Billy Joe Brewer v. Dillingham Trucking, Inc., et al
Employee, a truck driver, fell while climbing into the cab of Employer’s truck, which was parked at Employee’s home. Employer initially accepted the claim as compensable, but later denied it, asserting that Employee was not in the course of his employment when the injury occurred. The trial court found the injury to be compensable and awarded benefits. The trial court also granted a post-trial motion ordering Employer to pay for Employee’s independent medical evaluation (IME). Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The order requiring Employer to pay the cost of the IME is reversed. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. |
Lawrence | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Alanna Christine Howe v. John Ashley Howe
This post-divorce appeal concerns the requested modification of a parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent and awarding the mother reasonable visitation. The mother filed a petition to modify, alleging that a material change in circumstances necessitated her designation as the primary residential parent. The father objected and filed a motion for contempt for failure to pay child support. Following a hearing, the court held the mother in contempt for failure to pay and denied her request for designation as the primary residential parent. However, the court awarded her additional co-parenting time, finding that a modification of the residential schedule was warranted. The mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Durward Watson, II
The Defendant, Joseph Durward Watson II, was charged with possession with the intent to sell more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-417 (2014). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of the home in which the marijuana was found. The trial court granted the motion, determining that the police exceeded the scope of a levy issued for the collection of unpaid court costs and fines. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because the Defendant disclaimed any expectation of privacy in the home, depriving him of standing to challenge the search. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Durward Watson, II - Dissenting Opinion
Only a person who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in an invaded place has standing to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment and may seek to have illegally obtained evidence excluded. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 720 (Tenn. 2016); State v. Cothran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 520-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). Because of his conduct, Defendant is not such a person. I believe that Defendant’s actions in this case fall squarely within the rule established by our supreme court in State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833 (Tenn. 2001). Defendant disclaimed and abandoned whatever interest he may have had in the property, thus losing a subjective expectation of privacy. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Kilburn v. Granite State Insurance Company, et al.
In this workers’ compensation case, Charles Kilburn sustained several injuries from a motor vehicle accident. He underwent cervical spine surgery to resolve his neck injury complaints. His authorized physician also recommended lumbar spine surgery to combat his back pain, but that request was denied through the utilization review process. Mr. Kilburn took oxycodone to alleviate his back pain, and his treating physician referred him to a pain management clinic. Six months after the cervical spine surgery, Mr. Kilburn died due to an overdose of oxycodone combined with alcohol. After a bench trial, the chancery court found that the death was compensable. Mr. Kilburn’s employer appealed. The appeal was initially referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, but we later transferred the case to the Supreme Court for review. After examining the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Darrell Jennings v. Michael Parris, Warden
The Petitioner, Darrell Jennings, filed a petition in the Lake County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his first degree felony and second degree murder convictions and resulting life sentence, alleging that he is entitled to relief because he was convicted of an offense that was not alleged in the indictment and because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Warren Hildred v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Warren Hildred, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Enrique Leon v. Mike Parris, Warden
The petitioner, David Enrique Leon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2009 Dickson County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree felony murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alexander Haydel v. State of Tennessee
Alexander Haydel (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and received two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief; the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that lead trial counsel’s performance was deficient because “he misled the [Petitioner] in the events leading up to the [Petitioner’s] entering a guilty plea.” The Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by lead trial counsel’s deficient performance because absent that advice he would have proceeded to trial. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that his guilty pleas were entered unknowingly and involuntarily due to lead trial counsel’s deficient performance. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cameron M. Cook v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cameron Cook, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of 30 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddy Lee Penley
The defendant, Freddy Lee Penley, appeals his Greene County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of filing a false report and leaving the scene of an accident, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his entire three-year sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Chris Luthi
A Coffee County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Michael Chris Luthi, for DUI, third offense, DUI per se, and violation of the seat belt statute. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of a search of his vehicle, contending that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to support the stop. The trial court denied the motion. A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant of DUI, third offense and of violating the seat belt statute. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trooper could not have seen that the Defendant was not wearing his seat belt and, thus, lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Robert Christensen, Jr.
James Robert Christensen, Jr., (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of resisting arrest, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Prior to trial, the Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained through what he claimed was an illegal search. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion and also denied the Defendant’s motion seeking an interlocutory appeal. On direct appeal following trial, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments, including the trial court’s ruling on the suppression issue. We granted the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to address the legality of the police officers’ warrantless entry onto the curtilage of the Defendant’s residence. We hold that the officers’ entry onto the Defendant’s property was constitutionally permissible in spite of the posted “No Trespassing” signs near the Defendant’s unobstructed driveway. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Robert Christensen, Jr.
The maxim, “every man’s house is his castle,” is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). It applies whether the house is a castle or a cottage—a mansion or a mobile home. The right to retreat into the privacy of one’s home and be free from governmental intrusion is a basic tenet of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Our homes and adjoining land are protected spaces; governmental officers must have a warrant, absent special circumstances, to intrude onto this private area. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. John Talley
Defendant, John Talley, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that relief was not available because his illegal sentence had expired. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cordell L. Butler v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cordell L. Butler, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of conspiracy to sell over fifty grams of hydromorphone and possession of over fifty grams of hydromorphone. The Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Murphy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Murphy, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and two counts of incest and resulting effective sentence of forty-eight years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations because due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tory Hardison
The Appellant, Tory Hardison, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, the possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the possession of alprazolam with the intent to sell. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Appellant received a total effective sentence of twenty years, which was suspended to community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s community corrections sentences for failure to comply with the terms of release and ordered the Appellant to serve his original sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his judgments of conviction are illegal and cannot be revoked. In the alternative, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentences and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Upon review, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wendall Curtis Doree
The Appellant, Wendall Curtis Doree, was convicted by a Perry County Circuit Court Jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, unlawful employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense, theft over $1,000, and facilitation of vandalism over $1,000. The trial court merged the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery conviction and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-two years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, contending that in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), the State failed to adduce sufficient proof that the confinement of the victim was not incidental to the aggravated robbery and was sufficient, standing alone, to sustain his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demond Hughes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demond Hughes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated rape and his effective twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Sample
The defendant, Edward Sample, was convicted of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and evading arrest. He was sentenced, respectively, to eleven months and twenty-nine days, twelve years, six years, six years, two years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court found him to be a dangerous offender and ordered that all sentences be served consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of twentyseven years, eleven months and twenty-eight days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a recording of his jailhouse phone call, by charging the jury regarding his admission against interest, and by enhancing his sentences and ordering that they be served consecutively. Additionally, he argues that double jeopardy results from his convictions for attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during its commission and that the State’s closing argument was improper. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demetrius Armstrong v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Demetrius Armstrong, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief by the Gibson County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
L. B. Rittenberry, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, L.B. Rittenberry, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder despite his claim of self-defense. He appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate the victim’s prior history of violence. We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Kizer v. State of Tennessee
In 2009, the Petitioner, Robert Kizer, pleaded guilty to sale of cocaine and was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration, with all but ninety days to be served on Community Corrections. In 2010, a Community Corrections violation warrant was issued, prompting the Petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief alleging that his sentence was incorrect and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2012, a second violation warrant was issued, and, in 2013, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s Community Corrections sentence and dismissed his post-conviction petition. Later in 2013, the Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held a hearing in 2015 following which it denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea hearing because his attorney lacked “legal authority” to represent him and because his attorney had a conflict of interest. After review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle
We granted the State’s appeal primarily to determine whether the intermediate appellate court erred in finding the search warrant affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause, and in doing so, to revisit the continuing vitality of State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989). In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). For the reasons explained herein, we overrule Jacumin and adopt the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Applying this standard, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision holding the search warrant invalid. We also reverse the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to possess over 300 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and conspiracy to commit money laundering and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. Finally, we affirm, on separate grounds, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s judgment ordering forfeiture of the $1,098,050 cash seized when the search warrant was executed. |
Maury | Supreme Court |