State of Tennessee v. Christopher Johnson
The Defendant, Christopher Johnson, was convicted by a Hardin County Jury of possession of mushrooms with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, possession of mushrooms, possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. As a Range II, multiple offender, he received an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon; (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a redacted audio recording of the Defendant’s interview with police at trial; and (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to provide discoverable evidence and improperly quoting a witness during closing argument. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form as to count four reflecting that the Defendant was found not guilty of possession of marijuana. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Lacy v. Saint Thomas Hospital West, et al
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bryson B.
This is an appeal by the appellant, Amanda M.-B., from an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child. The order terminating the appellant's parental rights was entered on December 12, 2016. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until February 13, 2017, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The Attorney General, on behalf of the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services, has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the record confirms that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacqueline Allen
The Defendant, Jacqueline Allen, was found guilty by a Humphreys County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101 (2010) (amended 2013), 39-17-1307 (2010) (amended 2012, 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as Range I, standard offender to an effective two years’ probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to inquire about a violation of the sequestration rule pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615. We conclude that the appeal should be dismissed because the Defendant’s motion for a new trial was untimely. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Tyler G.
This interlocutory appeal concerns whether the circuit court may sever a termination of parental rights proceeding from an adoption proceeding, which were filed together in the circuit court, and transfer only the termination of parental rights proceeding to the juvenile court in another county. Reversed and remanded. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Bob Travis d/b/a Travis Company v. Nathan Ferguson d/b/a Northside Auto Sales
Appellant purchased a vehicle, owned by Appellee, from an auto auction company. After the purchase, Appellant discovered that the vehicle’s engine was defective, a fact that was not disclosed prior to sale. Appellant sought rescission of the purchase against Appellee but did not name the auto auction company as a defendant. Because the rescission and warranty of merchantability statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-2-608 and 47-2-314 require privity of contract between the buyer and the seller, and because the automobile auction statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-19-128 clearly identifies the auction company as the seller of the vehicle, we conclude that Appellant did not have a cause of action for rescission against Appellee. Affirmed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Damien G.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home and willful failure to support; (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from Father’s home. Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee has failed to meet its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the grounds for termination of Father’s parental, we reverse and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Damien G.M. - dissenting opinion
The first referral in this matter occurred on October 31, 2014. It involved “drug exposure of [Damien and his older sibling].” On December 15, 2014, there was a second referral to DCS, again for “drug exposure.” Methadone and methamphetamine were involved in the children’s care, or, more aptly, their non-care. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scott Hall
The Appellant, David Scott Hall, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and sentenced to four years to be served as one year in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing an expert witness to give irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony, that he is entitled to coram nobis relief, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence without showing a proper chain of custody, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to play only a portion of a controlled telephone call to the Appellant, that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about habit, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence a letter supposedly written by the Appellant, and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to make improper closing arguments. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing a witnesses to give irrelevant testimony but that the error was harmless, that the Appellant is not entitled to coram nobis relief, and that his right to a speedy trial was not violated. Finding no plain error as to the remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Braden
The Appellee, Thomas Braden, was indicted for possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, all misdemeanors. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the affidavit in support of the search warrant for the home in which the drugs were found was defective because it failed to establish ongoing criminal activity at the residence, and the Maury County Circuit Court granted the motion. The State appealed to this court, and we concluded that the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the court’s recent opinion in State v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle, ___ S.W.3d ___, M2014-00566-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5812945 (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017), which overruled State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989), and adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. Upon reconsideration, we again conclude that the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee v. Board of Zoning Appeals Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, et al
A billboard company and the owners of the property upon which two billboards sit (“the defendants”) appeal the decision of the trial court holding that the board of zoning appeals erred in issuing building permits to the defendants to allow them to replace static display billboards with digital display billboards. Because we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the ordinance at issue is a lighting regulation, not a zoning regulation, and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 therefore does not apply, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Fitzrandolph Zink v. Rural Metro of Tennessee, L.P. et al.
In this action regarding injury allegedly caused by an emergency medical technician in the course of rendering medical aid, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”) and dismissed the claims with prejudice based on the plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate of good faith pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122. The plaintiff has appealed, conceding that his claims sounded in health care liability but asserting that they should not have been dismissed with prejudice because a certificate of good faith was not required. Following our review of the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the common knowledge exception such that a certificate of good faith was not required pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims without prejudice based upon his failure to provide pre-suit notice. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jeremiah N., et al.
The maternal grandmother of three children filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father of each child on various grounds and to allow the grandmother to adopt the children; the children’s mother joined in the petition for the purpose of consenting to the termination of her parental rights and to the adoption. Two of the fathers were incarcerated at the time of the proceeding and the father of the third child was unknown. The trial court terminated the rights of the father of one child on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of his child and on the ground that the father had been convicted of an offense and was under a sentence of more than ten years; the court terminated the rights of the father of another child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and visit his child within the four months preceding his incarceration and by engaging in conduct prior to his incarceration which exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of his child. The fathers of these children appeal. We reverse the judgment terminating the parental rights of one father on the ground of abandonment by failure to support and the judgment terminating the rights of the other father on the ground of abandonment by engaging in conduct evidencing a wanton disregard for his child; in all other respects, the judgments terminating the parental rights of the fathers are affirmed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Campbell
The defendant, Bobby Joe Campbell, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), arguing that the trial court committed plain error by failing to declare a mistrial following certain comments from a member of the jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for the entry of a corrected judgment that reflects the 180-day period of confinement ordered by the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Hawkins
A jury convicted the defendant of the premeditated first degree murder of his girlfriend, who was the mother of his three children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014). The jury also found the defendant guilty of initiating a false report concerning her disappearance and of abuse of her corpse, based on his sawing off her head, hands, and feet and throwing the remainder of her body over a bridge in Mississippi. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502 (2014); id. § 39-17-312(a). At the conclusion of a separate sentencing hearing on the first degree murder conviction, the jury imposed the death sentence, finding that the prosecution had proven two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, id. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (13), and had established that these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, id. § 39-13-204(g). For the remaining convictions, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twelve and six years, respectively, and ordered these sentences served consecutively to the death penalty. The defendant appealed, raising numerous issues, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences. State v. Hawkins, W2012-00412-CCA-R3-DD, 2015 WL 5169157 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2015). The case was thereafter automatically docketed in this Court for review, as required by statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1), (c)(1). We hold that: (1) the defendant’s sentence of death was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; (2) the evidence supports the jury’s findings that the aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant. We also hold that: (1) admission of the defendant’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the defendant to enter guilty pleas to the noncapital offenses pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) at the beginning of trial, after the jury had been sworn; (3) the trial court did not err by admitting testimony about the victim’s threats to call the police about the defendant’s conduct as this testimony was non-hearsay; (4) the trial court did not err by admitting the victim’s application for an order of protection against the defendant, pursuant to the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule; (5) the trial court did not violate Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) by permitting the defendant’s children to testify about his acts of violence and sexual abuse because this testimony was offered to prove motive and premeditation; and (6) any error in the prosecutorial rebuttal argument was not so improper or inflammatory as to prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the trial court upholding the defendant’s convictions and sentences. With respect to issues not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and include relevant portions of the intermediate appellate court’s decision in the appendix to this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Hawkins - Concurring
I concur fully with the Court’s opinion except for the analysis regarding the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D) by limiting its consideration to only those cases in which the death penalty had been sought. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013). In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrows the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D). Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review more closely resembles cases that have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty than those that have not. Id. at 230-31 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Carolyn Ann Talley v. Clinton Eugene Talley
In this divorce action, the trial court valued and allocated the parties’ marital assets. The court also awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,800 per month while awarding the wife attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $35,710. The husband has appealed. Discerning no error in the trial court’s marital property division, we affirm that distribution. Furthermore, we affirm the award of alimony in futuro and attendant life insurance requirement. We modify the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the wife to the amount of $29,060. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carl C. Smith, II v. Anderson County Sheriff Paul White, et al.
This is an employment termination case involving a civil service employee. The petitioner was employed as a law enforcement officer with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department (“the Department”) when the Department received notice from the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) that the petitioner had been “indicated” as a perpetrator of child abuse in a DCS investigation pending in Roane County. The petitioner was placed on voluntary administrative leave. Upon subsequent notification that the DCS indication had been upheld through administrative review, the Department terminated the petitioner’s employment in November 2009. The petitioner appealed the termination to the Civil Service Board of the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department (“the Board”). While the appeal to the Board was pending, the petitioner filed a petition in the Roane County Chancery Court, seeking judicial review of DCS’s administrative decision. Upon review, the Roane County Chancery Court entered a judgment on August 3, 2012, reversing the classification and directing DCS to change the classification from “indicated” to “unfounded.” Through his counsel, the petitioner contacted Anderson County Sheriff Paul White to request reinstatement of his employment, but Sheriff White denied the request. Following a hearing conducted on August 6, 2013, the Board affirmed the Department’s termination decision and denied the petitioner’s motion for reinstatement filed during the hearing. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and review of the Board’s decision with the Anderson County Chancery Court (“trial court”) on September 4, 2013, naming the Board and Sheriff White as respondents (collectively, “Respondents”). The petitioner then filed a motion for partial summary judgment, averring that he had not been provided constitutionally sufficient notice of misconduct justifying termination. Following a hearing, the trial court, with Chancellor William E. Lantrip presiding, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the petitioner in an order entered February 27, 2014. The Respondents filed a “motion to revise order,” pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54 and 59. Following a hearing, the trial court, with Chancellor M. Nicole Cantrell now presiding, vacated the prior order granting partial summary judgment and affirmed the Board's decision. The petitioner has appealed to this Court. We affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment affirming the Board’s decision to uphold the initial termination. However, having determined that the Board’s decision to uphold the denial of reinstatement was not supported by substantial and material evidence and yielded an arbitrary and capricious result, we reverse the trial court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision to uphold Sheriff White’s denial of the employee’s September 2012 request and the Board’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for reinstatement. We remand for entry of an order to reinstate the petitioner to his employment and a determination of back pay and other damages to be calculated from the point of his September 2012 request for reinstatement. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Grubb Wade v. Jeremiah Kent Wade
In this divorce action, the chancery court named Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. During the pendency of this appeal, Mother filed a dependency and neglect petition in juvenile court, and the juvenile court found the child dependent and neglected and awarded custody to Mother. We, therefore, remand this case to the chancery court to reconsider its decision in light of the juvenile court’s order. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: River C.
Justin C. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child River C. (“the Child”) on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g)(2) and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, et al v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, et al.
Plaintiffs brought suit asserting that defendants’ negligence prevented the proper defendant from being served with process in a healthcare liability action, as a result of which that defendant was dismissed from the suit. Contemporaneously with answering the complaint, Defendants moved for summary judgment on various grounds. Plaintiffs responded to the motion, disputing certain material facts and asking for additional time to conduct discovery. After settlement was reached in the healthcare liability suit, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their suit on the ground of mootness. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motions for additional time for discovery and to dismiss their suit and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for default judgment against one defendant, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs appeal the various rulings of the court. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of Plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their complaint, and for additional time to conduct discovery in order to respond to the motion for summary judgment; we vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Courtney R.
This case concerns the applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”). After the mother abandoned her child, the juvenile court found the child to be dependent and neglected and placed the child in state custody. The State sought provisional placement of the child with her father, who was unaware of the child’s existence until the dependency and neglect proceedings. Because the father lived in another state, the State made a request under the ICPC to the father’s state of residence for a home evaluation. The response to the request recommended against the placement. In light of the response, the juvenile court held a hearing on disposition in which it ordered the child to remain in State custody. After the father appealed, the circuit court awarded custody to the father and relieved the State of any further responsibility for the child. On appeal to this court, among other things, the mother argues that the ICPC precluded awarding custody to the father. Because we conclude the ICPC did not apply, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garry Baker
The Defendant, Garry Baker, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211 (2014), 39-12-101 (2014), 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court merged the convictions into a single count of aggravated assault and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by permitting the State to introduce evidence of his previous conviction and (2) by imposing consecutive service. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ola Halim v. Tarek G. El-Alayli
This is a post-divorce child support modification case. Ola Halim filed a petition against her former husband, Tarek G. El-Alayli, seeking an increase in child support based upon a material change in circumstances. The parties’ final divorce decree had incorporated a permanent parenting plan setting child support at $3,000 per month. The day before the hearing on the petition, mother filed a request for relief seeking an upward deviation in child support for the specific needs of one of the children; a special needs trust for that child; and an educational trust for another one of the parties’ children. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order setting monthly child support at $4,009 and denying mother’s other requests. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jade C. Nunnally v. Adam Nunnally
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s designation of Husband as the primary residential parent for their daughter. For his part, Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding Wife unsupervised visitation. He also contends the child support award is based on an erroneous determination of the parties’ gross monthly income. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |