State of Tennessee v. Demarcus Lashawn Blackman
The Defendant, Demarcus Lashawn Blackman, was indicted by a Marshall County grand jury for the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-417(a)(2) and (3) (2010). He was later convicted by a jury as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and imposed twelve years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing its sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester Arnold Clouse
A White County jury convicted Defendant, Lester Arnold Clouse, of aggravated assault, assault, and resisting arrest. The trial court merged the resisting arrest conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced Defendant to an effective fifteen-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender, to be served consecutively to other outstanding sentences. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but reversed his sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. See State v. Lester Arnold Clouse, No. M2013-02633-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7332181, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2014). Following a sentencing hearing on remand, the trial court imposed an effective fourteen-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender to be served consecutively to his sentences for other convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that he qualified as a persistent offender, the length of his sentence, and the imposition of partial consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm Defendant’s sentences for aggravated assault and assault, and we reduce Defendant’s sentence for resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, to six months. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment on the resisting arrest conviction to reflect that the conviction is merged into Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction in accordance with the trial court’s prior findings. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Christopher Lynn Taylor
The Defendant, Christopher Lynn Taylor, appeals as of right from the trial court’s order of total incarceration after his second violation of his six-year probationary sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that he was a danger to society and by denying his request for drug treatment in the Community Corrections Program. Following our review, we discern no error. Thus, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Mellon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Mellon, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to present a viable defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Charles Milner v. Suzanne Cary Milner
The January 12, 2017 order to which the Notice of Appeal is directed in this post-dissolution case did not adjudicate a pending motion to modify child support or the pending issue concerning whether the appellant “wrongfully” received benefits from the Social Security Administration for the benefit of the parties’ minor child based upon the step-father’s disability. As such, it is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below and is not a final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
David C. Duncan v. State of Tennessee
Nearly thirty-five years from the date Petitioner, David C. Duncan, burglarized the home of, raped, and then killed a victim in Sumner County, he appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon our review of the record, not only is the petition untimely filed, it also fails to allege any newly discovered evidence that may have affected the outcome of Petitioner's trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Palmer
Defendant, Ricky Lee Palmer, appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault for which he was sentenced to six years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence was monumentally sufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Reynolds
Defendant, Timothy Reynolds, pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine. As a result of the guilty plea he was sentenced to six years with one year to serve and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. After Defendant’s probation was partially revoked on two separate occasions, a third probation violation resulted in the complete revocation of probation. Defendant appeals the revocation of probation. We affirm the trial court’s decision to revoke Defendant’s probation. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Dodson v. Blair Leibach, Warden
Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his conviction for attempted first degree murder is illegal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Lea Williams v. John Buraczynski
This appeal arises from a motor vehicle accident. Christopher Lea Williams (“Williams”) and John Buraczynski (“Buraczynski”) both worked for Progression Electric, LLC (“Progression”). In January 2015, Buraczynski was driving his vehicle with passenger Williams as part of a carpool arrangement when they were involved in an accident. Williams subsequently claimed he was entitled to and received workers’ compensation benefits. Williams then sued Buraczynski, personally, in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Buraczynski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams’ exclusive remedy was in workers’ compensation. The Trial Court granted Buraczynski’s motion. Williams appealed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey S. Petty v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Petty, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to move for a mistrial based on juror misconduct; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence found in the Petitioner’s car; and (3) failing to include certain issues in his motion for new trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason William Kirk
The Appellant, Jason William Kirk, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to theft of property valued $10,000 or more and evading arrest and resulting effective fifteen-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Lowery
Petitioner, John Lowery, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Eleven years after Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was summarily dismissed by the trial court. In his petition, Petitioner asserted that two witnesses recanted their identification of Petitioner as the shooter, and a previously unknown witness said that Petitioner was not at the scene of the crime. On appeal, this court reversed the court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the State filed a response, asserting that the statute of limitations had run. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, finding the two witnesses who recanted not credible and that the testimony of the newly discovered witness did not meet the test that it “might have” changed the outcome of the trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Avery Reno
The Defendant, Paul Avery Reno, pleaded guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-113-506 (2014). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant agreed to a six-year sentence as a Range III offender, with the method and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The court ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) denying alternative sentencing, and (3) ordering the Defendant to register as a sex offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John H. Brichetto, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John H. Brichetto, Jr., and his wife were convicted of Class B felony theft of property. The Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. As part of an agreement for a reduced sentence for his wife, the Petitioner executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, his right to file for post-conviction relief, and his right to collaterally attack his conviction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Finding that the waiver was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Joan Rains v. Wal-Mart Associates Inc.
Barbara Rains (“Employee”) filed this action in the Circuit Court for Hardin County, alleging that she sustained a back injury in the course of her work as a cashier for Wal-Mart (“Employer”). The issues were bifurcated, with compensability to be tried first and any remaining issues to be heard later. After the hearing about compensability, the trial court found that Employee had failed to sustain her burden of proof and dismissed the complaint. Employee has appealed, alleging various errors by the trial court. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because Employee failed to present any expert medical evidence to support her claim, we conclude that the trial court’s finding regarding compensability was correct. All other issues raised by Employee are pretermitted. Therefore, we affirm the judgment. |
Hardin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jeffrey Scott Beck v. City of Brownsville, et al.
Jeffrey Scott Beck (“Employee”) filed a workers’ compensation complaint claiming he suffered a back injury six months earlier during the course and scope of his employment with the City of Brownsville (“Employer”). Employer denied that the alleged injury arose out of his employment and maintained that Employee failed to give timely notice of the alleged injury. The trial court determined that Employee’s notice was untimely and that Employee’s excuse for not providing timely notice was unreasonable. The trial court also concluded that Employee failed to establish causation. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Haywood | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Bryson F.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the mother and stepfather sought termination of the biological father’s parental rights to his child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination on the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to remit child support. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anna Chick
The defendant, Anna Chick, appeals her Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of failure to appear, see T.C.A. 39-16-609, arguing that Code section 39-16-609 is unconstitutional; that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her; that the State failed to establish that the offense was committed before the finding of the indictment; and that the six-year sentence imposed in this case constitutes unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shawn Bough v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Shawn Bough, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing because it determined the newly discovered evidence was not credible and would not have led to a different result at the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Whitney Kristina Harris
The Defendant, Whitney Kristina Harris, was convicted upon her guilty pleas of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and accessory after the fact to first degree murder, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (tampering with evidence), 39-11-411 (2014) (accessory after the fact). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender as a term of the plea agreement and agreed to an effective ten-year sentence. The manner of service of her sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the accessory after the fact judgment. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Micah Alexander Cates
The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). See State v. Micah Alexander Cates, No. E2014-01322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5679825, at *1-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that a new trial was necessary because the warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances and that the evidence obtained from the blood draw should have been suppressed. Upon further review, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the relevant evidence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dewayne Jones
The Defendant, Dwayne Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to five years of incarceration. The trial court also imposed the $7000 fine assessed by the jury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to the Defendant’s pending petition to remove the case to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction because the proof did not show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury; and whether the trial court erred in imposing the $7000 fine without making any specific findings of fact regarding the Defendant’s financial circumstances and ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joletta Summers v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Joletta Summers, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel mentioned during opening statement an inculpatory statement that was never introduced into evidence; failed to adequately argue for severance of her case from her codefendant’s; failed to object to the State’s improper closing argument; failed to file a timely motion for new trial; and failed to argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to specify the predicate felony in the jury instructions for the employment of a firearm charge. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Trina A. Scott v. Sharfyne L'Nell White
A judgment creditor moved to extend her judgment for an additional ten years under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.04, and the trial court issued an order requiring the judgment debtor to show cause why the judgment should not be extended. Almost a year later, the judgment debtor filed a motion for relief from the judgment based upon an error in the certificate of service on the show cause order. In her response, the judgment creditor acknowledged that the address shown for the judgment debtor was incorrect but stated that, after the order was returned by the post office, it was mailed to the correct address. The judgment creditor also asserted that the motion for relief was premature because the court had not yet entered an order extending the judgment. The trial court entered an order extending the judgment for an additional ten years. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |