State of Tennessee v. James Allen Ballew
In this second appeal of the amount of restitution ordered in a Class E felony theft case, the defendant, James Allen Ballew, appeals the $36,473.00 at the rate of $50 per month that the trial court ordered he pay to the victim lumber company, arguing that the amount is unreasonable given the evidence of the victim’s losses presented at the second restitution hearing, the two-year length of his sentence, and his financial resources and future ability to pay. The State concedes that the trial court erred by imposing an amount of restitution that the defendant could not reasonably be expected to pay and by ordering a payment schedule that exceeds the length of the sentence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to restitution and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James R. Goan et al. v. Billy B. Mills
Plaintiff James R. Goan’s mail delivery vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Billy B. Mills as Plaintiff was delivering mail. The Plaintiff and his wife, Judy Goan, sued Mills. During settlement negotiations, Plaintiffs offered to settle for $100,000, the limits of Defendant’s insurance policy. Defendant accepted the offer on December 4, 2013. Over a year later, Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that there had been no meeting of the minds and no enforceable agreement. The trial court enforced the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Mrs. Bobby Patterson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant appeals the dismissal of a complaint filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission. Because the record does not support the Claims Commission’s grounds for dismissing the case, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Lukis B.
The father appeals the circuit court’s adjudication that his child is dependent and neglected due to the father’s mental illness and paranoid behavior, which make the father unfit to properly care for his child. The father contends the circuit court erred in determining that, at the time of trial, his child was dependent and neglected. Finding the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the circuit court’s ruling, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony J. Bookout, Sr.
In April 2016, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Anthony J. Bookout, Sr., on charges of driving under the influence (DUI), driving while his alcohol concentration was .08% or more (DUI per se), DUI second offense, leaving the scene of an accident, and evading arrest. Following a trial, a jury convicted the Defendant of DUI, DUI per se, DUI second offense, and leaving the scene of an accident involving injuries, for which the Defendant received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation following the service of ninety days in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Prewitt
In September 2009, Larry Prewitt (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary and was sentenced to three years in the workhouse with release eligibility after service of thirty percent of the sentence. On May 18, 2016, the Petitioner filed a “Motion to Challenge the Criminal Court Jurisdiction,” arguing that the judgments were void, his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the indictments were fatally defective, which the trial court denied. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Cauthern v. State of Tennessee
Ronald Cauthern (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Gibson County Circuit Court, alleging that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition after concluding that the petition was untimely. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of coram nobis relief. Upon review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s determination that the Petitioner’s claim regarding an unedited videotape is time-barred. However, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court as to the Petitioner’s claim regarding lab bench notes and remand for the coram nobis court to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling on this claim. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie Lamont Harshaw v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ronnie Lamont Harshaw, pled guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies; three counts of aggravated assault, Class B felonies; reckless endangerment by firing into an occupied habitation, a Class C felony; two counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, Class D felonies; and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. He received an effective sentence of thirty-six years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner also argues that the criminal gang enhancement statute, which was applied to increase his aggravated assault convictions from Class C felonies to Class B felonies, is unconstitutional. Upon review, we conclude that pursuant to State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), the criminal gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional; therefore, we must reverse the judgments for the aggravated assault convictions in counts three, four, and five in case number 100379; vacate the criminal gang enhancements in those convictions; and remand for entry of judgments reflecting that each aggravated assault conviction is a Class C felony with a sentence of fifteen years. The Petitioner's total effective sentence remains the same. The judgments of conviction are affirmed in all other respects. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ryan James Howard v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ryan James Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings leading to his convictions for one count of second degree murder and one count of voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clyde Hobbs
The Defendant, Clyde Hobbs, appeals as of right from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and order of confinement for eight years. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the Defendant had violated specialized conditions of his probation. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking the Defendant’s probation without considering possible alternatives. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Hailey O., et al.
The father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit them within the four month period preceding his incarceration and by engaging in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Hudson
John Hudson (“the Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting that he was entitled to relief because the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it revoked the Defendant’s probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Spencer Peterson
Spencer Peterson (“the Defendant”) appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reginald Dion Hughes v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
The petition for writ of certiorari of Reginald Dion Hughes (“petitioner”) to the chancery court from the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole‟s denial of parole was dismissed pursuant Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 following the discovery that petitioner still owed $258.58 from prior cases. Petitioner appealed the chancery court's decision, but the Court of Appeals also dismissed the appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812. Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. Prob. and Parole, No. M2015-00722-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 1, 2015) (order dismissing appeal), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2016). Petitioner then requested permission to appeal to this court, alleging that section 41-21-812 was unconstitutional. We granted petitioner‟s request to review this case and to determine “[w]hether Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812(a) is constitutional as applied to this case.” After reviewing the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss petitioner's appeal. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Reginald Dion Hughes v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (Dissent)
The Court bars Mr. Hughes’s access to the courthouse based on its interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-801 to -818, an act that adopted procedures and penalties for prison inmates who file frivolous or malicious lawsuits. As noted by the Court, the purpose of this act was to “offset the tide of frivolous inmate litigation filtering through the court system.” Under this act, a trial court may dismiss an inmate’s claim upon a finding that the claim is frivolous or malicious or if the inmate has previously filed three or more claims found to be frivolous or malicious. The specific section at issue is section 41-21-812(a), which provides that “on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.” Id. (emphasis added). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Reginald Dion Hughes v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (Dissent)
We granted permission to appeal believing this case presented us with an opportunity to address the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 (2014)—an issue that merits our attention given a 2014 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding the statute unconstitutional as applied in certain circumstances. See Clifton v. Carpenter, 775 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding the statute unconstitutional when applied to bar a petitioner whose parole had been revoked from appealing the parole board’s decision because he owed $1,449.15 in court costs from prior cases). Having now reviewed the record on appeal and the relevant statutory provisions, I am convinced that the statute does not apply to authorize dismissal of Mr. Hughes’s appeal. As a result, I have concluded, like Justice Lee, that it is unnecessary to address the constitutionality of this statute in this appeal. See West v. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d 482, 493–94 (Tenn. 2015)(“[C]ourts decide constitutional issues only when necessary.”). Therefore, while I do not disagree with the majority’s discussion of the relevant constitutional principles or take issue with the outcome the majority reaches on the constitutionality of the statute, I am unable to join the majority decision affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal. Rather, I would hold that dismissing an inmate’s claim based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 is permissible only if the record establishes that the inmates’ outstanding court costs were assessed against the inmate “under this part,” meaning in a manner consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-808(b).Because the record on appeal fails to establish that costs of the divorce action were assessed against Mr. Hughes “under this part,” consistently with section 41-21-808(b), I would reverse the dismissal and remand to the trial court for consideration of Mr. Hughes’s petition for certiorari on the merits. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Associates Asset Management, LLC v. Angela Blackburn
This is a breach of contract case. After Appellant purchased a package of default loans, which contained Appellee’s second mortgage note, Appellant waited almost four years to file suit against Appellee for breach of contract. Appellee raised laches as an affirmative defense. The trial court held that gross laches applied to bar Appellant’s lawsuit. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in applying gross laches to bar Appellant’s claim in that Appellee’s injuries were only economic, and Appellee failed to pursue her claims for predatory lending, misrepresentation, and/or lender misconduct. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Patton Rogers, et al. v. Bradley Dean Hadju, et al.
Appellants filed this lawsuit against Appellees for damages resulting from the alleged negligence of Appellees’ subcontractor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, ruling that they could not be vicariously liable for the subcontractor’s negligence because the uncontroverted facts conclusively established that the subcontractor was an independent contractor. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ashton V.
This appeal arises from a juvenile court’s modification of a primary residential parent designation. The mother appeals the juvenile court’s findings that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that a change in the primary residential parent was in the child’s best interest. The mother also challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her Rule 60.01 motion. Upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in relying on a report that was not entered into evidence at the hearing, but the error was harmless. Even excluding the report, the evidence does not preponderate against the juvenile court’s findings that a material change in circumstance had occurred and that modification of the primary residential parent designation was in the child’s best interest. We further conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother’s Rule 60.01 motion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earl Vantrease
The Defendant, Earl Vantrease, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of aggravated robbery in 2003 and received a sixteen-year sentence as a Range II offender. Thirteen years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Wolfe
The Petitioner, Tony Wolfe, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition on the basis of newly discovered scientific mental health evidence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion without conducting a hearing on the merits. Because the Petitioner has no appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to reopen and did not follow the procedure required for seeking permission to appeal, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Crayton
The defendant, William Crayton, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Hall
The Appellant, Carl Hall, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelley Elizabeth Cannon v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Kelley Elizabeth Cannon, of first degree premeditated murder and a life sentence was imposed. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. State v. Kelley Elizabeth Cannon, No. M2010-01553-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5378088, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 30, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 9, 2013). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel, asserts that the post-conviction court erred by preventing her use of trial exhibits for a demonstration and challenges the validity of the search warrants in this case. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Williams
Defendant, Christopher Lee Williams, was convicted of reckless endangerment, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether dual convictions for aggravated kidnapping resulting in bodily injury and domestic assault based on bodily injury are proper, and (2) whether the trial court failed to consider a statutory mitigating factor in fashioning Defendant’s sentence. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |