George Metz, Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, TN, Et Al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge two administrative decisions by the Planning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. The petition was dismissed pursuant to a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The challenge to the first decision was dismissed because the statutory sixty-day period had run from the date the minutes approving the challenged decision had been entered. The challenge to the second decision, the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the final site plan, was deemed untimely because the challenge to a site plan must be filed within sixty days of the entry of the minutes approving the master development plan, not the final site plan, and the statutory period had run. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Evans Wilhoit v. Gary Dennis Wilhoit
This is a post-divorce modification of alimony case. Appellant/Husband contends that the trial court erred by not terminating his alimony in futuro and life insurance obligations. We conclude that Husband’s alimony obligation should be modified to $500 per month so that the parties can retain enough assets to continue to support themselves for a longer duration. Affirmed as modified. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Mark Bentley v. Wood Byrd, et al.
In this case, a judgment creditor pursued enforcement of a foreign judgment. Although the judgment creditor obtained a charging order against the judgment debtor’s interest in a partnership and later moved to foreclose this interest, the judgment debtor subsequently moved to dismiss the case and vacate all prior orders by alleging that he had never been properly served. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and entered an order allowing foreclosure against the partnership interest. Despite filings by the judgment debtor highlighting the absence of personal service, the trial court ultimately left its enforcement orders undisturbed. Because we agree that the judgment debtor never received proper service incident to the judgment creditor’s attempt to enroll the foreign judgment, we vacate the trial court’s orders relating to execution. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Finis Layne v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jerry Finis Layne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lee Gordon
The Defendant, Gregory Lee Gordon, pled guilty to aggravated assault by strangulation, a Class C felony, and after a sentencing hearing, was ordered to serve nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terance P. Bradley, aka Terrance P. Bradley
The Defendant, Terance P. Bradley, aka Terrance P. Bradley, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years at 45% for the aggravated burglary conviction; as a Range IV, career offender to twelve years at 60% for the reckless aggravated assault conviction; and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to his convictions in another case. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his aggravated burglary and reckless aggravated assault convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Harvey Santee v. Stacy Lynn Santee
This appeal concerns divorce and child support matters. Robert Harvey Santee (“Husband”) sued wife Stacy Lynn Santee (“Wife”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court awarded Husband a divorce based upon Wife’s inappropriate marital conduct. The Trial Court divided the marital estate, awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, and imputed income to her for child support purposes. Wife appealed to this Court, arguing that, among other things, as a stay-at-home mother in a long-term marriage, rehabilitative alimony is insufficient. Husband argues in response that he has longstanding plans to retire. We find that the Trial Court erred in imputing income to Wife for two years of child support purposes when the Trial Court also found that Wife was capable of going to school for those two years to improve her financial situation and awarded rehabilitative alimony for Wife to do exactly that. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Harvey Santee v. Stacy Lynn Santee - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I concur completely in the majority’s decisions pertaining to (1) the allocation of the parties’ debt; (2) the imputation of income to wife for the purpose of calculating child support; and (3) wife’s request for her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. In my judgment, there is no error regarding any of these matters. I dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to award wife “rehabilitative” alimony rather than alimony in futuro. I do so because, I believe, the evidence clearly and overwhelmingly preponderates against the trial court’s “rehabilitative” decision. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
De'Quon Letray Boyd v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, De’quon Letray Boyd, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the petitioner’s 2011 convictions of attempted first degree premeditated murder, premeditated murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and aggravated criminal trespass. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bank of New York Mellon v. Chandra Berry
A bank filed a wrongful detainer warrant in general sessions court against a homeowner who defaulted on her loan, and the homeowner raised counterclaims that the foreclosure was wrongful and fraudulent. The general sessions court awarded the bank possession of the property and dismissed the homeowner’s counterclaims as barred by res judicata based on an earlier action in which the homeowner sought to prevent the foreclosure. The homeowner appealed the general sessions court’s decision, and the circuit court also dismissed the homeowner’s counterclaims based on res judicata. The homeowner appealed the circuit court’s judgment to this court, and the bank sought an award of its attorney’s fees as damages for having to defend against a frivolous appeal. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment and deny the bank’s request for an award of its fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deredious Otis, Brashard Gibbs and Carlos Key
Defendants Deredious Otis and Carlos Key each were convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder, and Defendant Brashard Gibbs was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder, five counts of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendants Otis and Key each were sentenced to life for their first degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for each of their attempted first degree murder convictions, with all sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant Gibbs was sentenced to life for the first degree murder conviction, twenty-five years for each of the five counts of attempted first degree murder, and six years for each of the three counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, with all sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, all three Defendants argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts and that the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments; and Defendants Otis and Gibbs argue that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernest Butler aka Antonio Butler
The Defendant, Ernest Butler, aka Antonio Butler, was convicted of first degree felony murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and fifteen years, respectively, to be served consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the murder conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tristar Centennial Medical Center v. Dana C. Pugh
Dana Pugh (“Employee”) and Tristar Centennial Medical Center (“Employer’) settled a claim for a compensable back injury to Employee after participating in and failing to resolve their dispute at a Benefit Review Conference (“BRC”). Employee later filed a motion to compel Employer to approve a surgical procedure recommended by her authorized physician and for attorney’s fees. Employer approved the surgery after another physician conducted a review of Employee’s medical records. Employee subsequently reset her motion, and the trial court awarded her attorney’s fees. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the judgment, and dismiss the case. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Cole-Pugh
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Brandon Cole-Pugh, was convicted of being a felon in possession of a handgun and sentenced to eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for an instruction on the defense of necessity. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request on the defense of necessity. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Rodney Smith, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, the petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to call a material witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell M. Anderson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darrell M. Anderson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Carter K.
This appeal involves a custody dispute between the unmarried parents of a minor child. Mother filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking custody of the minor child, a determination of Father’s child support arrearage, the establishment of a child support order, the entry of a permanent parenting plan, and an award of attorney’s fees. Mother also sought a temporary restraining order preventing Father from removing the child from her care, custody, and control. Following several pre-trial hearings, the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court awarded visitation to Father. Within days of the trial, Mother filed a motion to vacate the juvenile court’s ruling based on Mother’s allegation that Father had perjured himself at the trial. Following a hearing at which Father failed to appear, the juvenile court suspended Father’s visitation, and in a reversal of the its prior decision, ordered Father to pay all of Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred throughout the proceedings. Because we find that the juvenile court’s orders fail to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 such that we are unable to determine the basis for the juvenile court’s decisions, we vacate the court’s orders pertaining to the establishment of a permanent parenting plan, the suspension of Father’s parenting time, and attorney’s fees, and we remand for more detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James Kemmler Rogers
This probate action is before this Court on appeal for the second time. Following remand from this Court subsequent to the first appeal, the trial court determined that the petitioner did have standing to file her petition for probate as a “purported creditor” of the decedent. The trial court ultimately denied the petition, however, finding “no basis for either primary or ancillary probate in Tennessee.” The trial court had also previously awarded sanctions against the petitioner and her counsel pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no error in the trial court’s denials of both primary and ancillary probate, we affirm such determinations. Although we also affirm the trial court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against the petitioner and her counsel generally, we vacate the specific award granted against the petitioner personally and remand such issue to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount of sanctions to be awarded against the petitioner solely pursuant to Rule 11.02(1). We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother/Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the proof is not sufficient to establish that the child was removed from Appellant’s home, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Jose A. Rivas v. Randy Lee, Warden
The petitioner, Jose A. Rivas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2005 Hancock County Criminal Court guiltypleaded convictions of facilitation of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie Diane Bramlett v. Michael Lee Bramlett
This case involves the intent of Stephanie Diane Ellerman, formerly Bramlett, (mother) to relocate with the parties’ minor child. Mother, the primary residential parent, seeks to move from Cleveland, Tennessee to Greenville, Tennessee, a distance of approximately 160 miles. She sent notice to Michael Lee Bramlett (father) of her intent to relocate. The notice indicated that mother intended to relocate because she had remarried and intended to move into her husband’s residence. Father responded with a petition objecting to the relocation. The court entered an order allowing mother to move, finding that the move has a reasonable purpose and is not vindictive or meant to interfere with father’s coparenting time. Father appeals. We affirm. We decline mother’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses at the trial court level. In the exercise of our discretion, we do award to mother her reasonable fees and expenses on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Reed v. Willie Kate Reed Et Al.
This appeal involves the interpretation and construction of a trust agreement. John Marion Reed and his wife Willie Kate Reed, in the process of their estate planning, executed a revocable living trust agreement. They conveyed approximately 204.61 acres of real property to the trust. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Reed died testate. The trust was the sole residual beneficiary of his will. Mrs. Reed, the successor trustee, distributed all of the real estate in the trust to herself by way of a quitclaim deed. She then terminated the trust. Bobby Reed, her son and a beneficiary of the trust, filed this action alleging that Mrs. Reed exceeded her authority under the terms of the trust agreement. He asked the trial court to order an accounting of the assets of the trust that had been distributed by Mrs. Reed since her husband’s death. He sought the return to the trust of the assets wrongfully distributed. The trial court held that Mrs. Reed did not have the authority to transfer all of the real estate in the trust. Accordingly, the court voided the quitclaim deed, and granted the requested relief of Bobby Reed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Alan Steele v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth Alan Steele, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of relief for his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The post-conviction court granted his petition for analysis but denied further relief based upon the results of the analysis. The Petitioner contends that the court failed to afford him a hearing and erred in denying relief after interpreting the DNA analysis reports. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Walker v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
Homeowner brought an action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for damages to his property caused by storm water runoff under the tort theory of a temporary continuous nuisance. Homeowner alleged that each time it rained, the drainage overflow from the street caused his property to flood. Homeowner sought to compel Metro to repair or replace the broken drainage pipe on his property. The trial court granted summary judgment to Metro based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Wayne Bumpas
Following a bench trial in the Criminal Court for Davidson County, the Defendant, Darrell Wayne Bumpas, was convicted of forgery over $1,000; criminal simulation over $1,000; theft of property over $1,000; and two counts of identity theft. For these offenses, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twelve years to serve in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a photocopy of the fraudulent check and still photographs from a bank security camera. He argues that the State failed to properly authenticate the evidence under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. The Defendant also asserts that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |