In Re Conservatorship of Charles C. Rowe
The Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) granted the petition of Janice Peters-Rowe (“Petitioner”) for a conservatorship over her husband, Charles Rowe (“Respondent”). Respondent’s daughter from a previous marriage, Dawn Rowe (“Daughter”), filed an intervening petition. Daughter claimed that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent had lived his entire life in New York until recently and that Respondent had not established residency in Tennessee. The Trial Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was valid, giving Petitioner priority for appointment as conservator; and that it was in Respondent’s best interest that Petitioner be appointed as his conservator. Daughter appealed. Given that Respondent did not have the mental capacity to change his domicile at the time of his arrival in Tennessee, we conclude that the Trial Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and accordingly vacate the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank National Association v. Mark A. Searcy
A bank obtained a money judgment in South Carolina in 2010. The judgment debtor moved to North Carolina, and the bank domesticated the South Carolina judgment in North Carolina, a state that treats enrolled judgments as new North Carolina judgments. The judgment debtor moved to Tennessee, and in 2023, the bank filed a petition to enroll the North Carolina judgment in Tennessee. The judgment debtor objected, arguing that the original South Carolina judgment had expired. The bank responded that it was not seeking to enroll the South Carolina judgment, but instead the North Carolina judgment. The trial court enrolled the North Carolina judgment. The judgment debtor appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy D. Woodard Jr.
The Defendant, Billy D. Woodard, Jr., appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original five-year sentence for his theft conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by relying on grounds not included in the probation violation warrant; and (2) by failing to consider any other punishment or alternative to incarceration. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marina Kotova v. Thomas Kevin True
This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. According to the appellant, the notice of appeal was mailed to this Court on July 3, 2024, but the notice never arrived at the Appellate Court Clerk’s Office. The appellant provided a tracking number that was allegedly used to mail the notice of appeal, but the tracking information does not demonstrate that the notice was sent via certified mail pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 20 during the thirty-day appeal period. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gene A. Hoskins, Jr.
The Defendant, Gene A. Hoskins, Jr., appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the original three-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by failing to consider the consequence of the revocation as a separate discretionary decision, and (2) by failing to consider the interests of justice. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Jordan L. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the children by willful failure to make reasonable payments toward the support of the children and ruled that it was in the children’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the ground of abandonment by failure to support and that clear and convincing evidence exists to support that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Tony Burrell
Defendant, William Tony Burrell, was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), possession of a handgun while under the influence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and violation of the implied consent law. After Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained against him during a traffic stop that led to his arrest was denied by the trial court, Defendant entered into negotiated guilty pleas to one count of DUI and one count of possession of a handgun while under the influence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties reserved a certified question of law for appeal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). After review, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because the certification did not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and we dismiss the appeal. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Rolandus Keel v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, filed a pro se “Motion to Reopen Post Conviction Petition in Conjunction with Writ of Error Coram Nobis” (“the Petition”).1 The trial court found that the Coram Nobis Petition, on its face, failed “to establish that there is newly discovered evidence that would give rise to coram nobis relief” and summarily dismissed the Coram Nobis Petition. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the Coram Nobis Petition. Because Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking appellate review of the denial of the Motion to Re-open, we lack jurisdiction to consider the Motion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Williams, IV - Concur in Part/Dissent in Part
I fully concur with my respected colleagues reasoning and judgment as it relates to Parts I through IV of the majority opinion. As it relates to Part V, however, I must depart from the majority regarding the remedy for the trial court’s imposition of an illegal sentence. I believe the Defendant has the right to a sentencing hearing upon remand. On this point alone, I dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Williams, IV
The defendant, Cornelius Williams IV, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second-degree murder and convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error in providing the jury with an erroneous instruction; (3) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce a pro se pleading purportedly filed by the defendant; (4) the defendant is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (5) the defendant’s sentence for convicted felon in possession of a handgun is illegal. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in count two indicating the statutorily authorized release eligibility of eighty-five percent on the handgun conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarmie Alonzo Hill
The Defendant, Jarmie Alonzo Hill, whose first trial with a codefendant before a Davidson County Criminal Court jury ended in a mistrial, was convicted in a second Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not sua sponte recusing itself based on a prejudicial finding it made against the Defendant in the codefendant’s unrelated drug case; (2) whether the State committed a Brady violation by not providing the Defendant with the transcript of an unavailable witness’s jury trial testimony until the first day of the retrial; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Houston-Polk, III
The Defendant, John Houston-Polk, III, was convicted in a Rutherford County Circuit Court bench trial of simple possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail with the first 30 days to be served at 100% and the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in two general sessions court cases. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle parked in the driveway of his parents’ home. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danielle Wright v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Danielle Wright, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Skinner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Skinner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his fourth untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. He argues on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because he presented newly discovered evidence in support of actual innocence; therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. Alternatively, he argues that the lower court improperly denied his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the coram nobis petition and conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the denial of the motion to reopen and dismiss the appeal in that respect. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Theus
The pro se Defendant, Brandon Theus, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical mistake in his judgments of convictions for simple possession of methamphetamine and driving on a suspended license. The Defendant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to award pretrial jail credit on his sentence in the instant case, which had been ordered to run consecutively to separate cases that were pending parole revocation proceedings at the time of the Defendant’s sentencing. The State contends that the Defendant’s appeal was untimely, that the record is inadequate for review, and, nonetheless, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Defendant’s motion to correct a clerical mistake. We conclude that the appeal is timely and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ray Niles
The Defendant, Kenneth Ray Niles, appeals from his convictions in the Dickson County Circuit Court for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and one count each of aggravated arson, a Class A felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; theft of property, a Class D felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-14-302 (2018) (aggravated arson), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14-406 (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated criminal trespass). He received an effective sentence of life plus fifty years. The Defendant contends that (1) the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence found in the Defendant’s wife’s truck, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the victims. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Foutaine Shaw
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Shawn Foutaine Shaw, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant claims that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. He also raises an evidentiary issue regarding the testimony of a witness at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment in count 2 and corrected judgments in counts 3 through 6. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenyon Demario Reynolds
The Petitioner, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals from the Knox County Criminal |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher R. Smith
A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher R. Smith, of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to consecutive fifteen-year sentences for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in Count 1 for aggravated assault, modify Count 2 to a conviction for assault, and remand for entry of an amended judgment and sentencing on Count 2. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Geri McBride, Individually and D/B/A The Real Estate Shop v. Cynthia H. Allison
Geri McBride, individually and d/b/a The Real Estate Shop (“Buyer”), sued Cynthia H. Allison (“Seller”) for breach of contract with respect to a real estate purchase and sale agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Seller had breached the agreement and granted Buyer specific performance but denied Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. Seller filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for a new trial. The trial court denied Seller’s post-judgment motion, and Seller appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s grant of specific performance to the Buyer and reverse the trial court’s denial of Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Melba P. Mershon, Surviving Spouse of Rondell M. Mershon, ex rel. Hyland M., et al. v. HPT TA Properties Trust et al.
This is a wrongful death negligence action arising out of a fatal automobile collision that occurred on Long Lane, a public road in Franklin, Tennessee, which abuts a TA Travel Center. On October 6, 2016, Kenneth Page (“Mr. Page”) was traveling northbound on Long Lane in a vehicle with his wife as passenger. As he began to turn left into the entrance of the TA truck stop marked for semi-trailer trucks (“the trucks only entrance”), where there was a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested shortly ahead, Mr. Page was hit by Rondell M. Mershon (“Mr. Mershon”), who was traveling southbound on Long Lane on a motorcycle. The collision occurred on Long Lane before Mr. Page could enter the TA Travel Center. Mr. Mershon died soon after the collision. Mr. Mershon’s wife, Melba P. Mershon, brought a wrongful death negligence action on behalf of herself and her two daughters (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against Mr. Page. She later amended the complaint to add the owner and operator of the TA Travel Center, HPT TA Properties Trust and TA Operating LLC d/b/a Travel Centers of America (collectively “the TA Defendants”), alleging that the TA Defendants created a hazardous condition by failing to display clearly visible signage at the “trucks only” entrance of the TA truck stop directing passenger vehicles to the proper entrance located a short distance down Long Lane. Thereafter, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Mr. Page, leaving the TA Defendants as the only defendants in the case. In 2017, the trial court granted the TA Defendants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that they owed no duty of care to Mr. Mershon. Plaintiffs appealed. In the first appeal of this action, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the TA Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not come forward with any evidence to show that they “owed a duty of care to Mr. Mershon related to the applicable sight distances and visibility of signs on TA’s property and that TA Defendants breached that duty.” The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs failed to present any genuine issues of material fact, and that the TA Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs could show no evidence that the TA Defendants owed a duty to Mr. Mershon or that any act or omission of the TA Defendants constituted a cause in fact or proximate cause of Mr. Mershon’s injuries. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the TA Defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
John Jason Moore v. Amanda Jean Heilbrunn
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s entry of a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father primary residential parent, awarding him sole decision-making authority, and awarding Mother 80 days of visitation. Because the trial court did not engage in a best-interest analysis as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106, and because the trial court’s orders are too vague to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful review of its decisions, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
John Jason Moore v. Amanda Jean Heilbrunn (concurring)
I concur in the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the trial court’s ruling should be vacated in this case. Because I conclude that the record clearly reflects that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in this case, however, I write separately. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Lacy L. Austin v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Lacy L. Austin, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for two counts of possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense; possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony involving the use of force or violence; simple possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tanna Gordon, et al. v. State of Tennessee
The State appeals a judgment against it for an injury caused by the gross negligence of its employees in the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition on state-owned property. Because we conclude that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims for gross negligence, we reverse. |
Court of Appeals |