State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Cole
Nicholas Cole (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to fifteen counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less and eighteen counts of burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to serve partially consecutive sentences, erred in sentencing him to continuous confinement, erred in denying probation, and erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon a thorough review of the record below and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the length of the Defendant’s sentences, the partial consecutive sentence alignment, and the denial of probation, but reverse the trial court’s order of continuous confinement for his convictions of “burglary of an auto,” a specifically enumerated non-violent property offense in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(c)(18). We remand for resentencing consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(a) and section 40-35-104(c). |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arturo Jaimes-Garcia v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Arturo Jaimes-Garcia, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 drug-related convictions and his effective eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lynn Brummitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Lynn Brummitt, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lishun Brewer
The Defendant, Joshua Lishun Brewer, entered a guilty plea to carjacking, a Class B felony, with an agreed-upon sentence of eight years and with the manner and method of service to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-404 (2014). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anita Marie Strickland
The Defendant, Anita Marie Strickland, pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). The sole issue presented for our review is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Vonner
The Defendant, Terry Vonner, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2014) (second degree murder), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1324 (2010) (amended 2012) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of fifty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not placing more weight on the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, to reflect 100% release eligibility. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Russell Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Richard Singleton v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy R. Singleton, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged the validity of his guilty plea to aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily because he did not understand the agreement due to his mental illness. Additionally, he claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history and using such information to arrange a better plea deal with the State. Finally, the Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress his confession. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. D&H Machine Service, Inc.
Aqua-Chem, Inc. contracted with D&H Machine Service, Inc. for D&H to machine three large, identical pieces of equipment. The piece of equipment is referred to in the record as a “cooler.”The work was not done properly, rendering them unusable. Aqua-Chem sued D&H for breach of contract, seeking damages for the replacement cost of the coolers and for lost profits. Aqua-Chem also sought attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the terms of its agreement with D&H. Following a two-day bench trial, the court awarded Aqua-Chem $191,870 in replacement costs, but declined to make an award for lost profits. The court did award Aqua-Chem $50,000 in attorney’s fees and out-of-pocket expenses. D&H appeals. Both sides raise issues. D&H argues that the trial court erred when it held that the terms and conditions of the purchase orders presented to D&H were applicable to the facts of this case. It also argues that the award of damages is not supported by the evidence. Aqua-Chem contends that the trial court erred in refusing to award damages for lost profits. It also asserts that the trial court should have awarded it the full amount of its fees and expenses, the total of which was $64,739.48. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Cright v. Tijuan Overly, M.D. et al.
Catherine Cright's husband passed away on August 4, 2008, due to complications arising from a stent placement procedure. Cright1 subsequently filed a medical malpractice action2 against Dr. Tijuan Overly, Knoxville Cardiovascular Group, P.C. (KCG), and University Health Systems, Inc. (UHS) (collectively the defendants). Cright nonsuited that action in April 2013 three days into trial. She later sent a notice letter to each of the defendants advising them of her intent to refile her action. She neglected to attach a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. Thereafter, Cright refiled her complaint against the defendants, all of whom filed a motion to dismiss because of her failure to comply with the HIPAA-compliant authorization requirement set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a) (Supp. 2009). The trial court granted the motions. Cright appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of James Kemmler Rogers
Appellant, as a purported creditor of Decedent, appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to open primary or ancillary probate of Decedent’s estate in Tennessee. Appellees, the Decedent’s surviving children, argued, inter alia, that Appellant lacked standing to pursue probate in Tennessee. The trial court did not address the standing issue before denying probate. We conclude that, in the absence of a ruling on standing, the trial court’s order is not final and appealable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a). As such, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Stephen C. Duggan, et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over the fair value of stock in a dissenting shareholders case. Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. (“Athlon”) completed a merger (“the Merger”) which converted the minority dissenting shareholders’ (“Defendants”) shares into cash consideration and terminated their rights as shareholders. Athlon offered cash consideration for the shares at $0.10 per share. Defendants contend that their shares are worth at least $6.48 per share. Athlon sued Defendants to determine judicially the fair value of these shares. This case was tried before the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, applying the Delaware Block Method for determination of share value, found that the share value was $0.10 per share as of the date of the Merger. Defendants appeal to this Court, arguing that (1) the Delaware Block Method is ill-suited for a business like Athlon attempting a new venture, and is antiquated, generally; and, (2) that the Trial Court erred in its application of the Delaware Block Method. We find and hold that, under Tennessee law, the Trial Court properly utilized the Delaware Block Method. We find and hold further that the Trial Court considered the competing expert testimony, accredited Athlon’s expert, and the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Geico General Insurance Co. v. G & S. Transportation, Inc.
This appeal arises from the circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Appellant Geico filed an action in general sessions court against Appellee G&S Transportation, seeking subrogation damages resulting from an automobile accident. The general sessions court entered a default judgment in favor of Geico. G&S appealed the case to circuit court. Three years later, G&S filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure of Geico to prosecute. Geico did not file a response and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Geico appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Classic City Mechanical, Inc. v. Potter South East, LLC, et al.
This case involves competing claims concerning a State construction project. The trial court awarded one of the subcontractors on the project compensatory damages, plus interest, based on the prime contractor's failure to remit payments for work that had been performed. On appeal, the prime contractor challenges the trial court's finding that it committed the first material breach of its contract with the subcontractor. The prime contractor also challenges the trial court's finding that it did not prove its claims for damages, which were predicated on an alleged delay created by the subcontractor and the subcontractor's cessation of performance. Although the subcontractor maintains that the trial court's findings regarding material breach should be left undisturbed, it appeals the trial court's specific award of interest, the dismissal of its fraudulent concealment claim, and the denial of its request for attorney's fees. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Athena of S.C., LLC et al. v. James F. Macri, Jr. et al.
The plaintiffs sued an attorney for legal malpractice related to the enforcement of two promissory notes. The plaintiffs purchased these notes, which were secured by property at a real estate development, from the two other defendants in this lawsuit. During the purchase of these notes, the sellers were represented by the defendant-attorney in this lawsuit. Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired the same attorney to help them collect the amounts due under the notes from the real estate developer. The attorney drafted a complaint and an agreed judgment for each of the promissory notes and filed these documents in the Circuit Court for Knox County. The circuit court entered the agreed judgments the same day they were filed. When the plaintiffs attempted to sell the property that secured the promissory notes, the real estate developer's former business partner filed a motion for an injunction in federal court. The federal district court issued two injunction orders, one in May 2012 and one in August 2012. Both orders were based on findings that the transaction by which the plaintiffs acquired the promissory notes was likely fraudulent. On January 6, 2014, the parties who sold the notes to plaintiffs filed an affidavit that, according to the plaintiffs, admitted that the sale of the notes to plaintiffs was fraudulent. On January 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed this action against their former attorney and the parties that sold them the promissory notes. The attorney filed a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), arguing that the plaintiffs' claim was time barred because it accrued in August 2012. The trial court granted this motion because it determined that the plaintiffs knew they had suffered an injury when the district court issued the second injunction order in August 2012. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Duncan
In this appeal, we consider the sufficiency of an indictment. The five-count indictment charged the defendant with several felonies and also with employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The count for the firearm charge recited the statute listing the offenses that can constitute a “dangerous felony” but did not designate one of the accompanying charges as the predicate dangerous felony. After a trial, a jury found the defendant guilty on all five counts. On appeal, the defendant argues that the indictment for the firearm charge must be dismissed because, by not designating the predicate felony for the firearm charge, it violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. We hold that, considering the entire five-count indictment, the count of the indictment charging the defendant with employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony sufficiently apprised the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and enabled him to adequately prepare a defense to the charge, and therefore is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on that issue. However, because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, we remand for a new trial on that charge. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Rhakim Martin
A jury convicted the defendant of carjacking and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sixteen-year sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In this Court, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him because the victim previously viewed his photograph on a county-operated “mug shot” website; (2) whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (3) whether the failure to name the predicate felony of the firearm offense voids that count of the indictment; (4) whether the defendant’s conviction for the firearm offense violates the prohibitions against double jeopardy and the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c); and (5) whether the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. We hold that the victim’s prior viewing of the defendant’s booking photograph on the county-operated website did not constitute state action and that the trial court therefore properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him. We further hold that the defendant failed to establish that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony affected a substantial right, so the defendant is not entitled to plain error relief. Based on our holding in State v. Duncan, No. W2013-02554-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL ____, at * _ (Tenn. ___ ___, 2016), released on the same date as this opinion, we conclude that the failure to name the predicate felony of the firearm offense does not void that count of the indictment. We hold that the defendant’s convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not violate either double jeopardy or Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Finally, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David Lynn Jordan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Lynn Jordan, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions of three counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident and his sentences of death. On appeal, the petitioner contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; (2) the venue of the trial in Madison County, Tennessee, violated his rights to a fair trial and due process; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by suppressing evidence; (4) the selection and impaneling of the grand jury was unconstitutional; (5) the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion to continue the evidentiary hearing; (6) the post-conviction court erred in allowing trial counsel to assist the State during the evidentiary hearing; (7) the post-conviction court erred in excluding an expert witness; (8) Tennessee's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional; (9) his death sentence is disproportionate; and (10) cumulative error warrants a new trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond B. Thomas
Raymond B. Thomas (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of felony failure to appear and was sentenced to two years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his request for an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonardo Williams
Leonardo Williams (“the Defendant”) appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant claims the trial court erred in revoking his probation on a three-year sentence because the sentence had expired. The trial court found the motion failed to state a colorable claim because the Defendant’s sentences imposed by the court were legal and proper. We affirm the summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LeAnn Barnes v. David Ellett Barnes
This appeal comes before us a second time. In the first appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the manner in which to divide the marital estate given the adjustments we made and the nature of the marital assets; we also vacated the trial court’s amended order modifying the original award of alimony and reinstated the original award. On remand, the court entered an order providing that the Wife’s interest in Husband’s 401K Plan would be increased in the amount of the adjustments ordered by this court, to be made pursuant to the Qualified Domestic Relations Order which was also entered by the court; the court awarded Wife a judgment for the difference in the alimony awarded in the original decree and that paid by Husband pursuant to the amended decree. In this appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s compliance with this court’s instructions. We find that the orders entered by the court comply with the instructions of this court as to the division of the marital estate; we modify the order relating to the award of alimony to specifically state the amount and type of alimony awarded. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Joe Russell, Jr., AKA Joe Billy Russell, Jr., AKA Craig C. Scott v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Billy Joe Russell, Jr., a.k.a. Joe Billy Russell, Jr., a.k.a. Craig C. Scott, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for relief. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his petition is timely because it falls within one year of certain federal opinions which establish a constitutional right requiring retroactive application. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Laurie Lynn Welch and Roland John Welch
Defendants, Laurie Lynn Welch (“Mrs. Welch) and Roland John Welch (Mr. Welch”), were convicted of promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing, initiation of methamphetamine manufacture process, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Mrs. Welch was sentenced to four years for the promotion charge, eight years for the initiation charge, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently for an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. Mr. Welch was sentenced to eight years for the promotion charge, eighteen years for the initiation charge, and eleven-months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently for an effective eighteen-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, both Defendants argue that: (1) the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not contain probable cause; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a warrantless search and seizure; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support both Defendants’ convictions for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and initiation of methamphetamine manufacturing process and Mr. Welch’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia; and (4) Mr. Welch’s sentence was excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martin Dean Gibbs v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Martin Dean Gibbs, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for multiple counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age and rape of a child more than three years of age but less than thirteen years of age. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504; -522. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to provide appropriate accommodations for the Petitioner’s hearing difficulties during his trial. The Petitioner claims that, because of this failure, he was unable to meaningfully participate in his own defense at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brannon Harrison Shockley
The Defendant, Brannon Harrison Shockley, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with an agreed sentence of four years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2014) (amended 2015) (aggravated assault by strangulation). The court denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |