Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Jason Levi Butts
The Defendant, Jason Levi Butts, fired a shot from a rifle toward a home, and the bullet penetrated the wall and hit the sleeping victim in the hip. The trial court ruled that all three statements which the Defendant made to law enforcement during the investigation of the shooting were admissible. The Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of reckless endangerment, a Class C felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of three and two years, respectively. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s initial statement to police, which he made without being advised of his rights and after law enforcement twice told him he could not leave the police station. However, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm the convictions. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary E. Floyd
The Defendant, Gary E. Floyd, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the lesserincluded offense of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-210. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (2) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (3) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; (4) that the trial court committed several errors when instructing the jury on self-defense; and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
MJM Real Estate Investments, LLC v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a statutory writ of certiorari. The petitioner filed an application with the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission (“the Commission”) to obtain a permit to renovate a 1935 industrial building in the Broadway Historic Preservation District in downtown Nashville. The Commission partially approved the application but required modifications before a permit would be issued. In pertinent part, the Commission denied the request to install vertically operable windows (similar to “roll up” garage doors) because they were not consistent with the style of the original 1935 windows. The Commission also required the construction of a parapet wall around the fifth story rooftop deck, rather than a railing proposed by the petitioner, to hide the building’s rooftop additions because the additions were not compliant with the design guidelines for the district. Following an evidentiary hearing, the chancery court affirmed the Commission’s decision. We affirm the chancery court. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Haley S. Et Al.
This appeal arises from a juvenile proceeding wherein the mother, Heather P. (“Mother”) filed a petition to modify her visitation with her two children, Haley S. and Leila P. (“the Children”), who were eleven and four years old, respectively, at the time of trial. Haley’s father, Michael S. (“Father”), remained incarcerated during the entire action. Leila’s father was deceased prior to the commencement of this proceeding. The paternal grandparents of Leila, Leroy W. and Tammie W. (“Grandparents”), who had legal custody of both children, subsequently filed a counter-petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Haley. The magistrate of the juvenile court entered a pre-trial order, stating, inter alia, that if Grandparents were successful in terminating the parents’ rights, Mother’s petition to modify visitation would be dismissed but that if Grandparents were not successful, Mother’s petition would be scheduled for hearing. The magistrate’s order further allowed Mother to amend her original petition to modify visitation. Following a bench trial regarding the termination action, the trial court granted Grandparents’ petition to terminate the parents’ parental rights to the Children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to the removal of the children from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court further found that grounds existed regarding Father because he had abandoned Haley by failing to visit her and because he had failed to establish parentage. Mother appealed the trial court’s decision. Because no adjudicatory hearing order exists in the record finding the Children to be dependent, neglected, or abused, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions as to Mother. We further determine that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its determination that statutory grounds for termination existed regarding Father. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights and remand to the trial court for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) (2017). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre Bonds aka Israel El-Elyon
The Appellant, Deandre Bonds, aka Israel El-Elyon, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and one count of evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors, for which he received a total effective sentence of six months. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review, we conclude that the judgments of conviction incorrectly note the convictions are Class B misdemeanors; accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court only for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that the offenses are Class A misdemeanors. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Von Brown
The Defendant, David Von Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony by one having a prior felony conviction, Class D felonies; and felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the two drug convictions and imposed a sentence of twelve years on that conviction; the court merged the four various possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions and imposed a sentence of five years on that conviction; and the court imposed a sentence of five years on the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. The court ordered that the sentence for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction be served consecutively to the other sentences, which were to be served concurrently, for a total effective term of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in not considering any mitigating factors in determining his sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Pierce Lankford v. City of Hendersonville, Tennessee
This case involves the seizure of the plaintiff’s cellular telephone and other items of personal property by police officers employed by the defendant city during a criminal investigation in October 2012. The plaintiff pled guilty in August 2013 to one count of aggravated assault and three counts of simple assault before the criminal division of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“criminal court”). While subsequently incarcerated, the plaintiff initiated this action on March 2, 2016, by filing a motion requesting, inter alia, a “property hearing” in the civil division of the Sumner County Circuit Court (“trial court”), averring that his cellular telephone and other personal property had been illegally seized without notice and that his telephone had ultimately been destroyed by order of the criminal court. The plaintiff asserted that city police officers had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court subsequently entered an order, inter alia, determining that the plaintiff’s pleading was in substance a complaint alleging conversion. The city filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it had governmental immunity from the plaintiff’s constitutional and conversion claims. The city also asserted that any negligence claim was time-barred under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). Upon consideration of additional pleadings filed by the parties, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the city possessed immunity from claims that its employees had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or committed conversion. The trial court further determined that any negligence claim against the city was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Maureen Davis v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, et al.
Homeowner brought a lawsuit asserting multiple challenges to the bank’s administration of her mortgage and initiation of foreclosure proceedings. The bank filed a motion to dismiss, which was ultimately granted by the trial court, despite several post-judgment motions filed by the homeowner. On appeal, the bank argues that the homeowner’s notice of appeal was not timely. Although we find that the homeowner’s notice of appeal was timely, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the bank’s motion to dismiss the homeowner’s complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mattie Florence Sweeney
Defendant, Mattie Florence Sweeney, was found guilty of gross neglect of an impaired adult as charged in Count One and guilty of neglect of an impaired adult in Count Two. The trial court merged the two convictions into a single conviction for gross neglect of an impaired adult, and sentenced Defendant to a term of five years “to serve.” After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court committed plain error by constructively amending the indictment during the jury charge; (2) the trial court erred by admitting testimony about the victim’s driver’s license record; (3) the trial court erred by admitting lay testimony about the victim’s cough and the condition of his skin; (4) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim’s buttocks into evidence; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janie Marie Marcum-Bush v. Kevin Patrick Quinn
As part of a divorce proceeding, the trial court awarded one party a monetary judgment against the other. The judgment debtor’s obligation to pay the judgment did not arise until the sale of certain real property or after two years from the date of the judgment. Although the real property was sold, the judgment debtor made no payments on the judgment. The judgment creditor later moved to extend the judgment. The motion was filed within ten years of the date of the sale of the real property but more than ten years from the entry of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion to extend, concluding that the judgment creditor’s cause of action on the judgment did not accrue until the real property was sold. Because the motion to extend the judgment was untimely, we reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark W. Givler v. State of Tennessee
This case originated when the plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Correction facility at Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), alleging that medical professionals at the correctional facility had provided him with untimely and inadequate medical care for a serious heart condition. Finding that the plaintiff’s allegations concerned individuals who were not employed by the State, the Claims Commission (“Commission”) initially dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff subsequently attempted to file a proposed amendment naming State employees as defendants and then a second claim, resulting in the instant action. The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the defense of res judicata. Finding that the plaintiff had misnumbered his proposed amendment to the original claim, the Commission treated the proposed amendment and second claim together as an amended claim. Ultimately determining that the plaintiff had alleged a health care liability action but failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for such a suit and that he had failed to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction over intentional or criminal acts allegedly committed by State employees, the Commission entered a final order dismissing the action. The plaintiff has appealed. Determining that the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Crisp v. Michael Nelms, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit over a fatal cycling accident. Carolyn Crisp (“Plaintiff”), surviving spouse of William Andrew Crisp (“Decedent”), sued Michael Nelms (“Nelms”) and George Long (“Long”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) for negligence. Decedent and four others, including Nelms and Long, were riding as part of a “paceline” group when a crash occurred. Nelms asserted comparative fault, stating that Long slowed down suddenly at the head of the line. Long denied he slowed down suddenly. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court held, among other things, that paceline cycling inherently is dangerous and that Decedent was at least 50% at fault for his accident. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Long slowed down suddenly at the head of the line and whether a reasonable jury could find Decedent less than 50% at fault in his accident. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the case to proceed. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Sabrina Renae Witt v. Erica Christine Witt
Individual members of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly and the 110th Tennessee General Assembly appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) denying their motion to intervene in this suit involving the divorce of a same-sex couple and specifically involving the issue of whether the spouse who has no biological or other recognized legal relationship to the parties’ minor child may be considered a parent under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-306 (2013). We find and hold that because all of the issues in the divorce now are final the case has been rendered moot as it has lost its justicability and no longer involves a present, ongoing controversy. We further find and hold that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. As the case is moot, we dismiss this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Quanya Revell Prewitt v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Quanya Revell Prewitt, appeals the denial of her petition for postconviction relief from her conviction for possession of dihydrocodeinone in a school zone with intent to sell. She argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey A. Jones
The Defendant, Jeffery A. Jones, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to DUI .08 % or greater, reserving as a certified question of law whether the results of his forced blood draw should have been suppressed because the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained reckless falsities and the form nature of the search warrant and affidavit prevented the magistrate from making an informed judgment as to probable cause. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re McKenzie Z.
Unmarried father filed a petition to establish parentage and a residential parenting schedule. After father’s parentage was established, the juvenile court set a residential parenting schedule that awarded equal parenting time and ordered the child’s surname changed to a hyphenated version of both parents’ surnames. Mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in fashioning the parenting schedule and in ordering a change of the child’s surname. Upon review, we affirm the residential parenting schedule but vacate that portion of the order directing a change in the child’s surname. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Cullen Lee
The Defendant, Derek Cullen Lee, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court “did not sufficiently weigh all the [required] factors . . . in deciding suitability for diversion”; and (2) that the trial court’s decision to deny his request for judicial diversion was based on the offense that he was convicted of rather than the applicable factors. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Lacy Franklin
Defendant, Brandon Lacy Franklin, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and imposition of an increased sentence of ten years’ incarceration. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie Henry v. State of Tennessee
Over twelve years ago, Petitioner, Ronnie Henry, was convicted at a jury trial of several counts of robbery involving multiple victims in Shelby County. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2006-00344-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 450459, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). After resentencing, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s effective seventy-year sentence. State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2009-00089- CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103823, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2009), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Ronnie Henry v. State, No. W2014-01786-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 1402951, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 26, 2016). Now, Petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Lyndell Dibrell - concurring
ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., concurring. I agree with the majority that the defendant was searched without reasonable suspicion, that the evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court,1 and that the judgment of conviction must be vacated and the case dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Davis
Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Adam Davis, was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent term of eight years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher James Kirkland
The defendant, Christopher James Kirkland, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Blount County Circuit Court conviction of the delivery of a controlled substance. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Lyndell Dibrell
The defendant, Calvin Lyndell Dibrell, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver within a prohibited zone, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle and that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions. Because the evidence obtained from the defendant’s vehicle was the result of an illegal search and seizure, the judgments of the trial court are vacated, and the case is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven O. Hughes-Mabry v. Randy Lee, Warden and the State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition as having been untimely filed and for failing to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review, we agree with the coram nobis court that the Petitioner is attempting to relitigate the denial of his pretrial suppression motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Louis Moore
The Defendant, Thomas Louis Moore, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and order of incarceration for the remainder of his ten-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals |