Todd Goldman v. Nicole Griffin
M2019-00138-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: M2019-00138-COA-R3-CV

This is a consolidated appeal concerning the trial court’s dismissal of two orders of protection in this domestic relations action.  We affirm. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Linda L. Rozen, et al. v. Wolff Ardis, PC
W2019-00396-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith

Appellants filed a legal malpractice action against their former law firm after two civil judgments were not renewed after a ten-year period. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that the appellants’ claim was filed beyond the statute of limitations. The trial court also found that no attorney-client relationship existed to impose a duty on the law firm to renew the civil judgments before they expired. We find no reversible error in the trial court’s ruling regarding the statute of limitations. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Frederick R. Ross, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
M2019-01117-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

Petitioner, Frederick R. Ross, Jr., appeals from the summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his guilty-pleaded conviction for selling hydrocodone, a Schedule II drug. Because Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Sumner Court of Criminal Appeals

Donna Felecia Watson v. Quince Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC, et al.
W2019-00261-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The subject arbitration agreement was executed in connection with a patient’s admission to a nursing home facility and signed by the patient’s son. The trial court found that the son lacked authority to bind his mother to the agreement. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Porscha J. Medaries v. State of Tennessee
M2018-01656-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Petitioner, Porscha J. Medaries, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief in which she challenged her conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was not knowingly entered. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Shelby County, Tennessee v. Gary Morris, Jr., et al.
W2019-00049-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

This appeal arises from Shelby County’s decision to terminate Appellee’s employment for non-compliance with the County’s residency requirement. The Civil Service Merit Board (“CSMB”) reversed the termination of Appellee’s employment and reinstated him with back pay. On appeal, the Shelby County Chancery Court affirmed the CSMB’s ruling. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Scott Foltz v. Barnhart Crane and Rigging Company
W2018-02198-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith

Appellant/employee brought this retaliatory discharge case against Appellee, his former employer. Appellant alleged that he was fired in retaliation for claiming workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that Appellant failed to meet his burden to show a causal connection between the filing of his workers’ compensation claim and the termination of his employment. In the alternative, the trial court found that Appellee provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate Appellant’s employment, and Appellant failed to meet his burden to show that the proffered reasons were pretext. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Dora Nesbitt Jones v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC
W2019-00448-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Samual Weiss

This appeal involves an arbitration agreement executed in connection with a nursing home admission. At the time of admission, Appellee, daughter of the resident, signed the admission contract and separate voluntary arbitration agreement on behalf of her mother. Appellee later sued the nursing home, on behalf of her mother, for injuries sustained in a fall, and the nursing home sought to enforce the arbitration agreement signed by Appellee. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Appellee lacked authority, under the power of attorney, to bind her mother to the agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Bonnie R. Lovell v. Warren County, Tennessee
M2019-00582-COA-r3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry R. Tidwell

A woman was incarcerated after being arrested and charged with several crimes.  Prior to trial, the charges against her were dropped and she was released.  Within a year of her release, the woman filed a claim against the county for false imprisonment.  The county moved for summary judgment, asserting that the complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.  The trial court granted the county’s motion and the woman appealed.  We reverse the trial court’s judgment and hold that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment claims does not begin to run until the imprisonment ends.

Warren Court of Appeals

Bryon C. Stephens v. State of Tennessee
W2018-00895-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The Petitioner, Bryon C. Stephens, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he is entitled to relief because his guilty pleas were unknowingly entered, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

Hardeman Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Michael Wayne Robinson, Jr.
W2019-00216-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Wayne Robinson, Jr., of three counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

John W. Harris, Jr. v. Robin L. Steward
W2019-00231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

This appeal arises from Appellant’s lawsuit against his former attorney, Appellee, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and double billing. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit on its finding that his claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Cory Lamont Batey
M2017-02440-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Cory Lamont Batey, of one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; two counts of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony; one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, a Class B felony; and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received a fifteen-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent for the aggravated rape conviction and concurrent eight-year sentences for the remaining convictions for a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the mens rea for the offenses and erred by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to aggravated rape; that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the superseding indictment because it violated double jeopardy; that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence regarding a codefendant’s statements and conduct; and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. The State argues that the trial court erred during sentencing by considering ex parte letters and emails written on the Appellant’s behalf and requests that this court remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. We conclude that the State should not have issued a superseding indictment charging the Appellant with aggravated rape in count four but that plain error does not require a retrial on that count. Accordingly, finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Buford Trammell
E2018-00382-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Buford Trammell, of six counts of rape, three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, one count of solicitation of a minor, one count of casual exchange of a controlled substance, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. After merging the appropriate convictions, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict and that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Betty Caitlin Nicole Smith v. Zachary Taylor Daniel
M2019-02083-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Christopher V. Sockwell

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal.  After carefully reviewing the record provided by the pro se appellant, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion for recusal. 

Maury Court of Appeals

Wheeler Bonding Co., Inc. v. 1st Stop Bonding LLC, Et Al.
M2019-00064-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

Following a nonsuit by the original plaintiff, one of the original defendants was granted a default judgment with respect to his counterclaim.  The original plaintiff thereafter moved to set the default judgment aside after the entry of final judgment, and later, attempted to re-file its previously nonsuited claims.  After the trial court denied the motion to set aside and entered an order striking the original plaintiff’s re-filed claims, this appeal followed.  We reverse the denial of the motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment. The striking of the re-filed claims is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Dominique Clarke v. Kymberly Ash
M2019-00217-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Tim Barnes

This appeal involves a petition for contempt and to modify a permanent parenting plan.  Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we conclude that the notice of appeal was not timely filed.  Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Chris Schaeffer v. Amanda Patterson
W2018-02097-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge David S. Walker

Father appeals the trial court’s decision allowing Mother to relocate with the parties’ daughter from the Memphis area to Blytheville, Arkansas. Father also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Applying the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108 based on the parties’ stipulation, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that relocation was in the child’s best interest. We also affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees but decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Re Jaydin A. Et Al.
M2018-02145-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles B. Tatum

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights on grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody. The evidence at trial showed that due to Father’s repeated criminal conduct, including two instances where Father fled the State to escape justice, he has had no contact with his daughter for approximately 95% of the child’s life. Because we conclude that the evidence was clear and convincing as to both grounds for termination and best interest, we affirm.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Tennesseans For Sensible Election Laws v. Tennessee Bureau Of Ethics And Campaign Finance, Registry Of Election Finance, And Davidson County District Attorney General
M2018-01967-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen H. Lyle

This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to two Tennessee statutes that are part of Tennessee’s campaign finance law.  Prior to trial, the chancery court granted several motions in limine that effectively excluded all of the testimonial and documentary evidence proffered by the State in defense of the statutes.  With no evidence presented by the State, the trial court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of proof as to the constitutionality of the two statutes.  Consequently, the trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-10-117 and 2-10-121 violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution.  The State appeals.  The State first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the State’s evidence.  Additionally, the State argues that the constitutional challenge to one of the statutes has become moot due to a statutory amendment.  Finally, the State argues that the remaining statute is constitutional.  For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.   

Davidson Court of Appeals

J. Philip Harber v. Marquerita Annette Dixon, Et Al.
E2019-00028-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor M. Nichole Cantrell

This appeal arises from an acrimonious dispute between former friends over real property. William M. Pruitt and his wife Shirley J. Pruitt (“the Pruitts,” or “Mr. Pruitt” and “Mrs. Pruitt”) live in a house next to three parcels of land once owned variously by Mr. Pruitt’s stepfather and mother, both of whom died intestate. J. Philip Harber (“Mr. Harber”), former attorney for the Pruitts, paid Mr. Pruitt’s fellow heirs for quitclaim deeds with the aim of acquiring their interests in the subject parcels. Mr. Harber then filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) to determine the interests of the parties and sell the three parcels. The Trial Court found in favor of Mr. Harber and ordered a partition by sale for division. The Pruitts appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Pruitts rely on several theories to argue that Mr. Harber never acquired an interest in the land. The Pruitts argue further that, even if Mr. Harber acquired an interest, the Trial Court should have applied the doctrine of unclean hands to deny him his requested relief because he sued them out of spite. We find and hold, inter alia, that Mr. Pruitt is but one of many heirs to his deceased parents’ land; that the other heirs never lost their interests in the land; and, that the other heirs were at liberty to sell their interests in the land to Mr. Harber, which they did. Although there is considerable evidence that Mr. Harber was motivated by spite in bringing this action, that alone does not compel application of the unclean hands doctrine, particularly as fraud is not alleged. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Anderson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kelley Hufford
M2018-01823-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

A jury convicted the Defendant, Kelley Hufford, of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and tampering with evidence for the abduction and homicide of her boyfriend. On appeal, the Defendant raises only a challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, alleging that the evidence did not establish that the crimes occurred in Tennessee. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence established that the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, and we affirm the convictions, remanding for merger of the kidnapping offenses.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

Kenneth Ray McElroy Et Al. v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company Et Al.
E2018-01038-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey Hollingsworth

An insured sued for breach of contract after his insurance company denied payment for a surgical procedure. The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing that the insured could not establish a breach of contract because the procedure was excluded from coverage in the medical benefits plan. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company and dismissed the complaint. Because the insurance company was entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts, we affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Kelly Colvard Parsons v. Richard Jearl Parsons
W2018-02008-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of relief on her post-divorce petition for contempt and breach of contract. The parties’ MDA awarded Wife 50% of Husband/Appellee’s FERS Supplement, which was subsequently terminated due to Husband’s yearly earned income being in excess of the FERS cap of $15,120.00. Because the parties’ MDA did not preclude Husband from earning income in excess of the cap, and did not include a provision for such occurrence, the trial court properly denied Wife’s petition. Although the trial court sua sponte modified child support to award an additional amount equal to the lost FERS Supplement, it did so in error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Husband’s motion to alter or amend the award of additional child support. Because the MDA allows the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees and expenses, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Husband’s reasonable fees and expenses, and remand for determination of same, and for entry of judgment thereon. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Shelby Court of Appeals

John J. Hasenbein v. Katherine J. Hasenbein
M2018-00070-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

This is an appeal in a divorce proceeding, wherein the mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding the father the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and in its holdings as to the factors at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106 in naming the father the primary residential parent.  Father appeals the court’s ruling on a motion he filed seeking to further specify the parents’ responsibilities relative to the transportation of the children.  Upon consideration of the record, we vacate that portion of the judgment that holds that factors (11) and (12) at section 36-6-106(a) are not applicable and remand the case for further consideration in that regard and, if necessary, to reconsider the designation of the primary residential parent; in all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Montgomery Court of Appeals