State of Tennessee v. Waynard Quartez Winbush
Defendant, Waynard Quartez Winbush, was convicted of various drug offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sever prejudicial offenses; (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the trial court erred by failing to include lesser-included offenses in the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; (6) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the case based on a violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (7) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial after failing to rule on Defendant’s pretrial motions; (8) the trial court erred by allowing the State to improperly introduce evidence; (9) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on witness perjury; (10) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (11) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession for conspiracy; and (12) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on cumulative errors. After conducting a full review of the record, we determine that Defendant is entitled to relief from his convictions for conspiracy in Counts 3 and 4 because the instructions given to the jury did not match the charges in the presentment, and we vacate Defendant’s convictions as to those counts. As to the remaining arguments, we find Defendant is not entitled to relief. Consequently, we reverse the judgments of the trial court in part and affirm the judgments in part. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie James Bradley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Willie James Bradley, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reginald D. Tumlin v. State of Tennessee
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Reginald D. Tumlin, of two counts of child abuse, one count of criminally negligent homicide, and one count of aggravated child neglect. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State v. Reginald D. Tumlin, No. E2013-01452-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7073752, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 15, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner maintains on appeal that his attorneys’ representation was deficient and he was prejudiced by the deficiencies. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos Smith v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carlos Smith, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, seeking relief from his convictions of two counts of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun and resulting effective sentence of one hundred twenty years. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this court affirmed the denial except for one issue: whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to advise the Petitioner that he was a career offender, which resulted in his rejecting a plea offer. Regarding that issue, this court remanded the case to the post-conviction court because that court failed to making any findings. Upon remand, the post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to inform him of his career offender status. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mateem Hudson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mateem Hudson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl S. Dixon
Defendant, Carl S. Dixon, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve two years, to be suspended on probation, and ordered Defendant to pay the victim $600 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s order of restitution was proper when Defendant’s only source of income was Social Security Supplemental Security Income. Having reviewed the record and the applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony James Zonneville v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Anthony James Zonneville, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone and simple possession of alprazolam. Petitioner contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Oviasojie v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, George Oviasojie, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re H. S.
The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of E.R. (mother) and T.S. (father) with respect to H.S. (the child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on multiple grounds. By the same quantum of proof, the court determined that termination of mother and father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Only mother appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re H.S. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I fully concur in the majority opinion’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions exist. I also agree that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting a finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Therefore, I agree with the ultimate result reached by the majority. However, I do disagree with the treatment of the ground found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The majority opinion follows In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018), which engages in a complicated use of statutory construction and grammar rules to essentially conclude that “and” actually means “or” in the language “ability and willingness.” I prefer the interpretation found in In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). I believe the General Assembly purposefully chose the word “and” in order to differentiate this ground from other grounds. Interpreting “and” as “or,” in my opinion, makes Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) a weaker version of other grounds. I do not believe such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion’s interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Connor B.
In this termination of parental rights action, the mother has appealed the trial court’s grant of a default judgment to the petitioners following the mother’s filing of an answer that did not contain her signature in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-117(o). Although we determine that the trial court properly granted a default judgment to the petitioners based upon the mother’s failure to file a proper answer within the time allowed, we vacate the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights, determining that the appellate record is insufficient to afford appropriate review of the statutory grounds for termination and best interest analysis. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Francine S. Labbe v. James Eric Karn II
The appeal arises from a divorce. Acting pro se, the former husband seeks review, of what we cannot be certain. Because his brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Glenn Allen Atkins
In this estate proceeding, the original petitioner, an adult child of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration, averring that the decedent had died intestate. The trial court initially granted the petition, designating the petitioner as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s surviving spouse subsequently filed a petition requesting the trial court’s acceptance into probate of a holographic will, purportedly executed by the decedent, which the surviving spouse presented to the court. The original petitioner and another adult child of the decedent then filed motions contesting the validity of the holographic will. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the holographic will to be valid, accepted the will into probate, and named the surviving spouse as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The adult children contesting the holographic will have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quintavious Montez Patton and Donte R. Swanier
A Davidson County jury convicted Quintavious Montez Patton of first degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Donte Ricardo Swanier of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced both Defendants to effective sentences of life in prison. On appeal, Defendant Patton: (1) challenges the trial court’s admission of video evidence; (2) claims his right to a speedy trial was violated; and (3) seeks relief based upon the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors. Defendant Swanier appeals the trial court’s admission of: (1) rap music; (2) Facebook posts; and (3) prior bad acts. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antoine Hinton
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Antoine Hinton, of first degree felony murder; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and he received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as provided by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), and that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction because the underlying felony was complete at the time of the victim’s death. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Appellant’s convictions and his total effective sentence of life plus twenty-eight years but remand the case to the trial court for amendment of the judgments to reflect that the Appellant’s conviction of aggravated kidnapping in count three is merged into his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping in count two and for correction of the judgments regarding concurrent and consecutive sentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Zachary Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board
The issue presented is whether the Shelby County Fire Department provided a firefighter with sufficient notice of the reasons for his termination. The Fire Department advised the firefighter that he was facing possible termination for violating two specific Fire Department rules. After further investigation and a meeting with the firefighter, the Fire Department gave him a termination letter that recited the two rules and detailed the factual basis for his termination. The firefighter appealed, and the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board upheld the termination in a written decision that stated the facts and reasons supporting the termination. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the firefighter did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for his termination. We hold that the Shelby County Fire Department provided the firefighter with sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements of due process. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of pretermitted issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re David S. Et Al.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. In terminating the parental rights of the children’s father, the trial court found that two grounds for termination had been properly established: abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court also determined that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. In addition to terminating the father’s rights, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother. On appeal, we conclude that considerations of fundamental due process require us to vacate that portion of the final order terminating the rights of the mother. We also conclude that one of the grounds relied upon for terminating the father’s parental rights, persistent conditions, must be vacated due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground. The termination of the father’s parental rights is otherwise affirmed, however, for the reasons stated herein. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re David S. Et Al. - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I concur in the affirmance of the decision to terminate the parental rights of David S. (“Father”). I write separately to address the majority’s decision to vacate the judgment terminating the parental rights of Cecilia S. (“Mother”) despite the fact that no party to the appeal has raised an issue with respect to the judgment against Mother. The issue not being raised is perhaps understandable. As the majority points out, the one person most likely to raise an issue with the termination of the Mother’s parental rights, Mother, may not have been served with process and may be completely unaware that her parental rights were being terminated. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. S.L.
This appeal presents the question of who has the duty to set a case for trial de novo when a defendant appeals a delinquency conviction from juvenile court to circuit court. The then-minor child S.L. (“Defendant”) was charged with rape and incest.1 After a trial, the Blount County Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) found that Defendant had committed these delinquent offenses. Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Circuit Court”) for trial de novo as provided for by statute. Defendant proceeded to do nothing regarding his appeal for around two years. Eventually, the State of Tennessee (“the State”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which the Circuit Court granted. Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that, notwithstanding his long stretch of inactivity, he has a right to trial de novo. We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(c) it was the Circuit Court’s duty—not Defendant’s—to set his case for trial. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand for Defendant to have his trial de novo, which is to be expedited. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Tanya Nicole Slimick v. State of Tennessee
A Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, numerous aspects of the jury instructions, and the State’s use of a demonstrative aid during closing argument. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Tanya Nicole Slimick, No. M2014-00747-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9244888, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 6, 2016). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective. In an amended petition, she added claims challenging the jury instructions and asserting prosecutorial misconduct. Thereafter, the Petitioner abandoned her claims as to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the remaining allegations had either been waived or previously determined on appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains her challenge to the trial court’s failure to properly charge the jury and assertion of prosecutorial misconduct. For the first time on appeal, she argues that a juror violated the trial court’s instruction not to communicate via social media during the trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
150 4th Ave. N. Tenant, LLC D/B/A WeWork v. The Metropolitan Nashville Board of Zoning Appeals, Et Al.
This dispute arose from the issuance of a skyline sign permit to a high-rise office-building tenant. The permit allowed the tenant to erect two 495-square-foot signs on the building’s northwest and southeast facades. Another tenant with skyline signs on the northeast and southwest facades appealed the issuance of the permit by filing an application with the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) for interpretation against the zoning administrator. The complaining tenant contended, inter alia, that its brand was harmed because the juxtaposition of the new and existing signs would blur the relationship between the two tenants and asserted that the new signs caused the building to exceed the maximum signage permitted under the zoning code. The BZA determined that the new signs violated the zoning code and revoked the permit. On a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Davidson County Chancery Court held that the BZA erred by relying on a zoning map rather than the code’s plain language and found the new signs complied with the code’s requirements. This appeal followed. We have determined the complaining tenant failed to establish standing because it failed to demonstrate that it was aggrieved by the issuance of the permit. There is no competent evidence to show that the signs’ juxtaposition would create public confusion about or signal a business relationship between the two tenants. Accordingly, the record fails to demonstrate that the complaining tenant’s alleged injury “falls within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the [law] in question.” See City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Further, based on the facts of this case, the BZA lacked the ability to provide meaningful redress. For these and other reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, albeit on different grounds, and remand with instructions for the trial court to order the BZA to dismiss the complaining tenant’s application and to reinstate the new sign permit as issued in June of 2017. As for a separate issue that a neighboring homeowners’ association attempted to raise during the BZA hearing—whether the northwest sign exceeded brightness standards—that issue was not properly before the BZA or the trial court. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s decision to remand the brightness issue to the BZA. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
150 4th Ave. N. Tenant, LLC D/B/A WeWork v. The Metropolitan Nashville Board of Zoning Appeals, Et Al. - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Because I conclude that Regions Bank had standing to challenge the issuance of the sign permit to 150 4th Ave N Tenant LLC (“WeWork”), I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion. As did the trial court, I would hold that the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the WeWork sign permit. But like the majority, I agree that the issue of the brightness of the skyline signs was not properly before the BZA, so I concur in that portion of the opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gracie H. Y. et al.
Ashley H. (“Mother”) appeals the March 2019 order of the Lawrence County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor children, Noah H. and Gracie H. Y. (collectively, “the Children”). Bobby H. (“Father”) surrendered his parental rights to the Children prior to trial and did not revoke his surrender. Upon petition of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children upon the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to visit prior to her incarceration, abandonment by wanton disregard, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Children. The Trial Court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother timely appealed. We reverse the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all other respects including the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stevie Williamson
The Defendant, Stevie Williamson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2018) (employment of a firearm), 39-17-1307 (2018) (firearm possession by a convicted felon), 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty years for attempted second degree murder, fifteen years and twelve years for the firearm convictions, and six years for reckless endangerment, for an effective fifty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s previous convictions and (2) by imposing consecutive service of the sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dondre Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dondre Johnson, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. He filed a post-conviction petition, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the evidence stemming from his seizure. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |