Rhonda Willeford, Et Al. v. Timothy P. Klepper, M. D., Et Al. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I concur in much of the majority’s excellent analysis, in its framing of the issues, and in its stated decision to adopt a substantive-versus-procedural test for whether a statute violates the separation of powers clause. I write separately because I must dissent from the majority’s holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(f) is unconstitutional only to the limited extent that it makes ex parte interviews mandatory instead of permissive. I see no way to avoid holding that the statute is unconstitutional in its entirety. |
Overton | Supreme Court | |
Matthew B. Foley v. State of Tennessee
This is the third occasion Petitioner, Matthew B. Foley, appeals from a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief raising the same primary lament – he does not belong on the Tennessee Sexual Offender Registry. He is seeking relief from his 2002 guilty-pleaded conviction for facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, an offense which, at the time of his plea agreement, was not listed as an offense requiring sexual offender registration. Petitioner, who was a sixteen year-old minor at the time of his guilty plea, continues to allege that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief should be tolled on due process grounds and that the State breached a material element of his plea agreement by requiring him to register as a sex offender. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. In the first appeal, this Court concluded that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on due process grounds, and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Matthew B. Foley v. State, No. M2015-00311-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 245857, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2016), no perm. app. filed (“Foley I”). On remand, the post-conviction court held a hearing and found the statute of limitations should not be tolled. In the second appeal, this Court found that the statute of limitations issue had been conclusively decided in Foley I and remanded the case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. Matthew B. Foley v. State, No. M2016-02456-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 5054571, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2017) no perm. app. filed (“Foley II”). On remand for the second time, the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to diligently pursue his rights and, therefore, that the statute of limitations should not be tolled. The post-conviction court also found that Petitioner failed to show the State violated a material element of his plea agreement and failed to show the State violated his due process rights. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, grant post-conviction relief and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew B. Foley v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur fully with the majority opinion. Although I realize that the issue in this appeal concerns the denial of post-conviction relief, I write separately to express my opinion that, in light of the numerous amendments to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (the TSORA) and specifically the numerous amendments to the residential and work restrictions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211, it is an appropriate time for the supreme court to revisit its holding in Ward “that the registration requirements imposed [by the TSORA] are nonpunitive and that they are therefore a collateral consequence of a guilty plea[.]” Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tenn. 2010). As the Ward court stated, “Obviously, nothing in this opinion precludes the possibility that an amendment to the registration act imposing further restrictions may be subject to review on the grounds that the additional requirements render the effect of the act punitive.” Id. at 472. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tamir Clark v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Tamir Clark, appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his 2012 guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the motion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe V. Williams v. Dennis Epperson Et Al.
This case involves an appeal to the Bradley County Chancery Court (“trial court”) of an administrative decision by the Building Board of Adjustment and Appeals for the City of Cleveland (“the Board”) to uphold the City of Cleveland’s chief building official’s decision to condemn and order the demolition of a commercial building. Upon a notice of condemnation issued by the chief building official based on the allegedly dilapidated and unsafe condition of the building, the building’s owner appealed to the Board. Following a hearing, the Board upheld the condemnation and demolition order. The owner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court, requesting, inter alia, that the demolition order be vacated. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the Board’s decision had been supported by substantial and material evidence and accordingly upheld the Board’s affirmance of the condemnation and demolition order. The owner filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied. The owner timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jadarian C. Et AL.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willingness and ability to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. Mother appeals both the grounds for termination and that termination was in her children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kyland F.
The parents of a severely abused child appeal the termination of their parental rights. When the child was less than five months old, his primary care physician became alarmed upon discovering that his head circumference had grown at an abnormal rate. Upon being admitted to the hospital for tests, the medical staff noted retinal hemorrhaging and the presence of blood in his cerebrospinal fluid, both of which indicated inflicted trauma. A pediatrician with a subspecialty in child abuse examined xrays that revealed healing fractures in the anterior lateral aspect of multiple ribs, which also indicated child abuse. When investigators from the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) interviewed the parents, the father admitted to observing the mother hitting the child in the head and covering his face with a blanket to muffle his cries. The mother told investigators she squeezed and shook the child, but it was the father who struck the child in the head. DCS placed the child in foster care, and both parents were charged with aggravated child abuse. While the parents remained incarcerated, DCS filed a petition to terminate their parental rights on two grounds, severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27) and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Following a trial, the court found that both grounds had been proven and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the child’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that DCS proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Mpoyi v. Richard T. Mpoyi
Ex-Husband appeals from a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”), which was entered several years after the final decree of divorce. Ex-Husband complains that the QDRO grants his ex-wife benefits that she was not entitled to under the final decree of divorce. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Ray Ward
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Randall Ray Ward, of two counts of promoting prostitution and one count of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He also argues the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions regarding S.C. and in failing to give the jury an instruction on accomplice testimony. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for merger of Counts three and four. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholaus Jones
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant of possession of heroin with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of heroin with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; two counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; and two counts of simple possession of Alprazolam, Class A misdemeanors. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the possession of heroin convictions, merged the possession of a firearm convictions, and merged the simple possession convictions and sentenced the Appellant to an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to show that the Appellant actually or constructively possessed the drugs or gun. Accordingly, the Appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the charges against him are dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Sherrill
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the Defendant’s, Brian Sherrill, motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his vehicle. The Defendant argued that the arresting officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that his truck’s brake light was malfunctioning. The State replied that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant for either the brake light offense or an alleged seatbelt violation. The trial court addressed the brake light offense and concluded that the “totality of the circumstances” did not support the stop. After the trial court granted the Defendant’s suppression motion and dismissed the indictment, the State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred by not considering the State’s alternative theory attempting to establish that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of a seatbelt violation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew Whitehair v. State of Tennessee
Matthew Whitehair, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of simple assault, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery, five counts of attempted incest, one count of incest, one count of statutory rape by an authority figure, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Petitioner was found not guilty of two counts of incest and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Matthew Whitehair, No. M2014-00883-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 880021, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged various instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, among other things. After a lengthy, multi-day hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. After our review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to relief. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pamela Kidd Hafer
In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court suppressing the results of toxicology testing conducted on the blood sample that the defendant, Pamela Kidd Hafer, provided to the police. The State asserts that the trial court erred because the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless drawing of her blood. In the alternative, the State contends that the trial court should have concluded that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement obviated the need to suppress the challenged evidence. Because the evidence establishes that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant twice voluntarily consented to the drawing of her blood, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we have concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw and because the good faith issue was not fully litigated below, we do not consider the State’s claim that the evidence was admissible via the good faith exception. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cortney R. Logan v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cortney R. Logan, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the flight or escape from the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Petitioner received consecutive sentences of 25 years and 6 years for a total effective sentence of 31 years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Yates v. Grady Perry, Warden ET AL.
Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals from the summary dismissal of his latest petition for habeas corpus relief challenging the judgment for his 2003 aggravated robbery conviction. Petitioner claims that an amended judgment entered by the trial court which ordered the sentence to run consecutively to his prior sentences is void. The habeas corpus court found that the amended judgment was not void and that Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Wayne | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
Juan Vargas v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Juan Vargas, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se Post-Conviction Petition, and after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Wharton
The petitioner, Ronnie Wharton, appeals the Sumner County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he has deemed an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michelle Henry v. Richard H. Henry
In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s award of 60 percent of the marital assets to Wife, the holding that he had gifted his mother’s ring to Wife, and the award of transitional alimony and alimony in futuro to Wife. Upon our review, we affirm the award of alimony and the holding that Husband gifted the ring to Wife, and hold that the issue of the division of the marital estate is waived. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Jodi McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC
We accepted certification of the following questions of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee regarding the constitutionality of Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102: “(1) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed in Article I, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution?; (2) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate Tennessee’s constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch?; (3) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate the Tennessee Constitution by discriminating disproportionately against women?” Upon review, we answer each of the District Court’s questions in the negative. |
Supreme Court | ||
Jodi McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC - Concurring
I join fully in the majority’s conclusion that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages enacted by our legislature does not violate either the separation of powers clause or the equal protection clause in the Tennessee Constitution. A much closer question is presented on whether the statutory cap violates the clause in the Tennessee Constitution guaranteeing a right to trial by jury. I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion on this issue but write separately to further explain my reasoning. |
Supreme Court | ||
Jodi McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC - Dissenting
I dissent. I would hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102(e) (2012) violates article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution by usurping the jury’s essential and constitutionally protected fact-finding function. |
Supreme Court | ||
Jodi McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC - Dissenting
The Tennessee Constitution guarantees that the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 (2012) (“the damages cap statute”), which forbids awards for noneconomic damages that exceed $750,000 (or $1,000,000 in catastrophic injury cases), is an unconstitutional invasion of the right to trial by jury. Thus, it cannot stand. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Taylor
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronald Taylor, of first-degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed the statutorily required life imprisonment sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the: (1) denial of his motion to suppress; (2) sufficiency of the evidence; (3) omission of a jury instruction; and (4) admission of an officer’s testimony regarding a video prior to admission of the video into evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Taylor - Concurring
I respectfully concur in results with Judge Wedemeyer’s majority opinion. I am unable to join with that portion of the opinion addressing Defendant’s Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) “unlawful detention” issue. I agree the issue is waived as a result of the failure of Defendant’s trial counsel to raise a pre-trial Gerstein challenge to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest. The State on appeal asserts the issue is waived. If this court concludes in this particular case that the issue is waived, we should stop our analysis there. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Travis Maples v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Charles Travis Maples, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2013 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of three counts of the sale of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. In this appeal, the petitioner claims, as he did below, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |