State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Mansir
The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Mansir, was convicted by a Blount County jury of kidnapping, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-303, and assault, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101.1 He was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to ten years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a Knox County conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for kidnapping; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for a mistrial following an improper comment by the victim; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant as a Range II offender based on a prior out of state felony conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Wright v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Paul Wright, pleaded guilty to six counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner timely filed a postconviction petition, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven Counsel was deficient or shown prejudice. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ryan D. Buford v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ryan D. Buford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Trevon Scott Barcus v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Trevon Scott Barcus, appeals as of right from the Scott County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief, alleging that (1) his separate federal and state convictions for failing to register as a sex offender violate double jeopardy principles; (2) he entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea because the trial court failed to inform him that he could not transfer the supervision of his probation to another state; and (3) that this “categorical” prohibition on travel constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates principles of substantive due process. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief and, therefore, affirm the summary dismissal of his petition. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Santos M. Martinez-Aleman v. Russell Washburn, Warden
Santos M. Martinez-Aleman, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of habeas corpus relief from his guilty plea to two counts of sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. After a review, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Cheyenne S. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. The juvenile court determined that four statutory grounds supported terminating her parental rights: abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan; persistence of conditions; and her failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of her children. The court also determined that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of her children. Upon our review, we conclude there was clear and convincing evidence supporting both the grounds for termination and the best interest determination. So we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Gibson Delosh v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shawn Gibson Delosh, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Timothy Dungey v. Doris Anne Dungey
In this post-divorce case, Doris Anne Baumgaertner (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s decision to deny her request to relocate the parties’ minor son (“Child”) to Germany. She also appeals the decision to change the primary residential parent designation from her to David Timothy Dungey (“Father”). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Nedra Finney v. Miles Jefferson Et Al.
In a letter sent to high-ranking school officials, parents claimed that a special education teacher had denied their child an appropriate education based on the child’s needs and improperly used physical restraints on the child. The parents also claimed that the teacher had ignored them at a school event and did not communicate with them for a month afterward. The teacher sued the parents for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the parents, reasoning primarily that the parents had not published the letter. The court also reasoned that the statements in the letter were not defamatory and that the parents did not act with actual malice. We conclude that some of the statements in the letter were not defamatory but others were capable of being understood as defamatory. For those statements capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, the record lacked evidence of actual malice. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Griffin v. Board of Zoning Appeals For Rutherford County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This case concerns the decision of the Rutherford County Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) to deny a property owner’s application for a special exception to operate a major home-based business on his residential property. The property owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court, and the court upheld the BZA’s decision. Discerning no error, we affirm the Chancery Court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Thacker, Et Al. v. Sheila Marie Wilbanks
Two children and two individuals who are neither biological nor adopted children of an intestate decedent contend that they are entitled to the decedent’s life insurance proceeds based on an alleged breach of contract between them and the decedent’s ex-girlfriend, who was the life insurance policy’s named beneficiary. The trial court found that the alleged contract failed for lack of consideration. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaiah Williams
A jury convicted the Defendant, Isaiah Williams, of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seventeen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Coty Shane Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Coty Shane Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie Keller Et Al. v. Estate of Edward Stephen McRedmond, Et Al.
In a previous appeal, we affirmed a trial court’s decision to hold a party in contempt, but we vacated the award of compensatory damages. Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, No. M2013-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2447041, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). We remanded the case to the trial court for a calculation of the damages solely attributable to the contemptuous conduct. Id. On remand, the trial court entered an amended judgment. In this appeal, among other things, the contemnor argues that the amount of damages awarded lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the amount of damages awarded, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Breeden
The Defendant, Ricky Dale Breeden, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced to an effective ninety-five years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his rape of a child convictions, (2) the State failed to make a proper election of offenses, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for expert funds, (4) the court erred by ordering consecutive service. Although we affirm the Defendant’s rape of a child convictions, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery and remand the case for a new trial. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sebastian A. Stevens
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Sebastian A. Stevens, of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court erred when it excluded the victim’s prior conviction and when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s prior incarceration. The Defendant lastly contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that his effective sentence of eight years in this case be served consecutively to his sentence for a previous conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judith Galilea Abner v. Steven Dale Abner
This appeal arises from a divorce action between Judith Galilea Abner (“Wife”) and Steven Dale Abner (“Husband”). As part of the divorce, the Trial Court entered an order classifying certain property inherited by Husband during the divorce as his separate property after finding that this property had not been comingled or transmuted into marital property. Husband also was awarded as his separate property the value of a log cabin at the time of marriage. The parties had resided in the log cabin throughout the marriage and made substantial improvements to the log cabin during the marriage to which Wife had substantially contributed. The Trial Court, therefore, classified the appreciation of value of the log cabin as marital property, and Wife was awarded one-half of the increase in value of the property. The Trial Court classified as marital property an account in Wife’s sole name, upon its finding that the money in the account had been comingled such that the money could no longer be traced back to the original deposit. Additionally, the Trial Court granted an award of attorney’s fees to Husband for four of the five days of trial due to Wife changing her testimony and the “immense amount of time spent on these issues.” Wife timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court’s findings concerning the classification of the parties’ property. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Husband. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sima Khayatt Kholghi v. Reza Aliabadi
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The parties were married for around thirty years, during which time the husband built a successful business and the wife was a homemaker and stay-at-home mother to the parties’ two children. After five days of trial, the trial court classified, valued, and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate; awarded the wife alimony in futuro; and ordered the husband to pay a portion of the wife’s attorney’s fees. Both parties raise various issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Kenneth Reed
This appeal arises from the second jury trial of the Defendant-Appellant, Randall Kenneth Reed, for which he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of property, and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (a)(2), 39-13-402, 39-14-103. In this appeal, Reed argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his right to self-representation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which it construed as a motion for reconsideration; (3) the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; (4) the guilty pleas he made in front of the jury should have been assessed and a new jury empaneled to ensure that he had a fair and unbiased trial; and (5) the trial court erred in admitting life and death photographs of the victim at trial. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable law, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Travis L. Lindsey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Travis L. Lindsey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and his effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully advise him of the deadline by which he could enter into a plea agreement with the State in order to avoid a trial. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Humberto Morales, Mario Garcia Flores, and Keyona Martina Newell
The Defendants, Humberto Morales, Mario Garcia Flores, and Keyona Martina Newell, (collectively “the Defendants”) were convicted of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Mr. Flores also was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After merging various convictions, the trial court ordered Mr. Morales to serve an effective sentence of forty-eight years, Mr. Flores to serve an effective sentence of thirty years, and Ms. Newell to serve an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendants, either collectively or individually, challenge: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions; (2) the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress based upon the constitutionality of the stop of the vehicle in which some of the perpetrators fled the scene; (3) the trial court’s denial of a continuance based upon the State’s late disclosure of discovery materials; (4) the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony of evidence extracted from the perpetrators’ cell phones; (5) the trial court’s denial of Mr. Morales’s motion for mistrial after Ms. Newell’s counsel questioned a witness about evidence that the trial court previously ruled to be inadmissible; (6) the trial court’s failure to issue an accomplice instruction; and (7) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Urshawn Eric Miller
Defendant, Urshawn Eric Miller, was convicted by a Madison County jury of premeditated first degree murder, felony first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction and the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second degree murder conviction. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for the first degree murder conviction. For the remaining convictions, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years, to be served concurrently with his death sentence. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues, as renumbered and reorganized by this Court: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in ruling on various challenges during jury selection; (3) the trial court erred in admitting a video of his prior aggravated robbery during the penalty phase; (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional; (5) the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) the death penalty is disproportionate in this case. Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for the correction of a clerical error. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clara Manley, et al. v. Humboldt Nursing Home, Inc.
After a nursing home resident died, her daughter filed a wrongful death action against the facility. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by the daughter when her mother was admitted to the facility. The daughter claimed that she lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement for her mother. The trial court agreed and denied the motion to compel. On appeal, we conclude that the Federal Arbitration Act required the trial court to resolve the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate had been formed. Because the nursing home failed to establish an agreement to arbitrate had been formed with the patient, we affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Martha B. Schubert
This is the second appeal of this action concerning the construction of the last will and testament of the decedent. In the first appeal, we reversed the trial court’s finding that the property at issue vested in her designated heir at the time of the decedent’s passing. Upon remand, the trial court held that the property vested when the personal representative executed warranty deeds for the property at issue, despite the fact that the deeds were never recorded. We now uphold the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings necessary for the distribution of the estate. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Louise Augustus, M.D. v. Tennessee Department of Health, Et Al.
Appellant, a psychiatrist, was sanctioned by the Board of Medical Examiners for violation of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County affirmed the Board’s action, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |