Roger Judd et al. v. Kaylee Powell et al.
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Roger and Regina Judd (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking grandparent visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ grandchildren. Kaylee and Spencer Powell (collectively, “Appellees”) filed their answer to the petition, claiming that Appellants lacked standing to bring their request. The Putnam County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) dismissed Appellants’ petition for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kendin L.
Rhonda L. (“Mother”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for the City of Bristol (“the Juvenile Court”) to modify a parenting plan granting Mark K. (“Father”) sole custody of Kendin L. (“the Child”) and Mother at least four days of parenting time each month.1 Father filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking the suspension of Mother’s parenting time based upon Mother’s persistent inappropriate behavior and psychological evaluation results. The Juvenile Court entered an ex parte order granting the motion for injunctive relief. After trial, the Juvenile Court dismissed Mother’s petition for her failure to prosecute and ordered that the suspension of Mother’s parenting time remain in full effect until Mother engaged in therapy and treatment for her personality disorder. Mother appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Destiny Diamond Baxter and Anthony Wayne Sheffield
A Maury County jury convicted Destiny Diamond Baxter and Anthony Wayne Sheffield of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of felony murder, and abuse of a corpse. Defendant Sheffield was also convicted of possessing a firearm with a prior conviction for a crime of violence and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury determined that both Defendants should serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for the homicide offenses. As for the remaining convictions, the trial court sentenced Defendant Baxter to an additional twenty-two years and sentenced Defendant Sheffield to a further thirty-five years. On appeal, both Defendants challenge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support their convictions. Defendant Sheffield also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the Defendants’ cases and admitting photographs of the homicide victim into evidence during the jury’s sentencing phase. Further, Defendant Sheffield argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him for the other convictions by failing to consider the risk and needs assessment, miscalculating the range, and imposing consecutive sentences beyond his life term. Upon our review, we conclude that a harmless error exists in failing to issue a limiting instruction as requested by Defendant Sheffield, and we also remand the judgments for correction of clerical errors. However, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel T.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Humphreys County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tabitha P. (“Mother”) and Cody T. (“Father”) to their minor child Gabriel T. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Mother and Father appeal, arguing mainly that DCS failed to assist or communicate with them. The Juvenile Court determined that Mother and Father were not credible witnesses, a determination we leave undisturbed. We find that each ground for termination found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Deena Brell v. Deniece Thomas, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al.
This is an appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits. The issue presented is whether, under Tennessee’s unemployment statutes, an employee who gives her employer notice of her resignation as of a certain date and is terminated by the employer prior to the effective resignation date is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee voluntarily quit. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision denying benefits. Based upon the plain language of the relevant statutory provision, we conclude that the employee’s actions do not constitute a voluntary decision to quit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Mahdieh Shabanian v. Seyed Mohammad Hadi Hosseini
We do not reach the substantive issues because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bianca Renee Bankston
Defendant pled guilty in Williamson County to aggravated vehicular assault and three DUI counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in confinement. Defendant argues on appeal that her sentence is excessive and the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, the applicable law, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgment forms as detailed in this opinion |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy Wayne Long v. Candice O'Brien Beasley et al.
This is a defamation action filed by a plaintiff police officer against two defendants concerning allegedly defamatory comments the defendants posted on Facebook about the officer. The defendants, citizens of Ashland City, where the plaintiff had served as a police officer for several years, filed a petition to dismiss the defamation action pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, determining that the officer had successfully established a prima facie case of defamation against each defendant and that the defendants had not met their burden to establish a valid defense. The defendants appealed the denial, arguing that the officer, a public official, had not met the heightened standard of proof necessary to establish that either of them had acted with actual malice when posting their comments to Facebook. During the pendency of this appeal, the officer attempted to nonsuit the underlying defamation lawsuit and moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Upon review, we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the officer’s voluntary nonsuit, and therefore we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal. We further determine, upon our de novo review of the record, that the trial court should have granted the defendants’ TPPA petition and dismissed the defamation lawsuit, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-20-105(b), because the officer failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that either defendant had acted with actual malice when posting the Facebook comments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarrod Dewayne Moore
The Defendant, Jarrod Dewayne Moore, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s imposition of an effective ten-year sentence in confinement for his drug and firearm-related convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latosha Starks-Twilley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Latosha Starks-Twilley, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her post-conviction petition, seeking relief from her conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred by summarily denying her pro se petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing because the petition alleged a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on our review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case to that court for the appointment of counsel and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stevy Ellis, et al. v. Snookums Steakhouse, LLC, et al.
The patron of a restaurant sued the business and its owner when she was injured attempting to sit on a bench outside the business. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the patron failed to demonstrate the existence of a dangerous or defective condition. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Manoucheka Thermitus v. Schiller Jerome
Appellant, Schiller Jerome, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on September 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Austin v. Angela Kay Plese
This appeal arises from a lawsuit over defamation and false light invasion of privacy. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jasmin Moore
The Defendant, Jasmin Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery and of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery). The trial court imposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of sixteen years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss based upon an alleged violation of her right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in several evidentiary rulings, (3) the court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction regarding unavailable evidence, (4) the court erred in permitting police recruits to attend the trial, and (5) she should receive a new trial due to the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors. We affirm the judgments of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Merritt v. Home Town Disposal, LLC
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Lee May
The Defendant, Brandon Lee May, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, evading arrest, and criminal trespass, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daryl A. Gray v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility concluded that Daryl A. Gray violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(d) and (e), 1.16, 4.1(a), and 8.4(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from the practice of law for six months. The violations stemmed from two separate complaints, both involving Mr. Gray’s representation of plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. After careful consideration, we too affirm. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamisha Lanea Haynes
A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Lamisha Lanea Haynes, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excluded testimony about the victim’s prior gun use; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight; and (4) her sentence is excessive. The Defendant also claims that the cumulative error of these issues warrants relief. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Andrew Archey
In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks us to review the trial court’s pretrial suppression of data from the Defendant’s cell phone. Before searching the cell phone, law enforcement officers sought and obtained a search warrant, which a magistrate authorized based upon its finding that probable cause existed to support the search warrant. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone, and the trial court granted the motion. The State asked for, and the trial court granted, an interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s ruling on the motion. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Allen Stephens
In 2023, the Defendant, Jeremy Allen Stephens, entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated child abuse. Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted and that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Ellen Lee v. Deanna Lynn Peavy
After an unfavorable judgment in a detainer action for real property in general sessions court, the Plaintiff sought relief in Davidson County Circuit Court. Two and a half years later, after numerous resettings, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robin M. McNabb v. Gregory H. Harrison
This appeal addresses constitutional residency requirements for Tennessee municipal court judges. Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requires inferior court judges to be “elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are to be assigned [and] have been a resident . . . of the circuit or district one year” prior to election. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 4. The appellant, Robin McNabb, proceeding pro se, filed an election contest against the appellee, Gregory Harrison, contending that he was constitutionally ineligible to be elected as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. Ms. McNabb asserted that “district” in Article VI, Section 4 refers to Lenoir City, and that Mr. Harrison had not lived within city limits in the year preceding. The trial court found that “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 refers to the modern-day judicial district. Because Mr. Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the trial court found him to be eligible to serve as Lenoir City Municipal Judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but modified the trial court’s judgment, finding that Article VI, Section 4 required Mr. Harrison to be a resident of Loudon County, rather than the Ninth Judicial District. McNabb v. Harrison, No. E2022-01557-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 7019872, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2023), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2024). The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court, “district” as used in Article VI, Section 4 means Loudon County. Id. We respectfully disagree. We hold that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate running for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution required Mr. Harrison to reside in Lenoir City. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Chancery Court for Loudon County. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Davarious Montral Taylor
The defendant, Davarious Montral Taylor, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sergei Aleksandrovich Novikov
The Defendant, Sergei Aleksandrovich Novikov, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in ordering a sentence of confinement without making proper findings that the Defendant was not entitled to alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence Willis Moore v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Clarence Willis Moore1 , appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Class B felony drug convictions, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to review videotape evidence with him or to convey the State’s plea offer, and that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that the Petitioner was not a credible witness. Because the Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel was previously determined by the trial court in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial, we conclude that the issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals |