State of Tennessee v. Westley A. Albright
The Defendant, Westley A. Albright, pled nolo contendere to one count of solicitation of a minor, a Class E felony, and was placed on judicial diversion, with a one-year probationary term. As part of his plea-agreement, the Defendant was required to register as a sex offender and to participate in sex offender treatment. After the Defendant was discharged from his treatment program for noncompliance, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a Diversion Violation Report. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s diversion, adjudicated the Defendant guilty, extended the Defendant’s probation by six months, and ordered the Defendant to attend and complete sex offender therapy. The Defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine whether the Defendant’s due process rights were violated because he was not specifically informed in conjunction with his nolo contendere plea that his judicial diversion could be revoked if he refused to admit certain facts during his sex offender treatment. We hold that due process does not require a sex offender placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period to be informed specifically in conjunction with his plea that his judicial diversion and probation may be revoked if he is discharged from sex offender treatment due to his refusal to acknowledge that he committed the elements of the offense to which he pled. Accordingly, we affirm the courts below. |
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Westley A. Albright - Dissenting
Westley Albright, with the trial court’s consent, entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge of solicitation of a minor without being required to admit his guilt. The trial court granted Albright judicial diversion with one year of probation. Albright complied with all the stated conditions of his diversion. He attended and participated in all scheduled treatment group meetings, paid for sex offender treatment, and underwent an assessment. Albright even took a lie-detector test. Yet the trial court revoked Albright’s diversion, convicted him of solicitation of a minor, and extended his probation by six months, because of his noncompliance with an unstated condition of diversion. This unstated condition was that Albright had to admit during treatment that he was guilty of solicitation. Because he would not or could not make this forced admission, Albright’s therapist discharged him from the treatment program, and the trial court revoked his diversion. |
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
Victor Thompson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Victor Thompson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he was denied the right to testify at trial, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Momon hearing. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell Malone v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darrell Malone, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2016 conviction for attempt to commit rape and his four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by determining that his petition was untimely. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for consideration of the issues raised in the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodricus Antwan Johnson
Rodricus Antwan Johnson, Movant, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion seeking correction of what he claimed was an illegal sentence because the trial court applied enhancement factors that were required by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) to be determined by the jury. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwight Mitchell v. State of Tennessee, Department of Health
Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in 2017, seeking to have the chancery court invalidate two final orders entered against him by the Tennessee Department of Health, one entered in 2008, revoking his license to operate a residential home for the aged, and the second entered in 2011, placing him on the Tennessee Abuse Registry. Upon the Department’s motion, the chancellor dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to timely seek review under the Administrative Procedures Act, and on the basis of res judicata. The plaintiff appeals; on our de novo review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with the judicial review provisions set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gaberiel S. Et Al.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four children. The juvenile court found five statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the children. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny McClain, Jr. v. Tennessee Board of Parole, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied petitioner parole, citing the seriousness of the offense, the substantial risk that petitioner would not conform to the conditions of his release, the adverse effect his release would have on institutional discipline, and his need to complete therapeutic community. Petitioner appealed the Board’s decision by petition for writ of certiorari. The petition was dismissed by the trial court, which found that the petitioner had failed to present any facts that would support a claim that the Board acted illegally, fraudulently, arbitrarily, or in excess of their jurisdiction. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Jimmy D. Harris
Wife of the decedent appeals the probate court’s denial of her petition to admit a will to probate. Because we conclude that the testimony presented did not rebut the presumption of due execution created by the will’s attestation clause, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Doantae Lester
Defendant, Stephen Doantae Lester, was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant’s gang affiliation and rank; that Defendant was deprived of a fair trial by statements made by the State during closing arguments and by juror misconduct; that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses; and that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan David Patterson
We granted this appeal to determine what showing, if any, a defendant must make to prevail on a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, where the defendant pleaded guilty without an agreement as to sentencing, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant must present post-sentencing information or developments warranting a reduction of sentence to prevail on a Rule 35 motion. We disagree and limit this standard to Rule 35 motions seeking reduction of specific sentences imposed in exchange for guilty pleas, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s Rule 35 motion and reducing his aggregate sentence. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
In Re Eleanor Chappell Revocable Living Trust
Decedent’s son, Appellant, sought to set aside Decedent’s trust, alleging that Decedent lacked capacity at the time she executed the trust and that Appellees, Decedent’s sister and the sister’s husband, exercised undue influence over Decedent in the execution of the trust. Appellees moved for dismissal arguing that Appellant’s lawsuit was barred by res judicata based on Appellant’s previous suit for conservatorship over Decedent. The trial court held that the elements of res judicata were not met but dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit on its finding that same was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for claims for breach of fiduciary duty under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-109(a)(3). We conclude that the trial court’s conclusion as to res judicata was correct. However, because Appellant’s complaint does not state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the applicable statute of limitations is that set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-15-604(a)(1), and Appellant’s lawsuit was timely filed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reuben Eugene Mitchell
A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Reuben Eugene Mitchell, of arson and filing a false insurance claim valued between $10,000 and $60,000, and the trial court sentenced him to four years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for filing a false insurance claim, and we vacate the judgment and dismiss that charge. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction for arson. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Reuben Eugene Mitchell - concurring in part, dissenting in part
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s arson conviction. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for filing a false insurance claim. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Michayla T. Et Al.
A mother appeals the termination of parental rights to her two children. After investigating a report of drug exposure, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) obtained emergency temporary custody of the children. After nearly ten months, DCS petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence six statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent by willful failure to support, abandonment by wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Cyntoia Brown v. Carolyn Jordan
We accepted certification of a question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that requires us to determine if a defendant convicted of first-degree murder committed on or after July 1, 1995, and sentenced to life in prison under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(c)(3) will become eligible for release, and if so, after how many years. We conclude that a defendant so convicted and sentenced to life in prison under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(c)(3) may be released, at the earliest, after fifty-one years of imprisonment. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Kayla Marie Anderson
The Defendant, Kayla Marie Anderson, pled nolo contendere to theft of property valued over five hundred dollars for her role in arranging a drug transaction during which the victim was robbed. The Defendant preserved as certified questions several issues related to her arrest, her interview, and the search of her telephone pursuant to two separate warrants. Because the record reveals the existence of inculpatory evidence not derived from the arrest, interview, or search, we determine that the questions are not dispositive and dismiss the appeal. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayford Demonbreum, Jr.
Defendant, Wayford Demonbreum, Jr., appeals the denial of his Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. In this appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence should be reduced because his plea agreement stated the offense to which he pleaded guilty as attempted possession of marijuana in an amount less than 70 pounds, which is a Class E felony. T.C.A. § 39-17-417(i)(13); T.C.A. § 39-12-107(a). The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion, having determined that the plea agreement was erroneous, and Defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to the offense of attempted possession of marijuana in an amount more than 70 pounds, a Class C felony, for which Defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to six years. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrea Scott et al. v. Carlton J. Ditto et al.
This is the second appeal of a case in which a parcel of property was sold by the City of Chattanooga at a delinquent tax sale. The property had earlier been sold at a foreclosure sale conducted by the holder of a deed of trust on the property. The successor in interest to the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale brought an action against the purchaser at the tax sale and others to quiet title to the property; the tax sale purchaser filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against two of the defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to the foreclosure sale purchaser based on its determination that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the tax sale and that she had recorded her deed first; the court dismissed the cross-claims. The tax sale purchaser appealed and this Court affirmed the dismissal of the cross-claims and reversed the grant of summary judgment to the foreclosure sale purchaser, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had notice of the tax sale purchaser’s interest in the property prior to her purchase. Upon remand, the case was tried without a jury, and the trial court ruled in favor of the foreclosure sale purchaser, holding that she was a bona fide purchaser of the property without notice of the tax sale purchaser’s claim of ownership. Tax sale purchaser appeals; finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Anna Maria Butler v. McKee Foods Corporation
Anna Maria Butler (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury on May 2, 2012, in the course and scope of her employment with McKee Foods Corporation (“Employer”). The trial court found that Employee sustained a compensable injury and awarded permanent total disability benefits. Employer has appealed that decision, arguing that Employee’s injury was not causally related to her employment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Angel Geovanna Hurtado v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Angel Geovanna Hurtado, of three counts of aggravated child abuse, one count of child neglect, and one count of reckless aggravated assault. She was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Angel Geovanna Hurtado, No. M2014-00180-CCA-R3CD, 2014 WL 7417763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2014). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner has appealed, asserting that she is entitled to relief based upon her trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Wayne Parsons
The Defendant, Michael Wayne Parsons, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of felony failure to appear, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) that he is entitled to diplomatic immunity from prosecution because he is an ambassador of the “Tsilhqot’in Nation, Country of Chilcotin” and (2) that the indictment was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over his person because it lists his name in all capital letters, which denotes a corporation rather than a “live man.” Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss the appeal. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Jones
The Defendant, Ronald Jones, was convicted of the second degree murder of the victim and sentenced to serve 25 years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Farmer v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Farmer, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his guilty plea to carjacking and his tenyear sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Kocher, et al. v. Laua Bearden, et al.
This is the second appeal in this dispute involving a third party’s attempt to obtain access to a record that was sealed in the trial court pursuant to an agreed order. In the first appeal, this Court explained that judicial records are presumptively open, and the reason for sealing judicial records must be compelling. Because the trial court had not articulated any specific reasons for keeping the record sealed, we remanded for the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny the petitioner access to the record. We said, “If the trial court determines on remand that the record should remain sealed due to a compelling reason, that reason ‘is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.’” Kocher v. Bearden, 546 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017) (quoting In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). Unfortunately, the trial court did not comply with these instructions on remand. After repeatedly expressing disagreement with this Court’s decision, the trial judge refused to modify the seal on the record, citing only “confidential information pertaining to the minor plaintiff.” Because both the trial court and the appellees have failed to articulate any compelling reason for maintaining the seal to the exclusion of the petitioner, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for reassignment to a different trial judge and the entry of an order allowing the petitioner to access the sealed record. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |