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his six-year sentence for aggravated assault. Although the Defendant acknowledges that he violated the terms of his probationary sentence, he submits that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to serve the balance of his sentence in custody given his expressed desire for drug treatment and need for rehabilitation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Odell Glass
The defendant, Odell Glass, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, felony murder, and reckless homicide, challenging the admission of testimony from the medical examiner regarding muzzle distance, the admission of surveillance video, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffrey Scott Widby v. The City of East Ridge, TN, Et Al.
Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). We affirm the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Ann Lennon
The Defendant, Kimberly Ann Lennon, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court Jury of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2017). The trial court sentenced her to eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75% service, to be served on probation, supervised by the community corrections program, after two days’ jail service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the judgment form. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals |