State of Tennessee v. Eric Dewayne Wallace
The Defendant, Eric Dewayne Wallace, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Defendant has failed to establish that his sentence is illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David New v. Lavinia Dumitrache, et al.
A general sessions court issued orders of protection for a mother and her child against the mother’s ex-husband, who was the child’s father. Thirty-six days after the final order was entered, the father filed suit in chancery court, essentially seeking to enroll the mother’s and the father’s Texas divorce decree and to appeal the orders of protection. On the mother’s motion, the chancery court dismissed the suit in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The mother then moved to alter or amend, seeking an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs incurred in defending the action. The chancery court granted the motion and awarded the mother attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, the father challenges only the award of attorney’s fees. We conclude that the court did possess subject matter jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees. But because the father was not permitted to put on proof concerning the reasonableness of the fees incurred by the mother, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Miolen Et Al. v. Doug Saffles Et Al.
Plaintiffs David Miolen and Ann Miolen, husband and wife, hired contractor Doug Saffles to install, on the backyard of the plaintiffs' property, a pool, additional water features, a bathhouse, outdoor kitchen and fireplace, and a large amount of stone pavers and stairs. Because their home was on a sloping hillside, the work involved moving a lot of earth and building two retaining walls to support the project. When the work was about 90% done, plaintiffs became dissatisfied and ordered defendant off the site. They sued him for breach of contract, negligence in failing to perform in a good and workmanlike manner, misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq. (Supp. 2018). Defendant counterclaimed for unpaid work. The trial court held that defendant violated the TCPA by misrepresenting that both walls had been engineered by a professional engineer, and by charging plaintiffs $10,000 in "engineering" expenses that were not incurred by an engineer. The court awarded plaintiffs $68,974 in compensatory damages and assessed treble damages for the TCPA violation, plus plaintiffs' costs and attorney's fees. The total amount of $232,285.31 was offset by a judgment in defendant's favor on his counterclaim in the amount of $12,061.75. As calculated in our opinion, the net award to plaintiffs is reduced to $127,727.56. The trial court's judgment, as modified, is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Coleman v. Armstrong Hardwood Flooring Company ET AL.
In this appeal from the judgment of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, the employer and its insurer argue that the employee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury arose primarily out of the course and scope of his employment, and that the employee’s physician expert did not use an appropriate method to opine on the impairment rating for the employee’s right ear. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Paul McMillin v. Realty Executives Associates, Inc., Et Al.
Paul McMillin (“Plaintiff”) appeals the April 11, 2018 order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) finding Plaintiff in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and awarding $19,983.94 in sanctions to be paid to the attorney for Realty Executives Associates, Inc. and Tammy Garber (“Defendants”). Plaintiff raises issues regarding the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants and the Trial Court’s grant of sanctions. We find and hold that Plaintiff waived his issues with regard to the grant of summary judgment. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding Plaintiff in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and awarding sanctions. We, therefore, affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rashell Holt, Et Al. v. John Robert Whedbee, Et Al.
This appeal concerns an alleged breach of contract. Patsy Yearwood (“Decedent”), an insurance agent with John Robert Whedbee and James L. Whedbee at the Whedbee Insurance Agency (“Defendants”), entered into an agreement (“the Agreement”) with Defendants whereby Defendants would buy all of Decedent’s contracts of insurance and expirations and renewals. For a set period of time, Decedent would receive 50% of her commissions and renewals and Defendants were to receive the other 50%. Decedent, in declining health, was to assist in retaining and producing business. Upon Decedent’s death, her commissions were to go to her estate. Decedent died and three months later, Defendants halted payments. Decedent’s daughter RaShell Holt, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Patsy Yearwood (“Plaintiff”), sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted on the basis that Decedent first breached the Agreement by not working in the period leading up to her death. Plaintiff appealed. We find and hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Decedent breached the Agreement by ceasing to work. We hold further that, even if Decedent stopped working, this in itself was not a breach of contract because her sickness and death were anticipated in the Agreement. We hold further still that, even if Decedent breached the Agreement, Defendants were not entitled to continue receiving all the benefits of the Agreement while denying the estate its benefits. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Scott Bickford
Defendant, Michael Scott Bickford, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for correction of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant voluntarily pled above his range, his sentence is not illegal. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Lewis Tuttle v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jerry Lewis Tuttle, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief as previously determined and/or failing to state a colorable claim. In this appeal, the State concedes, and we agree, that the Petitioner stated a colorable claim for relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patricia Gay Patterson Lattimore v. James S. Lattimore, Jr.
This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding wherein the wife filed a petition requesting that the trial court hold the husband in civil contempt due to his noncompliance with the alimony provision in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and enter a judgment in favor of the wife representing the alimony arrearage and statutory interest. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the wife’s petition without entering a monetary judgment against the husband, upon finding that although the husband had violated the alimony provision of the MDA, his failure to pay was not willful. The trial court also denied the wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Having determined that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding, we conclude that the husband’s failure to comply with the alimony provision was willful. Upon further determination that the trial court erred in dismissing the wife’s petition for civil contempt and a monetary award, we reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Barry L. Clark v. Mark Gwyn Et Al.
The petitioner was convicted of multiple sexual offenses in Maryland in 1981. Several years after completing his sentence for these convictions, he was incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a different crime. While serving his sentence in Pennsylvania, he received interstate transfer of parole to Tennessee. Thereafter, the petitioner was informed that he must register as a sexual offender in Tennessee. He registered in 2011 and, in 2016, sent the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) a letter requesting termination of his registration. After the TBI denied his request, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the TBI’s denial of the petitioner’s request, and the petitioner appeals. Finding no error in the chancery court’s decision, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Green
The Defendant, Marvin Green, pleaded guilty to three drug-related offenses in exchange for an effective sentence of fifteen years. The Defendant appealed but his direct appeal was dismissed for failure to file an appellate brief. See Marvin Green v. Jerry Lester, Warden, No. W2013-025250-CCA-R3-HC, 2014 WL 2941237, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 26, 2014) (citing Marvin Green v. State, No. E2008-00182-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 29, 2008) (order)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 19, 2014). After numerous unsuccessful post-conviction petitions, on December 18, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that his plea agreement was not voluntarily entered. The trial court denied the motion for failure to state a cognizable claim. On appeal the Defendant maintains that his guilty plea was involuntary. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm Wade Frazier
Defendant, Malcolm Wade Frazier, pleaded guilty to one count of possessing more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver after the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant received an eight-year sentence. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, Defendant attempted to reserve two certified questions of law. Because the certified questions fail to identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and therefore it is dismissed. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Wi v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, David Wi, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, felony murder, attempted first degree felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and aggravated assault in exchange for a sentence of life plus twenty-five years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied relief. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court on the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and the knowing and voluntary nature of Petitioner’s guilty plea. However, we must reverse Petitioner’s conviction for attempted first degree felony murder and dismiss Count Five of the indictment because Count Five of the indictment fails to state an offense. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LaGerald Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, LaGerald Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of one count of aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, and one count of harassment and resulting effective six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in his guilty pleas being involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Juan A. Hill v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Juan A. Hill, appeals from the summary dismissal of his fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Petitioner was convicted in March, 1996, of one count of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 35 years in confinement. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the judgment of conviction is void because he was convicted of a crime that was not in effect at the time of the offense. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Austin
The Defendant, Michael Austin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony; and driving with a revoked, suspended or cancelled license, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction, three years for the firearm conviction and six months for the driving conviction and ordered that the felony sentences be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his felony convictions and argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chew Cornelius Sawyer
The Defendant, Chew Cornelius Sawyer, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to an effective term of five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance L. Brown
The Appellant, Terrance L. Brown, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Adams
The Appellant, Darrell Adams, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby K. Watson v. Matthew T. Watson et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, arising from an appeal filed by the plaintiff to the Monroe County Circuit Court (“trial court”) from a judgment of the Monroe County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”), granting the defendants immediate possession of certain contested property located in Madisonville, Tennessee. The plaintiff challenges both the January 8, 2019 trial court order, which denied his initial and supplemental motions seeking judicial recusal of the trial court judge, and the subsequent order, which denied his motion to alter or amend the January 8, 2019 order. Having carefully reviewed the petition for recusal appeal (“the Petition”), together with the challenged orders, we conclude that the Petition was not timely filed and accordingly dismiss this appeal. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Otis Johnson
Defendant, Brandon Otis Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly relied on hearsay evidence without making the required findings of reliability and good cause justifying its admission over his objections. After a full review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristie Lea Crafton
Kristie Lea Crafton, Defendant, was sentenced to drug court after she violated the terms of probation. After she was expelled from drug court, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered Defendant to serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kermit George Parker v. Sherry Elizabeth Parker
A husband and wife were divorced after being married for nineteen years. The trial court divided the marital estate and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The husband appealed, claiming the trial court erred in classifying a camper as marital property and in awarding the wife long-term spousal support. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and award the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Burrow
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Charles Burrow, of three counts of second degree murder, one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated criminal trespass, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the jury’s verdicts are inconsistent and requests plain error review of improper statements by the prosecutor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in Counts one, two, three, four, and five. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rose Mary Thompson v. Robert Boyd
homeowner and a contractor entered into a contract requiring the contractor to repair damage to the homeowner’s house caused by a kitchen fire. The repairs to be performed were those covered by the homeowner’s insurance policy as outlined in a detailed estimate of repair work. After the contractor abandoned the project, the homeowner hired another contractor to complete the work and sued the original contractor for breach of contract. We affirm the decision of the trial court to the extent of the court’s determination that the contractor breached the contract by his undue delay and poor workmanship. We have concluded, however, that the trial court’s decision fails to adequately explain the award of damages or to dispose of the contractor’s counterclaim. Therefore, we vacate the damages award and remand for more specific findings regarding the basis for the damages award and a disposition of the counterclaim. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |