State of Tennessee v. Floyd Pete Lynch
The Defendant, Floyd Pete Lynch, was convicted by a Hancock County Criminal Court jury of violating the sexual offender registry, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208 (2018). He received a sentence of four years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hancock | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ken Smith Auto Parts v. Michael F. Thomas
We granted permission to appeal in order to clarify the procedure circuit courts must follow when an original defendant in general sessions court appeals an adverse general sessions judgment to circuit court but then fails to appear for the de novo circuit court trial to prosecute his appeal. In this case, when the defendant/appellant failed to appear in circuit court to prosecute his appeal, the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the general sessions court for execution of the general sessions judgment. We hold this was error. Under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-5-106 and -107, the circuit court should have instead entered its own default judgment against the defendant/appellant in the amount of the general sessions judgment, subject to execution in the circuit court, and assessed costs against the defendant/appellant and his sureties. We also hold that, after the circuit court dismissed the appeal and remanded to general sessions court, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction under Rules 59 and 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to grant the defendant/appellant’s timely motion to set aside its prior order. The decision to grant or deny the defendant/appellant’s post-judgment motion was within the circuit court’s discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
In Re Daisy A.
A mother whose parental rights to her daughter were terminated appeals the court’s best interest determination. Upon our review of the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s holdings that clear and convincing evidence existed to sustain three grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
CRAIG DEWAYNE MASSEY v. HEIDI WADE MASSEY
A father appeals the modification of a parenting plan, contending that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to the modify the plan because the mother’s petition raised allegations that the children were abused and neglected, which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear. Concluding that the circuit court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the post-divorce petition, we affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
Patrick Lewis Laforce v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Patrick Lewis LaForce, appeals as of right from the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The State has filed a motion to affirm by memorandum opinion the judgment of the trial court. Following our review, we conclude that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ercil K. Gate-Rayford v. Hilton Hall, Jr., Warden
The Petitioner, Ercil K. Gates-Rayford, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Blount v. State of Tennessee
Brandon Blount, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary acting in concert with two or more other persons and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after a jury trial. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Brandon Blount, No. W2015-00747-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3131355 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied post-conviction relief. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michelle A. Morel v. Christopher R. Nochera
Mother sought a judgment for child support arrears tracing back to January 2010. Relief was denied when it was determined that a prior order suspending child support in January 2010 had been a final order. Having determined that the order suspending child support was not a final order and was entered in error, we hereby reverse the dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Juvenile & Family Courts | |
John Alan Chapman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John Alan Chapman, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Neveah A.
The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also found that termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Finding clear and convincing evidence in support of the trial court’s determinations, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Smith Rawls v. Daniel Wexler Rawls
This appeal arises from the divorce of Susan Smith Rawls (“Wife”) and Daniel Wexler Rawls (“Husband”). Wife sued Husband for divorce in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife alimony and child support. Husband appeals to this Court raising a host of issues. However, Husband’s brief is non-compliant with the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to such a degree that his issues are waived. Wife raises an additional issue of her own as to whether Husband is obligated, either by an oral contract he allegedly entered into or through promissory estoppel, to pay the college expenses of one of the parties’ adult children. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Husband never committed to pay these college expenses. Wife also requests an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. We decline to grant such an award. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
LaRonda Johnson v. Barry Dominick
This is a case involving the propriety of retroactive child support. Following the death of the Respondent and notwithstanding the Petitioner’s stated efforts to have an administrator ad litem appointed and thereafter substituted in the Respondent’s stead, the trial court dismissed this case. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the dismissal should be set aside. |
Montgomery | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
Jessica Owens Et Al. v. Gary W. Stephens, D.O. Et Al.
This is a healthcare liability action resulting from the death of a child. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal to this court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madux F.
This is an appeal of an order terminating a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that three grounds for termination were proven against the mother and concluded that terminating her rights was in the minor child’s best interests. Although we vacate one ground for termination due to the trial court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground, we otherwise affirm the termination order. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley Harper v. Jim Hammond, Sheriff Et Al.
This appeal follows the trial court’s entry of an order of dismissal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Justin Joseph Harris v. Wendell Smith Et Al.
This is a constructive trust case. The plaintiff, who had recently purchased a twelve-acre tract of real property, filed a complaint for ejectment against the defendants, his uncle and cousin by marriage, who were residing in and claiming ownership of a block house and a two-acre parcel of the twelve-acre tract. The defendants, however, requested—and the trial court ultimately imposed—a constructive trust in favor of defendant uncle against the two-acre parcel and the block house. Finding that the plaintiff purchased the entire twelve acres with notice that the defendant uncle had a beneficial interest in the two-acre parcel and block house, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua P. Holt v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Joshua P. Holt, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Ray Rickman
The Defendant, Christopher Ray Rickman, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. As a condition of his plea, the Defendant expressly preserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stemming from his denied motion to suppress. After thorough review, we conclude that the certified question does not meet the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cora Beth Rhody v. June E. Rhody Et Al.
The decedent’s daughter filed suit to set aside conveyances of her father’s property made pursuant to a durable power of attorney. The trial court granted summary judgment in the petitioner’s favor, holding that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to enter into any legal agreement on the date the durable power of attorney was executed. Because we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to this question, we reverse the entry of summary judgment and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion. |
DeKalb | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
Michael Hart v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Hart, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Snipes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Snipes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he is entitled to a second post-conviction evidentiary hearing due to post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance at the first hearing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shermond Dewayne Dillard, Jr.
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Shermond Dewayne Dillard, Jr., of aggravated robbery, for which he received a |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shermond Dewayne Dillard, Jr. - Concur in Part
I join the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery and ten-year sentence, but I write separately to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err by allowing testimony about the stolen rental car. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHN R. FARMER
Appellant challenged the trial court’s ruling that determined when interest began to accrue on a promissory note. Appellant argues that the trial court issued a sua sponte ruling without allowing additional evidence to be presented. Because Appellant failed to meet its burden to show reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Robertson | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
State of Tennessee v. Elizabeth Lynn Schmitz
Defendant, Elizabeth Lynn Schmitz, appeals her convictions by a Dickson County jury of attempted theft of property over $500 and hindering a secured creditor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two-years for hindering a secured creditor and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine day for the misdemeanor theft, suspended to probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction when the evidence demonstrated that the subject property of both offenses was her own car. Defendant also claims the trial court gave incomplete instructions to the jury. After a full review, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to relief as to the attempted theft of property conviction because Defendant cannot be convicted of attempted theft of something she owned, and we vacate the conviction as to that count. As to the remaining count of hindering a secured creditor, we confirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals |