Donald Douglas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Donald Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a direct appeal in exchange for a sentence of eight years and that his trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the postconviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Langlinais
A jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Langlinais, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted rape of a child, and he received an effective sentence of twenty eight years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The Defendant also challenges the admission of his recorded statement to law enforcement, alleging that the recording was inadmissible due to its poor quality, that the recording contained inadmissible evidence of the Defendant’s bad acts, and that the recording violated his right to confront witnesses. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Bell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of twenty-one years with community supervision for life. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Johnson Hart
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Johnson Hart, of facilitation of possession with intent to sell one-half ounce or more of marijuana and facilitation of possession with intent to sell less than two pounds of tetrahydrocannabinol, a schedule VI narcotic. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, thirty days to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied her request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brent Dewayne Carr v. Kellie Renea Carr
This is an appeal in a divorce proceeding wherein the Mother of the parties’ child appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as primary residential parent and designation of the residential parenting schedule, contending that the trial court failed to properly consider Father’s history of domestic violence and abuse against her. Upon our review we have determined that the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court did not include a discussion of the impact of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406 on the finding of domestic violence; accordingly, we vacate the decision and remand the case for the court to make appropriate findings in that regard. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, TN v. Jeremy Brittenum
This is an animal cruelty case. The circuit court entered an order finding Appellant guilty of numerous violations of the city’s animal cruelty, animal hoarding and vaccinations ordinances. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James William Sherrell, Jr. v. Lisa Daniela Schnur
The Trial Court in this custody proceeding attempted to certify as a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the order entered on March 31, 2017, which resolved all issues in the proceedings below except those related to the payment of child support for the benefit of the parties’ minor child. Because the order fails to expressly determine in accordance with the rule that “there is no just reason for delay,” the order is not appealable as a certified final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02. See Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal and it is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new appeal once a final judgment or appropriately certified final judgment has been entered. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lorna Mae Gibson v. Charles William Bikas
This case involves an order of protection sought by the petitioner against the respondent, who is the petitioner’s brother-in-law, on behalf of the petitioner and her two minor daughters. The petitioner previously had obtained an order of protection that had expired in May 2016. On March 24, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition seeking a one-year, no-contact order of protection, alleging that, inter alia, since entry of the prior order, the respondent had repeatedly attempted to influence her by following through on threats to obtain custody of the petitioner’s two minor daughters. The trial court initially granted an ex parte order of protection as to the petitioner but denied the petition as to the children, questioning whether standing existed because the petitioner did not at that time have physical or legal custody of her daughters. Following a subsequent bench trial, the trial court found that the petitioner had standing to petition for an order of protection on behalf of her children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-602(b). Also finding that the respondent posed a danger to the petitioner and her children, the trial court extended the ex parte order into a one-year, no-contact order of protection against the respondent on behalf of the petitioner and modified the order of protection to include the petitioner’s children. The court also awarded to the petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees. The respondent appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Teffeteller
In February 2013, the Defendant, Joshua Teffeteller, pleaded guilty to identity theft, and the trial court granted judicial diversion and ordered him to serve three years on Community Corrections. On September 17, 2015, the Defendant was charged with numerous offenses and, the following day, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed an affidavit, alleging that the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence on multiple grounds. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges on March 7, 2016, and received additional Community Corrections sentences. On August 25, 2016, another probation violation warrant was issued and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement rather than reinstating his Community Corrections sentences; and (2) that one of his sentences had expired. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randel Lee Burnett, II
The Appellant, Randel Lee Burnett, II, pled guilty in the Fayette County Circuit Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated child neglect, and three counts of vehicular assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and erred by ordering consecutive sentencing based upon his being a dangerous offender. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors during sentencing but that the length of the Appellant’s sentences is not excessive. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darlene F. Hottiman
A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Darlene F. Hottiman, of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor, and she received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions due to her defense of necessity; that the trial court made improper comments to an alternate juror, made improper comments about the length of jury deliberations, and made improper comments about plea negotiations during the sentencing hearing; and that the trial court improperly enhanced her felony sentence based upon her prior criminal history and should have granted her request for probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cedric Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cedric Taylor, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In the petition, the Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by calling an alibi witness whose testimony was not favorable to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angela Stevens, et al. v. State of Tennessee
State of Tennessee appeals the Claims Commission’s award of damages to a mother and daughter who were injured in an automobile accident with a state employee driving a state-owned vehicle. Discerning no error in the award of damages, we affirm the decision. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Allie A. Et Al.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a motion for recusal. The petition for recusal appeal was filed twenty-four days after entry of the order denying the motion. Because the appeal was untimely, we dismiss. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Gene Parish v. Smith Utility District, Et Al.
Plaintiff brought an action against a local utility district for damages allegedly arising from the construction and maintenance of a water line on plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. The utility company moved to dismiss, asserting that it was immune from suit or, alternatively, that plaintiff’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the utility company’s motion. The court concluded that plaintiff’s claim for damages were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The court further concluded that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was barred by the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations. And the court determined that the action would be barred by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to governmental takings. We conclude that the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim was for inverse condemnation, and the action was time barred. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Sylvia Marene Tolbert Et Al. v. State ot Tennessee
Claimants asserted monetary claims against the State of Tennessee for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident with a state employee. The Tennessee Claims Commission found the State liable and awarded compensatory damages. On appeal, the State argues that the Claims Commission erred in awarding damages for medical expenses based on the claimants’ unadjusted medical bills. Upon review, we conclude that the collateral source rule precludes introduction of evidence of insurance adjustments to claimants’ medical bills. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Artt Tanner Horne
After a bench trial, a judge found the Defendant, Artt Tanner Horne, guilty of theft of property valued less than $500 and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days of unsupervised probation. The trial court also ordered that he stay away from Walmart, where the theft occurred, and continue with his mental health treatment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen D. Demps
Stephen D. Demps, the Defendant, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged counts six and eight, aggravated sexual battery, into counts two and four, rape of a child. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his statement during his December 2013 interview with law enforcement should have been suppressed because he was in custody and was not informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) his statement during his January 2014 interview with law enforcement should have been suppressed because he was coerced into confessing; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after individuals spoke to the sequestered victim during trial; and (4) the State failed to properly submit a bill of particulars and he was prejudiced by this failure. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwayne Scott Franklin
A jury convicted the Defendant, Dwayne Scott Franklin, of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court imposed sentences of twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five years in prison for the crimes, and the sentences were ordered to run partially consecutively for an aggregate sentence of sixty years. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the State’s alleged failure to preserve evidence, and sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Toby S. Earhart
A Stewart County jury convicted the defendant, Toby Shane Earhart, of two counts of child abuse. On appeal, the defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped forensic interview of the victim; the trial court erred by excluding the defendant’s expert witness; and the trial court erred when imposing consecutive sentences. Based upon our thorough review of the record, we agree the trial court erred when admitting the forensic interview; however, this error was harmless. Additionally, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when excluding the defendant’s expert witness, and the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Daniel Pettie v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bobby Daniel Pettie, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Karsonovich v. Linda Lee Kempe
This case involves the grant of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. Two years after the parties’ final divorce was entered, Mr. Karsonovich lost his job and filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to determine his alimony obligations. Mr. Karsonovich sought a declaration that the alimony provision was void and unenforceable because the provision was ambiguous and against public policy. Ms. Kempe filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the provision was unambiguous and not void against public policy. The trial court agreed with Ms. Kempe and granted the motion to dismiss. The court also awarded Ms. Kempe her attorney’s fees incurred from defending the suit. We reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss the complaint because there was an actual controversy for the court to decide. However, the trial court also decided the controversy at issue when it determined that the provision was neither ambiguous nor void against public policy, with which we agree. Thus, we affirm the court’s decision on the merits of the complaint. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award Ms. Kempe her attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to determine whether attorney’s fees are still appropriate based upon our reversal of the dismissal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Govindaswamy Nagarajan v. Lonnie Sharpe, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s discrimination action against Tennessee State University and certain administrators. The court determined that the plaintiff had requested relief beyond its authority to award and granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Regina Montanna Marie Mullins v. Amy Paige Hernandez
Regina Mullins (petitioner) sought an order of protection against Amy Hernandez (respondent), the grandmother of one of petitioner’s children. The parties were living together in an apartment when respondent allegedly threatened petitioner and her mother with a handgun. After a hearing, the trial court found that respondent did threaten petitioner, and that “there was a gun involved,” but held that these facts did not constitute “legally sufficient proof for an order of protection to be issued.” We hold that the facts found by the trial court provide a legal basis for the issuance of an order of protection under the statutes governing such orders, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 et seq. (2017). Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the issuance of a protective order. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Victoria H.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) failure to establish/exercise paternity; (2) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services did not meet its burden to show that Father has the ability to pay support, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Marion | Court of Appeals |